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2Abstract
In this thesis a theory of cultural justice is developed from Hayekian premises. Importantly, and 
despite the virtual disappearance of the centralised economic institutions that Hayek was always keen 
to reject, it claims that it is possible to reconnect his thought to contemporary political theory and to 
both critically and normatively contribute to debates about multicultural justice. For what is most 
interesting about Hayek today are not the reasons why he defended liberalism but rather the conceptual 
tools that he deployed in doing so. It is these conceptual tools that can e shown to have a relevance to 
contemporary concerns with cultural diversity that is methodologically, critically and normatively both 
clear and compelling.
Part One of this thesis discusses Hayek’s place in contemporary political theory. In Chapter 
One it is claimed that an interpretative reading of Hayek’s social theory and of the conception of the 
self that underlies it not only clarifies his well-known economic arguments, but also enables us to 
appeal to his thought with respect to culture. Chapter Two builds upon this to address Hayek’s 
normative argument for individual cultural liberty. Part Two is concerned to examine, from this 
Hayekian, the response to diversity of a range of theorists. In Chapter Three, the response of the 
difference democrats who endorse a group-differentiated account of deliberative democratic decision­
making is assessed and, in Chapter Four, that of liberal egalitarian theory that both attempts and in a 
significant sense rejects the reconciliation of cultural difference with the institutions of the welfare 
state. Finally, Part Three is concerned with the account of cultural justice emergent from these 
discussions. Thus Chapter Five concerns itself with the articulation of the Discursive Minimal State 
and, in Chapter Six, with its defence against some important objections.
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5Introduction
7. Hayek, Postsocialism and Multiculturalism
This thesis sets out to answer three questions that all relate to the contemporary status of 
Hayekian political theory. The first of these centres upon the programmatic issue of whether 
the thought of Hayek in any sense can be said to be relevant to contemporary debates about 
justice in culturally diverse societies. That is, can Hayekian political theory resonate in any 
telling way with discourses pertaining to the economic, cultural and legal positioning of the 
diverse members of contemporary societies? Second, if it is relevant, how adequate is its 
response to the challenge that diversity presents? More specifically, can Hayekian political 
theory serve as the basis for a critical and normative engagement with cultural diversity? 
Thirdly, and related to this, what, if anything, makes that critical and normative response 
preferable to other possible responses and the theories of justice they lend theoretical support 
to?
Answering these questions, of course, presupposes knowledge of just what the 
challenge of cultural diversity is and what it amounts to. A cursory look at recent historical 
events can help to make this clear. In the last ten years, the theory of justice has witnessed the 
emergence of the multicultural perspective as the principal rival to liberalism. In Culture and 
Equality Brian Barry has claimed that this development can be traced to the demise of 
communism in the late 1980’s and the political vacuum created by its departing.1 Similarly, 
John Dryzek locates the rise of multicultural or difference politics in the post-Communist 
crisis of the left.2 In the countries where central planning failed - a failure for which, we may 
note, Hayek’s work offers at least one powerful explanation - there has arisen the often-ugly 
politics of ethnic nationalism. By contrast, in the West this ‘postsocialist’ age has witnessed a 
less extreme form of this trend in the emergence of multiculturalism, or the politics of 
recognition. This emergence, as Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young have 
all pointed out, has often taken inspiration from what have come to be called the New Social 
Movements of the left that arose in the 1970’s in defence of the claims of, among others, 
women, gays and ethnic and national minorities.3 As such, multiculturalism should be 
construed in broad terms that comprehend but are not exhausted by specifically cultural 
claims.
1 Barry, B., Culture and Equality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 3-5.
2 On this see Dryzek, J., Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 57.
3 Benhabib, S., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 14; Fraser, N., ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of 
Justice in a “Postsocialist” Age’ in Fraser, N., Justice Interruptus: Critical reflections on the 
"Postsocialist” Condition, New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 11-39.
6In academia, the increasing importance of cultural and social diversity to politics has 
been reflected in the attention devoted to issues of cultural difference and plurality in the 
theory of justice. Indeed, its significance can be seen in the fact that many, if not most, 
theorists accept as a starting point for discussion of such issues what John Rawls called ‘the 
fact of pluralism.’4 That is, the fact that liberal democratic societies are and always stand to 
be marked by a diversity of conceptions of the good, each competing for the attention of the 
body politic and the benefits and burdens it confers.
The rise of multiculturalism, however, poses an important problem for a political 
theorist such as Hayek and for those whose work is implicitly or explicitly influenced by his 
thought. Most obvious here is the fact that Hayek is primarily considered as a contributor to 
debates concerning just distribution that now appear historically distant from and theoretically 
tangential to the contemporary theory of justice. John Gray, for instance, has argued that 
Hayek contributed in the main to debates concerning economic methodology, the possibility 
of centralised economic planning and for a post-war critique of social or distributive justice. 
The problem with this is that there is little scope for a significant Hayekian contribution to 
contemporary political philosophy precisely because it finds itself in a ‘postsocialist’ age 
preoccupied with notions of culture, community and difference or, if  not with these, with the 
more economic specific task of defining which kind of post-socialist liberal market regime is 
preferable.5 It is right, then, to consider Hayek as not only working from within what Iris 
Marion Young has called the ‘distributive paradigm’ but to be one of its archetypal 
representatives.6 Hayek’s perspective may have something of interest to say about economic 
management in Soviet Russia, or the distributive implications of Rawls’s Difference 
Principle, but must remain silent, upon pain of irrelevance, with respect to issues such as 
female circumcision, same-sex adoption or the differential positioning of members of 
minority groups. What is perhaps ironic about all of this, as Gray has made clear, is that by 
deploying such incisive arguments against centralised economic planning that simultaneously 
offer powerful explanations for recent historical events, Hayek has not only become one of 
the principal victims of those arguments’ persuasiveness but has actually helped to make way 
for a contemporary concern with culture about which he has little, if anything, to say. This 
we may call Gray’s ‘marginality thesis’ concerning the contemporary status of Hayekian 
political theory. It is a thesis to which we will return during the course of this enquiry.
4 Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. xviii-ixx.
5 Gray, J., ‘Postscript’, in Hayek on Liberty, London, Routledge, 1998. On Hayek’s contributions to 
these distributive debates, see Hayek, F. A. (ed.) Collectivist Economic Planning, London, George 
Routledge and Sons, 1935; The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944; 
Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948; The Mirage o f  Social 
Justice, in Hayek, F. A., Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, London, Routledge, 1982.
6 Young, I. M., Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, 
Chapter 1, esp. pp. 15-19.
7How, then, may one go about responding to this potentially fatal state of affairs? In 
the first instance, we may question the theoretical importance of culture itself upon which 
critical and normative discourses pertaining to multiculturalism and diversity are founded. 
Such a response, of course, would not be a new one for it is one of Barry’s central claims in 
Culture and Equality that multicultural political theory, in all its hues, is but a distraction 
from other, more important concerns, more specifically from his perspective, distributive 
inequalities.7 Similarly, in his various writings on the subject, Chandran Kukathas largely 
rejects the political importance of culture that is presupposed by multicultural theory. 
Although in sharp contrast to Barry, he does not go on to claim that politics should be in the 
main concerned with distributive inequality and inequality of opportunity but rather that 
politics should be concerned with much less than is often thought.8
Defending the distributive paradigm by rejecting the importance of culture, then, 
would by default be one way to reconnect Hayek’s thought to contemporary concerns, for it 
would swiftly enable us to participate anew in debates about distributive justice that have so 
marked the post-war theory of justice. Yet, it seems that such a strategy may be as potentially 
ill advised, as it is unhelpful. Ill-advised because, superficially at least, one may end up 
ignoring a plethora of concerns - ranging from what one and others may do to one’s body, to 
the legal status of particular sectors of the community - which probably should not be 
ignored.9 Beyond this, moreover, it seems that attempting such a response may merely be to 
participate in an unhelpfully reductive discourse about the relative conceptual priority of the 
distributive and the cultural as the ultimate focus of the theory of justice. Establishing 
whether, for instance, economic inequality ultimately motivates unequal cultural outcomes, or 
that it is inequality of cultural or social status that motivates income inequality may prove to 
be an irresolvable and ultimately futile project.
Another way for a postsocialist Hayekian to respond to the challenge o f cultural 
diversity involves shifting the focus from debate about the competing claims to theoretical 
priority of the distributive and the cultural to the altogether different question of the normative 
significance of diversity itself. As was briefly mentioned earlier, it is usual for theorists 
concerned with diversity to work from the fact of pluralism and then proceed to outline and 
defend theories of justice that adequately respond to it. Yet, there is an important sense in 
which such a starting point may be an inadequate one. Framing contemporary normative 
discourse in terms of the adequacy or otherwise of a particular tradition of political theory to 
come to terms with cultural plurality may well be politically contentious, if  not inflammatory,
7 Barry, Culture and Equality. For a critical appraisal of this book, see Kelly, P. J. (ed.), 
Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its critics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002
8 On this, see Kukathas, C., ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, Political Theory, vol. 20, no. 1 (1992), 
pp. 105 - 139.
9 This is not to say, of course, that either Barry or Kukathas are guilty of this.
8to some. Why after all, should diversity be publicly recognised and why, therefore, should 
normative political theory seek to come to terms with it? For many, to recognise diversity as 
of political significance may well be to do their own culture a disservice, or even to 
undermine that culture’s public authority. Yet, such a complaint would be misconceived, for 
the question of the recognition of cultural diversity by political theorists is raised at an 
entirely different level of discussion. One may embark upon a research project, a la Barry or 
Kukathas for example, acknowledging the relevance of cultural diversity to the discipline and 
conclude that it is largely irrelevant insofar as politics and the justification of political 
institutions are concerned. (One may, of course, reach just the opposite conclusion.) 
Nevertheless, the very acceptance of diversity should itself be an important question for 
normative political theory. Indeed, that it is not probably says more about the deficiencies of 
the discipline than it does about the cogency of any anti-multicultural arguments that may be 
forthcoming.
The questioning of the desirability of cultural diversity itself, o f course, gives rise to 
an entirely different debate. Here the principal task of normative theory is not to uncover 
institutions of justice that accommodate diversity perse  but, rather, to balance the apparently 
irreconcilable claims of those who insist that cultural diversity should be recognised as 
publicly significant and those who insist that it should not. This we may call the challenge to 
critical and normative political theory of ‘hyper-diversity.’ It is a challenge that takes the 
notion of diversity ‘all the way up’ to acknowledge those who argue - in increasingly large 
and politically significant numbers, it may be added - not against the public significance of 
culture but, rather, against the public significance of cultural diversity by demanding the 
public recognition and preservation of their, usually majority, culture. Is there a theory that 
can accommodate the apparently irreconcilable claims of both diversity and hyper-diversity? 
A significant part of this thesis and in response to our second and third questions concerning 
the adequacy and attractiveness of Hayekian political theory will be to claim that, to its 
comparative critical and normative benefit, such a theory is capable of doing just this. 
Crucially, however, achieving these aims presupposes a positive answer to our first 
programmatic question concerning the possibility of a Hayekian account of cultural justice. 
To offer such an answer, moreover, is crucially dependent upon the success of reading 
Hayek’s corpus in a new way.
2. Hayek and Interpretative Liberalism
In his study, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, Roland Kley distinguishes Hayek from 
other recent Anglo-American political philosophers in two fundamental respects. Firstly, 
theorists such as Rawls, Dworkin, Raz and Gauthier, ‘seek primarily to work out the 
foundations of liberal political morality and to justify on moral grounds what they regard as
9liberalism’s overriding concerns.’10 Unlike Hayek, such theorists do not consider political 
disagreement to be ‘merely about the institutional means to universally shared ends but in the 
very ends and values themselves to which legitimate government must be committed.’11 
Secondly, for Kley and in contrast to Chandran Kukathas’s argument in Hayek and Modem  
Liberalism, Hayek was in any case not concerned with moral argument at all when he sought 
to justify liberal institutions.12 This, of course, marks him off very sharply from the 
mainstream for which, at least since Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice, ‘moral justification has 
quickly become the dominant paradigm of what political philosophy is all about.’13 If true, 
however, this has very serious implications for the status of Hayekian political theory and 
leads us back to Gray’s marginality thesis. For the amoral nature of Hayek’s research 
programme means that despite the historical significance of the distributive arguments he did 
make, his political theory is necessarily an incomplete one because it lacks the very moral 
argumentation needed to properly define the individual liberty and markets he defends or 
adequately engage with issues of identity, culture and difference.14 Not only may it be 
claimed, then, that Hayekian political theory has been rendered largely tangential to 
contemporary concerns by the historical confirmation of some o f its core insights. One may 
also add that it does not in any case possess the requisite philosophical resources to 
rehabilitate itself with respect to those mainstream ‘postsocialist’ research programmes that 
have arisen since the collapse of communism. In the present context, then, the veracity of the 
claim that Hayek’s is an amoral, instrumental project means that the prospects for Hayekian 
account of cultural justice appear decidedly gloomy to say the least. Hayek’s irrelevance is 
not only historical in character, it is an irredeemably philosophical irrelevance.
Two comments are apposite here, both of which are central to the concerns of this 
thesis. In opposition to Kley, I will show that Hayek’s is not an instrumentalist political 
theory that is concerned with the most appropriate institutional means to the fulfilment of 
universally shared ends but, rather, is better understood as being concerned with justifying 
specifically liberal individualist institutions of justice that enable society to discover on a 
rational basis which ends to pursue. That is, for Hayek individual freedom is not to be valued 
because it and it alone is capable of serving as the foundation of liberal political morality, nor,
10 Kley, R., Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 12.
11 ibid. See also Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (2nd ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp. 175-78.
12 Kukathas, C., Hayek and Modern Liberalism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989.
13 Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, p. 11. Rawls, J., A Theory o f  Justice, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1971. Kley here cites the work of Nicolas Rescher as another “instrumentalist” 
political theorist.
14 Gray, ‘Postscript’, Hayek on Liberty, passim.
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therefore, because it is the supreme ethical value, but rather on epistemological grounds 
because it ‘is the source and condition of most values.’15
Moreover, the arguments Hayek does deploy in support o f this can also be appealed 
to with respect to Kley and Gray’s other concern with Hayek’s apparent inability to offer an 
account of the proper definition of markets and the domain of individual liberty that the 
importance of freedom is supposed to ground. For not only does Hayek’s defence of 
individual liberty offer society a means of rationally discovering ends, it also enables us to 
answer questions concerning how the diverse and mutually ignorant members of the polity 
ought to respond in the course of their daily lives to the demands placed upon them by the 
ends that they pursue. That is, not only does Hayek defend institutions that enable us to 
discover the ends which we should pursue but also to discover the most appropriate means of 
pursuing them. For Hayek, we need liberal individualist institutions not only to discover 
what, for instance, autonomy, or tolerance, or the doctrinal demands of a particular religion 
requires of ourselves and of others, but also for discovering how material equality is best 
pursued, or for discovering the extent to which we may own property. From this starting 
point, then, I will defend a cultural as well as an economic reading of Hayek as being 
concerned with justifying an institutional framework for debates on important questions 
pertaining to distribution as well as cultural diversity, including the question of whether 
diversity itself ought to be respected and, if so, to what extent and how.
What features of Hayek’s thought facilitate the articulation of such a liberal account 
of economic and cultural justice? The clue is to be found in our discussion of the relative 
importance and particular demands of the diverse values to be found in society and the 
relationship this issue has to the notion of interpretative dispute. The notion of interpretation, 
of course, plays an important part in many contemporary debates about justice and this has 
been discussed at length by Georgia Wamke with reference to the work of Charles Taylor, 
Michael Walzer, Ronald Dworkin and the post-/f Theory o f Justice work of Rawls in her 
discussion of the idea of an ‘interpretative turn’ in recent political theory.16 Of these, the 
work of Taylor in particular is of special interest here in two important respects that relate to 
our concern to rehabilitate Hayekian political theory. In the first instance, we will see how 
Taylor works up a normative theory of justice that seeks to directly address the question of 
cultural diversity. Secondly, and similarly to Hayek, Taylor is also concerned to achieve this 
via a prior account of interpretative social science and the thoroughly embedded, or 
‘communitarian’ conception of the self that it presupposes.
Of course, despite this important similarity and to the extent that he can be said to be 
an interpretative theorist, what one certainly cannot say of Hayek is that he was ever
15 Hayek, F. A., The Constitution o f  Liberty, London, Routledge, 1960, p. 6.
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concerned in any significant way with interpretative diversity and dispute, least of all with 
respect to issues of culture and difference. However, where Hayek is unique is in his 
emphasis that at the root of such dispute is not the fact of the plurality o f opinion arising from 
our membership of diverse cultural traditions, but the normative implications of the 
epistemological burdens that such membership places upon us. That is, in contrast to 
contemporary multicultural theorists of diversity such as Taylor who stress the importance of 
the fact o f differentiated cultural membership to the articulation and defence of public 
institutions, for Hayek what is of singular significance is not cultural membership, social 
embeddedness or the fact of pluralism per se. Rather, it is the insight that regardless of which 
group or groups one happens to identify with, along with the fact o f cultural membership 
comes the fact that much of the knowledge necessary for rational social decision-making is, 
qua cultural and hence tradition-bound knowledge, of a tacit and inarticulable nature. As 
such, it imposes sharp limits upon what can be achieved via the exploitation of conscious 
reason and discourse. Emergent from this, of course, is Hayek’s unique normative claim that 
such knowledge is resistant to the kind of conscious articulation that is the prerequisite of 
efficacious political decision-making usually defended by theorists concerned with diversity. 
What makes Hayek particularly interesting, then, is that in contrast to Taylor and other 
multiculturalists who defend the politics of recognition as the institutional conclusion of a 
concern with identity and cultural embeddedness, Hayek derives strongly liberal individualist 
normative conclusions from very similar premises.17
Hayek’s thesis concerning the normative implications of the fact of our 
embeddedness, of course, can be traced back to the earlier part of his career as an economist. 
As Kukathas explains, Hayek’s argument for liberal individualist economic institutions arises 
more specifically from his extension of subjectivism beyond the calculational concerns of von 
Mises where he claimed that economists favouring command-economies incorrectly assumed 
that it was theoretically possible for all the knowledge in society to be given to a single 
(commanding) mind.18 From this assumption it was but one step to envisaging the problem of 
achieving a ‘rational economic order’19 - one that could guarantee social justice, for example - 
as merely one of making use of that knowledge so as to achieve the desired politically-
16 Wamke, G., Justice and Interpretation, Cambridge, Ma., MIT Press, 1993.
17 Of course, this argument is equally applicable to other theorists of a communitarian disposition such 
as MacIntyre and Walzer who, whilst not defending multicultural politics, derive in contrast to Hayek 
communitarian conclusions form communitarian premises.
18 Mises, L. v.-, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, Indianapolis, Liberty Classics, 
(1922) 1981; ‘Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth’, in Hayek, F. A. (ed.), 
Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibility o f  Socialism, London, George 
Routledge and Sons, 1935, pp. 87 - 130.
19 Hayek, F. A., ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ (1945), Individualism and Economic Order, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 77.
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determined outcome. According to Hayek, however, this assumption, betrayed a profound 
misconception of the economic problem that society faces:
... The economic problem of society is ... not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” 
resources - if “given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the 
problem set by these “data”. It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources 
known to any o f the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these 
individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem o f  the utilization o f  knowledge which is 
not given to anyone in its totality?0
Yet, it is not clear at this point in his intellectual development why knowledge is evasive, nor 
why it needs to be utilised in the way Hayek suggests. It is here, however, where our 
interpretative reading of Hayek makes its first significant contribution for the claim about the 
evasiveness of knowledge only gains substance when Hayek’s more explicitly interpretative 
texts on the methodology of the human sciences from the 1940s are considered. What these 
texts make clear are the reasons why Hayek thinks that mainstream economic theory has lost 
its way and how its task should be properly conceived of. This, of course, is intimately tied to 
his discussion of subjectivism that is the central concern of the papers on the human sciences.
Moreover, and with respect to the second major contribution of the interpretative 
reading, what these texts reveal is not only an account of ‘good’ social or human science - of 
which economics is one branch - but also an account of the interpreting se lf that is only ever 
implicit in the earlier economic texts. This is an account that presents the self as an embedded 
interpreter of the social world that presupposes not only those cultural traditions in virtue of 
which the world is meaningful but, more importantly for Hayek’s wider purposes, of the 
epistemological burdens upon the se lf s reason that membership of a culture inescapably 
imposes. What is of singular importance here is that with an explicit account o f the Hayekian 
self - rather than a few, albeit powerful, arguments about sound economic theory and policy - 
we may bridge the gap between distribution and culture in distinctively Hayekian terms. That 
is, we may elaborate more fully Chandran Kukathas’s claim that, for Hayek, ‘it is the 
epistemological rather than the calculational problem which characterizes not simply the 
production process but the human condition generally?21 Again, however, it is only if 
Hayek’s assumptions concerning the self are made clear that is it possible to transform his 
arguments for individual liberty as a co-ordinating device of tacit knowledge of economic 
resource needs and scarcities to arguments about the co-ordination of non-economic or 
cultural knowledge and the relative status of diverse cultural groups.
20 ibid., pp. 77-78, emphasis added.
21 Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, p. 101, emphasis added.
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Indeed, and returning to the apparently irresolvable issue of the theoretical primacy of 
the distributive and the cultural, what makes an interpretative reading o f Hayek particularly 
compelling here is that it not only allows his perspective to bridge the distributive-cultural 
divide that has opened up in recent normative political theory, but that it renders the divide 
largely otiose. The reason for this again takes us back to the emphasis Hayek places upon 
tacit knowledge. For to be free to dispose of one’s property as one sees fit - that is, to enjoy 
distributive freedom - just is, for the Hayekian, to be free to make use of one’s own and, 
crucially, others ’ local and often culturally-differentiated tacit knowledge so that answers to 
pressing questions of economic and cultural concern may be discovered. Of course, this does 
not mean that a proper definition of property rights would exhaust all that needs to be said 
about cultural justice. There are many issues - most obviously concerning who is to enjoy 
property rights including rights over one’s body, as well as non-economic civil and political 
rights and issues concerning freedom of speech and expression - that are the fitting subjects of 
cultural, rather than distributive public discourse. Any complete, let alone adequate, account 
of Hayekian cultural justice, then, must also provide principled answers to such questions. It 
is for this reason, moreover, that this thesis should not be taken as a thesis on Hayek. It is, 
importantly, a thesis about the public management of difference that arises from and expands 
upon Hayekian thought.
3. The Uses o f  a Hayekian Approach to Cultural Justice
Given that offering an interpretative reading of Hayek’s corpus is one way of connecting 
Hayekian political theory to contemporary concerns, how adequate is it? That is, to what uses 
may one put the interpretative variant of Hayekian political theory with regard to cultural 
diversity? I think that there are two such uses: one critical, the other normative. As we have 
seen, Hayek is famous for claiming that many economists and those in positions of political 
power who follow their lead incorrectly assume that it is in principal possible that all the 
knowledge in society necessary for the successful management of the economy could be 
given to a single (commanding) mind. Likewise, and building upon the development of a 
cultural variant of this argument, one of the principal claims of this thesis will be that many 
contemporary exponents of multicultural or difference-based justice base their defence of 
public institutions on an erroneous assumption that knowledge of the cultural, social and 
economic needs of the diverse members of society is unproblematically given. Related in a 
more fundamental way to this misrecognition of our epistemological predicament qua 
culturally embedded beings, and with respect to the problem of hyper-diversity, it will also be 
claimed that in an important sense much difference-based political theory fundamentally 
misconceives the very task of cultural justice. This is clear in its attempt to secure in advance 
a particular vision o f the status of different cultural groupings and the diverse traditions,
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rituals and practices that are said to be constitutive of their identities. That is, rather than 
offer an account of justice that facilitates the discovery of what the relative status of the 
diverse members of society should be, difference politics assumes that this issue has already 
been resolved.
Of course, it is not only the multiculturalists who it shall be claimed misconceive the 
task of justice in this way. Recent liberal egalitarian political theory is a particularly 
interesting case in point here because some of its defenders work from the assumption of the 
importance of culture and cultural difference whilst others do not. Will Kymlicka and Joseph 
Raz, for instance, both attempt to reconcile the claims of cultural difference with those 
concerning economic emancipation and participation whilst, as we have seen, Barry is 
sceptical of this enterprise. Nevertheless, an error similar to that of the difference democrats 
can be seen with regard to the evaluation of economic and cultural outcomes by theorists such 
as Kymlicka and Raz under liberal institutions as zWerproviding or insufficiently recognising 
the needs and preferences of disadvantaged groups. Our interpretative variant of Hayek’s 
political theory, however, illuminates this type of criticism as itself highly problematic 
because it lacks a coherently derived standard of cultural optimality in virtue of which it can 
appraise these outcomes. The problem here, of course, is that claiming that good x is 
underprovided or that group y  is insufficiently recognised as a pretext for invoking the state to 
enter the fray and provide the good or bestow appropriate recognition presupposes knowledge 
of what the relevant optimal level of provision or recognition should be. Moreover, despite 
the concerns he has with the ‘culturalism’ of theorists such as Kymlicka (concerns, we may 
add, that lead him to deny that Kymlicka even is a liberal), an important claim of this thesis 
will be that Barry too ultimately assumes a particular stance to culture, and hence to cultural 
diversity that begs the question of the relevant social optimum. This is most evident in his 
defence of economic and legal interventionism by the state as a response to social and 
economic inequality. This, it will be claimed, is tantamount not only to a socially irrational 
interventionism in the wider economic and cultural process but actually assumes a particular 
ethical claim concerning the need for public institutions to emancipate the less well off, that is 
not defended but, rather, postulated as a starting point for a politics of redistribution.
I stated at the outset of this introduction that we not only wanted to know if a 
Hayekian response to diversity was possible or whether it was capable of exerting critical 
leverage over other candidate theories of cultural justice but also whether it could be an 
adequate one on its own terms. What is there about Hayek, then, that could lend itself to 
finding solutions to our challenges? A Hayekian perspective recognises that the discussion of 
issues of central importance does not only take place in the face-to-face surroundings of 
democratic politics but also through the varied and often informal institutions of civil society. 
Indeed, the very kinds of institutions that are present in the extrapolitical arena of civil society
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are in themselves evidence of the kinds of issue that contemporary society is concerned with. 
This is a notion that, if taken to its fullest extent, would include the claim that individual 
choices constitute an integral and perhaps the principal part of what it is to have a social 
discussion concerning the ends of life.
All of this, moreover, relates to the challenge of cultural diversity and our concern 
with Hayek’s tangential position to contemporary theory. For, it would seem that attempting 
to offer any ethical justification of the ends and values to which legitimate government must 
be committed will unavoidably be a circular and, hence, philosophically inadequate enterprise 
if the diversity of the conceptions of the good to be found in that society, including those that 
do not celebrate diversity, is taken seriously. Because of this danger, Hayek’s account of 
liberalism as a discovery procedure that is rooted not in an ethical conception of the self or of 
our most essential interests but, rather, in the normative implications of an interpretative 
insight concerning the permanent limits of our reason, gains another significance. That is, it 
is precisely because of the fundamental and profound challenge that the multicultural 
problematic represents - that is, precisely because of the possibility of permanent 
disagreement about ultimate ends and what they require - that an amoral conception of 
political association such as Hayek’s could well be all the more attractive.
Consequently, I will argue that the amoral nature of Hayek’s interpretative defence of 
liberalism is, prima facie at least, not a reason for rejecting him. Rather, it is a virtue for a 
theory addressed to the needs of a society that is culturally diverse and comprised of members 
who for the most part are mutually ignorant and unaware of the knowledge that they have, but 
who still need publicly justified institutions to which all, including those who have difficulties 
with diversity, may assent.22
4. The Plan o f  this Thesis
The broad argument of this thesis, then, should now be apparent. Despite the postsocialist 
cultural turn and the virtual disappearance of the kind of centralised economic institutions that 
Hayek was always keen to reject, there is, after all, a way to reconnect his thought to 
contemporary political theory and to both critically and normatively contribute to the debates 
about multicultural justice that are so central to it. For what is most interesting about Hayek 
today are not the reasons why he defended liberalism - the debates from which they sprung 
are, for the most part, irrelevant today both to political theory and to political practice - but 
rather the conceptual tools that he deployed in defending liberalism. It is these conceptual 
tools that can be shown to have a relevance to contemporary concerns with cultural diversity 
that is methodologically, critically and normatively both clear and compelling.
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This thesis will be divided into three parts. Part One will discuss Hayek’s place in 
contemporary debates in normative political philosophy. In Chapter One I will claim that, 
despite his apparently marginal status to debates about justice and difference, an interpretative 
reading of Hayek’s social theory and of the conception of the self that underlies it, not only 
clarifies the well-known economic arguments he did make, but also enables us to appeal to his 
thought anew with respect to the cultural. Chapter Two will build upon this to address 
Hayek’s normative argument for individual economic liberty and extend it to the realm of 
culture, via our modelling of a Hayekian argument for individual interpretative liberty. In 
Part Two, I will be concerned to examine, from this Hayekian perspective, the responses to 
diversity of a range of theorists. In Chapter Four, I will examine the response of the 
difference democrats who endorse a group-differentiated account of deliberative democratic 
decision-making and, in Chapter Five, of liberal egalitarian political theorists who both 
attempt and in a significant sense reject the reconciliation of cultural difference with the 
institutions of the contemporary welfare state. Finally, in Part Three, I will be concerned with 
the account of multicultural justice emergent from our prior engagements with and 
modifications of both Hayekian and contemporary political theory. Thus, Chapter Five will 
concern itself with the articulation of the Discursive Minimal State and, in Chapter Six, with 
its defence.
22 Paradoxically, perhaps, this is not something to which Kley is blind. On this see Kley, Hayek’s 
Social and Political Thought, p. 204.
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Part I: Hayek and Contemporary Political Theory
18
TThe Silliest of Common Misunderstandings: From Economics 
to a Hayekian Conception of the Self
1. Introduction
According to numerous political theorists, the demise of communism has been associated 
with an upsurge in the normative significance of notions of identity and difference. In the 
words of Jurgen Habermas, normative political theory has witnessed a shift ‘from “issues of 
distribution” to a concern with “the grammar of forms of life”.’23 In addition, and writing 
with respect to the contemporary significance of Hayek’s political theory, John Gray has 
argued that the central argument of Hayek’s corpus - the epistemological critique of central 
planning and defence of free market institutions - has been rendered obsolete precisely by the 
fall of the Iron Curtain of which that critique offers at least one powerful explanation.24 There 
are two difficulties, then, that the Hayekian theorist faces if  he seeks to orient Hayekian 
political theory to issues of culture, identity and difference. Not only are the kinds of 
institutions most susceptible to Hayek’s arguments largely no longer extant - our political 
choice now is largely between varieties of liberal order - the whole terrain of normative 
discourse has in any case shifted away from issues of distribution precisely, perhaps, because 
of the impact upon contemporary political thought wrought by the disappearance of those 
institutions.
Despite this, it will be the central concern of this chapter to show that the apparent 
significance for Hayekian political theory of both theses is illusory and that it is, after all, 
possible to reconnect the Hayekian perspective to contemporary debates concerning identity, 
difference and justice. One way to do so, of course, would be to follow egalitarian liberals 
such as Barry who reject the shift in the terrain of discourse and set out to show that, in any 
case, the consequences of this post-socialist, communitarian and feminist-inspired ‘paradigm 
shift’ towards identity and difference are not to be welcomed. As we shall see in Chapter 4, 
central to Barry’s thesis is the claim that this shift is not only a distraction from more 
important distributive concerns, it actually plays into the hands of those wishing to perpetuate 
inequality by enticing the most vulnerable members of society into a wholly divisive and 
internecine politics.
Rather than following this approach, however, it will be argued that rehabilitating 
Hayekian political theory centres upon an interpretative reading of Hayek’s economic and
23 Habermas quoted in Benhabib, Democracy and Difference: contesting the boundaries o f  the 
political, p. 4, n. 7.
24 On this, see Gray, Hayek on Liberty, pp. 146-61.
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social theories and, most importantly, an uncovering of the account of the culturally 
embedded self that underlies it. Such a reading, it will be argued, makes it possible for the 
Hayekian to straddle the analytical and normative divide implicit in the shift from the 
grammar of distribution to that of forms of life, rather than seek to assert the normative 
priority of one side over the other.
O f course, any such reading of Hayek is bound to be controversial. After all, he is 
most famous precisely for his contributions to debates concerning the possibility of 
centralised economic planning and economic methodology in the 1930s and ‘40s and for his 
post-war critique of social justice, given its most comprehensive statement in volume two of 
Law, Legislation and Liberty, The Mirage o f Social Justice}5 Clearly, all of these 
contributions pertain in one way or another to economic theory and just distribution; that is to 
debates located firmly within the distributive paradigm. It would be more useful, then, contra 
the reading proposed here, to consider Hayek as not only working from within the distributive 
paradigm but to be one of its principal exponents. Moreover, it is in any case more common 
to claim that the starting point of his research project is the notion of spontaneous order or, 
more specifically, of how such order is achieved without being consciously willed, rather than 
with a question concerning the nature of the self.26
However, I will argue with respect to the first objection that a purely distributive 
reading of Hayek is premised upon a fundamental, although explicable, misunderstanding of 
the breadth of his research project that is only made clear once the assumptions concerning 
the nature of the self underlying the overtly economic papers are brought to light.27 The 
reason why this is not immediately clear is that these assumptions are only made explicit 
elsewhere, most clearly in papers such as ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’ and ‘Scientism 
and the Study of Society.’28 Importantly, however, and with respect to the second objection, 
it is these papers on the human sciences that provide us not only with a fuller account of the
25 On the former see Hayek, F. A. (ed.) Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the 
Possibility o f  Socialism, London, George Routledge and Sons, 1935. On the latter, see Hayek, F. A., 
The Mirage o f  Social Justice, vol. 2, Law, Legislation and Liberty, London, Routledge, 1982. We 
could perhaps include Hayek’s earlier economic writings such as Prices and Production, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931; Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (1929), trans. Kaldor, N. and 
Croome, H., London, Jonathan Cape, 1933; Profits, Interest and Investments, and other essays on the 
Theory o f  Industrial fluctuations, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939 and The Pure Theory o f  
Capital, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1941. This, however, would be to expand the scope of 
this thesis beyond the competence of its author.
26 Barry, N. P., ‘Hayek on Liberty’, in Pelczynski, Z., and Gray, J. (eds.), Conceptions o f Liberty in 
Political Philosophy, London, Athlone Press, 1984, pp. 263 - 288; Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political 
Thought, esp. Chapters 1-5.
27 See also Gamble, A., Hayek: The Iron Cage o f Liberty, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 19.
28 See also Cubeddu, R., The Philosophy o f the Austrian School, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 75. One 
perhaps should take exception to Cubeddu’s claim that the fact of social knowledge being dispersed 
across many minds is social science’s only objective ‘datum’, as well as the claim that at this stage of 
his development Hayek was working with a conception of practical or tacit knowledge. On this, see 
Cubeddu, The Philosophy o f  the Austrian School, p. 74.
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subjectivist, anti-scientistic perspective that serves as the philosophical foundation for the 
critical engagement with economic theory and practice. They also provide an account of a 
distinctively Hayekian conception of the interpreting self which, I will claim, is both logically 
and programmatically prior to the traditionally understood starting point of his research 
programme: the notion of spontaneous socio-economic order.29 Contrary, then, to most 
philosophical accounts of Hayek’s work the interpretative reading does not start with an 
account of the admittedly central notion of spontaneous socio-economic order.30 Rather, it 
commences with the question of what is it that Hayek thinks about man that makes the socio­
economic order he inhabits a spontaneous one and proceeds to offer an account of the 
Hayekian self - more specifically, the constitutional limits to its faculty of reason - as an 
answer. Thus, it is only because of the kinds of people that Hayek takes us to be that 
spontaneous orders can be said to be spontaneous at all. It is to Hayek’s implicit conception 
of the self that attention must be paid, then, if we are to reconnect his perspective in a 
meaningful and compelling way to contemporary issues in normative political theory and 
multiculturalism in particular.
As such, the interpretative papers on the human sciences are pivotal in that not only 
do they retrospectively give philosophical substance to the earlier arguments about economic 
theory and central planning. They also make theoretically possible Hayek’s move from 
economic theory towards more general socio-theoretical concerns that we shall see are in turn 
necessary for contemporary Hayekian political theory to resonate tellingly with concerns 
about culture and identity. Just because the self implicit in Hayek’s economic and socio- 
theoretic papers interprets from within the economic and cultural nexus - and, as such, is to be 
seen in opposition to that ‘celebrated figment’ of atomised or ‘economic’ man - Hayek is able 
to occupy an important and unique place not only with respect to economic theory but also 
with respect to culture.31 That is, because the Hayekian account of the nature and limits of 
individual reason is a general thesis that characterises a human predicament, it has major 
consequences for the articulation and justification of public institutions regardless of whether 
these are oriented toward the management of the economic or cultural life of society.
29 This is, of course, was something of which Hayek was aware. On this, see Hayek, F. A., Rules and 
Order (1973), Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume One, London, Routledge, 1982, p. 13.
30 Gray, Hayek on Liberty', Kukathas, C., Hayek and Modem Liberalism', Kley, R., Hayek’s Social and 
Political Thought.
31 The Constitution o f Liberty, p. 61. This is, moreover, a Hayekian conception of the self that in many 
fundamental respects prefigures that of the more canonical “communitarian” critics o f Rawls. On this, 
see MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984; Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?, London, Duckworth, 1988; Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982; Taylor, C., Sources o f  the Self, Cambridge Ma., 
Harvard University Press, 1989. For a comprehensive overview of liberal-communitarian debate see 
Mulhall, S. and Swift, A., Liberals and Communitarians (2nd ed.), Oxford, Blackwell, 1996.
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However, this is not to say that either aim is achieved without effort. Despite their 
necessity to any adequate reading of Hayek as a contributor to normative cultural discourse, 
we shall see that the interpretative papers on the human sciences alone are not sufficient for 
this task. Initially at least, the Hayekian interpreting self that emerges from them is but a 
shallow or weak self and this is only overcome once Hayek addresses the question of just 
what it is that endows man with the faculty to interpret the social world. That is, the question 
of the depth of Hayek’s conception of the self can only be answered once he moves from a 
somewhat bald assertion that men are by nature social beings to an explanation of the how 
and why of their sociality. It is to such questions, moreover, that we must look beyond the 
interpretative papers and to his work including and after The Constitution o f  Liberty, It is 
only here where Hayek explicitly invokes the notion of a rule, tradition or practice that both 
embeds man and situates him within the cultural, as opposed to purely economic nexus and in 
which co-ordination is no longer just an economic affair but is also a matter of culture. 
Equally importantly, however, because the invocation of rules and practices issues in a 
deepening rather than a rejection of the account of the self that the economic papers 
presuppose, Hayek is able to deepen his account of the self and therefore make the transition 
from economic to cultural theory. Moreover, he is able to do so without relinquishing the key 
interpretative insights that so coloured those earlier economic arguments against the 
philosophy of interventionism that have turned out to be so telling.
In the section that follows, I will outline the most salient features o f the notion of 
interpretation and the role that it plays in the distinction between the human and the natural 
sciences with reference to one contemporary interpretative social theorist who has engaged 
with issues of identity and difference in normative political theory, Charles Taylor. 
Subsequent to this, I will show how, on the basis of similar arguments, Hayek is to be 
considered as without doubt an interpretative social theorist. I will then claim that central to 
his interpretative critique of the ‘scientism’ of neo-classical economics and his more general 
writings on the social or human sciences upon which it rests is the emphasis upon our mutual 
ignorance and socially embedded nature and the consequent fact of our irremediably limited 
knowledge. This also gives rise to the first of two Hayekian conceptions of the self that shall 
be characterised respectively as ‘weak’ and ‘robust.’ This distinction is crucial for we shall 
see in Section 3. that it is at this point where the fundamental shallowness of Hayek’s early, 
inadequately weak conception of the interpreting self is laid bare, thus threatening the 
achievement of a Hayekian participation in cultural as well as economic discourse. Thus, I 
will claim following writers such as Lawson and Fleetwood, that despite his success in 
critiquing the ‘scientism’ of neo-classical economics and reformulating the economic problem 
faced by society, the self upon which Hayek’s achievement stands remains disassociated from 
the society of which it is a member, just as the rational, utility-maximising, Homo economicus
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of the neo-classical economic theory he seeks to reject does.32 Moreover, Hayek’s own 
positive conception of procedural economic co-ordination is left incomplete, for in the 
absence of an adequate theorisation of culture he is forced into the untenable position that 
social order is maintained exclusively by the price mechanism of the market. In section 4, 
however, we will see that the later Hayek is able to overcome both problems by theorising a 
more profound conception of the self who is capable of interpretation in virtue of his being a 
follower of rules - that is, as a participant in communal traditions and practices. With the 
notion of rules or practices, Hayek is able to move beyond economics into the realm of the 
cultural and to offer a more convincing conception of the interpreting self. At the same time 
he is able to preserve the most important achievements of his interpretative perspective, more 
specifically, the anti-scientistic critique of economic theory and centralised economic 
planning as well as the reformulation of the economic problem that is faced by society; a 
reformulation that we will be concerned to extend and restate as the ‘cultural problem.’
2. Interpretative Social Science: Taylor and Hayek
Firstly, then, just what do we mean by the notion of ‘interpretation’? There are at least two 
ways to understand this term, one normative the other positive. In politics, for instance, we 
may follow theorists such as Walzer and Dworkin and invoke the notion of interpretation as 
part of a philosophical project to uncover and justify particular principles of justice and 
institutional arrangements.33 Under this understanding, public principles of justice are 
recovered from the meanings of particular institutions and practices, rather than divined from 
a priori accounts of reason or of The Good for man. This, however, will largely be the 
concern of the next chapter. For now of central importance is the account of interpretation 
that emphasises the role of the notion of meaning in the explication of the nature and task of 
the social, moral or human sciences - of which politics is a part - and the role this notion plays 
in distinguishing these sciences from the natural or physical sciences.
An important contemporary exponent of this approach, of course, is Charles Taylor.34 
We will be concerned in particular with Taylor, principally because of the many parallels
32 Fleetwood, S., Hayek’s Political Economy: The socio-economics o f  order, London, Routledge, 1995; 
‘Hayek III: The Necessity of Social Rules of Conduct’, in Frowen, S. F. (ed.), Hayek: Economist and 
Social Philosopher, London, MacMillan, 1997, pp. 155 -  178; Lawson, T., ‘Realism and Hayek: A 
Case of Continuous Transformation’ (1994), in Colonna, M., Hagemann, H. and Hamouda, O. F. 
(eds.), Capitalism, Socialism and Knowledge: The Economics o f  F. A. Hayek, vol. 2, Aldershot, 
Edward Elgar, 1994, pp. 131- 159, ‘Development in Hayek’s Social Theorising’ (1995), in Frowen, S. 
F. (ed.), Hayek: Economist and Social Philosopher, London, MacMillan, 1997, pp. 125 - 148.
33 Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice, New York: Basic Books, 1983; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 
Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1986. See also Wamke, J., Justice and Interpretation, 
Cambridge, Ma., MIT Press, 1993 for an assessment of this project.
34 Taylor, C., ‘Neutrality in Political Science’ (1967), in Taylor, Philosophical Papers, Volume Two, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 58 - 90; 
‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’ (1971), in Taylor, Philosophical Papers, Volume Two,
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between his work and Hayek and because of his more recent concern with multiculturalism 
and the politics of identity that is the ultimate object of our enquiry and with which we wish 
to engage on a Hayekian basis.
2.i Hermeneutic Social Science: Taylor
Of central importance to Taylor, particularly in earlier papers such as ‘Interpretation and the 
Sciences of Man’, ‘Social Theory as Practice’ and ‘Understanding and Ethnocentricity’, is the 
centrality of the notion of meaning to our attempts to explicate human behaviour.35 Mulhall 
and Swift make this clear in their discussion of the interpretative foundations of Taylor’s 
political theory. For Taylor, they explain, ‘human behaviour (which cannot be understood as 
action unless related to a background of desire, feeling, emotion and purpose) can only be 
characterized in terms of the meaning that the situation in which the action occurs possess for 
the agent concerned.’36 That is, there is no independent or objective standard in terms of 
which human action can be explained but, rather, it is to the meaning of the actions for the 
actor that we must look in order to understand them. When we do so, moreover, we find that 
a particular meaning is never given to us but, rather, is to be grasped in virtue of its 
relationship to other meanings.37 As such, our understanding of these meanings ‘moves 
inescapably in a hermeneutical circle.’38 ‘An emotion like shame,’ Taylor writes,
... can only be explained by reference to other concepts which in turn cannot be understood 
without reference to shame. To understand these concepts we have to be in on a certain 
experience, we have to understand a certain language, not just of words, but also a certain 
language of mutual action and communication, by which we blame, exhort, admire, esteem 
each other.39
This, of course, is why we may ‘understand’ those whose behaviour we seek to explicate, and 
why we are less able to do this when explicating the purposive behaviour of those from very
Philosophy and the Human Sciences, pp. 21 - 28; ‘Social Theory as Practice’ (1981), in Taylor, 
Philosophical Papers, Volume Two, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, pp. 95 - 115; ‘Understanding 
and Ethnocentricity’ (1981), in Taylor, Philosophical Papers, Volume Two, Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences, pp. 116 - 133; ‘Introduction’, in Taylor, Philosophical Papers, Volume Two, Philosophy and 
the Human Sciences, pp. 1 - 1 2 ;  Gadamer, H.-G., Truth and Method (1960), New York, The 
Continuum Publishing Company, 1989, passim..
35 Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, passim.-, ‘Social Theory as Practice’, passim.-, 
‘Understanding and Ethnocentricity’, passim.. The views expressed here, of course, also loom large in 
Sources o f  the Self.
36 Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. 109.
37 Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, pp. 22-23.
38 Taylor, ibid., p. 23.
39 Taylor, ibid., pp. 23-24.
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different cultures to our own, something that Taylor discusses at length in ‘Understanding and 
Ethnocentricity.,40
What makes this science different to natural science or ‘the science of verification’?41 
Taylor gives three reasons for this. The first is the familiar ‘open system’ predicament that 
emphasises the impossibility of hermetically sealing the human sciences from external 
interference, although Taylor does not state what precise form such interference may take.42 
The second reason hinges upon the imprecision of the data of the human sciences; that is, the 
various interpretations that individuals have of the social world around them. ‘The data of 
natural science,’ writes Taylor, ‘admit of measurement to virtually any degree of exactitude,’ 
but the nuances, ambiguities and vagaries of interpretation mean that this is impossible in the 
human sciences. However, of most significance for present purposes is Taylor’s third claim 
that our interpretations are internal to the very objects of the social world of which they are 
interpretations.43 That is, unlike investigation in the natural sciences where our theories are 
always about something external to the theory itself, that is, the theory is always a theory o f 
something (of the natural world, for example), in the human sciences our theories are made up 
of a similar kind of stuff to their object. For example, in a discussion of politics - although 
the thrust of the argument applies equally to the social sciences more generally - Taylor 
claims that ‘[pjolitical theories are not about independent objects in the way that theories are 
in natural science.’ This is because in natural science ‘one applies what one knows about 
causal powers to particular cases, but the truths about such causal powers that one banks on 
are thought to remain unchanged.’ Indeed, he comments, ‘[t]hat is the point of saying that 
theory here is about an independent object.’44 By contrast, in a social scientific field such as 
politics ‘accepting a theory can itself transform what that theory bears on’ because the nature 
of the object of our investigation - the political - is not indifferent to the results of acting upon 
the basis of any particular theory we may have of it. This is because whilst we say that
... natural science theory also transforms practice, the practice it transforms is not what the 
theory is about. It is in this sense external to the theory. We think o f it as an ‘application’ of 
the theory. But in politics, the practice is the object of theory. Theory in this domain 
transforms its own object.45
40 Taylor, ‘Understanding and Ethnocentricity’, pp. 61-5.
41 Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, pp. 55-57; ‘Social Theory as Practice’, pp. 92-93, 
101-104.
42 Taylor, ibid., p. 55.
43 Taylor, ibid.
44 Taylor, ‘Social Theory as Practice’, p. 101.
45 Taylor, ibid.
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It is in this sense, then, that Taylor claims that political theories are ‘constitutive’ of the 
practice that they bear upon.46
The self-transformational nature of the relationship of theory to practice in the social 
sciences, moreover, relates in a most fundamental and, ultimately, programmatic way to 
Taylor’s discussion in ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’ of man as a ‘self-interpreting 
animal’ and his later development of a hermeneutic conception of the self in Sources o f  the 
Self.41 Briefly, for Taylor our very experience of the meaning of the objects and situations we 
encounter in our day-to-day lives is intimately bound up with and has a direct effect upon our 
sense of who we are. This is because such experience already presupposes an interpretation 
of those social objects and situations in terms of which that experience is made meaningful. 
Furthermore, it is here where the notion of community in Taylor’s account becomes 
prominent for it is only in terms of a moral vocabulary that is shared and intersubjective that 
the interpretation of our experiences, feelings and desires is made possible. Without such a 
vocabulary, there would only be descriptions in terms of physical properties, similar to the 
descriptions we provide for reactions such as nausea or giddiness. Of course, when we do 
self-interpret in this way we may also transform the meaning to us of the object of 
interpretation - the experience, or feeling, or desire - because we may introduce new terms 
into that vocabulary, deploy the same term to characterise two different situations or revise 
the meaning of those terms already in our vocabulary. Given what we have said, doing this 
will result in our own understanding of who we are changing as well.
These are, then, the key features of Taylor’s hermeneutic or interpretative approach 
to social science. The centrality of the notion of meaning to our attempts to explicate human 
action and behaviour, the correspondent dissimilarity between social science and natural 
science, or ‘the science of verification’ and finally the importance of community - more 
specifically, of an intersubjectively-constituted shared moral vocabulary - to the very faculty 
of interpretation in virtue of which the social world may be said to be meaningful.
2. i i  Interpretative Social Science: Hayek
How, if at all, then, does Taylor’s interpretative social science relate to the work of Hayek? 
What we shall see is that in each of the three respects outlined above with regard to Taylor - 
meaning, science and community - Hayek too can be said in a non-trivial way to be an 
interpretative or hermeneutic social theorist. As has been noted by numerous scholars in the 
last decade, the most obvious starting point for any interpretative reading of Hayek are his
46 Taylor, ibid.
47 Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, p. 26; Sources o f  the Self
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writings on the methodology of the human sciences from the 1940s.48 It is here where he is 
‘not concerned with the specific problems o f economics, but with the common character of all 
disciplines which deal with the results of conscious human action.’49
Moreover, and in common with Taylor, one of the central themes to come out of 
Hayek’s work here, most clearly in the essay ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, is his 
emphasis upon the notion of meaning to sound social science. As Gary Madison explains in 
‘Hayek and the Interpretive Turn’, for Hayek the study of discrete relations between men and 
men, and between men and physical objects can, in contrast to the natural sciences, only be 
carried out ‘by means of a category which is totally foreign to “objective” science, namely 
that of meaning,’50 That is, in the social sciences it is the meaning and use of objects or the 
meaning of actions for the actors, rather than the enumeration of the physical properties of 
either, that is central to our understanding of social behaviour. Indeed, and to anticipate 
another connection between Hayek and Taylor here, in stark contrast to the method of the 
natural sciences, tools and socially oriented acts - such as an act of production - are objects 
from which the social theorist abstracts away all physical properties for the purposes of social 
scientific classification and definition.51 ‘Whether a medicine is a medicine, fo r  the purposes 
o f understanding a person's actions,’ Hayek writes, ‘depends solely on whether the person 
believes it to be one, irrespective of whether we, the observers, agree or not.’ ‘In short,’ he 
explains, ‘in the social sciences the things are what people think they are,’ independently of 
the beliefs of the observer.52 Thus, if it is an explanation of social behaviour that we seek, we 
cannot do so with reference to any knowledge the observer may have about an object but, 
rather, must remain focused only on the knowledge the acting person has of it.53 Importantly, 
Hayek should not be taken here to be defending a radically idealist claim concerning the 
ontological status of the external world but, rather, is seeking to relegate such questions to 
other fields of enquiry. His position in this regard, then, could be said to be one of 
ontological agnosticism; an agnosticism as part, as it were, of the method o f sound social
48 On this see Madison, G. B., ‘Hayek and the Interpretive Turn’, Critical Review, vol. 3, no. 2 (1989), 
pp. 169-185; ‘How Individualistic is Methodological Individualism?’, Critical Review, vol. 4, nos. 1 
and 2 (1990); Buchanan, J. M. and Vanberg, V., ‘The Market as a Creative Process’, Economics and 
Philosophy, 7, (1991), pp. 167-86; Burczak, T., ‘The Postmodern Moments of F. A. Hayek’s 
Economics’, Economics and Philosophy, 10 (1994), pp. 31-58. For an argument against a hermeneutic 
reading of Hayek, see Caldwell, B., ‘Hayek’s Scientific Subjectivism’, Economics and Philosophy, 10 
(1994), pp. 305-313.
49 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study o f Society’, p. 57, emphasis added. See also ‘Introduction’ to 
Hayek, Co-Ordination and Evolution: His legacy in philosophy, politics, economics and the history o f  
ideas, Bimer, J. and Van Zijp, R. (eds.), London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 1-21, esp. pp. 5-8.
50 Madison, ‘Hayek and the Interpretive Turn, p. 171.
51 Hayek, ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 59; ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, pp. 50-3. 
This is made particularly clear, Hayek contends, when we consider the investigation of artefacts of 
cultures different to our own but is no less true of objects with which we are more familiar. On this, 
see Hayek, ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 60. See also Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 17.
52 Hayek, ibid., p. 60, emphasis added; ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 51.
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science which shares a certain affinity with phenomenological approaches to questions in 
epistemology and metaphysics.54
It is clear from the above, then, that similarly to Taylor, out of the emphasis upon the 
notion of meaning arises Hayek’s insistence that one distinguish between the methods of the 
natural and human (or social) sciences.55 At the heart of ‘ Scientism and the Study of Society’ 
is the two-pronged critique of ‘scientism’, the appropriation or ‘slavish imitation’ by the 
human or social sciences of the methods of the physical sciences.56 The first aspect of this 
was his critique of ‘objectivism’ with respect to the interpretation of individual objects and 
social acts and the second was the critique o f ‘collectivism’, ‘historicism’ and ‘purposiveness’ 
with respect to the study of social wholes. Let us take each of these in turn.
For Hayek a ‘scientistic’ approach to discrete social phenomena is inappropriate 
precisely because the objects of our enquiry are not the properties of the objects concerned 
but rather their imputed properties and our perceptions of their relationship to one another. In 
the physical or natural sciences, for example, the task is to overcome our innate and natural 
tendency to classify the external world simply in terms of its impact upon our senses, rather 
than to classify it in terms of its real or objective properties. ‘While the naive mind tends to 
assume that external events which our senses register in the same or in a different manner, 
must be similar or different in more respects than merely in the way in which they affect our 
senses’, he writes, ‘the systematic testing of Science shows that this is frequently not true.’57 
Science ‘constantly shows,’ Hayek continues, ‘that the “facts” are different from 
“appearances’” in which what may appear to be two different objects actually turns out to be 
the same object experienced under different conditions and vice versa.5* Thus, the task for the 
natural sciences is to continually revise and replace our initial classification of the phenomena 
of the external world with new classifications that do not take into account what we take their 
attributes to be. Science is not minded to take into consideration ‘our given concepts or even 
sensations’ of the external world. Rather, it is interested to offer an alternative classification
53 Hayek, ibid., pp. 60-61.
54 Hayek, The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations o f  Theoretical Psychology, §§ 1.90 -  
1.107. On this see also Crossley, N., Intersubjectivity: The Fabric o f  Social Becoming, London, Sage 
Publishing, 1996; Smith, M. J., Situating Hayek: Phenomenology and the Neo-Liberal Project, 
London, Routledge, forthcoming.
55 On this, see Hayek, F. A., ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’ (1943), ‘Scientism and the Study of 
Society.’ Hayek does mention in passing the distinction between the natural and human sciences in 
Hayek, ‘Economic Calculation I: The Nature and History of the Problem’ (Individualism and 
Economic Order, pp. 125-27) but does not treat it in any great depth or at any great length. See also 
Hayek, The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations o f Theoretical Psychology, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Chapter 1 and Chapter 8, §§ 8.87 - 8.98; Madison, ‘Hayek and the 
Interpretive Turn’, pp. 171-4; Steele, G. R., The Economics o f  Friederich Hayek, London, MacMillan, 
1993, p. 83.
56 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 24; Madison, ‘Hayek and the Interpretive Turn’, p. 
171.
57 Hayek, ibid., p. 31.
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that is ‘based on consciously established relations between classes of events.’59 ‘When the 
scientist stresses that he studies objective facts,’ Hayek adds, ‘he means that he tries to study 
things independently of what men think or do about them.’60
Of course, Hayek certainly did not wish to deny that all of us, even professional 
scientists, actually do proceed to act upon the basis of our provisional and often erroneous 
beliefs about and classifications of the discrete objects of the external world and that this is of 
singular importance. Indeed, it is precisely of the consequences of our doing so that the 
human sciences are properly mindful. ‘While science is all the time busy revising the picture 
of the external world that man possesses, and while to it this picture is always provisional,’ he 
writes, ‘the fact that man has a definite picture, and that the picture of all beings whom we 
recognize as thinking men and whom we can understand is to some extent alike, is no less a 
reality of great consequence.’61 Indeed, Hayek goes on to say here that fact that we do have a 
revisable picture or interpretation of the external world is itself ‘the cause of certain events’, a 
point to which we will return shortly.62
To sum up, because the principal task of the human sciences is to give an account of 
conscious, human action and of ‘the way in which man’s existing view of the world leads him 
to act,’63 the social scientist must proceed in the opposite manner to the natural scientist 
insofar as our mental classifications of the external world are concerned. This follows, for 
Hayek, ‘from the fact that only what people know or believe can enter as a motive into their 
conscious action.’64 Thus, rather than abstract away from our mental or subjective 
classifications of external objects in order to give an account of their real or objective 
properties and relations to one another, in the human sciences it is precisely to our mental 
classifications that attention must be paid. In contrast to the natural sciences where our 
mental classification of two apparently different objects (which are actually the same object 
classified under different conditions) is to be factored out of our investigation, in the human 
sciences it ‘must be regarded as a significant datum of experience’ and as ‘the starting point in 
any discussion.’65 For Hayek, the question for the human sciences is not the extent to which 
our own picture of the external world matches, corresponds to, or is true of the facts but,
58 Hayek, ibid., p. 31-2.
59 Hayek, ibid., pp. 32-3. See also Hayek, The Sensory Order, §§ 1.6- 1.14.
60 Hayek, ibid., p. 39.
61 ibid.
62 ibid., emphasis added.
63 ibid.
64 Hayek, ibid., p. 60.
65 Hayek, ibid., p. 37, emphasis added; Hayek, The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations o f  
Theoretical Psychology, §§ 1.18-1.21.
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rather, ‘how by his actions, determined by the views and concepts he possesses, man builds 
up another world of which the individual becomes a part.’66
Of course Hayek is sensitive to the question of the confidence with which we may 
make claims concerning the interpretations of the social world of any given individual.67 
Again, similarly to Taylor, for Hayek it is ultimately the existence of what we may term ‘the 
meaning community’ that enables us to interpret and classify individual facts in the social 
sciences.68 That is, we are only able to interpret individual facts on the basis of what we 
ourselves know and this knowledge is held in common with those whose action we seek to 
interpret: ‘[w]e assume that the idea of a purpose or a tool, a weapon or food, is common to 
them with us, just as assume that they can see the difference between different colours or 
shapes as well as we.’69 Crucially it is at this point where Hayek schematises what Taylor 
would call the hermeneutic circle of interpretation:
We know that the objects a, b, c, ..., which may be physically completely dissimilar and 
which we can never exhaustively enumerate, are objects of the same kind because the attitude 
of X toward them is similar. But the fact that X ’s attitude toward them is similar can again be 
defined only by saying that he will react to them by any one o f the actions a, P, y, ..., which 
again may be physically dissimilar, but which we just “know” to mean the same thing.70
That is, our understanding of the world is only ever given from within a pre-existing matrix of 
meaning. Again, similarly to Taylor, for Hayek the importance of the meaning community is 
made all the more clear when we attempt to analyse purposive behaviour in cultures different 
to our own. The more alien the practices of these cultures are to us, the less we are able to 
understand them in terms of our own particular interpretations of the social world and the 
more we must resort to more general concepts.71 Indeed, if the gulf of understanding were too 
great, it would follow that there would be no space for interpretation at all but rather, there 
would only be ‘physical facts which we can group and classify solely according to the 
physical properties which we observe.’72
Of course, for Hayek, we do not classify individual facts for their own sake. 
Ultimately, the reason why we classify them is to understand far more complex phenomena.73
66 Hayek, ibid., p. 40; Hayek, The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations o f  Theoretical 
Psychology, §§ 8.87 -  8.98.
67 Hayek, ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 63.
68 Hayek, ibid., pp. 62-3.
69 Hayek, ibid., p. 63.
70 Hayek, ibid., p. 62; ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 81. Compare with Taylor, 
‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, pp. 22-3.
71 Hayek, ibid., pp. 65-7; Taylor, ‘Understanding and Ethnocentricity’, passim.
72 Hayek, ibid., p. 66.
73 Hayek, ibid., pp. 67-9; ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, pp. 61-76
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Thus, the second kind of social facts Hayek discusses are social wholes that are ‘the 
unintended or undesigned results of the actions of many man.’74 Entities such as ‘the 
economy’, ‘the moral code of seventeenth century New England’ or ‘The French Revolution’, 
of course, pose a particularly profound problem because they are ‘undesigned’ orders and, as 
such, present social science with its principal explanatory task. Indeed, Hayek claims that the 
explanation of the undesigned emergence of such orders just is the task of social science.75
In contrast to discrete social facts such as objects or actions, these facts are, for 
Hayek, not entities whose physical properties have been abstracted away by the social theorist 
for the purposes of explanation but rather are devoid of physical properties altogether. That 
is, they do not occupy any position in the physical order but rather only inhabit the 
interpretative order and are no other than the actors’ own ‘ideas about the undesigned results 
of their actions - popular theories about the various social structures or formations.’76 This 
attitude towards social wholes, of course, is in contrast to those who appropriate the methods 
of the natural sciences and conceive them as if they were objects directly perceived by us.77
Of course, those who hold this second, ‘collectivist’ view would object to Hayek’s 
characterisation. Rather than being built up out of, or constituted by, our interpretations of the 
discrete actions of agents, it is these more complex facts that are causally determinant of our 
individual actions or, at least, that are the given context within which we act and, as such, 
should be explained as given prior to, rather than derived from, them. Yet Hayek argues 
against the idea that ‘when we turn from the action of the individual to the observations of 
social collectivities, we move from the realm of vague and subjective speculation to the realm 
of objective fact.’ Rather, “‘social facts” are no more facts ... than are individual actions or 
their objects,’78 because for Hayek terms such as ‘the economy’ do not refer to entities that 
are ‘constitutive of the phenomena we want to explain,’ but, rather, are ‘ideas which either we 
ourselves or the very people whose actions we have to explain have formed about these 
phenomena.’79 ‘[W]e use the different kinds of individual behaviour thus classified,’ he 
continues ‘as elements from which we construct hypothetical models in an attempt to 
reproduce the patterns of social relationships, which we know in the world around us.’80 
Thus, any attempt to define a complex social fact such as the economy or a social system 
must be a ‘mental reconstruction’ on the part of the theorist or student of society ‘in which
74 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 41.
75 Hayek, ibid., p. 69.
76 Hayek, ibid., p. 62. See also Cubeddu, The Philosophy o f the Austrian School, pp. 84-5.
77 Hayek, ibid., p. 94.
78 Hayek, ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 69; ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, pp. 93-8
79 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 62. See also Madison, ‘Hayek and the Interpretive 
Turn, pp. 173-4.
80 Hayek, ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 68.
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intelligible individual attitudes [towards discrete objects and actions] form the elements.’81 In 
keeping with the hermeneutic tone of his account, for Hayek social wholes are not the 
physical cause of, but rather, merely theories about social structures.82 As such, the nature of 
these theories will have a significant impact upon the practice -  economics, history and 
politics -  which the are theories of. Thus, as Madison makes clear, Hayek’s enterprise here is 
not to reduce the whole to the sum of its parts but instead to emphasise that social wholes are 
not objects that are causally efficacious. Rather, social wholes in this sense are to be taken as 
''meaning-objects which are not understandable apart from the categories of human 
understanding and agency, apart, that is, from the “individual”.’83 What the social theorist 
does, then, ‘is in a logical sense exactly the same thing as what we always do when we talk 
about a state or a community, a language or a market, only what we make explicit in everyday 
speech is concealed and vague.’84 Most significantly, the ‘compositive method’ of 
reconstruction of social wholes from discrete objects and actions in sound human science is 
necessary because, for Hayek, ‘what we call a fact is either a recurrent process or a complex 
pattern of persistent relationships which is not “given” to our observation'*5 The fact that 
social wholes such as ‘the economy’ are not given in this way may be called Hayek’s Limited 
Knowledge Thesis and it is to it that attention must now turn.
3. The Limited Knowledge Thesis
In what specific sense for Hayek are social wholes not given to our observation? It seems 
clear that the relevant sense is an epistemological one. As he claims in ‘Scientism and the 
Study of Society’, ‘the knowledge and beliefs of different people while possessing that 
common structure which makes communication possible, will yet be different and often 
conflicting in many respects.’86 The reason for this, as we have seen, is precisely because the 
data to be studied and out of which the social wholes are composed by the student of society - 
that is, discrete beliefs and attitudes - are the subjective beliefs of individuals who are not 
spatio-temporally contiguous with one another. It follows from this, moreover, that 
knowledge of such data can never be given to any single observing mind. O f course, if we 
could assume the problem of the subjectivity and dispersal of knowledge away, that is ‘[i]f we 
could assume that all the knowledge and beliefs of different people were identical, or if we
81 Hayek, ibid., p. 71.
82 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 62, emphasis added; ‘The Facts of the Social 
Sciences’, p. 72.
83 Madison, ‘How Individualistic is Methodological Individualism?’, pp. 49-50; Madison, G. M., 
‘Getting Beyond Objectivism: The Philosophical Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur’, in Lavoie, 
D. (ed.), Economics and Hermeneutics, London, Routledge, 1990, pp. 30-58; Cubeddu, The Philosophy 
o f the Austrian School, p. 38.
84 Hayek, ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 69.
85 Hayek, ibid., emphasis added.
86 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 49.
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were concerned with a single mind’ then it would not matter whether we considered social 
wholes to be a part of the objective or interpretative realms.87 However, this is precisely the 
assumption we can never make because, for Hayek, such knowledge 'only exists in the 
dispersed, incomplete, and inconsistent form in which it appears in many individual minds’ 
and, as such, is never given in its entirety to any individual.88 As such, social wholes are 
themselves never given to but rather inferred by us.
Hayek’s comments here prefigure Charles Taylor’s later observations of the 
differences between the natural and social sciences and how knowledge in each discipline 
relates to practice. Similarly to Taylor, Hayek is keen to claim that the intemality of the 
theory to the practice it explains imposes certain epistemological limitations. ‘[I]n those 
fields,’ he writes ‘where the object of our investigation, and our means of investigating and 
communicating the results, that is our thoughts, our language, and the whole mechanism of 
communication between men, are partly identical and where in consequence in discussing a 
system of events we must at the same time move within that system, there are probably 
definite limits to what we can know.’89
Yet, beyond all of this, the special problem here is that these aggregate orders are 
opaque to us if only described in terms of the physical properties of their constituents.90 
There would only be many different physical movements and uses of objects rather than, for 
example, different kinds of act of production. Therefore, for social wholes the same problem 
arises as it does for discrete actions and objects in that both only become salient via the notion 
of meaning and, therefore, of the community that meaning presupposes. ‘Just as the existence 
of a common structure of thought is the condition of the possibility of our communicating 
with one another, of your understanding what I say,’ Hayek concludes in ‘The Facts of the 
Social Sciences’, ‘so it is also the basis on which we all interpret such complicated social
87 Hayek, ibid., p. 49.
88 Hayek, ibid., p. 50, emphasis added.
89 Hayek, F. A., ‘Degrees of Explanation’ (1955), in Hayek, F. A., Studies in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, p. 21; ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 76. 
Hayek’s distinction, however, between ‘constitutive’ beliefs and opinions about social wholes and 
‘speculative’ beliefs about wholes seems to be untenable. (Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of 
Society’, pp. 61-5) On the one hand, he says that constitutive beliefs are ‘motivating’ opinions which 
determine what people will do and as such actually contribute to the nature of the interpreted whole in 
question. On the other he claims that ‘speculative’ or ‘explanatory’ beliefs are merely ideas that people 
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or formations’, and, as such, do not exert causal efficacy upon the actions of agents. Now, in a footnote 
Hayek does concede that such beliefs will often be an important component in explaining the politics of 
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views about communism or capitalism, for instance, will lead us to take particular actions - for 
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90 Hayek, ibid., p. 69.
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structures as those which we find in economic life or law, in language, and in customs.’91 It is 
clear, then, that for Hayek as for Taylor, our very capacity to interpret the social world - rather 
than merely record the physical properties of meaningless external stimulae - presupposes the 
existence of cultural communities and of our place within them.
i . i  The Rejection o f  Equilibrium and Homo economicus
It is clear, then, that Hayek’s work on the methodology of the social sciences places him 
firmly within the interpretative or hermeneutic tradition alongside present-day exponents such 
as Taylor. What, then, can be drawn out of Hayek’s interpretative approach to the human 
sciences? In contrast to Taylor, of significant interest in this regard is Hayek’s assumption of 
many of his later key interpretative insights into his work on economic theory. It is 
illuminating to compare at this point the quote from ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’ 
about the dispersal, incompleteness and inconsistency of social knowledge ‘in many 
individual minds’ with the passage below from an earlier seminal paper on economic theory 
‘The Use of Knowledge in Society.’ Here, Hayek claims that
... the peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely 
by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.92
What this comparison makes clear is that, having included ‘the economy’ in his list of social 
wholes,93 a version of Hayek’s critique of scientism was implicitly invoked to sharply restrict 
the usefulness - both theoretical and practical - of the neo-classical notion of general 
equilibrium where markets are conceived as attaining a state of perfect co-ordination of the 
plans of economic actors.94 Hayek, then, was here concerned to claim for the human sciences 
the study of economics itself and, in so doing, rejects the notion of equilibrium which he 
claims presupposes a scientistic and hence epistemologically fallacious account of economic 
interaction. What the notion of equilibrium does, of course, is ‘turn economics into a branch 
of pure logic [the Pure Logic of Choice], a set of self-evident propositions which like 
mathematics or geometry, are subject to no other test but internal consistency.’95 Yet, as 
Fleetwood claims, Hayek rejects this because it assumes ‘that knowledge is objective and
91 Hayek, ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 76.
92 Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, p. 77.
93 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, pp. 91-2, Chapter 10; ‘The Facts o f the Social 
Sciences’, pp. 69-72.
94 Hayek, F. A., ‘The Meaning of Competition’, in Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948, pp. 92-106.
95 Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’, p. 35.
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possessed in full by agents and observing economists - encapsulated in the expression ‘given 
data.”  Rather, knowledge of the discrete actions of countless individuals that taken together 
we understand as ‘the economy’ is subjectively held, dispersed and, therefore, is ‘possessed 
by agents in varying quantities and qualities, and subject to continual change.’96
With this radically different assumption concerning knowledge the task of economic 
theory for Hayek is shifted away from the attempt to describe an end-state of equilibrium 
towards a procedural explanation of how it is possible that ‘the combination of fragments of 
knowledge existing in different minds bring[s] about results which, if they were to be 
brought about deliberately, would require a knowledge on the part of the directing mind 
which no single person can possess.’97 That is, theoretical attention is reoriented towards the 
process of how economic knowledge is actually communicated in the absence of it ever being 
given in objective terms. The concept of equilibrium here, then, never refers to a real state of 
affairs that is actually achievable but, rather, refers to an interpreted state towards which the 
plans of discrete economic actors tend.
Now, whilst ‘Economics and Knowledge’ is primarily a paper about the usefulness of 
the concept of equilibrium to economic theory, Hayek did not think that his interpretative 
social science only had important theoretical implications. This much is clear in ‘The Use of 
Knowledge in Society’, which is concerned with the practical possibility of centralised 
economic planning and the communication and acquisition of knowledge.98 The practical 
importance of Hayek’s interpretative reformulation of the economic problem that society 
faces is seen most clearly in the debates about economic calculation in which he participated 
in the 1930’s. For with the reformulation of the economic problem Hayek extends Mises’s 
original calculational critique of socialism into an epistemological one. That is, from the 
Misesian assumption that the dispersed knowledge required for economic calculation in the 
socialist commonwealth is, albeit with significant difficulty, available, Hayekian economic 
theory moves to the assumption that, in principle, it is not. As Kukathas explains in his 
discussion of Hayek’s extension of Mises’s argument, the principal problem to be solved is 
not how to distribute goods or resources according to some pre-arranged plan ‘but how to co­
ordinate their use so that their employment correctly reflects their relative value.’99 The
96 Fleetwood, Hayek’s Political Economy: the socio-economics o f  order, p. 58.
97 Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’, p. 54.
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problem faced by planners, that is, ‘is not a calculational problem’ where they simply need to 
decide where to allocate resources on the basis of given knowledge, ‘but an epistemological 
one’ where an adequate account of how that knowledge is communicated through the 
economy must first be given.100 No longer, that is, must economics ‘just define an end state,’ 
but, rather, must ‘explain the competitive process at work.’101
However, and significantly for present purposes, it is not only in terms of economic 
theory that Hayek’s reformulation is important. His interpretative anti-scientism also issues 
in a rejection of the conception of the self implicit in the scientistic, neo-classical model of 
economic theory. This conception, of course is that of ‘Homo economicus’ who rationally 
optimises in terms of given data. Indeed, as Hayek tellingly suggests in ‘Economics and 
Knowledge’, the assumption of the ‘perfect market’ in which ‘all the members of the 
community, even if they are not supposed to be strictly omniscient, are at least supposed to 
know automatically all that is relevant for their decisions,’ implies that ‘that skeleton in our 
cupboard, the “economic man”, whom we have exorcised with prayer and fasting, has 
returned through the back door in the form of a quasi-omniscient individual.’102 Thus, 
Hayek’s interpretative social science and the account of the self and the limits of its reason 
that underlies it would seem to place Hayekian thought in a good position to contribute 
tellingly to contemporary debates about culture and identity. This is precisely because at the 
root of Hayek’s anti-scientistic reclamation of economics for the human sciences and 
interpretative reformulation of the economic problem, is not a conception of ‘economic man’ 
but rather a conception of the self whose reason, it must be emphasised, is irremediably 
limited regardless of whether it participates in the economic or cultural nexus.
4. H ayek’s Problem: Meaning, the Market and the Depth o f  the S e lf
Significantly, however, the transposition of Hayekian thought from economic and distributive 
discourse to the domain of culture is not anywhere nearly as straightforward as this account 
would have us believe. For, beyond the brief above comments concerning the relationship 
between an assumption of omniscience and the kind of selves we are understood to be, Hayek 
does not discuss at any compelling length how his interpretative subjectivism militates against 
the model of reason of Homo economicus. Nor, perhaps more importantly does he state what 
an appropriate conception of human reason and agency should be, if  it is not to be that of
Neurath and von Mises in O’Neill, J., ‘Who won the Socialist Calculation Debate’, History o f  Political 
Thought, Volume XVII, Number 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 431-442, p. 442.
100 Kukathas, Hayek and Modem Liberalism, p. 57.
101 Fleetwood, Hayek’s Political Economy: the socio-economics o f  order, p.69; Cubeddu, The 
Philosophy o f  the Austrian School, pp. 74-5.
102 Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’, p. 46.
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Homo economicus}03 Of course, on numerous occasions in ‘Scientism and the Study of 
Society’, especially in the chapter on ‘“Conscious” Direction and the Growth of Reason’, 
Hayek is concerned to show that individual reason is socially constituted out of an 
intersubjective or ‘ interindividual’ process that is contemporary terminology would be best 
described as communitarian.104 This concern, moreover, is central to the paper 
‘Individualism: True and False’ where Hayek distinguishes his own, thoroughly social ‘true’ 
account of the self from the ‘false’ conception of ‘atomistic’ or ‘economic’ man.105 Yet, he 
does not go any further than this rather blunt claim and the reason for this should be clear - he 
does not have the conceptual resources to do so.106 All he can claim at this stage is that 
individual reason is socially constituted and that we are thoroughly social beings. What he 
does not explain is how this is so. That is, Hayek makes a claim about the nature of the self, 
but does not offer any argument, let alone a convincing one, to back this claim up.
He faces a similar problem, furthermore, in his account of the relationship between 
the social scientist and those he observes. As we have seen, for Hayek one cannot separate 
the interpretative process of the observer from the observed because the theorist classifies the 
social facts ultimately in terms of the conjectures he makes regarding the opinions those 
whose actions he wishes to explain have of them. Clearly doing so immediately involves the 
idea of a necessary commonality of understanding between the theorist and the agents. That 
is, observers themselves make claims about the attitudes of acting people only in virtue of 
what the observers believe as similar, acting people to those they study. ‘Our procedure is 
based’, Hayek claims, ‘on the experience that other people as a rule (though not always - if 
they are colorblind or mad) classify their sense impressions as we do.’107 Again, Hayek 
makes this clear with reference to our understanding of the actions of members of cultures 
very different from our own.108 That is, we must presuppose a commonality o f understanding, 
a communal matrix of shared meaning, if you will, in order to interpret effectively. Indeed, 
Hayek claims that where the ‘possibility of interpreting in terms of analogies from our own 
mind ceases, where we can no longer “understand”,’ he writes, ‘there is no sense in speaking 
about mind at all; there are then only physical facts which we can group and classify solely 
according to the physical properties which we observe.’109 However, as is the case with his 
claim that our reason is communally, or intersubjectively, constituted it is equally important 
to note here is that at this stage Hayek only claims that we do in fact understand in this way.
103 Fleetwood, Hayek’s Political Economy: the socio-economics o f  order, p.71.
104 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, pp. 152, 159-61; ‘Individualism: True and False’, pp. 
1-33.
105 Hayek, ‘Individualism: True and False’, pp. 1-32; Cubeddu, R., The Philosophy o f  the Austrian 
School, p. 39.
106 See also Madison, ‘How Individualistic is Methodological Individualism?’, pp. 44-50.
107 Hayek, ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 60-3.
108 Hayek, ibid., p. 66.
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That is, he gives no account of how it is that ‘we just know’ that two physically dissimilar 
social facts - for instance, where one agent fashions an object out of heated metal to produce a 
drinking vessel, whilst another operates a weaving machine to make a rug - are similarly 
meaningful as acts of production.
This, glaring hole in his theory, of course, is particularly damaging given that out of 
the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism Hayek not only wants to derive a 
thesis about the embedded nature of the self, but also a logically identical thesis about the 
epistemological limits faced by those who attempt study or determine the action of socially 
embedded agents as they make their way about the socio-economic nexus. The reason that 
this is so vital for Hayek is that out of it he derives his critique of planning and intervention in 
the economy, via his critique of the epistemological assumptions of the planner. These, we 
may remind ourselves, he equates with those of the economic theorist who assumes away the 
limitations to our knowledge, or of the over-zealous student of society who assumes he can 
safely ignore the subjective belief of those whose action he seeks to explain.110 Thus, despite 
their importance to his critique of scientism, the interpretative papers do not provide Hayek 
with all the resources needed to complete his project. That is they do not enable him to give 
more than an economic account of order nor to offer a convincing account of man. Hayek’s is 
a social theory, then, that can be said to start from the idea of ‘men whose whole nature and 
character is determined by their existence in society’ only in the most superficial and 
unsupported sense.111
This lacuna, of course, belies a significant problem with Hayek’s conception of the 
interpreting self at this stage of the development of his social theory. As Fleetwood observes, 
the fact that Hayek does not discuss the nature of the self in any great detail is intimately tied 
to the largely negative character of his research project at this point. For he was primarily 
concerned to displace the epistemological foundation of the general equilibrium model of 
economics and its underlying conception of human agency and rationality without offering a 
positive statement of why men are thoroughly social beings in the communitarian sense. 
Moreover, Fleetwood points out, this gap in Hayek’s thought also exposes a logically 
identical gap in his economic theory. Being more concerned to critique centralised economic 
planning on the basis of its epistemological difficulties, Hayek does not posit any institutions 
of his own beyond the exaggerated role he accords to the price mechanism of the market as 
the facilitator of the transmission of dispersed knowledge in society.112 He is, of course, able 
to offer a telling epistemological critique of many of the most important assumptions of neo­
classical economic theory but is unable at this time to offer his own positive account of how
109 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 43; ‘The Facts of the Social Sciences’, p. 66.
110 Cubeddu, The Philosophy o f  the Austrian School, pp. 38-9.
111 ‘Hayek, ‘Individualism: True and False’, p. 6.
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the problem of ‘the division of knowledge’ is overcome because he simply does not have the 
conceptual resources to do so.113 For, despite emphasising the epistemological problem faced 
by the adequate theorisation of economic action, Hayek realises that the communication of 
knowledge upon which successful co-ordination is based is not exhausted by the price 
mechanism of the market. Yet, he is also unhelpfully vague about what does facilitate such 
communication when prices do not, merely claiming that ‘there must be some discernible 
regularity in the world’ which allows individuals ‘to predict events properly,’114 and that it is 
‘exceedingly difficult to say what exactly are the assumptions on the basis of which we assert 
that there will be a tendency toward equilibrium.’115 ‘The dilemma for Hayek,’ concludes 
Fleetwood, is that at this stage ‘he can conceive of no institution other than the telecom 
system [that is, the price mechanism] that might facilitate the discovery, communication and 
storage of knowledge.’116 In his eagerness to escape the scientism of neo-classical economics, 
Hayek offers an underdetermined account of just how the very communication of knowledge 
which neo-classical theory assumes away is actually achieved. That is, he is overly reliant 
upon the price mechanism of the market as the most important institution that facilitates the 
communication of knowledge and economic co-ordination.
This, of course, is of great significance for it means that Hayek’s interpretative social 
science is necessary but certainly not sufficient for the transposition of his perspective - and 
ultimately, of the politics that flows from it - to the domain of culture, identity and difference. 
We could, of course, jettison his early work here, yet this would be at the cost o f the 
important conclusions he reached with respect to economics from that social science and the 
account of the self that it presupposes. Thus, given that the movement from economics to 
culture is precisely what we want to achieve in order to reconnect Hayek’s important 
epistemological concerns to contemporary debates, Hayek needs to offer a more convincing 
account of the self and community.
5. RuleSy Tradition and Hayek’s Conception o f  the Interpreting S e lf
Hayek, of course, was himself not unaware of the gaps in his social theory. In ‘Kinds of 
Rationalism’ he claimed that in ‘Economics and Knowledge’ he examined ‘the central 
difficulties of pure economic theory’ and concluded that its main task was to explain how
112 Fleetwood, Hayek’s Political Economy: the socio-economics o f  order, pp. 71 -  75.
113 Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’, p. 50; Fleetwood, Hayek’s Political Economy: the socio­
economics o f  order, p. 71.
114 Hayek, ibid., p. 49.
115 Hayek, ibid., p. 48.
116 Fleetwood, Hayek’s Political Economy: the socio-economic o f  order, p. 57. See also Keizer, 
‘Hayek’s Critique of Socialism’ p. 216 for the view that thus far Hayek’s arguments only relate to 
economic rather than cultural processes.
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knowledge was acquired and communicated without ever being concentrated in a single 
mind.117 Yet, he also conceded that it was still a great distance from this explanation
... to an adequate insight into the relations between the abstract rules which the individual 
follows in his actions, and the abstract overall order which is formed as a result of his 
responding, within the limits imposed upon him by those abstract rules, to the concrete 
particular circumstances which he encounters.118
Nonetheless, we are told that ‘Economics and Knowledge’ was ‘the starting point’ and the 
reason ‘why though at one time a very pure and narrow economic theorist, [he] was led from 
technical economics into all kinds of questions usually regarded as philosophical.’119 
Similarly, and again referring to ‘Economics and Knowledge’ as well as to ‘The Use of 
Knowledge in Society’, Hayek comments in Rules and Order, that ‘[t]he insight into the 
significance of our institutional ignorance in the economic sphere, and into the methods by 
which we have learned to overcome this obstacle, was in fact the starting point for ... ideas ... 
systematically applied to a much wider field.’120
How, then, were these ideas generalised to other fields of enquiry? Similarly to both 
the economic and social scientific papers central to Hayek’s later research programme was 
‘the fact of the necessary and irremediable ignorance of everyone’s part of most of the 
particular facts which determine the actions of all the several members of human society.’121 
‘The sum of the knowledge of all the individuals,’ he writes in The Constitution o f Liberty, 
‘exists nowhere as an integrated whole’ and because of this, the problem we must solve is 
‘how we can all profit from this knowledge, which exists only dispersed as the separate, 
partial, and sometimes conflicting beliefs of all men.’122 Indeed, he goes on to claim in a 
manner logically identical to his discussion of the economic problem that ‘[a]ny examination 
of the moral or legal order which leaves this fact out of account misses the central 
problem.’123 Thus, as with economics, the central problem of the human or social sciences in 
general was for Hayek the epistemological one of the (inter-)subjectivity of knowledge. 
Indeed, for the later Hayek, the ‘problem’ discussed is no longer just an economic problem
117 Hayek, ‘Kinds of Rationalism’, p. 91.
118 Hayek, ibid., p. 92. Hayek goes on to say that it is only at this point that he has reached what seems 
to be ‘a tolerably clear picture of the nature of the spontaneous order of which liberal economists have 
so long been talking.’ (‘Kinds of Rationalism’, p. 92)
119 Hayek, ibid., p. 91.
120 Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 13. See also Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, p. 35, n. 13
121 Hayek, ibid., p. 12. Indeed, he continues that our irremediably limited knowledge is ‘the reason 
why most social institutions have taken the form they actually have.’
122 Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, p. 25.
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but is no less than a general human predicament that emerges directly from our membership 
of traditions and adherences to traditional practices.
How, then, is this ‘central problem’ to be solved? For the later Hayek, and in sharp 
contrast to his earlier work, it is via the notion of the rule of conduct, or practice or tradition, 
and not just that of the price mechanism, that knowledge is communicated both beyond and, 
indeed, prior to the economic sphere. However, as was the case with his discussion of social 
wholes, we must be careful not to impute to Hayek here a naive ontologically realist account 
of rules as being in some significant sense physically real. Similarly to Taylor, for Hayek 
rules and practices are not things, but rather are theorised by us in as much as they are 
manifested in the regularities of conduct that we observe in social agents.124 Rules, moreover, 
are the facilitators of co-ordination and order in a world that can only ever be partially known 
because they enable our actions to be adapted not only to the facts that we do know, those in 
our immediate environment, but also to those that are located beyond it.125 Rules and 
practices are indispensable to our acting successfully because they enable us to cope with the 
fact that we are only ever privy to a limited number of the facts in the social world around 
us.126 Hayek claims in The Mirage o f Social Justice
... we are guided in most of our plans for action by the knowledge not of concrete particular 
facts but by knowledge of what kinds of conduct are ‘appropriate’ in certain kinds of 
circumstances - not because they are means to a particular desired result, but because they are 
a restriction on that we may do without upsetting an order on whose existence we all count in 
deciding on our actions.127
Moreover, as guides to appropriate action, they transmit knowledge through time so that we 
may take advantage of the experience of previous generations.128 That is, rules and practices 
are the bearers of tradition-bound or tacit knowledge. Our tacit knowledge, moreover, to an 
important extent delimits the kinds of actions that are acceptable to us without us knowing in 
any explicit sense why. Furthermore, and more significantly for present purposes, Hayek 
claims that, along with the price mechanism, rules and practices transmit knowledge among 
contemporaries. ‘The successful combination of knowledge and aptitude,’ he writes,
124 Hayek, ‘Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct’ (1967), p. 67; Rules and Order, 
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... is not selected by common deliberation, by people seeking a solution to their problems 
through a joint effort; it is the product of individuals imitating those who have been more 
successful and from their being guided by signs or symbols, such as prices offered for their 
products or expressions or moral or aesthetic esteem for their having observed standards of 
conduct -  in short, of their using the results of the experiences of others.129
Thus, with the notion of the rule, tradition or practice Hayek is at last able to offer a fuller, 
deeper account of economic co-ordination, although crucially one that does not do away with 
but rather deepens the earlier account of co-ordination in the economic papers. The notion of 
the rule also allows Hayek to give a more complete account of interpretation in the human 
sciences. In ‘Rules, Perception and Intelligibility’ he returned to one of the important themes 
of ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, that of the relationship between the social theorist 
and those whose actions he studies. However, instead of just stating that social facts are 
interpreted in virtue of what the theorist conjectures the world means to the actors, he now 
provides an account of how the theorist is actually capable of doing this. That is, Hayek now 
discusses the rules and traditions that facilitate a commonality of understanding between the 
theorist and those whose action he seeks to explain. It is here, then, where Hayek does not 
just baldly claim that the actions of others are meaningful to us. Rather, he backs this up with 
the further claim that they are meaningful because ‘some of the rules in terms of which we 
perceive and act are the same as those by which the conduct of those whose actions we 
interpret is guided.’130 What Hayek invokes, then, is an account of meaning located within 
the matrix of community and thus emphasises the intersubjective preconditions for individual 
choice. Of course, given that both the theorist and the agent inhabit this matrix of meaning, 
the rules and practices that constitute it not only enable the former to interpret the actions of 
agents upon the basis of what the world means to the latter, they also explain how the world is 
meaningful to those agents whose actions are thus interpreted. It is with this conception of 
rules, then, that we may see Hayek’s position as a fully hermeneutical one. Meaningfulness is 
no longer posited but is substantiated, although without relinquishment of the conclusions of 
the earlier, largely unsubstantiated, arguments.
Clearly, this reading of the significance of rules for Hayek militates against reading 
him as a crude conservative for whom tradition is to be valued in itself.131 Any 
‘conservatism’ here, then, is not in any sense political but, rather, socio-theoretic. That is, it 
manifests itself in a descriptive account of reason and its limits that comes before any
129 Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, pp. 28-9; ‘Competition as a Discovery Procedure’, pp. 181-2. 
See also Gray, Hayek on Liberty, pp. 15-6; Crossley, Intersubjectivity: the fabric o f  social becoming, p. 
92.
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normative deliberations on justice. It is in this regard that Hayek is echoing Hume whose 
defence of liberal justice, as Kukathas explains, ‘is grounded in a ‘conservative’ acceptance of 
existing order as the framework for all moral and political thought.’ Thus, far from it being 
the case that Hume’s - or Hayek’s - conservatism is political, these ‘conservative’ arguments 
about reason and its limits ‘are significant because they show Hume’s [and Hayek’s] 
antipathy towards attempts to construct a rational philosophical foundation or justification of 
existing human practice’132 regardless, one may venture to add, of which particular account of 
politics that practice affirms. Indeed, even this may be to concede too much. If this 
conservative element is ultimately constitutive of a set of claims about reason and not politics, 
it seems odd to claim that it is in any non-trivial sense conservative. To do so would be to 
presuppose an alternative ‘progressive’ account of reason that this account denies. Moreover, 
as Kenneth Minogue has noted, Hayek’s emphasis upon tradition and inherited institutions is 
in any case
... based upon their consequences in promoting prosperity. The conservative support for what 
we have inherited arises from, by contrast, a concern with our own concrete identity, and this 
is a concern for which Hayek, whose strength lies in abstraction, cares little. The conservative 
view is that we ought not lightly to challenge religious, or patriotic, or habitual practices and 
loyalties, because these things reveal to us what we are, and no politics that ignores what we 
are, in all our historical concreteness, can be successful.133
Such a view of traditions - traditions and inherited practices as having an instrumental value - 
is stressed by Hayek himself in various places in The Constitution o f  Liberty although, to be 
sure, his own discussion suggests an understanding of ‘prosperity’ that is wider than 
Minogue’s. For Hayek traditions are useful because they promote what could be called 
‘epistemic’ rather than merely material prosperity. That is, they promote the maximisation of 
that practical wisdom in terms of which we make our way in a complex world that would 
otherwise be lost to us.
... We understand one another and get along with one another, are able to act successfully on 
our plans, because, most of the time, members of our civilization conform to unconscious 
patterns of conduct, show a regularity in their actions that is not the result of commands or 
coercion, often not even of a conscious adherence to known rules, but of firmly established 
habits and traditions. The general observance of these conventions is a necessary condition of 
the orderliness of the world in which we live, of our being able to find our way in it, though
132 Kukathas, Hayek and Modem Liberalism, p. 23.
133 Minogue, K., ‘Hayek and Conservatism: Beatrice and Benedick?’, in Butler, E. and Pirie, M. (eds.), 
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we do not know their significance and may not even be consciously aware of their
134existence.
Thus, despite being correct in stopping short of labelling him as a conservative, it seems that 
Minogue misunderstands what Hayek achieves via the invocation of rules. For Hayek, rules 
and practices are intimately tied to our ‘concrete identities’ and, as such, also help to resolve 
the third problem we have claimed besets his earlier social theory: the problem of the 
shallowness of his conception of the self. For rules and practices not only serve to co­
ordinate our action, in doing so they also constitute us and shape what actions we will actually 
take and which preferences we will form.135 Crucially, as we have seen, they do this by 
embodying tacit or practical knowledge and, as such, delimit the choices we may conceivably 
make in any particular context.136 That is, for Hayek we are the kinds of people that we are 
qua interpreters of the world precisely in response to the epistemological predicament that the 
social environment confronts us with.137
That his invocation of rules and practices falls short o f a conservative politics does 
not mean that Hayek must not be concerned with identity and the nature of the self is made 
very clear by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti in ‘Individualism, Social Rules, Tradition: The Case 
of Friederich A. Hayek.’ Central to Galeotti’s account is the fact that for Hayek the identity 
of the self is constituted by the often-unconscious rules of action that it follows which 
simultaneously enable one to co-ordinate one’s behaviour and plans with others. As she 
explains, it is not simply the case that the social rules of conduct and traditional practices are 
‘instruments for means-end rationality, working toward coordination or toward goals whose 
success requires coordination.’ To be sure, they do work in this way, but not exclusively so 
because individual actors ‘are not really aware of following rules and are not really able to 
spell them out.’138 Rather, ‘the system of uncreated rules is something more than a mere 
instrument for the display of rationality, insofar as it is constitutive of social practices, shared 
meanings, common understanding, and personal identity.’139 ‘The rules of conduct,’ she 
continues, ‘are not merely regulative rules of behaviour. Rather, they are constitutive rules,
134 Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, p. 62, pp. 66-67.
135 See Crossley, Intersubjectivity: the fabric o f  social becoming, where tacit knowledge or 
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defining the range of possible interactions in the various areas of human action, providing the 
actors with the resources for understanding and communication, and, finally bringing about 
social co-ordination. In this sense, the rules of conduct constitute social practices.’140 It is 
here where similarly to Minogue, Roland Kley also errs in his understanding of the role of 
practices in Hayek. Kley claims that Hayek’s cardinal error is that he ‘completely fails to 
realise’ that social rules of conduct are constitutive of, as well as instrumentally conducive to, 
socio-economic co-ordination.141 The cardinal error here, however, seems to be Kley’s and 
not Hayek’s,142 for in his social thought
individuals do not appear as isolated entities, each one involved in the fulfilment of his or her 
goals, plans, and aims within their private spheres, protected from external interference, as 
they appear in Hayek’s conception of the state. Hayek’s social philosophy portrays 
individuals as living within a context of traditional rules, which constitutes the ground for 
individual identity, common understanding, and shared meaning. It is only within this social 
environment that the single individual can conceive of plans and goals in a meaningful way 
for her life and the lives of the people she cares for. In a word, Hayek’s version of community 
is tradition.143
Given, moreover, that rules are constitutive of our identities and also themselves changeable, 
it follows for Hayek that our identities are similarly changeable.144
To recap, then, we have seen that it is via the notion of the rule, practice or tradition 
that Hayek is able to deepen his interpretative account of social science. In the first instance, 
the invocation of tradition enables him to offer a positive account of economic co-ordination 
that is not overly reliant upon the price mechanism of the market. Secondly, tradition 
provides him with a robust explanation of the notion of meaning that is so central to his 
subjectivism. Finally, the notion of tradition allows him to give a more complete account of 
our embedded natures that moves his thought clearly beyond the mere claim that we are 
thoroughly social beings to the explanation of why this is so.
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5 .i  The Epistemological Limitations o f  Tradition
Of course, it is not only the fact that Hayek is able to resolve some important problems in his 
social theory with the account of tradition. Perhaps more significantly for present purposes, 
he is able to posit a thesis concerning the limits of reason that, we will observe in the next 
chapter, allows him to derive distinctively liberal political conclusions from decidedly 
communitarian premises. For with the fact of our embeddedness within tradition comes an 
important implication for the notion of meaning in virtue of which we interpret the world and 
the action of others. In brief, it is that ‘if to have meaning’ is to have a place in an order 
which we share with other people,’ Hayek writes in ‘Rules, Perception and Intelligibility’
... this order itself cannot have meaning because it cannot have a place in itself. A point may 
have a distinct place in a network of lines which differentiates it from all other points in that 
network; and, similarly, a complex structure of relationships may be distinguished from all 
other similar structures by a place in a more comprehensive structure which gives each 
element of the first structure and its relations a distinct ‘place.’ But the distinguishing 
character of such an order could never be defined by its place in itself, and a mechanism 
possessing such an order, though it may be able to indicate meaning by reference to such a 
place, can never by its action so reproduce the set of relations which defines this place as to 
distinguish it from another such set of relations.145
Acceptance of what can be here called Hayek’s hermeneutic circle, provides ‘the framework 
within which the problem of meaning (intelligibility, significance, understanding) can be 
meaningfully discussed’ and, of course, also implies definite epistemological limits upon our 
powers of explanation.146 It is interesting to compare how Hayek describes the rules that 
govern the workings of the mind and those that govern human action in Rules and Order. 
Since the system of rules that governs the operation of the mind, is itself embedded in a social 
structure that is also ‘constituted by rules of conduct, it is similarly impossible for the mind to 
step outside society and view its operation from beyond,’147 or ‘to articulate the rules upon 
which the operation of society depends.’148 That is, Hayek denies the existence of an 
Archimedean standpoint from which it is possible to comprehend - and thus momentarily to 
pause to articulate in comprehensive fashion -  either the workings of mind or of society. 
Thus, in ‘The Errors of Constructivism’ Hayek claims that ‘ [t]he picture o f man as a being 
who, thanks to his reason, can rise above the values of his civilisation, in order to judge it
Liberalism, pp. 90 - 1, 97, 128 - 9. This, of course, ties in at a most fundamental level with Taylor’s 
ideas concerning man as a self-interpreting animal.
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148 Kukathas, ibid., p. 54.
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from the outside, or from a higher point of view, is an illusion.’ Rather, ‘[a]ll we can ever do 
is to confront one part with the other parts. ’ ‘ [S]udden complete reconstruction of the whole,’ 
he adds, ‘is not possible at any stage of the process, because we must always use the material 
that is available, and which itself is the integrated product of a process of evolution.’149 This, 
of course, relates directly to his earlier distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ individualism 
and the constructivist rationalism the latter gives rise to.150 The distinction Hayek has in mind 
is precisely that between the atomised, asocial individual of Homo economicus and the 
embedded individual, between ‘the individualism which sets man apart from society and ‘the 
liberalism which sees man’s individuality as an organic part of social life.’151
Moreover, the key aspect of this, writes Gray, ‘is the distinction [Hayek] finds in the 
different role allotted within each individualist tradition to the use of reason. In the one, 
reason has an architectonic and constructive role, whereas in the other it is critical, 
exploratory and only one aspect of the process of cultural evolution.’152 Central here is the 
notion of tacit knowledge. Not only is it the case that we are incapable of surveying the total 
order of society, we are similarly incapable of articulating in any explicit way the knowledge 
that we do have because, as tradition-bound knowledge, it is tacitly held. Thus, writes Gray, 
Hayek claims that because the ‘false’ individualist neglects ‘the dependency of reason itself 
on spontaneous order in the life of the mind’, he inverts ‘the true relations of tacit with 
explicit knowledge and accords reason a prescriptive role it is wholly unfitted to perform in 
mind or society.’153 Indeed, to think that some of us could either plan or offer an explanatory 
account of the total order of society would in the final analysis constitute a rather crude and 
groundless epistemological exceptionalism. At the forefront of this exceptionalism, of course, 
would be the assumption that rather than being thoroughly social beings, much of whose 
knowledge was tacitly-held, we - or at least some of us - would be extrasocial beings 
endowed with fully explicit knowledge of the preferences and desires of ourselves and others. 
Indeed, as Hayek somewhat facetiously comments in ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, 
those who recognise the thoroughly social nature of man yet who do not recognise that at the 
same time this imposes limitations upon their own faculty of reason often have ‘some special 
theory which exempts their own views from the same sort of explanation and which credits 
them as a specially favored class, or simply as the “free-floating intelligentsia”, with the 
possession of absolute knowledge.’154 Clearly, then, for the later Hayek we are thoroughly 
embedded in the social matrix of cultural rules and, as such, are far removed from the asocial,
149 Hayek, ‘The Errors of Constructivism’ (1970), New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and 
the History o f  Ideas, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 20.
150 On this, see Hayek, ‘Individualism: True and False’, pp. 1-32.
151 Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 130.
152 ibid.
153 Gray, ibid., p. 30.
47
utility-maximising animal otherwise known as Homo economicus.155 Indeed, he has little 
time for ‘the silliest of the common misunderstandings: the belief that individualism 
postulates (or bases its arguments on the assumption of) the existence of isolated or self- 
contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose whole nature and character is 
determined by their existence in society.156 With the account of rules, then, Hayek can not 
only make good on the then largely unsubstantiated claim that reason itself ‘does not exist in 
the singular, as given or available to any particular person ... but must be conceived as an 
interpersonal process in which anyone’s contribution is tested and corrected by others, he can 
also position himself with respect to debates about culture precisely because these rules, 
traditions and practices are cultural phenomena.157
6. The Theory o f  Cultural Evolution and Culturally Diverse Societies
Perhaps the clearest example of Hayek’s later concern with culture lies in his claim that 
traditions themselves are subject to alteration precisely because we in turn constitute and are 
constituted by them. As such, and because we only ever act and interpret within the cultural 
matrix we are unable to determine as an act o f our conscious collective will which rules, 
traditions and practices ought to be adhered to. Given this, the process of the selection of 
rules is passed on in Hayek to a process of cultural evolution rather than human choice.158 For 
Hayek then, as Kley points out, there are actually two forms of spontaneous order at work. At 
the first, lower level, there is the spontaneous order yielded by the regular observance of rules 
and practices whilst at a higher level there is the body of rules and practices evolving 
spontaneously; that is, the process of cultural evolution.159 Moreover, ‘[t]he structures formed
154 Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’, p. 158.
155 On this see Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 130; Fleetwood, Hayek: the socio-economics o f  order, p. 148; 
Kukathas, Hayek and Modem Liberalism, p.97.
156 Hayek, ‘Individualism: True and False’, p. 6; Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, pp. 90-91; 
Fleetwood, Hayek’s Political Economy: the socio-economics o f  order, pp. 84-85.
157 Hayek, ibid., p. 15.
158 Hayek, Rules and Order, pp. 18-19. Crowley develops Hayek’s conception here to contrast his 
selection of rules via the social process of cultural evolution with the contractarian hypothetical choice- 
situation of Rawls in A Theory o f  Justice. On this see Crowley, The Self, the Individual, and the 
Community: Liberalism in the Political Thought o f  F. A. Hayek and Sidney and Beatrice Webb, pp. 
199-202; see also Cubeddu, The Philosophy o f the Austrian School, p. 40. Consistent with this, Hayek 
critiques social contract theory as the appropriate methodology for the derivation of rules of justice. 
On this see Hayek, ‘Scientism and the Study of Society’ p. 142. An interesting field of research would 
be to investigate how far this critique would impact upon contemporary theories o f the selection of 
moral rules, such as Thomas Scanlon’s. On this, see in Scanlon, T., What We Owe One Another, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1998.
159 Hayek, The Political Order o f  a Free People, p. 156; Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, 
pp. 38-9. Kley also claims, erroneously, that Hayek ‘is led to put the spontaneous formation of order 
within given rules and the evolutionary development o f  rules in the same category (Kley, Hayek’s 
Social and Political Thought, p.39). However, the paper ‘Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules 
of Conduct’ (a paper which Kley strangely refers to at this part of his book) is devoted to the 
relationship between the two and where he claims that the two actually inform - via the notion of 
immanent criticism - each other. For Gray, moreover, the selection of competing cultural traditions
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by traditional human practices,’ he writes, ‘are neither natural in the sense of being 
genetically determined, nor artificial in the sense of being the product of intelligent design, 
but the result o f a process of winnowing or sifting.’160
What is of special importance to note at the outset, then, is that Hayek is keen to 
distance himself from the idea that by the evolution of culture he is drawing any strict analogy 
with the notion of natural selection in the natural sciences, most notably in biology. In The 
Constitution o f  Liberty, for example, he is quite explicit about this and states that rather than 
being a process of natural selection in which only the fittest survive, for cultural evolution 
‘the decisive factor is not the selection of the physical and inheritable properties of the 
individuals but the selection by imitation of successful institutions and habits.’161 That is, it is 
via individual migration between norms that the wider body of social rules that shape our 
actions transforms itself over time.162 This runs counter to Kukathas’s reading in Hayek and 
Modern Liberalism who claims that the reason that unsuccessful traditions will not survive is 
because those who identify with them and who do not adapt will not survive.163 The problem 
here is that Kukathas conflates physical survival with survival qua particular, culturally 
‘thick’ person. The person actually does survive, regardless of whether or not they migrate 
from one tradition to another. Nevertheless, there is still a crucial question here for Hayek to 
answer: which rules survive and in virtue of what criterion do they survive? It seems that the 
criterion here is the persistence of different cultural groups and the individuals that comprise 
them.164
What is doubly significant about Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution for present 
purposes is the two-fold relevance they have to culturally diverse societies and to our concern 
with justice within them. No longer does cultural evolution have to be understood to relate to 
a competitive process between discrete traditions, each with its own broadly identifiable 
territorial boundaries; that is, to a competitive process between states. Rather, the theory of
constitutes the third element of Hayek’s wider notion of spontaneous order. On this, see Gray, Hayek 
on Liberty, Chapter 2.
160 Hayek, The Political Order o f a Free People, p. 155.
161 Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, p. 59, emphasis added; The Political Order o f  a Free People, 
Law, Legislation and Liberty, volume three, p. 159; ‘Nature v. Nurture Once Again’ (1971), New 
Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economic sand the History o f  Ideas, p. 291.
162 Hayek, ‘Nature v. Nurture Once Again’ (1971), p. 292. Hayek discusses this process and the 
relationship between rules and the aggregate order of actions yielded by following them at greater 
length in Hayek, ‘Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct’ (1967).
163 Kukathas, Hayek and Modem Liberalism, p. 81. For Hayek, Gray writes, ‘the evolution of culture 
may itself be fruitfully investigated in terms of the competition between different traditions or 
practices, with a natural selection among them occurring which is at least partly to be explained by 
their relative efficiency as bearers or embodiments of knowledge.’ Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 41.
164 Hayek, Rules and Order, pp. 18-19, The Political Order o f  a Free People, pp. 155-9, ‘The Errors of 
Constructivism, pp. 19-20, ‘Kinds of Rationalism’, p. 86, ‘Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules 
of Conduct’, p. 69 for Hayek’s non-naturalistic selection. See also Kley, The Social and Political 
thought o f  Hayek, pp. 161-5 and Witt, U., ‘The Theory of Societal Evolution: Hayek’s Unfinished 
Legacy’, p. 183 for a reading of Hayek discussing the survival of groups rather than individuals.
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cultural evolution may be reformulated to refer to the competition that occurs within states 
between differing cultural traditions, or more specifically between the norms those traditions 
endorse. What is important, then, is that Hayek’s arguments concerning cultural evolution 
highlight the need to answer the question of how we should respond when a competitive 
process for adherents between traditions takes place not only between but also within 
societies. Moreover, the discovery process that Hayek’s thought clearly endorses with respect 
to the resolution of economic issues does not merely concern itself with arbitrating between 
different viewpoints concerning diverse cultural issues, as if  these were readily apparent to the 
arbitrating agent, but also facilitates the emergence of what these viewpoints actually are.
7. Conclusion
In this chapter, an argument has been made that achieves two things. Firstly, by offering an 
interpretative reading of Hayek’s social theory, we have been able to read back onto his 
earlier reformulation of the economic problem facing society and critique of the key 
assumption of neo-classical economics an interpretative critique of ‘scientism’ in economic 
theory and in economic practice. We also saw, however, that Hayek runs into difficulties 
when trying to give an adequate account of just how the communication of the knowledge 
necessary for the achievement of economic order is made possible. This problem is in fact 
two-fold. On the one hand, his account of the interpreting self is a shallow one and therefore 
does not really achieve the displacement of homo economicus that he sought. Moreover, and 
because of this, he is led to over-exaggerate the role of the price mechanism of the market as 
the facilitator of economic co-ordination.
Ultimately, however, Hayek answers both problems by developing a more robust and 
explicit conception of the self via the notion of the rule, or practice. It is in virtue of rules, we 
may remind ourselves, that the preferences of diverse and mutually-ignorant actors are 
formed and reconciled and their disparate knowledges made use of. More significantly, for 
the purposes of the argument we wish to make here, we have seen that not only does Hayek’s 
invocation of the rule or practice ‘deepen’ his account of the interpreting self without 
jeopardizing the important interpretative insights lying behind the reformulation of the 
economic problem. It also means that he is able to contribute to both economic and cultural 
discourse in a profound way because the traditions in virtue of which economic co-ordination 
takes place do not only co-ordinate economic knowledge but also cultural knowledge. More 
importantly still, the rules themselves are subject to change - although not via a process of 
conscious selection - and thus are constitutive of a wider process of cultural selection that 
relates in a most direct way to multiculturalism’s contemporary concern with the relative 
status of the members of the diverse traditions of any given society.
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With the introduction of the notion of tradition Hayek is able to extend his hitherto 
purely economic considerations into the domain of culture. Most importantly for present 
purposes, he is able to do so without relinquishing the important achievement of the 
reformulation of the economic problem facing society, or the interpretative account of the self 
that underlies it. This, of course, is of supreme importance because it means that Hayekian 
thought may contribute meaningfully to contemporary debates about culture and identity and, 
more importantly, contribute at the most profound level by questioning not only the 
significance of culture and cultural diversity to politics, but by actually reformulating what the 
‘cultural question’ may in fact be.
Thus, Hayek’s reformulation of the economic problem facing society and our 
Hayekian extension of this to the domain of culture means that not only is it the case that the 
‘post-socialist cultural turn’ has failed to marginalize his concerns. Rather, the extension of 
his concerns to culture has rendered that very turn normatively irrelevant. For the Hayekian 
perspective, it is a moot point as to whether the focus of our concerns is economic or cultural, 
distributive or constitutive. For, as he states in The Constitution o f Liberty, ‘it is very 
questionable whether there are any actions which can be called merely “economic”.’165 
‘Economic considerations,’ he continues, ‘are merely those by which we reconcile and adjust 
our different purposes, none of which, in the last resort, are economic (excepting those of the 
miser or the man for whom making money has become an end in itself).’166 Whatever our 
concerns are, of primary importance is that practical decisions with respect to them have to be 
made under the assumption of the self’s practice-bound, embedded nature, its ignorance of its 
fellows and the epistemological burden both assumptions bring with it.
Before outlining the contours of a Hayekian account of cultural justice, however, we 
must further develop our Hayekian reformulation of the cultural and economic problems as 
we draw out the implications of his social thought - including his conception of the self - for 
normative political theory. It is to the account of Hayekian justice as an answer to society’s 
‘cultural co-ordination problem’, then, that we will turn next.
165 Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, p. 35.
166 ibid.
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2 Cultural Justice as a Co-ordination Problem
1. Introduction
We saw in the previous chapter that the Hayekian perspective is after all capable of 
addressing both distributive and cultural concerns via a re-reading of Hayek as an 
interpretative social theorist who assumes a radically embedded account of the self. We are 
now in a position to explore the implications of this interpretative reading of Hayek for his 
apparently tangential position to contemporary concerns in the theory of justice. What might 
these implications be? That is, what does the Hayekian positive account of the self as a 
socially embedded interpreter imply for normative political theory?
There seem to be at least two. Firstly, given the importance of the notion of 
interpretation to Hayek’s account, it would seem clear that the settlement of public political 
questions concerning either just distribution or the relative status of the diverse members of 
society need in some sense to refer to the social meanings implicit in the traditions of that 
society. Of course, it is crucial here to remind ourselves of the fundamental epistemological 
timbre of the Hayekian account of interpretation and the questions it raises concerning the 
authority of any given interpretation of those meanings to which we are supposed to refer 
when deciding upon such questions. For, given the unique Hayekian emphasis upon the 
epistemological burdens that come with what today would be called a communitarian 
acknowledgement of our thoroughly social nature, it is clear that for Hayek these meanings 
are not to be revealed but rather discovered. Thus, building upon the Hayekian reformulation 
of the economic and cultural problems facing society, the interpretative reading issues in what 
I shall call the epistemological reformulation of economic and cultural justice.167 In both 
cases, furthermore, the consequence of the interpretative reading of Hayek’s social theory is a 
the normative argument for individual interpretation that privileges the public protection of 
individual interpretative domains - the exploitation of which constitutes the cultural and 
economic process - over and above the political achievement of an ‘optimal’ economic or 
cultural end-state. Optimal cultural and economic end-states, that is, are not to be understood 
as the ambition of public political decision-making but, rather, as the ever-changing results of 
the cultural and economic processes which the state is obliged to protect.
In this chapter, I will draw out the normative implications of the Hayekian account of 
the radically social interpreting self. In the first instance, Hayek’s account will be seen to lead
167 For a critique of the association of libertarianism with hermeneutics more generally see Quinn, K., 
and Green, T. R., ‘Hermeneutics and Libertarianism: An Odd Couple’, Critical Review, vol. 12, no. 3 
(1998), pp. 207-223.
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to the claim that justice must be seen as an answer rather than as a question. That is, rather 
than defend a substantive account of the requirements of justice, such as the maximisation of 
the position of the least well-off, the achievement of material equality, or the satisfaction of 
the doctrinal demands of a particular religion, one must offer an account of how the demands 
of such substantive accounts may be reconciled with one another, given our mutual ignorance 
and thoroughly social natures. More specifically, just because for Hayek no individual is ever 
in a position authoritatively to claim what an optimal distributive or cultural outcome for 
society would be, nor what their achievement would practically require, we must view justice 
as an answer to this epistemological predicament, rather than as a question that we may 
answer in any substantive way. Because of this, what justice secures for us are the conditions 
for the social discovery and achievement of cultural optima. In the section that follows, I will 
briefly set out the implications the notion of interpretation has for politics and how our 
reading o f Hayek as an interpretative theorist relates to them. In the light of this, in sections 3 
and 4, I will claim that justice best answers the economic and a cultural co-ordination 
problems facing society when configured along individualist lines and that in the final 
analysis the very distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ justice is at best a tenuous 
one. Finally, in section 5, we will proceed to further elucidate this conception of justice via 
Hayek’s account of the law of liberty and the delimitation and protection of individual 
domains that the arguments for individual economic and cultural interpretation demand. In 
doing so, I will also attempt to correct certain prevalent misconceptions within contemporary 
Hayekian scholarship about the proper foundational status of Hayek’s normative enterprise.
2. Interpretation, Politics and The Epistemological Reformulation o f  Justice
In Justice and Interpretation, Georgia Wamke contrasts the broad features of interpretative 
politics with the ‘Kantian’ approach to political theory that seeks to provide a ‘neutral 
procedure for a rational choice of political principles.’168 One of the most salient 
characteristics of the interpretative method, she claims, is that it seeks to justify our principles 
of justice in terms of their being ‘appropriate for us because of our history and traditions, or 
social practices and the kind of community we are.’169 Moreover, with this emphasis upon the 
particularity of those communal traditions and practices that are to be the ultimate source of 
the content and justification of public political principles of justice comes the centrality to the 
interpretative approach of the notion of the hermeneutic circle. Again, the contrast with the 
foundationalist or Kantian approach is clear. In this latter approach, the idea of an extra- 
communal foundation acts as a starting point, a point of theoretical departure if  you will, for
168 Wamke, Justice and Interpretation, p. 3.
169 ibid., p. vii. See also Walzer, M., Spheres o f Justice, esp. chapter 1; Dworkin, R., Laws Empire, 
Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press, 1986.
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the political theory to be outlined and justified. What the interpretative approach makes clear, 
by contrast, is that there is no such point of departure but, rather, only the circular appeal to 
and process of interpretation of the understandings that the community is said to share and in 
virtue of which the principles are to be justified.170
For now, however, it is important to note that it is at this point where the 
interpretative approach is beset by two particularly acute problems. Following Wamke, we 
may call these the problems of conventionalism and subjectivism.171 The problem of 
conventionalism centres upon the doubt that we are able effectively to criticise the meanings 
that we share if we accept first that they define the field of meaning that is our reference point 
in assessing principles of justice. Secondly, if all we do have are differing and often 
conflicting sets of culturally-bounded shared meanings and yet no independent, non- 
subjective means of adjudicating the desirability of one set over an above the others, it 
remains unclear what normative purchase the appeal to traditions and conventions may have, 
regardless of how they are interpreted. As Wamke makes clear,
[hjermeneutic political theorists calling for the most substantial reforms in our practices and 
institutions as well as hermeneutic theorists content with the way things are will all be able to 
claim that they are being conventionalistic in that they are simply being faithful to the real 
meanings of these practices and institutions. But since this phenomenon will mean that a 
hermeneutic political theory can go either the way of “contemporary German apologists for 
Nazism” or the way of Rawlsian liberals ... it might be asked whether a hermeneutic approach 
can help clarify issues of justice at all.172
What this suggests, then, is that it is not immediately apparent what specific normative 
conclusions, if  any, one may come to from a methodological commitment to interpretivism. 
Related to this, of course, is Wamke’s concern with the idea that our shared social meanings 
are subject to an irreducible plurality of interpretations.173 Ultimately, for Wamke such a 
concern means that the task of the theory of justice is reoriented from the project of the 
elucidation and adjudication of principles of justice whether from first principles or from 
culturally specific meanings - to the promotion of discussion.174
Similarly, for Hayek and similarly to the reformulation of the economic and cultural 
problems discussed in the previous chapter, the limits to individual knowledge leads one to
170 ibid., p. 5.
171 ibid., pp. 6-11.
172 ibid., pp. 10-11.
173 ibid., p 11.
174 ibid., pp. 11-12, Chapters 7 and 8. On the relationship of the two parameters of the re-orientation in 
the political theory of Iris Marion Young, see Tebble, A. J., ‘What is the Politics of Difference?’, 
Political Theory, Volume 30, Number 2, April 2002, pp. 259-281.
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radically reconsider the task that justice sets out to achieve. The reason why justice cannot be 
reflective of a substantive preference for a particular distributive or cultural outcome is 
twofold. Firstly, and similarly to Wamke, such an approach would factor out the plurality of 
interpretations of what justice would require and secondly because even if  there were 
unanimity concerning this, it would presuppose the epistemological possibility o f a) assuming 
knowledge of the outcome of the cultural process itself and b) of ordering the actions of 
discrete individuals so as to conform to what that assumption required. This provisional 
assumption of omniscience, of course, is itself all too often assumed to be of little 
consequence, to be an assumption ‘which can later be dropped without much effect on the 
conclusions’ arrived at upon its basis.175
For Hayek, however, this assumption is of central, if not supreme consequence 
because ultimately its falsity accounts for the possibility of justice itself.176 ‘[T]he possibility 
of justice,’ he writes, ‘rests on [the] necessary limitation o f our factual knowledge, and that 
insight into the nature of justice is therefore denied to all those constructivists who habitually 
argue on the assumption of omniscience.’177 Clearly, this comment echoes precisely the 
argument he made in ‘Economics and Knowledge’ and ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ 
against neo-classical economic theory’s postulate of omniscience. Indeed, in Rules and Order 
Hayek acknowledges that the earlier forays into the implications of dispersed knowledge in 
economics were the starting point for his generalisation of the same thesis in Law, Legislation 
and Liberty. The assumption he describes in Rules and Order is logically identical to that 
critically examined in ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society.’ It is, no less, than the neo­
classical assumption of economic equilibrium. It is interesting to compare how similar 
Hayek’s respective expressions of the synoptic delusion are. In Rules and Order he explains 
how the synoptic delusion of omniscience ‘assumes away the central problem which any 
effort towards the understanding or shaping of order in society raises: our incapacity to 
assemble as a surveyable whole all the data which enter into the social order.’178 Similarly, in 
‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ he describes how the approach to economic theory that 
‘starts from the assumption that people’s knowledge corresponds with the objective facts of 
the situation, systematically leaves out what is our main task to explain.’179 Furthermore, he 
writes that ‘[t]o assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind in the same manner in 
which to assume it to be given to us as explaining economists is to assume the problem away 
and to disregard everything that is important and significant in the real world.’180 This, of
175 Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 12.
176 ibid., p. 13.
177 ibid., emphasis added. See also Hayek and Modem Liberalism, p. 139.
178 Hayek, Rules and Order, pp. 14-15.
179 Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, p. 91.
180 ibid.
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course, is but a particular instance of the more general thesis concerning the requirement of 
rules and practices for omniscient people. Just as ‘ [t]here would be no need for rules among 
omniscient people who were in agreement on the relative importance of all the different 
ends,’ Hayek claims that ‘[a]ny examination of the moral or legal order which leaves this fact 
out of account misses the central problem.’181 All of this leads Hayek to reconsider at the 
most fundamental level the problem that the theory of justice is supposed to address. As 
Kukathas comments ‘rather than seeing justice as posing a question about the right 
distributive outcomes or distributive procedures, he regards justice as the answer to the 
question ‘how do we co-ordinate individuals’ actions in society given our limited 
epistemological powers?’182 Thus, in their own ways, both Wamke and Hayek radically 
reformulate what the task of justice is. For Wamke, the task of justice is moved away from 
the elucidation and adjudication of principles of justice because of the fact of the plurality of 
interpretation, whilst for Hayek it is because of the fact of our irremediable ignorance that an 
interpretative account of the self presupposes.
Yet, it is here that Wamke and Hayek’s accounts of the relationship between justice 
and interpretation begin to diverge. For Wamke, the conversation that arises as a result of the 
irreducible plurality of interpretations of social meanings needs to be a fair and inclusive one 
and, as such, ‘will also involve promoting the social and economic conditions that can make it 
fair and inclusive.’183 Yet, what Wamke fails to ask is why the question of the most 
appropriate social economic conditions for achieving this is itself not the subject of public 
discussion and, as such, equally subject to interpretative plurality? That is, what material 
equality, tradition, or inclusivity do and should mean and how each should be pursued is not 
‘given’ to society but must be discovered by it on account of its members’ mutual ignorance 
and embedded identities. This, furthermore, points us to another, deeper problem: that of the 
content and cultural controversy of the values upon which such promotion is defended. The 
problem, of course, is that the values of fairness and inclusivity cannot be coherently appealed 
to without falling foul of the very interpretative diversity the discourse that Wamke defends 
seeks to justly regulate. This, of course, raises a cultural problem all of its own - no less than 
the controversy of a public commitment to economic emancipation itself - that is perhaps fatal 
to what Wamke hopes to achieve.
By contrast, and in the light of our extension of Hayek’s reformulation of the 
economic problem to the cultural, much the same argument can be made with respect to the 
discovery of answers to important cultural questions concerning the proper relationship 
between mutually ignorant social actors; for instance, the relationships between the genders,
181 Hayek, The Mirage o f  Social Justice, p. 8.
182 Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, p.58. Kukathas compares Hayek with Hume and Smith 
in this regard. On this see Hayek and Modem Liberalism, p. 54 .
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sexualities, races and ethnicities. Again, cultural justice is here to be understood as an answer 
to the question of how we regulate our cultural lives, given our irremediably limited 
knowledge. Rather, then, than invoking a cultural optimum, or the notions of fairness and 
inclusivity so as to justly manage a public discourse that is supposed to be neutral, we need 
justice to enable us to discover just what such an optimum might be, or what fairness and 
inclusivity require, if they are required at all, given our particular traits, the practices we 
participate in and our local, tacit and culturally-differentiated knowledges.
3. Whose Interpretative Justice? H ayek’s Argument fo r  Individual Economic 
Interpretation
Given that for Hayek justice is the means by which answers to economic and cultural 
questions are discovered rather than the public institutionalisation of any particular answer 
itself, it becomes immediately necessary to ascertain just who is to do the discovering and on 
what defensible basis. At the beginning of the paper ‘Individualism: True and False’ Hayek 
claims that individualism ‘is primarily a theory of society, an attempt to understand the forces 
which determine the social life of man, and only in the second instance a set of political 
maxims derived from this view of society.’184 This notwithstanding, it is clear that from the 
Limited Knowledge Thesis Hayek also derives the maxims that constitute his normative 
political theory. What, then, might these maxims be? Answering this question is something 
to which he devotes his attention both in this paper and, more extensively, in The Constitution 
o f Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty.185 Ultimately, there appears to be just one 
maxim - which we will call the Individual Liberty Principle - that is intended to act as the 
master principle governing the character of public institutions. It consists, moreover, in the 
injunction to bestow upon individuals a clearly delimited and inviolable sphere of individual 
freedom in furtherance of the process of discovery of answers to distributive questions of 
public concern.186
Hayek offers three arguments for his Individual Liberty Principle, all of which are 
ultimately rooted in the Limited Knowledge Thesis and the peculiar socio-economic 
problematic that it presents. The first argument arises from the universal nature of the 
Limited Knowledge Thesis and echoes Hayek’s earlier concern with the epistemological 
place of the social theorist in society. Because we are all equally limited in what we can
183 Wamke, Justice and Interpretation, p 12, Chapters 7 and 8.
184Hayek, ‘Individualism: True and False’, p. 6.
185 See also Hayek, F. A., ‘The Principles of a Liberal Social Order’ (1966), Studies in Philosophy, 
Politics and Economics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, pp. 160-77; ‘Liberalism’ (1973), 
New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History o f  Ideas, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 119-51.
186 Hayek, ‘The Principles of a Liberal Social Order’, p. 166; The Constitution o f  Liberty, p. 31; Rules 
and Order, pp. 57, 61.
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know the best that we can do is give each other an equal liberty to decide what to do for 
ourselves.187 ‘We want the individual to have liberty,’ he writes in ‘The Moral Element in 
Free Enterprise’, ‘because only if  he can decide what to do can he also use all his unique 
combination of information, skills and capacities which nobody else can fully appreciate.’188
The second, related, argument for individualism is that the bestowing of such freedom 
actually allows us to achieve more, not less, than would otherwise be the case because of the 
unique epistemological benefits such liberty confers. More specifically, the conferral of 
individual liberty and its converse, ‘the demand for a strict limitation of all coercive or 
exclusive power,’189 enables us to make use of otherwise socially unavailable dispersed and 
tacit knowledge that is never given to any single agent in its entirety.190 Claiming this, of 
course, does not mean that Hayek has committed himself to the knowability of one particular 
end state in virtue of which alternative institutional arrangements may be judged. Rather, his 
is a claim concerning the comparative effectiveness of such arrangements at making use of 
knowledge, whatever the outcome of the process is.
An important question here concerns the kinds of activity the individual freedom 
Hayek defends is supposed to protect. Clearly, and in line with standard accounts of cultural 
freedom, it protects freedom of thought, expression and conscience; that is, the expression of 
our interpretations concerning the optimal use and distribution of resources. However, need it 
protect anything else? Why, after all, could we not simply convene national and local 
deliberative fora where all would be free to put forward their interpretations concerning, for 
example, resource allocation in order to publicly decide which interpretation should be 
acknowledged and put into practice?
To be sure, Hayek believes that individual liberty most certainly encompasses 
freedom of thought, or liberty of conscience and expression.191 Yet, such a liberty alone is but 
an empty and formal, if not impotent, privilege unless it is accompanied by freedom of action.
187 See also Crowley, The Self, the Individual and the Community: Liberalism in the Political Thought 
o f F. A. Hayek and Sidney and Beatrice Webb, pp. 14-15 for a contrast here between Hayek and the 
Webbs. Precisely because of the Limited Knowledge Thesis that Hayek thinks the Individual Liberty 
Principle has a role to play in public affairs at all. Liberty as the master principle of justice would be 
unnecessary if  we were omniscient. The Constitution o f Liberty, p. 30.
188 Hayek, F. A., ‘The Moral Element in Free Enterprise’ (1962), Studies in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, p. 233.
189 Hayek, ‘Individualism: True and False’, p. 16, emphasis added; Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, 
pp. 29-38. This, of course, is a significant formulation of Hayek’s Individual Liberty Principle for it is 
not tantamount to a rejection of power as a factor in social decision-making per se but rather of 
monopoly power. On this see Hayek, ‘Individualism: Tme and False’, p. 16. Finally, the principle 
does not preclude the collective activity of groups, so long as the collaboration in question takes place 
voluntarily. On this see Hayek, ‘Individualism: Tme and False’, p. 16; The Constitution o f  Liberty, p. 
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Indeed, given the centrality he attaches to the exploitation of tacit knowledge in the economic 
discovery process, for Hayek, freedom of action is in a significant sense prior to freedom of 
thought or liberty of conscience. This is because only by allowing individuals to act upon the 
basis of their interpretations - as these are constituted by the traditions and practices they 
adhere to and that endow them with moral personality - is society as a whole able to make use 
of the total stock of socially-constituted knowledge that is potentially at its disposal for 
rational decision-making. Thus, whilst being of central importance, the exercise of liberty of 
conscience and freedom of expression are for Hayek ‘only the last stage of the process in 
which new truths are discovered’, and out of which arises the explicit, propositional 
knowledge that we are able to discuss.192 Indeed, he continues, it is from the utilisation of 
such knowledge that the economic discovery process gains its creative potential: ‘the flow of 
new ideas,’ he writes, ‘springs from the sphere in which action, often non-rational action, and 
material events impinge upon one another’ and which, ‘would dry up if  freedom were 
confined to the intellectual sphere.’193 It is for this reason that Hayek claims in The 
Constitution o f  Liberty that ‘[t]o extol the value of intellectual liberty at the expense of the 
value of liberty of doing things would be like treating the crowning part of an edifice as the 
whole.’194 To only confer formal rather than, we may say, praxeological interpretative liberty 
concerning distribution would be to thoroughly impoverish the epistemological basis upon 
which any public decision would be arrived at. For Hayek, then, the freedom to dispose of 
and actively choose amongst means in the pursuit of our ends is how economic co-ordination 
is actually achieved and, as such, is a necessary condition for economic decision-making in 
society to be rational.195 The absence of individual economic freedom, then, is au fond , the 
marker of irrational public economic decision-making.
This relates, moreover, directly to another argument that Hayek offers in favour of 
individual economic liberty. Given that it is our reason that chooses the ends that we seek to 
pursue, the realisation of those ends, he writes, ‘depends on the availability of the required 
means.’196 Because of this relationship of dependency of the realisation of ends upon our 
means to realise them, control of the means to our ends entails ultimate control over the ends 
that one may choose.197 Without the freedom to dispose of the economic means as we see fit 
in the pursuit of our diverse, ultimately cultural, ends - that is, without the public institution
191 Hayek, The Constitution o f Liberty, pp. 32-5; ‘Liberalism’, pp. 147-9.
192 Hayek, ibid., pp. 33, 110, emphasis added.
193 Hayek, ibid., p. 35.
194 ibid., p. 33. See also ‘Liberalism’, p. 149; The Mirage o f  Social Justice, pp. 8-9.
195 Hayek, The Mirage o f  Social Justice, pp. 8-11; The Constitution o f  Liberty, pp. 30-1.
196 Hayek, ‘Liberalism’, p. 149.
197 ibid., p. 147-9; The Road to Serfdom, p. 92; The Philosophy o f  the Austrian School, p. 216.
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of the free market - the freedom to pursue ends is emptied of any significance and becomes a 
merely formal freedom.198
The converse of the conclusion of Hayek’s epistemological arguments for individual 
liberty and the protection of individual domains, then, is that the role of the state should be 
sharply limited. The state’s role should not be ‘to determine particular results for particular 
individuals or groups’ but rather only ‘to provide certain generic conditions whose effects on 
the several individuals will be unpredictable.’199 Of course, one may press Hayek here upon 
the issue of the status of these generic conditions and in doing so uncover a serious defect in 
his normative political theory. Could such conditions, for instance, include positive welfare 
rights for those on an appropriately low income? It would seem that Hayek’s himself thinks 
so as he states in numerous places that the state should provide a minimum safety net below 
which nobody should fall, as well as provide various kinds of public goods as conducive to 
the proper functioning of the wider regime of liberty.200 Yet, for Hayek, this is a fatal 
concession. Given the universal nature of the Limited Knowledge Thesis, it would seem that, 
even here, the free market endorsed by the Individual Liberty Principle should trump the state 
as the preferred method of provision. That is, given the Limited Knowledge Thesis, we are 
best served by ordering public institutions - including those concerned with the provision of 
social minima - in line with the Individual Liberty Principle. This is so that society’s stock of 
dispersed and tacit, practice-bound knowledge may be made use of in order to discover 
properly social answers to questions about the nature and most appropriate minimum level of 
welfare, given the particular attachments of its diverse and mutually-ignorant members.
4. A Hayekian Argument fo r  Individual Cultural Interpretation
4. i The Market as necessary fo r  the Discovery o f  The Good
Hayek’s epistemological arguments for economic liberty here are also significant insofar as 
they may be made anew with respect to cultural practices and norms. The observation that 
this is so is, despite being underdeveloped, not entirely new in Hayek scholarship. Kukathas 
has noted, for instance, Hayek argues
... that it is the epistemological rather than the calculational problem which characterizes not
simply the production process but the human condition generally. The market, defined by the
institutions of justice, is to be praised not merely for making production cheaper; for what is
198 This problem, of course is made all the more interesting precisely because the charge o f the classical 
liberal regime protecting ‘merely formal rights’ is often raised against it by those who seek to defend a 
more expansive role for the state.
199 Hayek, The Mirage o f  Social Justice, pp. 8, 2.
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60
discovered in the market process is not only 'economic’ knowledge, but knowledge of the 
world, of others, and even of oneself.201
Thus, despite taking place within the institutional auspices of the market, the discovery 
procedure it facilitates is not to be read as pertaining solely to the discovery of ‘economic’ 
information concerning the cost, degree of scarcity, or optimal distribution of goods, with 
other purely social and cultural questions being answered in the domain of the political. For 
Hayek, the market is also to be understood as pertaining to the discovery of precisely what 
things are to count as goods and how scarce and valuable they are.202 Ultimately, then, the 
discovery procedure of the market is concerned with the discovery of the good itself and the 
corollary of this is that the optimal relationship between the diverse adherents to these 
conceptions is to be discovered, not assumed. Rather, then, than defend an account of public 
institutions that presupposes an account of what a optimal state of cultural affairs in society 
should be - whether, for instance, it is defined in terms of the degree to which society 
conforms to the doctrinal demands of a particular religion, or whether it is defined in terms of 
which members of society are said to be equal with one another - Hayekian political theory 
defends an account of such institutions that allow society to discover what is economically 
and culturally optimal. For Hayek, of course, this would mean that we allow individuals to 
make use of their own local and tacit cultural knowledge as well as their economic knowledge 
of means to this end. That is, public institutions should permit us to dispose of our property in 
such a way that is reflective of our diverse conceptions of the good and of our attitudes 
towards those of others, given our particular traits, attachments and knowledges. As 
Kukathas argues
... if  the human good has to be identified, which individual or institution is to take up the task 
of evaluating, and choosing from among, the various conceptions of the good people favour? 
Any comparative evaluation will prove even more difficult than central planning for not only 
are views of the good life numerous but many may not emerge except in conditions which 
leave it open for competing views to be tried and tested.203
Thus, because knowledge of the good cannot be had independently of the economic process, 
for Hayek ‘the emergence, and survival of the good society requires, not institutions which 
serve a shared or common understanding of the good for man but, rather, institutions which 
recognize that man in society is constantly engaged in the pursuit o f that understanding.’204
201 Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, p. 101.
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Of course, equally central here is the importance he attaches to tacit, tradition- and practice- 
bound knowledge for it is precisely this kind of knowledge that is made socially available 
when individuals are left free to act and choose as they see fit. That is, when they enjoy rights 
to property, individuals - and ultimately society itself exploit their unique local and practice- 
bound tacit knowledge so that answers to questions of pressing public concern are discovered 
in a rational way. Kukathas concludes, then, that Hayek’s ‘defence of an individualist theory 
of justice rests on the argument that knowledge of the nature of the good is not ‘given’ to 
human understanding and, indeed, cannot be discovered without institutions of justice which 
leave people free to seek it.’205 Of course, one may object here that this reading glosses 
Hayek’s account as a procedural rather than substantive one that is not actually concerned 
with substantive outcomes. Yet, as Kukathas explains ‘a concern for procedural justice does 
not mean indifference to, or unwillingness to consider, the nature of the good for man. The 
concern for procedures betrays a recognition that it is largely because of the rules of justice, 
which seek to preserve the freedom to pursue the good, that the good can be discovered.’206
4.ii The Market as a Necessary but not Sufficient device for the Discovery o f  The Good 
Granted that it may perhaps be through the institution of the market that we externalise or 
concretise some of our interpretations and thus make use of disparate, tacit and culturally 
diverse knowledge, that of itself does not go to show that it is via the market that we 
externalise all of them. This, of course, is something of which Hayek is aware when in The 
Constitution o f Liberty Hayek claims that ‘freedom of action is wider than the concept of 
“economic liberty”.’ Indeed, he questions whether restrictions upon liberty can be confined 
to the economic sphere at all because ‘[ejconomic considerations are merely those by which 
we reconcile and adjust our different purposes, none of which, in the last resort, are 
economic.’207 The question this observation raises, then, is what other non-distributive 
questions could be answered by way of a Hayekian appeal to the Individual Liberty Principle?
To answer this, we may add extra detail to Hayek’s arguments for the protection of 
individual domains by claiming that the individual freedom to act also implies the freedom to 
exploit and use one’s body as one chooses including the freedom to allow others to exploit it 
as one chooses. Importantly, this extension of Hayek’s concerns with our freedom to act as 
underpinning our freedom of expression has important implications for many issues 
pertaining to culturally diverse societies such as circumcision and other ritually-sanctioned 
body-affecting practices, the requirements of religiously-inspired dress-codes, abortion and
205 ibid.
206 Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, p. 118.
207 Hayek, The Constitution o f Liberty, p. 35.
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the severity of the administration of parental discipline, much of which is intimately related to 
the proper legal status of minors.
This, furthermore, relates in an important way to questions concerning membership 
and status. At the most fundamental level our cultural discovery process that is guaranteed by 
a Hayekian commitment to individual liberty may also enable us to come to some public 
knowledge of which individuals actually belong to which groups, without at any stage of the 
process reifying the groups in question. That is, by conferring liberty upon individuals we 
may see to which groups they migrate or within which groups they opt to stay. The same, 
moreover, could be claimed with respect to the particular norms and values people adopt. 
Similarly, we would also be in a position to ascertain the status o f people within groups and of 
groups within the wider society.
Of course, this all assumes a rather rosy outlook upon the prospects of Hayekian 
cultural justice that perhaps we should reconsider carefully. For, the questions of membership 
and status raise a serious problem for our Hayekian argument, a problem that is made 
particularly vivid by the multicultural problematic that is our primary concern. This problem 
centres, of course, upon the issue of just how far we are to allow this discovery process to 
extend. Do we confer individual liberty upon those who wish, in conformity with their 
traditions and practices, to participate in genital mutilation, marital rape, slavery, contract 
killing or the denial of education to some of their members or indeed, if their culture enjoined 
it, to the members of other groups they regard as objectionable or of an unworthy or inferior 
status? This problem is made all the more acute for an amoral, epistemological perspective 
such as Hayek’s because it is obvious that he has no recourse to moral argument to rule them 
out without falling into serious self-contradiction.
Yet, one may appeal here in Hayekian terms to an epistemological concern with our 
capacity to interpret and accordingly participate in the wider social discourse concerning the 
nature of The Good and what it requires of us. Central to this, of course, would be our 
physical capacity - involving the use and exploitation of our bodies, minds and their 
associated faculties - to interpret the social meanings and adhere to the values that constitute 
us, some of which may involve the use and exploitation of our bodies in certain culturally- 
specific ways. Importantly for our present discussion of ritualistic practices involving the 
body, consistent with Hayek’s emphasis in The Constitution o f  Liberty upon our freedom to 
act as authenticating our freedom to express and utilising tacit economic knowledge, we may 
extend his defence of corporeal freedom to include the authentication of our beliefs about 
particular ritualistic practices that involve the body itself. Without this physical capacity to 
interpret the meanings and requirements of a particular religion, the epistemological 
muscularity of the cultural discovery process would, of course, be undermined and thus be in
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flat contradiction with the grounding of the process itself, just as Hayek claimed it would be if 
our freedom to act were curtailed in the economic sphere.
Moreover, intimately related to the notion of our physical capacity to interpret would 
be the notion of consent. The notion of consent here acts as the guarantor of the physical 
integrity of our interpretative capacity because it locates final authority for participation in 
ritual practices in the person of the individual who undergoes them, rather than in the office 
holders who perform the acts themselves. Moreover, on identical epistemological grounds, 
we may impose an additional requirement here upon office holders who carry out the rituals 
to show or, more weakly, publicly state that no coercion has been used in the gaining of 
consent. The foundation of such requirements, it is important to emphasize, is not to be found 
in an ethical account of the Good or our most essential interests but in the epistemological 
requirement that the cultural discovery process make maximal use o f society’s stock of social 
knowledge, including its tacitly-held knowledge.
Given the consent requirement and the requirement of proof of non-coercion, it is 
clear that practices such as genital mutilation would be illegal unless it could be shown that 
they had been voluntarily consented to. If either or both requirements are not met, then acts 
falling under such practices would be equivalent to assault, grievous bodily harm, false 
imprisonment and murder and would be treated as such. In the case of minors, moreover, we 
may add the further qualification that such practices would always be illegal, regardless of 
whether the minor consented to it or not, because they would be deemed to be unable to give 
their consent and therefore should be taken to be saying ‘no’. In fact, just this precept lies 
behind the UK Government’s recent Sexual Offences Bill concerning child prostitution.208
Equally problematically, however, would be the fact that consistent with this 
approach, consent could only be given in virtue of beliefs that the consenter already has. An 
objection to our argument, then, would be that consent in this context merely begs the 
question of the ethical value and rectitude of those traditions in virtue of which it is given. A 
person who knows nothing other than the culture in to which they were bom and within which 
they were raised may indeed consent to practices that others find repugnant. However, such 
consent should impress us as little as it surprises us, if construed as a justification of the 
practice. For, in the absence of an independent criterion that confers authenticity upon the act 
of consent beyond the criterion of the act’s mere coherence with a wider set o f culturally- 
specific norms, the act of consent is of scant worth and does little, if  anything at all, to 
guarantee the consenter’s physical capacity freely to interpret the social world. Moreover, 
such an act would be equally oblivious to the structures of power and hierarchy that mark if 
not positively distort it and most, if not all, traditions and practices. Giving one’s consent in
208 UK Government, Sexual Offences Bill (2002).
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the light of such traditions, then, would be merely to accede to processes and hierarchies that 
serve only to distort the very cultural discovery process the Hayekian state is supposed to 
guarantee.
What can we say in response to this? It seems that all that can be said is that this is 
the case for all practices and traditions, including the liberal tradition and associated practices 
from the perspective of which such objections are often, although not necessarily, raised. 
Indeed, even from within liberal culture some do submit themselves to what most would 
consider as ritualistic physical abuse. Sado-masochistic sex clubs, of course, are a case in 
point here, as are some varieties of prostitution and violent contact sports such as boxing or 
kung-fu. It seems, then, that all cultures sanction such behaviour on the basis of already 
implicit values within them. An independent reason needs to be given, therefore, for the 
privileging o f one culturally particular perspective over any other. Yet, it seems unlikely that 
such independence will be obtainable if  we remain within the confines of specifically ethical 
reasoning here. Given this, it would seem that the objection fails in its own terms.
An antidote to this problem, of course, arises precisely from the amoral 
epistemological grounding of the consent requirement discussed above and o f the wider 
cultural discovery process. Precisely because the requirement is an epistemological one and, 
as such, entirely divorced from any ethical and hence culturally particular justification, it is 
likely to be acceptable to all members of the polity.
Given this, we may translate two of Hayek’s three arguments for economic liberty 
into two arguments for cultural liberty with respect to such questions. Firstly, given that we 
are all embedded in the cultural process, none of us has a privileged view of that process as a 
whole and thus does not have the epistemological authority to impose his conception of the 
good upon others. Importantly, imposition here is to be understood in terms of both the 
authority and content of the tradition of a particular cultural group within society and of the 
authority and content of a particular tradition when invoked as the foundation for the public 
management of relations between them diverse traditions in a single society. Given the 
epistemological impossibility of articulating and achieving a comprehensive vision of an 
optimal cultural outcome in the name of justice in either case, justice’s task is to offer a 
procedural account of how culturally differentiated knowledge may be communicated and 
made use of within and between cultural traditions so that these optima may emerge and be 
discovered. The second Hayekian argument is that unlike rival accounts of justice that 
already presuppose a comprehensive ethical account of how cultural relations should be 
publicly managed and thus thwart the emergence and expression of other accounts, under the 
regime of cultural liberty the maximal amount of culturally-differentiated knowledge will be 
made use of, given our irremediable ignorance of all the particular facts that would need to be
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known in order to achieve such an outcome. In the last resort, our Hayekian argument for 
individual interpretative freedom just is an argument for cultural freedom in a diverse society.
4. iii The Dissolution o f  Hayekian Liberalism?
Our cultural variant of Hayekian justice as a discovery procedure has profound implications 
for what we have called in the Introduction Gray’s marginality thesis concerning the 
contemporary status of Hayek’s political theory.209 As we saw earlier central to Gray’s 
argument is the claim that one of the core critical and normative features of Hayek’s theory - 
the epistemological critique of centralised economic planning and the concomitant defence of 
the market - has been rendered irrelevant by the demise of Communism.210 Given that such 
economic management is no longer prevalent - indeed, practically non-existent - there seems 
little to make Hayek’s thought relevant, not least because it cannot help us to make the now 
primary political choice between the differing kinds of capitalism that remain after 
communism’s departing; a choice that is so central to the politics of transition.211 In addition, 
and related to this problem for Gray, is Hayek’s failure to appreciate the importance of culture 
to the maintenance of a cohesive society. According to Gray, the cultural roots of that 
liberalism upon which the institution of the market rests are themselves undermined by the 
very market that Hayek seeks to defend.212 Given this, the crucial question that political 
theory must answer - and it is one that for the above reasons Hayek’s cannot answer - is how 
a State may ‘reform capitalism so that it is consonant with its underlying cultural values and 
meets its enduring needs.’213
Yet, Gray’s argument seems to trade upon the assumption that Hayek’s thought is 
only capable of addressing specifically economic or distributive questions of public concern. 
What we have made clear here is that there are good reasons - offered both by Hayek himself 
and developed in this chapter in a Hayekian vein - that show this to be quite clearly not the 
case. Given the universal nature of the Limited Knowledge Thesis - that is, that whatever the 
question that is of pressing concern happens to be, the way we go about answering it and, 
after this, fulfilling the requirements of that answer in our daily lives will be fundamentally 
affected by the limits of our reason - such a perspective is equally capable of addressing 
specifically cultural concerns. Indeed, even if we concede for the sake of argument Gray’s 
claim concerning capitalism’s apparently suicidal tendencies, we need to ask ourselves what 
the underlying values and enduring needs that need to be protected and satisfied actually are 
and, once discovered, what we should do in the face of their discovery? It is here where
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Hayek’s thought is, de novo, of singular importance and relevance for what he offers is not an 
account of justice that presupposes an answer to such clearly cultural rather than distributive 
questions but, rather, offers one that is intended to help us find just such an answer.
5. The Philosophical Foundations o f  Hayekian Political Theory
To defend an amoral epistemological grounding of the economic and cultural process, 
however, is not to argue that for Hayek the Good is a merely subjective value, nor is it to 
imply that individuals will always pursue different conceptions of the good. Rather, as 
Kukathas points out, it shows that for Hayek the good is not ‘given immediately to human 
perception but must be discovered,’214 Of course, precisely the assumption of a value 
subjectivism underlies John O’Neill’s account of Hayek’s political theory in ‘Polity, 
Economy, Neutrality.’215 Yet, he is somewhat misleading when he discusses Hayek’s 
political theory as a neutralist, although «o«-dialogical response to pluralism that assumes a 
subjectivism about value. For O’Neill social co-operation in the Hayekian market ‘occurs 
without rational dialogue or conversation about ... ends.’216 ‘In exchange,’ he writes, ‘I do 
not engage in conversation. An actor informs others not by voice but by exit.’217 Central, 
then, to O’Neill’s understanding of the supposed priority of exit over voice in Hayek’s theory 
are the claims that ‘Austrian’ economists such as Hayek are ‘strongly non-cognitivist about 
value’ and consequently that the market is not a form of dialogue.218
However, this misunderstands the Austrian case for the market order. Hayek’s theory 
clearly does allow for voice, alongside exit. Members of the polity do directly engage with 
one another on important issues pertaining, for instance to the internal organisation of their 
communities and the internal distribution of benefits and burdens they sanction. Exit, then, is 
only part of the account. It is not that Austrians such as Hayek are non-cognitivist about 
value or that they subscribe to the view that ‘ [bjeliefs about values do not answer to rational 
argument’219 but, rather, that debates concerning values cannot be managed by political, that 
is, explicit, propositional and aggregative discourse where all the knowledge relevant to any 
public decision is assumed to be retrievable in a single discursive forum on a rational basis. 
Given this epistemological difficulty, it is the institutions of the liberal order that we must 
invoke as a public arbiter of the discourse about values. It is a discursive institution that, 
importantly, factors in and does not assume away our epistemological reliance upon practices
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as the repositories of social knowledge in a way that politics does. As Kukathas explains, the 
process of discovery of the good for man ‘has to be one in which the search is not confined by 
limits imposed by individual reason .’220 None of this, however, means that any particular 
viewpoint about the ultimate status of values or of the good is reflected in the defence of the 
discovery process endorsed by Hayek’s classical liberalism of the market for the simple 
reason that discussion of such matters is itself located within the process. The point here is 
not to affirm or deny the objectivity of values but rather to deny that even if values are 
objectively given, that ‘their source is knowable or can ever be satisfactorily articulated by 
anyone.’221
Given that it prioritises explicit deliberation as the method by which values are 
judged, politics is severely limited in its capacity to do so. It is for this reason, as Crowley 
explains, that it is the evolution of traditions and not reason that must act as the final arbiter 
between competing values. Crowley is concerned here to draw a contrast between Hayek on 
the one hand and the political thought of Sidney and Beatrice Webb on the other. Crowley’s 
central thesis, of course, is that despite the obvious normative differences between them, the 
Webbs and Hayek concur ‘that men and women cannot reach valid conclusions about the 
management of their collective affairs,’222 and, as such, reject ‘politics as a desirable means of 
maintaining social order.’223 Indeed, the normative differences between the Webbs and 
Hayek are ultimately premised on the extent to which both sides are prepared to take this 
postulate. As Crowley explains ‘ [tjhey concur in rejecting the claim the average person is 
capable of managing the res publica in co-operation and consultation with his peers, but again 
different epistemological assumptions lead Hayek to conclude that no one is capable of 
‘managing’ it and the Webbs to conclude that only social scientists can.’224 For Hayek, then, 
it is precisely because the search for The Good is itself a thoroughly social affair that we need 
liberal individualist institutions to allow us to discover it. Moreover, there is the further 
difficulty that even if  the Good were objective and recognised as such by all - that is, that we 
could assume a value cognitivism concerning what it is and what it requires of us and of 
society - that would still leave unanswered the question of what should be done to satisfy 
those requirements, given our necessarily limited reason and our mutual ignorance. It is upon 
the basis of tackling this problem that Hayek defends liberal individualist institutions. 
However, what is the philosophical basis of this defence? It is to this question that I now turn.
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5.1 Friederich Hayek, utilitarian
If Hayek is not a value subjectivist then what is the foundation of the economic and cultural 
discovery process that we are claiming his social and normative theory lends support to? 
What strikes the reader of the secondary literature on Hayek is the wide range of readings of 
him that seems to stem in no small measure from the wide-ranging, multidisciplinary nature 
of his work. The first and perhaps most common reading of Hayek is as a utilitarian defender 
of the market225 in which alternative actions are seen as means and assessed in 
consequentialist fashion ‘entirely in terms of outcomes.’226 In characterising this reading 
Kley claims that ‘utilitarianism judges the alternatives available by the overall goodness of 
the states of affairs each of them would produce, such goodness being measured by a single 
general standard of evaluation, utility.’227 Yet, he notes, there is ample textual evidence that 
Hayek himself would reject such a view as he explicitly rejects ‘any comprehensive common 
denominator such as ‘ends-utility.’228 For Hayek conflict between alternative choices does 
not dissolve ‘by calculating the overall sum of goodness, expressed in a single currency, 
which a course of action would bring about.’229 Kukathas also notes this in his critique of 
Gray’s reading of Hayek as a utilitarian because, he claims, Hayek ‘offers no utilitarian 
criterion by which to evaluate social systems.’230 This, then, would indicate ‘that Hayek’s 
arguments are consequentialist but not utilitarian, for they do not point to any welfarist end- 
state to be achieved.’231 Yet, even here, Kukathas gives us reason for not reading Hayek as 
any kind of utilitarian defender of liberalism ‘because no form of consequentialism is 
compatible with the dominant anti-rationalist strand of his thought.’232
Finally, we may adduce another reason to exclude a utilitarian or consequentialist 
reading lies in the disadvantages Hayek’s discovery position suffers from. ‘Since the value of
224 Crowley, The Self, the Individual and the Community: Liberalism in the Political Thought o f  F. A. 
Hayek and Sidney and Beatrice Webb, p. 15.
225 Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, p. 8.
226 Roland Kley cites the following authors as offering utilitarian readings of Hayek: Barry, ‘Hayek on 
Liberty’, in Pelczynski, Z., and Gray, J., (Eds.) Conceptions o f  Liberty [in Political Philosophy], 
London, Athlone Press, 1984; Yeager, L., ‘Utility, Rights, and Contract: Some Reflections on Hayek’s 
Work’, in Leube, K. R. and Zlabinger, A. H., (eds.), The Political Economy o f  Freedom: Essays in 
Honor o f  F. A., Hayek, Munich, Philosophia Verlag, 1984; Gray, J., Hayek on Liberty, London, 
Routledge, 1984 and Hardin, R., Morality within the Limits o f Reason, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1988.
227 Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, p. 8.
228 Kley, ibid., p. 9. Kley cites the section entitled ‘The Constructivist Fallacy o f Utilitarianism’ in The 
Mirage o f  Social Justice, pp. 17-23 in this regard.
229 ibid.
230 Kukathas, Hayek and Modem Liberalism, p. 195.
231 ibid., p. 196. It is somewhat unfair to accord Gray this reading of Hayek. Given Hayek’s emphasis 
upon ‘the great partiality and fallibility of our own understanding’ Gray shows correctly that if his 
thought is to be construed as utilitarian at all then it would be a utilitarianism of the second rather than 
first order variety in which appeal is made to socially accepted codes of behaviour to settle practical 
questions rather than utility itself. On this and other reasons why Hayek should, if  at all, be regarded as 
an indirect or system utilitarian, see Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 59.
69
freedom rests on the opportunities it provides unforeseen and unpredictable actions’, he 
writes, ‘we will rarely know what we lose though a particular restriction of freedom.’233 
Thus, Hayek concludes, ‘when we decide each issue solely on what appear to be its individual 
merits, we always over-estimate the advantages of central direction.’234 This fact, of course 
makes the temptation to restrict liberty all the more great because we engage in that restriction 
upon the basis of the achievement of a ‘foreseeable particular result’ and do not, indeed 
cannot, take into account all the emergent costs associated with achieving it.235 It is for this 
reason, then, that Hayek asserts that the epistemological benefits o f individual freedom can be 
enjoyed only if we treat political liberty -  that is, individual liberty - ‘as a supreme principle 
which must not be sacrificed for particular advantages.’236
5. i i  A Kantian Defence o f Individual Liberty?
Given that it is difficult to maintain a utilitarian reading of Hayek, the next most common 
although multifaceted reading is of him as a quasi-Kantian defender of individual autonomy. 
In an important sense the Kantian reading can be viewed as a corrective to the problems found 
in the utilitarian reading and its reliance upon a unitary metric of resolution and evaluation. 
Kley cites Crowley as offering a Kantian reading of Hayek in which are recommended ‘rules 
of justice which arbitrate among people’s conflicting conceptions of the good life without 
themselves presupposing the validity of any such conception.’237 ‘The same deontological 
perspective,’ Kley notes, ‘Hayek seems to follow when he insists that liberty as defined by 
the rules of just conduct must be accepted as a value in itself, as a principle that must be 
respected without our asking whether the consequences in the particular instance will be 
beneficial.’238 Yet, for Kley this Kantian reading is worthy of rejection because, ultimately 
‘the seemingly deontological primacy of the rules of just conduct over consequentialist 
considerations of expediency is contingent on the empirical assumption that the rules actually 
in force are the ones most conducive to the generation and maintenance of spontaneous 
economic order.’239
Before his shift away from classical liberalism240 Gray offered from within his 
broadly utilitarian reading of Hayek a moralised Kantian reading that placed autonomy at its 
centre and also stressed the underlying unity of his thought; the Hayekian project as system
232 ibid., p. 199.
233 Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 56, emphasis added.
234 ibid., p. 57.
235 ibid., pp. 57, 61.
236 ib id .; The Constitution o f  Liberty, p. 31.
237 Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, p.9.
238 ibid., Hayek quoted from The Constitution o f Liberty, p.68.
239 ibid.
240 See Gray, ‘Postscript: Hayek and the dissolution of classical liberalism’, Hayek on Liberty, pp. 146- 
161.
70
‘as fully ambitious as the systems of Mill and Marx.’241 In this book, Gray had offered a 
reading of Hayek which emphasised his Kantian heritage both in terms of his epistemology 
and his jurisprudence. As Kley remarks, ‘[f]or John Gray, Hayek’s political philosophy 
exhibits its Kantian inspiration most perspicuously in its reliance on Kant’s universalization 
test and its rejection of any natural law doctrine.’242 Yet, once again, comments Kley, any 
adherence to a strict Kantian view is mitigated by the fact that for Hayek ‘Kant’s famous test 
comes down to examining the consistency of the rules of the market and improving the 
smoothness of the market’s co-ordinating function.’ ‘In short,’ he concludes, ‘much of 
Hayek’s Kantianism must ... be seen as part of an overall perspective in which 
consequentialist considerations are paramount.243
5. h i  A Synthesis o f  Humean and Kantian Ethical Concerns?
Beyond this analysis of law, Gray discusses Hayek’s conception of justice  as the attempted 
synthesis of Kantian and Humean concerns. It is Kantian in its minimalist or formalist 
strategy in which he works ‘with postulates or regulative ideas, epistemological or normative, 
which are as metaphysically neutral, and as uncommitted to specific conceptions of the good 
life, as he can reasonably make them.’244 Moreover, it is Humean in its ‘account of the 
content and basis of the rules of justice.’245 The evaluation of this attempted synthesis is the 
subject matter of Chandran Kukathas’s book Hayek and Modern Liberalism that ‘concentrates 
on Hayek’s attempt to combine Kantian and Humean ethical claims in a coherent moral 
theory of liberalism.’246 Kukathas’s central claim, of course, is that this attempt ends in 
failure because on the one hand ‘[mjany of Hayek’s arguments are, like Hume’s, largely 
negative’ and share with him a ‘suspicion of all attempts to secure political values with 
abstract philosophical justifications,’247 whilst on the other, he is keen to articulate the 
normative principles that would secure the classical liberal political order by turning ‘to a 
Kantian emphasis on the importance of freedom as the master principle of the Great 
Society.’248 In short, Kukathas claims, Hayek invokes Hume to say what justice should not 
consist in and -  out of a fear that this may be too conservative a justification of the liberal 
political order -  he invokes Kant to say what it ought to be via ‘a principle delimiting
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individual domains.’249 The problem with such a venture, however, is not so much that one 
aspect of Hayek’s moral enterprise assumes a priority over the other but, rather, in the fact 
that these arguments rest ‘upon inconsistent claims rooted in conflicting philosophical 
assumptions.’250 Thus, ‘there remains,’ writes Kukathas an ‘unresolvable conflict in Hayek’s 
thought between the search for a [Kantian] moral justification of the principles of a liberal 
social order, and a [Humean] moral epistemology which denies the possibility of such an 
undertaking.’251
5./v Instrumental Defender o f  Capitalism
Given the difficulties inherent in any programme of synthesis of Humean and Kantian 
concerns, Kukathas claims that the most promising aspect of the ethical dimension of Hayek 
is that influenced by Hume’s scepticism which delimits what is practicable given our 
knowledge of the workings of society. Thus he concludes Hayek and Modern Liberalism 
with the suggestion that ‘while it will prove difficult to establish philosophical foundations for 
liberal rights, or a liberal theory of liberty, an understanding of the nature of social processes 
may offer a surer guide by telling us what kinds of rights and liberties cannot be adopted if 
the liberal ideal is to survive.’252 Similarly, in conceiving of Hayek’s social theory of 
spontaneous order as a negative, value-free explanatory scheme, Gray contends that, whilst 
not issuing in liberal normative conclusions, it does posses a liberal character in that it 
precludes certain kinds of socio-economic order.253 Thus, Hayek’s social theory ‘strengthens 
the case for liberty’ negatively ‘by showing that constructivist planning is bound to be always 
limited in success and often self-defeating in social life.’254
Roland Kley, however argues against Gray and, more explicitly, against Kukathas, 
that all of this presupposes that a specifically moral defence of the classical liberal market 
order was of central concern to Hayek’s research programme. Yet, it is reasonable to suggest 
that this was not Hayek’s chief aim. Indeed, Kley tells us, even for Kukathas, to whom the 
ethical aspects of Hayek’s corpus are paramount, ‘moral justification was not Hayek’s chief 
aim.’255 Consequently, Kley defends an instrumental reading of Hayek in which issues of
249 ibid., p. 163, emphasis added. Kukathas notes that it is, perhaps, not only Hayek who suffers from 
this problem. Most famously of all, the project of Rawls is considered to rest precisely on such a 
programme of synthesis of Hume and Kant. On this, see Kukathas, Hayek and Modem Liberalism, 
p. 16 and Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice pp. 13-14 where Rawls’s project is characterised 
as an attempt to secure ‘deontology with a Humean face.’
250 ibid., p. 45, emphasis added.
251 ibid., pp. 201-202.
252 ibid., p.228. Ultimately it is to the theory of spontaneous order that lies at the heart of Hayek’s 
Humean account of justice to which Kukathas suggests we must turn in order to unearth a “positive” 
Hayekian agenda. On this, see Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, p. 228.
253 Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 122.
254 ibid.
255 Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought, p.l 1, footnote 12.
72
feasibility and practicality buttress the defence of individualist public institutions. It is, Kley 
contends, because of the efficiency of markets and wider liberal individualist institutions at 
utilising social knowledge that they are to be recommended, and not because they are the 
guarantors of individual liberty per se as is the case, for instance, in Nozick’s more strictly 
libertarian theory. Moreover, and despite his criticism of the broad contours of Kukathas’s 
assessment, Kley’s instrumentalist argument would seem to tie in neatly with Kukathas’s 
treatment of Hayek’s Humean account of the limits of reason - what Kley calls Hayek’s 
‘persistent claims that reason is unable to justify ultimate values and that liberalism’s defence 
against socialism is a matter of scientific argument.’256 ‘Such an interpretation,’ writes Kley, 
‘can make sense of his views about the limits to rational debate in ethics and about the 
scientific nature of the argument. In addition, it is able to grant his own social theory the 
central role he wants it to play.’257
Yet, for Kley, precisely because of its instrumental status, Hayek’s theory is 
insufficient as a defence of the classical liberal order that he prefers: ‘[mjarkets must, as 
[Hayek] rightly insists, play an important role. Yet how far they should extend, how far they 
should be constrained and in what ways supplemented, and in what kind of political 
framework they should be embedded, cannot be decided on grounds of feasibility alone.’258 
Similarly, and whilst conceding that Hayek’s arguments deliver a devastating blow to ‘the 
most hubristic types of economic planning’, Gray claims that they contain little if  anything to 
aid us in choosing between different ways of organizing the market of which there are 
numerous examples.259 Answering questions concerning the type of market that we desire 
Kley, Gray and Kukathas conclude is not something that Hayek can do because it, ‘requires 
genuine moral reflection and falls in the province o f normative political philosophy,’260 Thus, 
despite claiming that Kukathas is unfair to concentrate solely on the moral aspects of Hayek’s 
defence of liberalism, Kley himself argues that this moral dimension is precisely what Hayek 
needs and lacks. In this sense, then, one can take Kukathas’s and the Gray/Kley thesis to be 
complimentary. Kley claims that Hayek lacks the moral arguments to complete his theory 
and Kukathas supplements this by investigating the moral arguments Hayek does deploy and 
finds that they are inconsistent with one another.
6, Protecting Individual Domains: Interpretative Liberty Under the Rule o f  Law
These problems, of course, are manifested in Hayek’s account of the law. He accepts that any 
adequate account of justice must achieve more than the formal prioritisation of individual
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freedom and the protection of individual domains that flows from it. It must give some 
specific content to that freedom.261
Yet, what has perhaps been overlooked by those who claim Hayek’s corpus is not up 
to this task is that of primary importance is Hayek’s concern to allow individuals to define 
their own private domains. As we have already seen, Hayek claims in The Mirage o f  Social 
Justice in logically identical terms to the earlier account of the economic problem facing 
society that any examination of the moral or legal order that leaves out the fact of our 
constitutional ignorance ‘misses the central problem’ that law or Nomos is supposed to 
address.262 That is, just as general equilibrium theory’s assumption of omniscience ignores 
the economic problem of dispersed and tacit knowledge and the need for markets that is its 
solution, so the assumption of omniscience misses what we may similarly describe as the 
‘legal problem’ facing society.263 Given our necessary ignorance, the primary function of the 
law, for Hayek, is ‘to tell each what he can count upon, what material objects or services he 
can use for his purposes, and what is the range of actions open to him.’264 As such, for 
Hayek, the laws of liberty ‘constitute an adaptation of the whole of society to its 
environment.’265 Hayek does not believe that it is desirable ‘to have the particular contents of 
a man’s private sphere fixed once and for all* for to do so would unnecessarily impinge upon 
any future chance he may have to make the best use of and hence contribute his own 
knowledge to the wider social process.266 To adopt such a restrictive attitude, moreover, 
would run counter to the evolving nature of morality itself within whose context debates 
concerning the proper sphere of individual action take place. For this reason he claims that it 
is desirable for individuals ‘ themselves to have some voice in the determination of what will 
be included in their personal protected sphere.’267 They way this is done, moreover, is via the 
recognition of general rules governing the conditions under which material objects or 
permissible actions become part of the protected sphere of a person or persons.268 
Importantly, and in keeping with the priority accorded to the Individual Liberty Principle, the 
law of liberty is not one among many laws but, rather, is a rule concerning what may count as 
a law. It is ‘a meta-legal doctrine or a political ideal’, which stipulates what is sound law and, 
as such, facilitates the pursuit of many individual ends and projects.269 As such, Kukathas
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observes, the theory of the rule of law occupies the same place as the Original Position in 
Rawls’s account of justice insofar as both are theories about what laws ought to be.270
All of this offers a response to the concerns of Kley and Gray. For, we can read 
Hayek here as defending this conception of law as, on amoral, epistemological grounds, the 
answer to the question of how far, indeed i f  at all, should markets extend? For, even if  we 
concede Kley and Gray’s objections to the programmatic burden Hayek places upon the 
theory of spontaneous order, the question then arises as to who in that case is to decide upon 
the ethical values that are to determine the scope and extent of private property rights. Even 
more significantly, we must also ask from where these values in virtue of which we are to 
delineate individual domains are to appear? Yet, it seems difficult to have an adequate 
answer to this question without running into the kind of ‘false’ individualism discussed 
earlier. If the regime of individual liberty is to be preferred to politics because of the unique 
epistemic advantages it confers then it would also follow that is to be favoured because it 
enables the values in virtue of which we ethically appraise and ‘correct’ the results of social 
interaction to emerge also. That is, the regime of liberty is the most rational institutional 
framework to allow for the evaluation and correction of its own outcomes.271 What Kley 
mistakenly assumes is that moral values remain in some other domain and do not emerge out 
of the same kinds of interaction as do prices or other kinds of ‘purely economic’ information. 
Ultimately, then, what Kley’s overly instrumentalist reading overlooks is that Hayek’s theory 
rests on an amoral claim concerning the nature of man and the limits of his reason which 
issues in a normative argument for a particular institutional framework that maximises the 
social emergence of economic, cultural and, therefore, moral knowledge. Thus, if we appeal 
to ‘other’ considerations to determine the scope of individual domains, we still need liberal 
individual rights to elicit the content of these considerations as fully as possible, given the 
constitutional limitations upon the powers of individual reason that flow from our embedded 
natures and mutual ignorance.
Problematically, however, Hayek also claims that the notion of the rule of law forms 
part ‘of the moral tradition of the community, a common ideal shared and unquestioningly 
accepted by the majority.’272 At least two problems seems to arise from this. Firstly, if it 
ought indeed to form a part of our public life, then we may always ask whether it does so in
270 On this, see Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, pp. 154-5; Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, 
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Kantian or Humean terms, a question which Kukathas has shown is fraught with difficulty for 
Hayek. Secondly, we may claim that it runs counter to the evolutionary aspect of the theory 
of the natural section of competing cultural traditions. The question here, of course, is what 
happens if our moral tradition evolves away from the view that privileges the Individual 
Liberty Principle? Before he sets out in greater detail his conception of law, Hayek’s spends 
considerable time giving a historical-evolutionary account of the development of the idea of 
the rule of law that is quite consonant with his evolutionary leanings.273 Yet it also leaves him 
with a serious problem for, as we have just seen, his Individual Liberty Principle is supposed 
to be rooted in the moral convictions of the populace whose interactions it orders. It seems 
that all that can be said here is that, not for the first time, Hayek has flatly contradicted 
himself. There is no point asserting the specifically moral importance of the ideal of 
individual liberty in the minds of the members of the polity as this would be in conflict with 
his evolutionary tone. Hayek, rather, should have abandoned moral claims altogether and 
grounded the public acceptance of the ideal solely upon epistemological considerations.
So much for Hayek’s arguments for the rule of law. What does he say that its 
characteristics should be? For Hayek, the way we determine the justice of a rule is via a 
Kantian test o f universalizability, which, he observes, ultimately amounts to a test of its 
consistency with the wider body of rules of which it is a part.274 This test, however, does 
more than merely preclude the law in question referring to particular individuals or groups. It 
also factors in requirements of impartiality between agents and of neutrality between 
diverging preferences and tastes.275 Beyond this, the result of the universalization test is that 
law possesses ‘three main attributes: (1) that its rules be general [universal, in the sense 
above] and abstract; (2) that they be known and certain; (3) that they respect individual 
equality before the law.’276 Importantly, Kukathas claims that, as long as any law possesses 
these attributes then according to Hayek, that law is just.277 What this fleshing out of the test 
of universalizability achieves, moreover, is a more robust definition o f the individual domain 
that Kukathas and Kley believe. Admittedly, it is one that we arrive at by default for, as Gray 
points out, the test will preclude most if not all policies of economic intervention as 
prejudicial to the interests of some and will fell all policies o f legal moralism’, rather than 
positively say what the individual domain must be.278
6.i The Adequacy o f  H ayek’s Legal Conception
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Of course, the question naturally arises as to the stability of the three criteria that Hayek 
claims restrict what one may classify as good law. Kukathas outlines some defects with the 
account of law, the first of which is that it is not clear whether the criteria for good law 
actually rules out many of the principles of justice that Hayek and liberals more generally 
would want ruled out, a critique that Richard Bellamy has more recently rehearsed.279 More 
importantly for present purposes, however, is that for Kukathas the absence of a moral theory 
to ground Hayek’s account of law means that the criteria of good law that he does offer -  
universality (generality), certainty and equality -  ‘are not sufficient to define the scope of the 
individual’s protected domain in any substantive way.’280 This is because some laws which 
liberals would not consider just -  such as those pertaining to religious conformity and, we 
may add, to gender relations within the family and the legal status of homosexuals -  may be 
quite general and yet be uniquely felt as onerous by some groups. Hayek, of course, attempts 
to sidestep this problem by claiming that the very private nature of such relations means that 
such laws do not limit conduct towards others and, as such cannot be acceptable as rules of 
justice. The judge, he tells us, is only concerned with the effects of individual action upon 
others and not with ‘private’ behaviour where one only affects oneself.281 Yet, as Kukathas 
makes clear, this response presupposes that we are clear as to what constitutes affecting 
others. We may, after all, be thoroughly annoyed by the fact that others practice religions 
different to our own and in such terms claim that their behaviour affects us adversely. Having 
found Hayek’s account of law wanting, then, Kukathas investigates whether any other aspect 
of Hayek’s political philosophy may provide the hitherto absent account of individual 
domains and, as we have seen, concludes that it cannot. It is unclear, then, whether Hayek is 
capable of offering ‘any moral theory which would enable us to specify the kinds of rules of 
entitlement, or identify the rights, which should characterise the liberal order’282 without 
recourse to Kantian, a priori reasoning which, given his account o f the changing nature of the 
very categories of reason is not an option open to Hayek.283
6 . 11’ The Common Law and the Judge as Authoritative Public Interpreter
Yet, it is here where the Common Law judge assumes a central role in Hayek’s account of 
law as the corrector of disturbances in the spontaneous legal order that emerge in the form of
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disputes between different social agents.284 What the judge does is discover the laws that are 
already implicit in pre-existing practices so as to resolve such disputes and, in so doing, 
establish which actions are permissible.285 It is this function, moreover, that makes the law 
different from the social practices of the culture in that it comes to be discovered and 
articulated.286 The process of the evolution of the common law within which individual 
domains are constantly redefined is in effect, then, Hayek’s third discovery procedure. 
However, rather than an economic or cultural discovery procedure it is a legal or juridical 
discovery procedure that both facilitates and encompasses the economic and cultural 
discovery procedures. Of course, given the Limited Knowledge Thesis, the judge contributes 
to the advancement of law in dealing with new conflicts -  and hence to the evolution of law 
itself -  via a process of immanent criticism.287 In addition, of course, this process is just how 
individual domains are defined and given definite - although, temporary - content. The three 
criteria of good law, then, can be interpreted as criteria to be held in the mind of the judge 
when they come to articulate the laws already latent in the culture which explain the verdict 
he makes in the particular case they preside over.
One may object here that investing such interpretative authority in the person of the 
judge will simply give him a free reign in the determination of individual fates. Narrow self- 
interest will perhaps further distort the legal process as the judge seeks to impose 
adjudications that are consonant with his own unadmitted interests. Consequently, what is 
needed is the democratic appointment of judges so that they will be directly beholden to the 
public on whose behalf they are supposed to deliver justice.
Yet, this objection would seem to be defective on at least two counts. Firstly, it 
ignores the authority of tradition - in the form of judicial precedent - that is ultimately the 
judge’s guiding hand. What precedent achieves is to delimit in advance the kinds of 
adjudication that the judge can make, given the fact of the particular case before him. Indeed, 
that is what is meant by the judge’s being ‘bound’ by precedent. Moreover, it is at best 
unclear how subjecting the appointment of judges to democratic procedures would do much 
to address the problem of self-interest in any case. On this occasion, o f course, the judge 
would be beholden to the promises he makes in his election campaign - say a commitment to 
hang more and more child killers - as well as the often short-term interests of an outraged 
public with whom he now has a formal, and accountable relationship. It is hard to see how 
such a process would do anything but distort the judicial process, with often deadly 
consequences for the innocent, on a far larger scale than does the system of unelected judges.
284 Hayek, Rules and Order, pp. 94-5, 119.
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Thus, it is via the institution of the Common Law, which is itself continually subject 
to change, that we arrive at a method of delimiting individual domains consistent with 
Hayek’s fundamental interpretative position. Individual domains never are decided once and 
for all but, rather, are continually redefined in the light of ever changing social, economic and 
cultural circumstances by individuals and, where they disagree or are in conflict, by judges.288 
What Hayek offers, then, is not a once-and-for-all ethical account of the proper limits of 
individual action and, conversely, the proper sphere of state action. Rather, he offers a means 
by which, in the face of the Limited Knowledge Thesis, we may seek to discover what those 
limits actually are via our own efforts and via the person of the authoritatively interpreting 
judge. None of this, however, betrays a lack of ‘genuine moral reflection’ in the process of 
defining the proper scope of individual domains. All it says is that for strong epistemological 
reasons, such reflection should not take place within politics but rather within culture and the 
legal process the outcomes of which the culture helps to shape via the operation of precedent.
7. Conclusion
We have seen how a Hayekian reformulation of the cultural as well as the economic problem 
facing society ultimately issues in a normative argument for liberal individualist institutions. 
Thus, not only are we able to recommend a particular kind of institutional arrangement, we 
may do so in a more comprehensive way than Hayek himself did, for with the interpretative 
rereading of the foundations of his theory we may re-orient his perspective as much to the 
cultural as to the economic or distributive domain.
The reason that we are able to do this, moreover, is because of the radically new 
reading of Hayek that we have defended. By emphasising the ultimately interpretative 
character of his social scientific and economic theories and, more importantly still, the 
conception of tradition-bound and epistemologically limited man that is implicit in them, we 
may expand the horizon of Hayek’s concerns into the domain o f culture. This, of course, is 
both a striking and new development because culture is a domain with respect to which it is 
not commonly thought Hayek’s perspective would have much to say. This, then, is the 
unique and original achievement of the first part o f this thesis for this new account of 
Hayekian justice recasts Hayek’s defence of liberal individualist institutions as not just a 
procedure for the discovery and co-ordination of knowledge in the economy but also for the 
discovery of the same with regard to culture.
Moreover, reading Hayek in this new way allows us to make an original contribution 
to Hayek scholarship that issues in a rejection of two important criticisms. Firstly, we may 
take issue with a line of argument manifested in the work of Kukathas, Kley, Gray and
288 Hayek, Rules and Order, p. 119.
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Bellamy concerning the problem of adequately defining individual domains. We have seen 
that such a critique is only telling if  Hayek is unable to give an account of law that is 
consistent with his interpretative premises - something that he clearly does do. Secondly, we 
may reject what we have called Gray’s marginality thesis, which is sound only if Hayek is 
understood to be uniquely concerned with economic arguments and the politics of 
distribution. We have seen that there is little reason to assume this once the interpretative 
dimension of his work is considered.
Finally, with this interpretative reading of his theory, we may place Hayek’s political 
theory upon a sound philosophical foundation. Far from being a utilitarian, Kantian or 
instrumental defender of liberalism, we have characterised Hayek’s theory as an interpretative 
defence of liberal individualist public institutions that enable society to discover rather than 
presuppose answers to questions of pressing economic, cultural and, ultimately, moral 
concern. The reason that we bestow individual rights in the Hayekian state, then, is so that we 
may find out what morality requires, rather than presuppose what it requires.
Of course, discovery-based minimalist liberalism is not the only possible answer to 
the challenge of cultural diversity and we do not want to know only that there is a possible 
Hayekian response to diversity but, more importantly, how, if  at all, compelling it is. 
Answering this would seem to depend on two issues. Firstly, the extent to which the 
Hayekian perspective may be invoked to critique other theories of cultural justice and 
secondly the adequacy of the normative account of cultural justice that flows from it. With 
respect to the former, we may claim for now that the test of the adequacy of a normative 
theory of economic or cultural justice is the degree to which the institutions it endorses are 
sensitive to this reformulation. Let us turn next to some of the protagonists of the cultural 
turn outlined in Chapter One to see what, if anything, Hayek’s interpretative liberalism may 
say about their theories of politics as responses to the challenge presented by cultural 
diversity. The first of these will be the response of what we will call the difference 
democrats.
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3 Difference, Democracy and the Politics of Interpretative 
Inclusion
1. Multiculturalism in Context
I have claimed thus far that if one pursues an interpretative reading of Hayek, it is possible to 
invoke his perspective with respect to contemporary debates in political theory about justice, 
identity and difference, without relinquishing the philosophical importance of his 
interpretative reformulation of the economic problem faced by society. Yet, ultimately it is 
necessary to consider whether what can be said from such a perspective is in any way 
critically or positively compelling. What I will do in the chapters that follow, therefore, is 
apply the Hayekian perspective to some of the key contributions in these debates. Let us start 
with that of what shall be called multicultural or difference democracy.
As we have seen, for theorists such as Taylor, it is a mistake to claim that our 
identities are or can properly be conceived as being given. Rather, what his interpretative 
human science makes clear is that identities are constituted by us in concert with others, most 
notably in the first instance our families and thereafter with other members of wider society. 
For theorists such as Taylor, personal identity is intersubjectively or dialogically 
constituted.289 This, of course, arises out of Taylor’s interpretative social science that 
emphasises our embedded or tradition-bound nature. Equally central to Taylor’s political 
concerns, however, is that the dialogical process of identity formation often involves the 
misrecognition o f our identities by those around us, often with terribly oppressive 
consequences, not least an inescapable disposition of externally imposed self-loathing. 
Moreover, the problem of misrecognition of our identities has, of course, been a central 
concern of much feminist political theory.290 Because of the potential for serious harm 
implicit in the dynamics of misrecognition, for Taylor ‘[d]ue recognition is not just a courtesy 
we owe people. It is a vital human need.’291 With the vital importance Taylor attaches to the 
recognition and misrecognition of identity, then, comes a demand for a politics of recognition 
that seeks to make good the deleterious consequences of the latter.292
This politics of recognition may be thought of in two ways. The first way, associated 
most famously perhaps with the Civil Rights movement in the post-war United States, aims at
289 Taylor, C., ‘The Politics of Recognition’, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f Recognition 
(2nd ed.), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 32-34. See also Horton, J., ‘Charles Taylor: 
Selfhood, Community and Democracy’, Carter, A. & Stokes, G. (eds.), Liberal Democracy and Its 
Critics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, pp.155-174, esp. 166-167.
290 Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, pp. 25-26.
291 Taylor, ibid., p. 25.
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what we may call a universalist blindness towards our particular traits so that we may all 
enjoy equal rights and entitlements.293 More recently, however, Taylor notes that the politics 
of recognition has come to be enunciated not in terms of the claim that public institutions 
ought to be blind towards our particular identities so that we may avoid drawing distinctions 
between first and second-class citizens. Rather it has been advanced in terms of the altogether 
different claim that it is precisely our particular identities that, for the sake of equality, should 
be afforded public recognition. This, Taylor explains, is a demand not for a politics of equal 
respect but for a politics of difference.294 Moreover, more often than not, it is argued that the 
surest way of securing the equalisation of group identity is through a specifically democratic 
and discursive from of group-differentiated politics. In such a democratic politics, it is 
claimed, the diverse members of society may directly participate in discourses the outcomes 
of which have important consequences for their well-being.
In this chapter, I will claim that the account of difference democracy is inadequate in 
two important respects that the Hayekian reformulation of the cultural problem clarifies. In 
the first instance are the problems associated with group-differentiated representation and 
difference. The basic thrust of the argument here will be that difference democracy does not 
satisfy the ethical and epistemological claims often made on its behalf. In the first instance, 
this is because its commitment to group-differentiated decision-making leaves unanswered the 
ethical question of who is to represent the groups concerned. Moreover, the essentialisation 
that comes with any commitment to a group-differentiated public decision making procedure 
means that the difference democrats cannot keep pace with the ever-changing nature of the 
groups whose voices they seek to privilege. Rather than offering public institutions that 
enable us to answer the question of who belongs to which group and what the relative status 
of their members should be, the difference democrats rather assume that answers to such 
questions are already clear and uncontroversial. A similar Hayekian argument, of course, can 
be made with respect to the ethical and epistemological claims made on behalf of difference 
democracy as a specifically democratic form of public decision-making, for their privileging 
of a democratic discourse means that any public decision made with respect to resources or 
the positioning of the diverse members of society will be an irrational one.
Most fundamentally and in stark contrast to the Hayekian conception, however, the 
difference democrats’ account of group-differentiated democratic institutions does not seek to 
answer the question of what is the proper relative standing of the diverse groups in society 
either in cultural terms (that is, which practices should be tolerated and what are the proper 
relationships between individuals from different communities) or economic terms (which
292 ibid., p. 25.
293 ibid., pp. 37-38.
294 ibid., pp. 38-42. See also Horton, ‘Charles Taylor: Selfhood, Community and Democracy’, p. 167.
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groups should enjoy what resources and in what quantities). Rather, it presupposes that a 
particular answer to this question has been given and that what that answer practically 
demands of us is readily apparent when the very fact of diversity, our mutual ignorance and 
the tacit nature of our cultural knowledge would suggest that this is never the case.295 
Consequently, and for the reasons set out above, it will be claimed that difference democracy 
is insincere with respect to its privileging of difference and diversity because it fundamentally 
misconceives the task of justice. That is, similarly to the neo-classical economic theory 
Hayek sought to reject on interpretative grounds, the cogency and persuasiveness of 
difference democracy’s concern to equalise identities rests on an unfounded assumption of 
cultural equilibrium in which questions of culture are already assumed to have been answered. 
These problems, of course, are all the more surprising given the emphasis both Hayek and the 
difference democrats are keen to place upon the importance of identity.
I will start, then, by giving a brief overview of the difference democrats’ position with 
respect to group-differentiated representation. In Section 3 I will criticize the difference 
democrats’ account of representation and the ethical and instrumental claims made on its 
behalf. In section 4 I will consider the instrumental and ethical claims of the difference 
democrats’ defence of a specifically discursive democratic form of decision-making. In the 
section following this, I will critically evaluate these claims and conclude that both in terms of 
group-differentiated representation and the deliberative account of democracy, both the 
ethical and instrumental claims of the difference democrats fail to hold and that this failure 
reveals the problematic account of the task of cultural justice that is at the heart of their 
theory.
2. The Virtues o f  Group-Differentiated Representation
For Iris Marion Young, the need for group-differentiated representation arises from a concern 
with the domination and oppression of marginalized social groups.296 Young wishes to 
mitigate these problems by offering a politics predicated on difference that enables the 
dominated and the oppressed to have a say on the socio-economic processes that give rise to
295 This ties in with Phillips’s comment about the difference democrats presupposing a radical 
redistribution of resources as a pre-condition on the discourse running properly. On this see Phillips, 
A., The Politics o f  Presence, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 154; ‘Dealing with Difference: 
a politics of ideas or a politics of presence?’ p. 144. See also Williams, M., ‘The Uneasy Alliance of 
Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy’, Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (eds.), Citizenship 
in Diverse Societies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 141-144; Justice and the Politics o f  
Difference, p. 94.
29 Following Mansbridge, I will assume a broad co-extensiveness between the terms ‘group- 
differentiated representation’, ‘descriptive representation’, ‘politics of presence’, ‘mirror 
representation’ and ‘self-representation.’ On this see Mansbridge, J., ‘What does a Representative Do? 
Descriptive representation in Communicative Settings of Distrust, Uncrystallized Interests, and 
Historically Denigrated Status’, Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 99-123, p. 100.
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their economic and culturally marginal status. She does so with recourse to the two important 
notions of her account of social understanding: mediated social relations and social groups as 
identity-conferrers.297 The notion of mediated social relations, embodied in the ideal of city 
life, acts as the starting point for the construction of the Politics of Difference. For Young
... [t]he city consists in a great diversity of people and groups, with a multitude of sub-cultures 
and differentiated activities and functions, whose lives and movements mingle and overlap in 
public spaces. People belong to distinct groups or cultures, and interact in neighbourhoods 
and workplaces. They venture out from these locales, however, to public places of 
entertainment, consumption and politics. They witness one another’s cultures and functions in 
such public interaction, without adopting them as their own.298
Thus, the inhabitants of the city ‘are externally related, they experience each other as other, 
different, from different groups, histories, professions, cultures, which they do not 
understand.’299 Furthermore, they ‘live side by side in public places, giving to and receiving 
from one another social and aesthetic products, often mediated by a huge chain of 
interactions.’300 The politics of difference, then, takes the structural features of urban social 
relations as an normative ideal conceived as ‘a relationship of strangers who do not 
understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense’ and who relate ‘across time and 
distance’301 but who nonetheless are capable of living together under conditions of justice. 
Mediated city life as a normative ideal is embodied at the level of public political deliberation 
by the notion of the group-differentiated heterogeneous public in which the social differences 
between the diverse members of society are publicly acknowledged as irreducible inasmuch 
as their group-differentiated histories and perspectives are to an important extent mutually 
incomprehensible.302 Given this, for Young public political deliberation ‘requires not 
principles that apply to all people in the same way, but a nuanced understanding of the 
particularities of the social context, and the needs particular people have and express within 
it.’303 Given, moreover, the account of social groups as important identity-conferring entities, 
Young argues that the oppressed among them ought to have a specific voice within the
297 For a critical evaluation of the role these notions play in Young’s wider political theory, see Tebble, 
A. J., ‘What is the Politics of Difference?’, Political Theory, vol. 30, no. 2, (2002), pp. 259-281.
298 Young, ‘The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference’, p.21.
299 Young, ‘The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference’, p.21; see also Young, 
‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought’, Intersecting Voices: 
dilemmas o f  gender, political philosophy and policy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997, 
pp.38-59.
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heterogeneous public304 and envisions that this will occur via the mechanism of group- 
differentiated public decision-making.305
In a similar although be no means identical vein, Anne Phillips hopes to remedy 
group exclusion by invoking a distinction between a politics of ideas and a politics of 
presence. Again, similarly to Young, Phillips traces the demand for a politics of presence 
from the emergence of new (left) social movements and their desires to rectify inequalities 
and relations of power in the agenda of a politics dominated by ideas.306 The problem with a 
characterisation of public decision making as exclusively a politics of ideas - that is, a politics 
where public contestation is founded upon a diversity of beliefs, opinions, preferences and 
goals that are ‘detachable’ from those who hold them307 - is that it ‘does not deal adequately 
with the experiences of those groups who by virtue of their race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion 
or gender have felt themselves excluded from the democratic process.’308 More 
problematically, for Phillips a focus solely upon a politics of ideas rather suggests that the 
range of ideas on offer itself will be curtailed or distorted by ‘orthodoxies that rendered 
alternatives invisible.’309
Working along similar lines, Jane Mansbridge offers two arguments in favour of 
group-differentiated or ‘descriptive’ representation. Firstly, such representation enables 
members of hitherto marginalized groups to overcome their distrust of the political process 
and of politicians in general by virtue of the similarity of the representatives to themselves, an 
argument also made by Melissa Williams.310 Secondly, and acknowledging the dynamic 
nature of public political discourse, she claims that descriptive representation enables the 
representative to represent interests that are as yet ‘uncrystallized’ on the public agenda 
because they are new to it.311 The way, of course that this crystallization takes place is
304 ibid., p. 263; ‘Polity and Group Difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship’, p. 262; 
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through a process of what Mansbridge calls ‘introspective representation.’312 Here a 
representative consults the opinion of his mirror group in absentia by consulting his own 
opinion with respect to a particular issue in the sure knowledge that any conclusion arrived at 
will be broadly congruent with those of the mirror group, due to the shared nature of their 
experience qua member of the group in question.
What, then, are the benefits of such decision-making? There appear to be at least 
two. In the first instance, for theorists such as Young, group-differentiated representation 
‘better assures that all needs and interests in the public will be recognized in deliberations’ 
and, as such, will serve to legitimate any decisions arrived at.313 Moreover, and in a more 
instrumental vein, the conveying of this new information from hitherto silenced or 
marginalized groups increases the amount of social knowledge - practical wisdom - as a 
whole.314 For difference democrats ‘[a] public that makes use of all such knowledge in its 
differentiated plurality is most likely to make just and wise decisions.’315 Thus, the difference 
democrats typically offer what can be construed as moral and instrumental arguments in 
favour of group-differentiated representation of the marginalized.
3. The Adequacy o f  Group-Differentiated Representation
As we have seen, the theorists we have considered are sensitive to the problem that 
essentialisation poses for group-differentiated representation. Consequently, in the main they 
conceive groups as fluid, relational, crosscutting and manifesting undecidable boundaries. 
Young, for example, asserts this anti-essentialist account to avoid a charge of chauvinism. 
‘Oppression,’ she writes,
has often been perpetrated as a conceptualization of group difference in terms of unalterable 
essential natures that determine what group members deserve or are capable of, and that 
exclude groups so entirely from one another that they have no similarities or overlapping 
attributes. To assert that it is possible to have social group difference without oppression, it is 
necessary to conceptualize groups in a much more relational and fluid fashion.316
Indeed, she argues in Inclusion and Democracy, ‘ [i]f a politics o f difference requires such 
internal unity coupled with clear borders to the social group, then its critics are right to claim 
that such politics divides and fragments people, encouraging conflict and parochialism.’317
313 Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, p. 185.
314 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, p.264. See 
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Yet, Young offers no account to explain why social group-differentiated domination and 
oppression is normatively significant whilst the oppression of a sub-group from within a 
social group is not. It seems that sub-groups are just as important as social groups as objects 
of domination and oppression. This is because membership of more than one social group 
may be the source of oppressive and dominating relations for the same individual at any given 
time. Indeed, we have seen that Young explicitly associates multiple group membership with 
the complex nature of contemporary societies in which numerous groups coexist and define 
the self-understandings of any given individual in that society. One may, for instance, 
identify oneself as both black and gay and therefore identify oneself with others who do the 
same. Out of this process emerges a distinct grouping - black gays - that is exhaustively 
identified by neither the black nor the gay social group. Thus, one is lead to postulate the 
existence of a distinct sub-group that may be oppressed not as either black or gay but as black 
and gay. Being black in a largely white society might be the main source of oppression and 
domination for some and yet, as black and gay a significant, perhaps the most significant, 
aspect of their identity may be underplayed if not completely marginalized within the black 
social group with which they also identify. This, clearly, would constitute an important 
source of oppression and domination given Young’s own definitions.
Of course, Young does mention that the issue of subgroup oppression is significant to 
the extent that subgroup members may be marginalized, silenced, demonised, forced out of or 
effectively excluded from a wider social group318 and claims that sub-groups should have 
specific representation in those institutions set up by oppressed social groups of which they 
are a part.319 Nevertheless, this is not the same as direct representation at the wider level of 
the heterogeneous public. Given that sub-group members may, as Young acknowledges, be 
oppressed within their own social group they should deserve representation within the 
heterogeneous public. Young only says, however, that they should have say on the affairs 
internal to the wider group to which they belong. However, in the absence of guaranteed 
representation in the heterogeneous public this seems only to beg the question of their 
oppression within the social group. For if they are dominated or oppressed in this way it is 
hard to see how they would have any say at all, without that say being specifically guaranteed 
as it is for social groups. Moreover the same would seem to hold in the case of micro groups 
within the sub-group, leading ultimately to the social agent that, perhaps, admits of no further 
sub-division: the individual.320 Once the fluid and crosscutting nature of social group 
membership is asserted it seems difficult to deny the importance of sub-sub-groups - black, 
Christian gays - and even ultimately of individual domination and oppression.
318 Young, ‘The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference’, p. 13; Justice and the Politics o f  
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Thus, Young needs to provide an account of why subgroups should be denied ‘(\)  
self-organization of [sub] group members so that they gain a sense of collective 
empowerment and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the 
context of the [group]’;321 (2) voicing a sub-group’s ‘analysis of how social policy proposals 
affect them, and generating policy proposals themselves, in institutionalised contexts where 
[group-level] decision makers are obliged to show that they have taken these perspectives 
into consideration’322 and ‘(3) having veto power regarding specific policies [that affect a sub­
group directly].’323 There seems, then, no principled way, given the anti-essentialist account 
of social groups that is necessary to forestall the same critique that she launches against the 
ideal of community, to avoid the slippery slope to individuals who would qualify, if 
dominated or oppressed, for specific representation. Yet, it is guarantees like these that 
Young is committed to withhold if the Politics of Difference is to preserve social group- 
differentiated representation in order to offer a politics distinct from standard liberal and 
communitarian accounts of justice. If Young were to prioritise the anti-essentialist account, 
the rationale for prioritising the group-differentiated nature of political representation would 
disappear and we would be left with a criterion of representation -  oppressed individuals - 
that looks uncannily liberal. However, given the complexities that would arise with a formal 
public commitment to individual history, need and perspective - that is to individual 
particularity - the Politics of Difference would quickly become unworkable, unless, of course, 
one was prepared to commence the process of abstraction to a theory of a common human 
nature. This, however, would seem to have a good chance of issuing in liberal impartialist 
principles of justice in the shadows of which lurk the understandings of the privileged.324 The 
difference democrats appear to be trapped by their desire to rehabilitate the marginalized 
voices of oppressed and dominated social groups and the need to advance a fluid, crosscutting 
conception of social groups to avoid such domination and oppression at the micro or group- 
specific level.
Phillips, of course, is not committed to any strong conception of group 
representation.325 For despite any positive epistemological and ethical contributions a politics 
of presence may make to public discourse in the wider polity, Phillips is keenly aware of the 
problem of essentialising group-membership, or the common experience it is said to
320 Postmodernists may, of course, by unified in their desire to contest this.
321 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the deal of Universal Citizenship’, p.261.
322 ibid., p.261-262.
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paragraph 3.
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represent.326 In particular, she highlights the problem that even if  we attempt to address the 
essentialisation of groups by pluralizing the representation of the diverse perspectives within 
them, ‘there is no way of knowing in advance whether diversity has been successfully 
acknowledged.’ ‘[E]ven if the boundaries are significantly pluralized,’ she writes, ‘they still 
define in advance what are the appropriate or relevant differences.’327 Ultimately, however, 
Phillips contends that the groups concerned are themselves sufficiently dynamic and a 
constant hotbed of disputation for the problem of group-specific essentialisation not to be 
very acute. Of far more acute difficulty, is the problem the essentialisation of group identity 
presents public discourse in the wider polity. Here, Phillips invokes a range of responses 
from the strategic redrawing or redefining of constituency boundaries to the reform of party 
political election shortlists that favour candidates from certain groups.328
Similarly, both of Phillips’s responses to the problem of essentialisation do not 
address the epistemological problem of representation - that is, the problem of ‘epistocracy’ 
where epistemological and decision-making authority is conferred upon select members of the 
group - in any fundamental way. The problem of the epistocracy both within and between 
groups still remains.329 If we redefine boundaries or instigate group-specific shortlists, we 
still do not address the ethical and epistemological problems of hierarchy within groups, 
despite obviously attempting to address them between groups.
Secondly, Phillips does not question whether the monopoly powers of the discursive 
democratic state are themselves either acceptable or necessary for adequate public decision­
making. At this level of analysis, there is little to distinguish her position form one such as 
Young’s. Phillips, then, does not reject deliberative democracy despite being sympathetic to 
difference.330 Dryzek, of course, sides with Phillips here in denying that deliberative 
democracy precludes or represses difference. Appealing to the concept of the ‘contest of 
discourse’ he claims that deliberative democracy may deal with the fact o f difference because 
it does allow a variety of modes of communication to enter into the decision-making
326 ibid., pp. 9 - 10, 52 - 54, 155 - 160; ‘Dealing with Difference: A Politics o f Ideas, or a Politics of 
Presence?’, pp. 144 -  146.
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note, of course, that this is not such a problem for political movements as they are already radically 
democratised. Yet, this does not address the theoretical problem.
328 Phillips, The Politics o f  Presence, p. 7, Chapters 3 and 4; ‘Dealing with Difference: A Politics of 
Ideas, or a Politics of Presence?’, pp. 149-150.
329 The term is Estlund’s. See Estlund, D., ‘Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic
Dimension of Democratic Authority’, Bohman, D. and Rehg, W. (eds.), Deliberative Democracy: 
Essays on Reason and Politics, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1997, pp. 173 - 204, p. 183. Yet, 
regardless of whether the specific recommendations Phillips discusses that are intended to address the 
lack of presence in politics are adequate to the task she sets them, there are other problems with her 
formulation of politics. First of all, it seems that ultimately the notion of presence is, at best, 
subservient to the notion of the idea in politics. For Phillips, it seems we need a politics of presence in 
order to make use of ideas that would otherwise be lost to political discourse.
330 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, p. 62.
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process.331 How, though, is his theory any different from Young’s? It is different insofar as it 
attaches the conditions that the form of communication not bring with it coercion or the threat 
of coercion and that it does not fail to connect the particular to the general or, in other words, 
is not purely concerned with one individual’s perspective or identity.332 Furthermore, the core 
deliberative notion of (dispassionate, reasonable) argument is always present in the decision­
making process in a way that other modes of communication -  such as storytelling, testimony, 
greeting and rhetoric -  do not have to be.333 Yet, we may ask, precisely whose form of 
communication is being made present here and how is this selection itself not exclusionary, 
given that the only person represented by that communication is the communicator himself?
3./ Institutions and the Ontological Dynamism o f  Groups
It is useful at this juncture to examine Chandran Kukathas’s criticism of Will Kymlicka as 
assuming that groups are ontologically given. For despite Kymlicka’s being an overtly liberal 
egalitarian theory - one that we will consider in detail in the next chapter -  Kukathas’s 
arguments are also telling against theorists such as Young. 334 ‘The primary reason for 
rejecting the idea of group claims as the basis of moral and political settlements,’ Kukathas 
writes, ‘is that groups are not fixed in the moral and political universe.’ Rather, they are 
‘constantly forming and dissolving in response to political and institutional circumstances.,335 
Neither, he remarks later on, are they internally homogenous.336 What, I think, is most 
interesting about Kukathas’s two-fold claim concerning the ontology of groups is that, despite 
their criticisms of liberal individualism as presupposing an untenable ontological atomism, the 
proponents of group rights are themselves group-level atomists who have to assert the 
giveness of groups in order that they may be clearly defined. O f course, in doing so they do 
not answer but rather merely transpose the problems of atomism to a new, group- 
differentiated level. This, of course, needs to be done so that we actually have something - 
the group - that can act as the bearers of the rights to be parcelled out.
What is interesting about Kukathas’s critique, then, is that the proponents of group 
rights are usually highly critical of the ontological individualist ‘atomism’ of liberalism and it 
is with this concern in mind that they posit group-differentiated rights in the first place. 
‘Liberalism’s individualist premises,’ Kukathas argues, are for the multicultural theorist, 
‘unacceptable because any conception of an individual presupposes some view of society and
331 ibid., pp. 74 -  80.
332 ibid., pp. 68 -  71.
333 ibid., pp. 71.
334 Kukathas, C., ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, Political Theory, vol. 20, vol. 1, (1992), pp. 105 -  
139.
335 ibid., p. 110.
™ ibid., p. 113.
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community since individuals are social beings.’337 Consequently, if  we give priority to 
individuals and conceive of them as separable from their affiliations - their cultural groups as 
‘contexts of choice’, as Kymlicka would say338 - their argument goes, then by default any 
normative debate about justice is biased towards that culture to which the majority of these 
individuals adhere. Thus, in the liberal project, the importance of constitutive group-level 
attachments -  particularly those of marginalized or dominated groups -  are by definition left 
out of the picture because the emphasis upon individuality ignores them. Yet, in advocating 
group rights upon the basis of this concern the proponents of group rights merely repeat the 
errors of atomism they claim mark liberal individualism. Of course, as Kukathas points out, 
the proponents of group-differentiated rights can always claim that the fact that groups are 
dynamic in this sense certainly does not entail that presently-constituted groups ought not be 
accorded rights of their own, more specifically, rights to their protection so as to ensure 
continued survival.339 Indeed, given at least Kymlicka’s claim that the group-differentiated 
rights he argues for are distinctively liberal rights insofar as they are instrumental to 
providing a context of choice to individuals, denying groups these rights would be a public 
bad, rather than a public good.340 Yet, Kukathas contends that to ‘choose conservatively’ in 
this manner and protect already-existent groups would merely be to reinforce current group- 
specific hierarchies, at the expense on the internal diversity of those groups.341 The internal 
diversity of groups, then, is again precisely what advocates of group-differentiated rights tend 
to play down or ignore. If they were to pay it sufficient attention, it swiftly would become 
clear that the kind of entity to which these group-differentiated representative rights are 
supposed to adhere is not there to receive them. It is in this sense, then, that Kukathas claims 
that ‘the divided nature of cultural communities strengthens the case for not thinking in terms 
of cultural rights.’342
Now, Kukathas’s two aspects of the ontology of groups -  their dynamism and internal 
diversity - actually run together in the sense that the fact of the latter to a large extent is both 
the precondition and explanation of the former. This becomes clearer when it is realised that 
their internal diversity is itself dynamic; that is, cultural groups are themselves internally 
diverse in continually new ways and it is this fact that cause the group to constantly change its 
character. This is something that Kukathas does not claim himself but we can make it is a 
supplementary claim that is of significance insofar as it relates to the development of the neo- 
Hayekian argument concerning the need for institutions and norms that allow this process to
337 ibid., p. 108.
338 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture; Multicultural Citizenship, passim.
339 Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, p. 112.
340 iM ,p .  112.
341 ibid.
342 ibid., p. 114.
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occur. This is the need for institutions that do not second-guess the ‘content’ of the group’s 
character. Now, this all ties in with the third aspect of Kukathas’s ontological holist claim 
that groups are ‘constantly forming and dissolving in response to political and institutional 
circumstances.,343 In politics how groups are important and to what extent they should 
feature in people’s lives are questions that can only be meaningfully answered by individuals. 
It is for this reason that the proponents of group-differentiated representation err when they 
advocate group-differentiated rather than liberal individualist institutional arrangement. 
Given this, the task is to outline a set of institutions that best reflects the fact of the dynamism 
of groups and what the neo-Hayekian argument points to is that the market is the most 
appropriate institution for the eliciting of their ever-unfolding character (on a free and equal 
basis) because it does not presupposes neither their ontological stasis nor their internal 
homogeneity. Yet, by according groups differentiated representation now as the difference 
democrats do precludes precisely this dynamic development.
Of course, in her most recent book, Inclusion and Democracy, Young has responded 
to three criticisms of her account of the social group as formulated in Justice and the Politics 
o f Difference and elsewhere: that of neo-Republicans such as Jean Elshtain, liberal 
nationalists such as of David Miller and socialists such as Todd Gitlin and David Harvey.344 
Briefly, the neo-republican criticism is that a group-differentiated politics of difference 
destroys the common good around which the political participation of all, regardless of 
background, gender, sexuality, age, income or race should orient their participation in public 
deliberation. For the liberal nationalists such as Miller the problem is that it ‘endangers the 
national identity, which ought to be the primary focus of political debate,’345 whilst for the 
socialists an identity-based, group-differentiated politics undermines class solidarity and 
‘freezes different groups in opposition to one another.’346 Despite the differing perspectives 
from which their criticisms arise Young claims that they are united in conceiving of the social 
group as premised upon an essentialist ‘logic of substance’ in which ‘the project of 
organizing in relation to group-based affiliation and experience requires identifying one or 
more personal or social attributes which make the group what it is.’347 Yet, as we have seen, 
for Young this is to misunderstand the nature of the social group as she has set it out for it 
‘freezes the experienced fluidity of social relations by setting up rigid inside-outside
343 ibid., p. 110.
344 The particular critiques that Young responds to can be found in Elshtain, J., Democracy on Trial, 
New York, Basic Books, 1995; Miller, D., On Nationality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995; 
Gitlin, T., Twilight o f  Common Dreams, New York, Metropolitan Books, 1995 and Harvey, D., Justice, 
Nature and the Geography o f  Difference, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996.
345 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 85.
346 ibid., p. 86.
347 ibid., p. 87.
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distinctions among [and, one may add, within] groups.’348 This, of course, is politically 
significant, for it is only if  one conceptualises the social group in terms of a substantive rather 
than relational logic that the charge of essentialisation of reification of the group at the level 
of ontology, and various other, normative criticisms such as that of antagonistic group self- 
interest, the denial of the perspective of those who view their identity as either unimportant or 
dangerous, the myth of group unity and the denial of difference within the group can arise.349 
Now, as we have seen, Young contends that if  this were what she was attempting to do with 
the conception of social groups then critics of it ‘would be right to claim that such politics 
divides and fragments people, encouraging conflict and parochialism.’350 Yet this is not, she 
maintains, what she has been trying to do in asserting the need for a group-differentiated 
politics. Rather, in contrast to the substantive approach, Young says that she has been 
offering a “structural” reading of the group where one retains ‘a description of social group 
differentiation, without fixing or reifying groups.’351 At the level of politics, such structures, 
Young claims, all too often leave people in unequal positions with respect to power, the 
distribution of resources or the capacity to participate in and shape the agenda of public 
deliberation.352 Consequently, she argues that ‘[c]laims of justice made from specific social 
group positions expose the consequences of such relations of power or opportunity’,353 and it 
is this as opposed to the idea - predicated upon a substantive or essentialised understanding of 
group identity - that makes political demands for the recognition of disparate identity groups 
telling. For this reason, Young is keen in Inclusion and D em ocracy  to disassociate the 
Politics of Difference from identity politics.354
How convincing is this defence? In fairness to Young, it is probably right to say that 
if her reading of their criticisms is correct her detractors have misunderstood in a rather 
fundamental way the purpose of the social group in Young’s political theory. Indeed, it may 
be considered fairly generous of Young to respond to these criticisms at all for at least since 
Justice and the Politics o f  D ifference, any careful reading of her work would clearly show that 
hers has indeed never been an identity politics in the sense of ethnicity, culture or religion. 
The position of those on low wages, or of single mothers, or of the elderly and perhaps gays 
(if theirs is not to be considered, as it should not be, as a cultural grouping) have always 
assumed a prominence alongside more obviously cultural groupings such as North American
348 ibid., p. 88.
349 ibid., pp. 88 - 9.
350 ibid., p. 88.
351 ibid.,
352 ibid., p. 86-7.
353 ibid., p. 87.
354 ibid., Chapter 3, esp. pp. 87-92, 99-107.
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ethnic and religious minorities and, more latterly, European immigrant minorities.355 
Significantly, in Inclusion and Democracy, Young claims that neither she, nor Kymlicka for 
that matter, advocate group-differentiated representation of the oppressed on the ‘simple 
grounds of diversity, recognition, or the assertion of group identity’ per se. “Groups,’ she 
writes, ‘do not deserve special representation in inclusive decision-making bodies ... just so 
they can express their culture in public discussion or be recognized in their distinctiveness.’356 
Rather, their representation is always grounded as a response to their domination and 
oppression. This, then, is a response to the false charge that Young seeks to celebrate 
difference for its own sake. Celebration in Young, rather, is functional to the rehabilitation of 
the voices of the oppressed and dominated and, as such, is conditional upon these two states 
of affairs being central to the experience of the group in question.
Yet, this does not resolve much at all, for the fact that Young’s is not a group-based 
identity politics is not the main problem with it. It is, rather, that however the unessentialised, 
collective entity is to be described at the ontological, social scientific level - whether as a 
social group, as a ‘serialised’ social group,357 or as a ‘structural’ social group - that of itself 
does nothing to rebut the charge that, at the level of politics and political institutions, such 
groupings must by necessity be essentialised so that they may be the fitting subjects of 
politics. In Young’s case, this means groups as the bearers of discourse rights and/or veto 
powers in the heterogeneous public. It is here, not at the level of social ontology, where the 
essentialisation process begins and which so vitiates the earlier, ontological, characterisation 
of groups as relational, fluid and crosscutting with indeterminate borders. Moreover, and 
more importantly, what this means is that the very act of institutionalising such representation 
means that the ethical and instrumental claims of the difference democrats on behalf of group- 
differentiated representation are made immediately vulnerable. Miller et al may have missed 
the point, but so has Young, for it is irrelevant where the reification or essentialisation of 
groups begins, but, rather, if and when it begins.
Young’s response, then does nothing to address the epistemological problem of 
maximising the utilisation of dispersed and tacit knowledge in the efface of complexity nor 
the related moral problem of the silence of those represented by the representatives in these 
plural associations. Nor, for that matter, does it address the problem of the inevitable inequity 
of the system- or aggregate outcomes that are resultant from the relations between them, the 
solution to which is one of the principal rationales for deliberative democracy in the first 
place. Similarly, Mansbridge and Williams’s claims are overdrawn. In the case of the first
355 The latter o f which receive attention in the discussion of urban segregation processes in Inclusion 
and Democracy. On this see Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 201-4.
356 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 146.
357 On this see Young, I. M. ‘Gender as Seriality’, Intersecting Voices: dilemmas o f  gender, political 
philosophy and policy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 12 - 37.
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claim concerning trust, it seems to be just as likely that the representative comes to be 
associated in the minds of the mirror group with the political establishment that is the object 
of their distrust, given especially the fact that he must already be sufficiently different from 
them to be able to enter into and interact with the political class in the first place. That is, it 
does not attend in any significant way to the representatives’ own position within the 
hierarchy of the group and the ways in which this positioning will colour the kinds of 
introspectively arrived-at conclusions he draws. In the case of the second claim concerning 
uncrystallized interests, it seems that introspective representation does not afford some 
privileged access to the opinion of the mirror group any more than it does.
One important sphere of discourse that is absent from Young’s account is that of 
ideology. Ideology for Young is not a perspective but, rather, an interest and as such does not 
qualify for our attention when we attempt to decide which groups should be accorded special 
representation in politics. It is clear, furthermore, why this may be the case. Ideology is one 
sphere of discourse that is subversive of a politics that is configured along group- 
differentiated lines for it tends to be reflected in the diversity of viewpoints that is 
characteristic of any social group. Some women, for instance, will be socialists whilst others 
will be fascists; some gays may see themselves as anarchists whilst others will be 
traditionalists; some men will be Marxists whilst some blacks will be libertarians. Given this, 
even if we confer group-differentiated representation in the discourse it is unclear how doing 
so will alter its content. Participants may of course cite their cultural affiliation as the reason 
why they have come to have the views they do have but this does not alter the fact that they 
have a view that is transcendent of their particular background. Marxists, whether black or 
white, for instance, tend to recommend the same or similar policies and once this is accepted 
it calls into question the need for the discourse to be group-differentiated. If, that is, I am to 
argue for redistribution because, as a member of a hitherto marginalized race, I have suffered 
from distributive inequity, it is not at all clear how somebody else - say someone from a 
privileged race and an upper income level who has come to see that distributive inequality is 
generally a bad thing - cannot do the same. Group-differentiated representation, therefore, 
does not seem to add anything to the public discourse the difference democrats are so keen to 
defend.
4. From Group-Differentiated Representation to Deliberative Democracy
What, then, of the relationship between multiculturalism and a specific endorsement of a 
deliberative democratic conception of politics? For Taylor, the link between a concern with 
the ‘politics of recognition’ and a deliberative democracy is a clear one. Given that we are 
actively involved in the constitution of our identities in terms of a reflection upon our own 
received traditions and engagement upon the basis of them with others from different
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traditions, any public recognition of those identities must facilitate such reflection and 
engagement. In brief, ‘a society that recognizes individual identity will be a deliberative, 
democratic society because individual identity is partly constituted by collective dialogues.’358 
Similarly to Taylor, in ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged 
Thought’ Young seeks to establish a necessary relationship between difference and 
democracy:
Just because social life consists of plural experiences and perspectives, a theory of 
communicative ethics must endorse a radically democratic conception of moral and political 
judgement. Normative judgement is best understood as the product of dialogue under 
conditions of equality and mutual respect. Ideally, the outcome of such dialogue and 
judgment is just and legitimate only if all the affected perspectives have a voice.359
In addition, of course, what makes Inclusion and Democracy such a different book to Justice 
and the Politics o f  Difference is that it is entirely premised upon the idea that democracy of 
some sort is the logical institutional conclusion of a concern for difference.360 Similarly, 
following Young and Cohen, Benhabib believes that decisions are legitimate if they result 
‘from processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and 
equal individuals.361 Importantly, and again similarly to Young, for Benhabib, not only do 
deliberative models of democratic politics bestow validity or legitimacy upon public 
decisions, they also confer what she calls ‘practical rationality’ upon them. That is, 
deliberative democratic decision-making facilitates the imparting of new and otherwise 
irretrievable information ‘because 1) no single individual can anticipate and foresee all the 
variety of perspectives through which matters of ethics and politics would be perceived by 
different individuals; and 2) no single individual can possess all the information deemed 
relevant to a certain decision affecting all.’362
Another kind of argument for deliberative democracy focuses upon its difference 
from standard accounts of liberal justice concerning the formation and public appraisal of 
preferences. John Dryzek, for instance, contends that at the core of liberalism are the claims
358 Gutmann, A., ‘Introduction’, in Gutmann, A. (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics o f  
Recognition, p. 7. However, at least in ‘The Politics of Recognition’, Taylor does not go into any 
specific detail about precisely what model of deliberative democratic decision-making would most 
adequately satisfy the demands of the multicultural politics of difference.
359 Young, ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged Thought’, p.59.
360 On this see Young, Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 3-4.
361 Benhabib, S., ‘Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, in Benhabib, S. (ed.), 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1996, pp. 67-94, p. 69; Cohen, J., ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, The 
Good Polity, Hamlin, A. and Pettit, P. (eds.), Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. 17-34.
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that individuals are in the main self-interested rather than oriented toward a conception of the 
common good, that they are the best judges of what their own interest requires and 
consequently that liberalism is mainly and properly ‘about the reconciliation and aggregation 
of predetermined interests under the auspices of a neutral set of rules’, or a constitution.363 As 
such, it is insensitive to the idea that preferences can be dialogically transformed in the 
process of deliberation.364 Similarly, for Benhabib, difference democracy corrects the 
‘fiction’ that individuals have ‘an ordered set of coherent preferences.’365 Rather, the 
deliberative model actually enables this ordering process to occur because the individual is 
allowed to reflect anew upon his preferences. ‘[t]he formation of coherent preferences,’ she 
writes, ‘cannot precede deliberation; it can only succeed it.’366 Finally, the intersubjective 
nature of the deliberative process enables our preferences to be transformed because we are 
encouraged to justify them before others. That is, Benhabib tells us invoking Arendt, such 
decision making leads to an ‘enlarged mentality’ on the part of the participants.’367
Anne Phillips is also concerned to tie the politics of difference in with a specific form 
of public decision-making, deliberative democracy. Of course, this is a somewhat awkward 
task for, as Phillips notes, the relationship between the politics of presence and deliberative 
democracy is not necessarily an easy one. This is particularly so, given the deliberative 
theorists’ concern that the politics of presence is but another, merely reformist, kind of 
interest-group politics that does nothing to critically appraise or transform the pre-given 
preferences of groups or their representatives.368 Yet, ultimately Phillips contends that the 
politics of presence is reconcilable with deliberative democracy, so long as the representatives 
of marginalized groups are afforded some autonomy to revise the interests they represent in 
the light of the transformative nature of the discourse they are parties to and that this revision 
is done in turn in the light of consultation with the group in question.369
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that Dryzek’s claim concerning self-interest may be true 
of some varieties of liberalism - although it is not clear which ones he has in mind - it is not at
362 Benhabib, ‘Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, p. 71. Melissa Williams also 
makes a similar claim in Williams, ‘The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative 
Democracy’, pp. 131-2 as does Young, of course.
363 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, p. 9; See also Elster, 
J., ‘The Market and the Forum’ (1986), in Bohman, J. & Rehg, W. (eds.), Deliberative Democracy: 
Essays on Reason and Politics, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1997, pp. 3-33; Moon, D. J., 
Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1993, pp. 87-97 who discuss a similar claim with respect to political applications of 
Habermasian discourse ethics.
364 Dryzek, ibid., pp. 11, 2. Taylor makes a similar point with respect to the dialogical formation of 
identity itself in ‘The Politics of Recognition’, p. 7
365 Benhabib, ‘Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, p. 71.
366 ibid., p. 71.
367 ibid., pp. 71 -  72.
368 Phillips, The Politics o f Presence, pp. 145 -  150.
369 ibid., pp. 155 -  160.
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all true of Hayekian liberalism. The reason for this is that on the Hayekian account of 
liberalism it is, on epistemological grounds, irrelevant whether preferences are self- or other- 
regarding if  what we seek to achieve is a satisfaction of their competing claims. What is 
crucial, rather, is that in whichever way they are oriented, we cannot know all that is needed to 
be known in order that they may be satisfied. We must, by necessity, rely on the local and 
tacit knowledges of others and it is for this reason that preferences must be taken as given.
Similarly to deliberative forms of democracy, under Hayekian liberalism, preferences 
need not be considered as pre-given or exogenous to the public discourse. What separates the 
Hayekian perspective form these is that the discursive process in which preferences are 
formed is not to be found within the province of politics but, rather, within the institutional 
confines of the market and the wider culture and Common Law. This, however, is a long way 
from the claim that the preferences are merely taken as given and not subject to critical and 
dialogical appraisal. Dryzek’s compliant against “liberalism”, then, does not go through.
4.i The Varieties o f  Deliberative Democracy
Dryzek locates the ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory in the recognition that democracy 
has come to be viewed in terms of ‘the ability of all individuals subject to a collective 
decision to engage in authentic deliberation about that decision’ rather than as an ‘aggregation 
of preferences or interests into collective decisions through devices such as voting and 
representation.’370 Importantly, however he seeks to distinguish a conception of deliberative 
democracy from his own preferred theory of ‘discursive democracy’, the former of which he 
views as wider than the latter and both of which reject the aggregative model of democratic 
decision-making alluded to above.371 The problem with the term ‘deliberative democracy’, 
Dryzek claims, is not only that it invokes the idea that decision-making is a private rather than 
an intersubjective or dialogical affair, but also that it implies that the decisions we do make 
are made in a calm, dispassionate manner that is exclusive of other modes of communication 
and persuasion that may be more marginal and the preserve of certain groups.372 It is upon the 
basis of this understanding of deliberative democracy that Dryzek seeks to defend his own 
model of ‘discursive democracy’ that, most importantly for present purposes, he claims in 
terms similar to Young’s conception of public communication under conditions of diversity, 
is ‘pluralistic in embracing the necessity to communicate across difference without erasing 
difference.’373 It must be noted further, however, that Dryzek sees his conception as distinct
370 Dryzek, J., Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, p. v; 1 -  2.
371 ibid., pp. v - vi, 3.
372 ibid., pp. vi, 1, Chapter 3 passim. See also Chapter 2 for Dryzek’s account - and critique - of Social 
Choice theorists’ anxiety that Deliberative Democracy will lead to chaos in public decision-making 
precisely because it admits of a plurality of voices.
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from that of Young and other difference democrats, as well as that of what he calls the Liberal 
Constitutionalist deliberative democratic theories of Ackerman, Bohman, Joshua Cohen, the 
later Habermas, Rawls and Gutmann and Thompson.374 For present purposes, however, we 
will consider Dryzek’s Discursive Democracy alongside those of the difference theorists’ but 
will not take into consideration that of the liberal constitutionalists.
4.ii The Critique o f  Interest-Group Pluralism
Given the need for deliberative democratic decision-making, an important issue concerns the 
specific model of deliberative democracy that is required. It is important to note in this regard 
that Young’s democratic conception has little in common with democracy as it is commonly 
conceived. Indeed, Young is critical of interest-group pluralism and in this regard at least 
they are both in the same camp as Hayek, albeit for different reasons. First of all Young is 
not in favour of ‘interest-group pluralism’; the type of democratic decision-making that is 
more prevalent in contemporary societies in which interest and lobby groups compete with 
one another for favours along a dispersed costs/concentrated benefits model. She criticises 
this form of democratic decision-making at length in Justice and the Politics o f  Difference 
and in Inclusion and Democracy where it is called ‘aggregative democracy.’375 As she 
observes this particular form of decision-making does not address the problem of self-interest 
in any fundamental way because it merely begs the question of the self-interest of special 
interest groups.376 These preferences and their formation, then, are not subject to moral
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in the work of Friederich Hayek. In ‘The Political Order of a Free People’ Hayek is chiefly concerned 
to deploy an interest-group based critique of the democratic process that is highly reminiscent of 
Young’s critique of interest-group politics in Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference. On this 
see, Hayek, ‘The Political Order of a Free People’, in Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3, 
London, Routledge, 1982, chaps. 12 and 16.
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scrutiny in public. Young describes the problem here as that the preferences are ‘exogenous 
to the political process.’377 Many of these criticisms, of course, are shared by the deliberative 
and discursive democrats.378 Under this model, Young explains,
... others test and challenge these proposals and arguments. Because they have not stood up 
to dialogic examination, the deliberating public rejects or refines some proposals. Participants 
arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have greatest numerical support, but 
by determining which proposals the collective agrees are supported by the best reasons.379
Yet, since Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, Young has taken issue with the deliberative 
democrats’ response to diversity. In ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative 
Democracy,’ ‘Justice and Communicative Democracy’ and Inclusion and Democracy,380 
Young extends the kinds of arguments deployed against the liberal ideal of impartiality and 
the communitarian ideal of community to the notion of deliberative democracy.381
In the first instance, and writing with specific reference to Joshua Cohen and, perhaps 
unfairly given the above, John Dryzek382, Young argues that the model of reason and 
discourse that figures in deliberative democracy is impartialist and, for the reasons cited 
against liberal impartiality, is difference denying.383 ‘The concept of “deliberation” or 
“discourse” is too narrow,’ she writes, ‘to include all the forms of communication that 
legitimately persuade others in a situation of democratic decision making.’384 This is not to 
say, of course, that Young is criticising these theorists’ wish to distinguish coerced consent 
from free agreement in which reason is prioritised over power, both political and economic. 
Young’s critique, rather, is centred upon the ideas that, even with these good intentions, the 
norm of rationality embodied in such free, equal and reasonable deliberative discussion itself 
presupposes and therefore perpetuates the conception of reason of one, dominant, group. 
‘Claims about the rationality of speech,’ she writes, ‘can and often are used as a means of
377 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 20.
378 ibid., p. 22.
379 ibid., pp. 22-23. See also pp. 26, 30.
380 Young, I. M., ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’ in Benhabib, S., 
(ed.) Democracy and Difference: changing the boundaries o f  the political, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1995; ‘Justice and Communicative Democracy’ in Gottlieb, R. S., (ed.), Radical 
Philosophy: Tradition, Counter-Tradition, Politics, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993; 
Inclusion and Democracy.
381 Young’s engagement with deliberative and discursive political theories, particularly that of 
Habermas, is traceable at least back to ‘Inpartiality and the Civic Public: some implications of feminist 
critiques of moral and political theory’ in Benhabib, S and Cornell, D. (Eds.) Feminism as Critique, 
Oxford/Minneapolis, Polity/University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
382 Cohen, J., ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, The Good Polity, Hamlin, A., and Pettit, P. 
(eds.), Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1989; Dryzek, J., Discursive Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.
383 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 6 - 7, 37 - 40,47 -  51.
384 Young, ‘Justice and Communicative Democracy’, p. 127.
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asserting power ... especially where there are cultural differences and implicit or explicit 
beliefs in cultural superiority.’385 This is a power, moreover, ‘that silences those who give 
reasons or make pleas of the “wrong” form. In an open discussion,’ Young concludes, ‘what 
counts as “acceptable” speech must itself be understood as contestable.’386
In the second instance, Young argues that deliberative democracy presupposes or 
seeks discursive unity respectively as pre-discursive ‘shared understandings’ or common ends 
to which discussion aims.387 ‘A deliberative model of democratic discussion,’ she writes, 
‘tends to presume that participants in the public already understand one another, that they 
share premises, cultural meanings, ways of speaking and evaluating.’388 The problem with 
this presupposition, she notes, is twofold. Firstly, it ignores the contemporary fact of ethnic 
and cultural diversity.389 Because of this, the deliberative model of democratic decision 
making ‘tends to close off the alterity of others’390 and marginalizes their contribution to 
debate. Secondly, it ‘obviates the need for self-transcendence.’391 As Young notes:
... if discussion succeeds primarily when it appeals to what discussants all share, then none 
need revise their opinions or viewpoints in order to rake account o f perspectives and 
experiences beyond them. Even if they need the others to see what they all share, each finds 
in the other only a mirror of him- or herself.392
In response to this problem, some theorists reconceptualise unity as the end to which 
discussion should aim.393 ‘On this view,’ Young writes, ‘participants transcend their 
subjective, self-regarding perspective on political issues by putting aside their particular 
interests and seeking the good of the whole.’394 The problem with this strategy, Young notes 
in a manner akin to her critique of liberal impartiality, is that ‘[w]hen discussion participants 
aim at unity, the appeal to a common good in which they are all supposed to leave behind 
their particular experience and interests, the perspectives of the privileged are likely to 
dominate the definition of that common good.’395
As a logical extension of her concern in Justice and the Politics o f  Difference with 
mediation, Young claims in Inclusion and Democracy that many theorists of discursive
385 ibid.
386 ibid., pp. 127-128.
387 See also Young, Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 40-44.
388 Young, ‘Justice and Communicative Democracy’, p. 128.
389 Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, p. 125.
390 Young, ‘Justice and Communicative Democracy’, p. 128.
391 Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, p. 125.
392 ibid.,
393 Young has Benjamin Barber in mind; see Barber, B., Strong Democracy, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1984.
394 Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, p. 126.
395 ibid.
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democracy - such as Mansbridge, Barber, Dryzek and Fishkin396 - implicitly assume that 
deliberations occur in a single forum where deliberators face each other directly.’397 In 
Hayekian vein, moreover, Young claims that the problem here is that this “centred”398 model 
of democratic communication and decision-making assumes wrongly that it is possible to 
bring ‘large and complex social processes’ into the view of the deliberators so that just 
decision may be made and enforced.399 ‘We cannot conceive the subject-matter of 
democracy,’ she adds, ‘as the organization of society as a whole.’400
4.iii Democracy: Communicative
Instead, of the interest group and deliberative/discursive model Young has argued up until the 
publication of Inclusion and Democracy for a conception of ‘Communicative Democracy’ 
that is sensitive to difference. Young asks us to ‘consider just democratic decision-making as 
a politics o f need interpretation,401 and Young envisages that this democratic decision­
making will take place ultimately at the local level. It is worth quoting her at length here:
Dismantling the bureaucratic hierarchies of governmental and corporate power and bringing 
decisions such as these under democratic control, however, does also mean that participation 
must become more immediate, accessible, and local. ... It does mean that there must be local 
institutions, right where people live and work, through which they participate in the making of 
regulations. Thus...I imagine neighborhood assemblies as a basic unit of democratic 
participation which might be composed of representatives from workplaces, block councils, 
local churches and clubs, and so on as well as individuals. ... Their purpose is to determine 
local priorities and policy opinions which their representatives should voice and defend in 
regional assemblies.402
Furthermore, the process of need interpretation will be open, accessible and, crucially, a 
process which ‘third parties may witness.. .within institutions that give these others 
opportunity to respond to the expression and enter a discussion, and through media that allow 
anyone in principle to enter the discussion.’403 In response to economic inequality, the
396 Mansbridge, J., Beyond Adversary Democracy, New York, Basic Books, 1980; Barber, B., Strong 
Democracy; Dryzek, J., Discursive Democracy', Fishkin, J., The Voice o f  the People, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1995.
397 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 44-45.
398 Young claims in a footnote that she is explicitly following Habermas’s discussion of centred 
democratic processes in Between Facts and Norms, pp. 296-307. On this, see Inclusion and 
Democracy, p. 45.
399 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 46.
400 ibid.,
401 Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, p. 185.
402 ibid., p. 252. See also Young, Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 228 -  235.
403 Young, ‘Impartiality and the Civic Public: some implications o f feminist critiques of moral and 
political theory’, p.73, emphasis added.
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democratic division of labour will take as its object the results of socio-economic interaction 
in all areas of civil society 404 thus expanding ‘the range of decisions that are made through 
democratic processes.’405 In effect, then, Young advocates the replacement of the division of 
labour/knowledge with what she calls the “democratic division of labour” in which the 
production and distribution of goods and services is subject to the endorsement of the 
democratic public 406 Similarly, for Benhabib, legitimate deliberation has to take place 
between ‘all about matters of mutual concern’, regardless of whether these matters affect 
individuals who are mutually ignorant of one another.407 In developing the notion of the 
democratic division of labour Young offers three criteria - the ‘modified Millian test,’408 by 
which decisions are justified in the heterogeneous public.
Agents, whether individual or collective, have the right to sole authority over their actions 
only if the actions and their consequences (a) do not harm others, (b) do not inhibit the ability 
of individuals to develop and exercise their capacities within the limits of mutual respect and 
cooperation, and (c) do not determine conditions under which other agents are compelled to 
act. ... The principle is simple: wherever actions affect a plurality of agents in the ways I 
have specified, all those agents should participate in deciding the actions and their 
conditions.409
The witnessed, democratic division of labour has at least two advantages to it which map 
quite neatly onto Young’s two-pronged moral and instrumental justification of oppressed 
social group representation. Firstly, the democratic division of labour will be ‘more likely to 
result in rational and just distributive decisions ... than hundreds of autonomous public and 
private units attempting to maximize their perceived interests.’410 Secondly, it will, like 
group-differentiated representation, maximise social and individual knowledge.411
404 Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, p. 91.
405 ibid., p. 251.
406 ibid., pp. 222 -  225.
407 Young, ‘Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, pp. 68, 79 -  80.
408 Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, p. 250.
409 ibid., pp. 250-251.
410 ibid., p.254.
411 On this see Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, 
p.264; ‘Asymmetrical reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought’, pp.58-59; 
Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 7, 30-31, Chapter 3 passim. Of course, Young does concede that 
including hitherto marginalized voices may indeed be complicated and slow down the decision-making 
process due to the larger number of perspectives that have to be taken into consideration. Yet, she 
claims, if the principal aim of decision-making be that the decision is arrived at justly then this should 
take precedence. On this see Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 119.
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5. Problems with Democratic Decision-Making
How compelling is the difference democrats’ claim that a deliberative form of democratic 
decision-making maximises practical wisdom? Just as with the priority of the representation 
of oppressed social groups, Young’s conception of democracy, despite modifications in 
Inclusion and Democracy, is at odds with both aspects of her understanding of contemporary 
society.
The first and most obvious objection to a specifically democratic conception of 
justice is the same one that arose with regard to the specific representation of dominated and 
oppressed social groups in the heterogeneous public. This is that it demands the clear 
definition of political subjects. Yet, this demand sits very uncomfortably with Young’s 
conception of the structural social group.
Another of our earlier arguments against Young’s privileging of oppressed social 
groups within the heterogeneous public can be usefully transformed into an argument against 
the democratic division of labour if we pause to examine of the key aspects of the notion of 
difference: the difficulty of coming to a full understanding of another’s perspective due to the 
existence of social groups that imply ‘different, though not necessarily exclusive, histories, 
experiences, and perspectives on social life.’412 This irreducible particularity is that members 
of one group ‘do not entirely understand the experience of other groups’413 with the result that 
‘[n]o one can claim to speak in the general interest, because no one of the groups can speak 
for another, and certainly no one can speak for them all.’414 If this is indeed the case it should 
come as no surprise that the problem of speaking for others will arise within a heterogeneous 
public that is configured along democratic, that is, distinctly representational, lines. How 
would it be possible for representatives of social groups adequately to represent or interpret 
needs given the absence of a general perspective? If no one can claim to speak in the general 
interest then how would representatives be able to speak in the general interest of social 
groups let alone sub-groups or individuals? Without an account explaining why 
representatives of oppressed social groups are able to speak in the general interest of the 
social group -  that is, why they are the inhabitants of a privileged position within the group - 
Young has not given any principled reason for the representative discourse she proposes. 
Moreover, under conditions of socio-economic mediation that are marked by irreducible 
spatio-temporal distancing it is just as likely that, due to the massive informational problems
412 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship’, p.262-263.
413 ibid., p.263.
414 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship’, p.263. 
Indeed, Young goes so far as to say that even face-to-face relations -  that is, relations between 
individuals -  are mediated by tone, gesture or even the presence of third parties and, as such, the 
sources of potential misunderstanding. See Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, p.233; 
‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged Thought’, p.51.
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that come with it, representatives would and, indeed, could only be interested in representing 
and interpreting their own perspectives and interests.
Of course, in Inclusion and Democracy, Young does accept that there is a paradox 
involved in a specifically democratic, that is representational, form of politics. ‘If we accept 
the argument that representation is necessary,’ she writes,
... but we also accept an image of democratic decision-making as requiring a co-presence of 
citizens, and that representation is legitimate only if in some way the representative is identical 
with the constituency, then we have a paradox: representation is necessary but impossible.415
Young hopes to resolve this paradox and thus to differentiate her democratic theory from that 
of the deliberative democrats by way of appeal to the Derridaesque concept of differance,416 
so that the logic of identity implicit in the mainstream deliberative democratic ideal is 
replaced by one that leaves the many who are to be represented ‘in their plurality without 
requiring their collection into a common identity,’417 and which, moreover, avoids the charge 
made, for instance, by Benjamin Barber that authentic democracy is one in which ‘imagines 
an ideal democratic decision-making situation as one in which the citizens are co-present,’418 
This reformulation of democratic representation clearly carries over Young’s earlier claims 
regarding the ontological status of groups - that is, their fluidity and structural 
interrelationships - into the issue of how they are to be represented within the democratic 
decision-making process. The point behind this for Young, of course, is to avoid the charge 
that such representation carries with it epistemological demands that fly in the face of 
Young’s earlier arguments about the problems of coming to know another’s perspective. 
Thus in the light of the appeal to differance that acknowledges and affirms the ‘separation 
between the representative and the constituents,’419 Young distinguishes between the 
representative function being one of speaking as the oppressed and speaking fo r  them.420 
With this distinction in hand, she is able to claim that ‘it is no criticism of the representative 
that he or she is separate and distinct from the constituents.’421 Thus, by conceiving of 
representation ‘as a differentiated relationship among plural actors,’ she hopes to overcome 
the difficulties of one person representing the perspective or voice of the many.422 O f course,
415 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 126.
416 Young cites Derrida’s paper ‘Difference’ in this regard. On this see Derrida, J., Speech and 
Phenomena and other essays on Husserl’s Theory o f  Signs, Evanston, 111., Northwestern University 
Press, 1973.
4,7 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 127.
418 ibid., p. 126.
419 ibid., p. 127.
420 ibid., pp. 127-128.
421 ibid., pp. 127, 133.
422 ibid., p. 127.
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all of this raises the question of precisely what it is that the representative is supposed to 
represent. Here Young invokes a distinction between interests that reveal what it is that an 
individual or group wants and perspectives that typically represent their points of view.423 For 
Young, the idea of perspective arises directly from the relational conception of social groups 
given in Chapter 3 in that just as a structural social group is not specifiable in terms of a 
determinate essence, ‘a social perspective does not contain a determinate specific content.’424 
Moreover, she contends that ‘the idea of social perspective suggests that agents who are 
‘close’ in the social field have a similar point of view on the field and the occurrences within 
it, while those who are socially distant are not likely to see things differently.’425 Indeed, 
Young specially offers the idea of perspective to combat the “individualist” idea ‘that any talk 
of structured social positions and group-defined social location is wrong, incoherent, or 
useless’426 for to talk of the vulnerabilities of certain disadvantaged groups as systematic and 
predictable does indeed capture a common-sense intuition. Thus, she concludes, ‘ [t]he idea of 
perspective is meant to capture that sensibility of group-positioned experience without 
specifying unified content to what the perspective sees.’427 Later on, in anticipation of the 
charge that in offering this account Young has not really resolved the problem of 
representation she puts forward the idea of plural representation - essentially committees of 
representatives rather than single representatives - as a way of reflecting the plurality and 
differentiatedness to be found within a social group’s perspective.428
It would seem then that in attempting to offer an account of social group perspective 
as something to be represented in a democratic forum without committing herself to 
identifying any particular content to that perspective that Young has answered our concern. 
Yet, it seems that in emphasising ‘representation o f  and the pluralizing group representation 
is but window-dressing for it still begs the question of, in the first instance, who is to decide 
who is able to do the representing and how such a decision would not in the first instance 
immediately beg the question of the differential positioning of the members of the group and, 
consequent to this, how it would mean that any definition provided would lead to the 
reduction of the number of perspectives the polity could make use of. If  this problem is 
surmountable then there is still the further question of the possibility of the aggregation of 
perspective on any given issue that is radically at odds with Young’s earlier claims about the 
both the absence of a general perspective and the mediated nature of contemporary social 
relationships. Indeed, given these problems, one could say that, contrary to Young’s claim,
423 ibid., pp. 133-141.
424 ibid., p. 137.
425 ibid., p. 136.
426 ibid., p. 138.
427 ibid., pp. 138-139.
428 ibid., p. 148.
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practical wisdom would actually be decreased by a thickly representative decision making 
procedure in relation to its scope in the disaggregated forum of civil society. If so, then 
difference under democracy turns out to be a thoroughly unexploited resource in democratic 
communication.
5.1 Impossible Aggregation: Utopianism, Democracy and the Thwarting o f Practical Wisdom 
These considerations relate in a most fundamental sense to Young’s claim that a discursive 
form of democracy promotes social knowledge or what is later called ‘enlarged thought.’429 
Given democracy’s representative nature, it is difficult to see how thought would be enlarged 
or practical wisdom maximised in the forum of deliberation beyond that of the representatives 
themselves. Pace the deliberative democrats and their idealized, unified conception of face- 
to-face democracy, Young points out that in highly mediated, complex modem societies
... the web of modem social life often ties the action of some people and institutions in one 
place to consequences in many other places and institutions. No person can be present at all 
the decisions or in all the decision-making bodies whose actions affect her life, because they 
are so many and so dispersed. 430
It is for this reason, she maintains, that political decision-making procedures, if they are to be 
democratic, must be representative. On this, Young is surely right but what she does not 
consider is the possibility of going the other direction and advocating self-representation 
without democracy. She does, of course, claim that ‘[s]ome claim that individuals should 
relate directly to political institutions without the mediation of groups, and that districts 
aggregating individual votes to obtain one representative is the only way to implement such 
political individualism.’431 To anticipate some of the claims in Chapters 5 and 6, a regime of 
liberal individual rights does allow us to precisely attend to individual particularity -  to 
represent ourselves in our actions -  whilst not doing violence to the mediated nature of 
society and the epistemological problems it brings forth. Indeed, acting on the market place is 
the response to this epistemological predicament. Any conception of democracy, on the other 
hand, including Young’s, most sooner or later face the fact that it must in the end come up 
with a decisions in which there will be winners and losers, no mater how far it goes to 
answering the epistemological predicament.
429 Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, p.93, 186; ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral 
Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought’, passim.
430 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 124.
431 ibid., p. 142.
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S.ii Tacit Knowledge, Conscious Control
A further problem with difference democracy is that it by necessity demands conscious reason 
because its decision-making process is predicated upon face-to-face discussion. Yet, we have 
seen that at the heart of Hayek’s critique of centralised decision-making is the tacit nature of 
much of our knowledge. Of course, both Dryzek and Young are concerned with the nature of 
communication. The argument here is that all too often deliberative political formations 
contain biases towards some forms of communication -  principally those that assume a 
dispassionate mode of reason -  over other forms and this in itself is a form of discrimination. 
Now, it would seem that in allowing more scope for differing forms of communication and 
the conveyance of perspective that this implies that difference democrats may safely avoid the 
Hayekian tacit knowledge argument.
Yet, is this really the case? For when it finally comes down to making a decision 
only those present have to any extent their particular knowledge of time and place and their 
skills taken into consideration. Among the ignored will be the vast multitudes who exist 
unbeknown to the participants in the discourse. As Horwitz explains in his discussion of the 
communicative functions of monetary exchange, the overtly rational task of deliberation and 
peisuasion leaves out our tacit knowledge. ‘Relying solely on articulate persuasion,’ he 
wntes, ‘limits us to what can be communicated only through speech and texts and closes off 
other sources of knowledge.’432 Indeed, he claims that the regime of liberty provides us with 
‘an extrasomatic sense, not built into our physiology, but allowing us to adapt ourselves to 
events which happen far beyond our vision,’ where ‘we are capable of serving people whom 
we do not know and even of whose existence we are ignorant’ and where ‘we in turn 
constantly live on the services of other people of whom we know nothing.’433 Thus, Horwitz 
argues, we may think of there being two ways to leam, via speech and via imitation 434 Over 
relance upon ‘the rule of reasons’ leaves us with an epistemologically impoverished public 
derision-making procedure.
All of this relates, of course, to Young’s criticisms of the ideal of community being 
utcpian for it is also unclear if  the replacement of the division of labour -  founded as it is 
upon a matrix of mediated socio-economic processes -  with a radically democratic division of 
labour in which decisions have to be made in local assemblies so that participants may 
witless the proceedings is any less utopian or destructive than the ‘gargantuan overhaul’ of 
society Young envisages would accompany the establishment of the ideal o f community. 
Thit the democratic division of labour is a utopian decision-making procedure in a world of
432 Horwitz, S., ‘Monetary exchange as an Extra-Linguistic Communication Process’, Review o f  Social 
Economy, vol. 50, no. 2, 1992, p. 198.
433 Hayek, F. A., ‘Our Moral Heritage’, Knowledge, Evolution and Society, London, Adam Smith 
Insttute, 1983, pp. 45-6.
434 Horwitz, ‘Monetary exchange as an Extra-Linguistic Communication Process’, pp. 197-8.
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socio-economic mediation can also be seen if one considers that it can only take into account 
and make decisions about those aspects of social relations that are of a local face-to-face 
nature; that is, those within the city and its representative assemblies. This is made clear 
when one considers Young’s ‘modified Millian test’ against which the decision-making 
procedure is to be judged. Taking inspiration from Gould’s remarks on discursive forms of 
democracy in general there would simply be no way of knowing if  an action was to violate 
any of conditions (a), (b) or (c) in Young’s modified Millian test.435 This problem would be 
even more acute once the global nature of mediation in taken into consideration. How, after 
all, would it be possible to know whether a decision made in London adversely effected 
others in, say, Bogota?
5.iii The Contextual Nature o f  Knowledge
Hayek considers democratic decision-making in Chapter Seven of The Constitution on 
Liberty, in which he is concerned more to critique democratic decision-making from the 
perspective of his spontaneous order-based theory of social change, in particular as it relates 
to opinion formation in society.
What is the significance of this and why should it matter to the difference democrats? 
As we have seen in the last chapter, for Hayek to stifle the process of opinion formation is 
ultimately to put an end to the prospect of social advance for ‘it is only because the majority 
opinion will always be opposed by some that our knowledge and understanding progress.’436 
That is, Hayek sees civil society as crucial to the sustainability of the cultural seedbed which 
yields the ‘data’ upon which we may later deliberate democratically. Just as disaggregated 
decision-making processes throw up outcomes both good and bad they also throw up the 
opinions we have of those outcomes. For this reason Hayek argues that it is imperative to 
ensure that the process of opinion formation be kept quite separate from democratic decision­
making. For without doing so, there would be literally nothing to talk about except the results 
-  both good and bad -  of democratic decision-making.437 Thus, he is moved to conclude with 
regard to the issue of opinion-formation in a very similar way to Young’s conclusion that the 
ideal of community would, if ever applied, probably mean the wholesale destruction of 
present standards of living:
... The conception that the efforts of all should be directed by the opinion of the majority or 
that a society is better according as it conforms more to the standards o f the majority is in fact
435 On this see Gould, C. C., ‘Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences’, Benhabib, S., 
Democracy and Difference: changing the boundaries o f  the political, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1995, pp. 1 7 6 - 177.
436 Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, pp. 109-110.
437 ibid., p.l 10, emphasis added.
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a reversal of the principle by which civilization has grown. Its general adoption would 
probably mean the stagnation, if not decay, of civilization.438
Furthermore, this argument can be strengthened when the democratic theorist advocates, as 
Young does, the replacement of the division of labour/knowledge with a democratic division 
of labour. ‘ Such a process, ’ Hayek writes,
... should not be confused with those spontaneous processes which free communities have 
learned to regard as the source of much that is better than individual wisdom can contrive. If 
by “social process” we mean the gradual evolution which produces better solutions than 
deliberate design, the imposition of the will of the majority can hardly be regarded as such. 
The latter differs radically from that free growth from which custom and institutions emerge, 
because its coercive, monopolistic, and exclusive character destroys the self-correcting forces 
which bring it about in a free society that mistaken efforts will be abandoned and successful 
ones prevail.439
Given this difference democracy ends up in a state of affairs in which within the defined 
domain of application, the process of coming up with new ways to determine actions would 
come to a halt. Of course, in her rediscovery of civil society, Young emphasises just this.440 
It seems, then, that Young simply assumes that the data of deliberation is somehow given 
independently of the socio-economic process. Again, these considerations relate in a most 
fundamental sense to Young’s claim that a group-differentiated difference democracy 
promotes practical wisdom. Because difference democracy is ultimately based on the face-to- 
face ideal, it does not maximise practical wisdom as much as may be possible under an 
alternative regime. Practical wisdom can only be maximised if  one allows for a free 
interchange of opinion and a free, that is non-majoritarian, opinion formation process. 
However, this is precisely what difference democracy precludes.
In essence, these problems can be construed as a problem of the democratic glove 
being too tight for the invisible hand it is meant to guide. It seems inappropriate to advocate a 
decision-making procedure based on the face-to-face model of social interaction when the
438 bid., p. 110.
439 ibid., p. 111. Despite this, it would be misleading to follow Andrew Gamble in Hayek: The Iron 
Cage o f  Liberty and consider Hayek as an anti-democrat. His criticisms relate to the scope of 
democracy rather than to its worth and indeed he offers three arguments in favour of it in The 
Coistitution o f  Liberty which are restated in The Political Order o f a Free People. Nonetheless, for 
Hajek, democracy is a double-edged sword: it serves both to protect and menace liberty. He wants to 
resolve this conundrum via constitutional limitations on the extent to which collective decision-making 
can be made ‘[i]t is the price of democracy that the possibilities of conscious control are restricted to 
the fields where true agreement exists and that in some fields things must be left to chance.’ Hayek, F. 
A., The Road to Serfdom, London, Routledge, 1944, p. 69.
440 7oung, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 178.
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subjects of that decision-making are the mediated socio-economic relations, the decision 
made in the light of those relations and their consequences. Furthermore, in advocating such 
a procedure as a replacement for the division of labour/knowledge, difference democrats such 
as Young not only stifle the very process of data-formation which is itself the subject of 
public political discourse but, in advocating difference democracy, merely devolves the 
philosophical question of the justice of Welfare-market outcomes to those of democratic 
outcomes. As Hayek has commented with regard to the idea of the state as an antidote to 
negative market outcomes: “[gjovemments ... start out with the proud claim that they will 
deliberately control all affairs and soon find themselves beset at each step by the necessities 
created by their former actions”.441 In effect, Young’s avocation of the replacement of the 
division of labour/knowledge with wall-to-wall democracy adds nothing to the philosophical 
problem of rectifying inequalities in income or power, nor the dominating effects of 
bureaucracy. Indeed, in this regard it seems to beg all the important questions.
5 . iv  From Wall-to-Wall Democracy to Civil Society, and back
Yet, it is clear in Inclusion and Democracy that Young has changed her position here quite 
radically. Indeed, she claims in the introduction to this book that the second of the two 
principle questions she sets out to answer - an answer given in Chapters 4 and 5 -  is that of 
‘how to understand communicative democracy in the context of mass societies.’442 Rather 
than a ‘centred’ conception of democratic decision-making, then, we may call it, following 
Michael Polanyi, ‘polycentric’ rather than ‘monocentric’ model.443 ‘Democratic politics,’ she 
contends, ‘must respond to this scale, and thus must involve millions of people related to one 
another through democratic institutions. The challenge for the theory of discussion-based 
democracy,’ she continues, ‘is to explain how its norm and values can apply to mass polities 
where the relations among members are complexly mediated rather than direct and face to 
face.’444 Indeed, out of this more recent concern which, as we have seen, arises quite 
naturally from Young’s earlier preoccupation with mediation in Justice and the Politics o f 
Difference, comes what appears to be her scaling back of the remit of communicative
441 Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, p .l 11.
442 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 8.
443 Polanyi, M., The Logic o f  Liberty, Indianapolis, Ind., Liberty Fund (1952), 1998. A distinction that 
Hayek was certainly aware of. See also Hayek, ‘Notes on the Evolution o f Systems of Rules of 
Conduct, p.73; ‘The Mirage of Social Justice’, Law, Legislation and Liberty: volume two, London, 
Routledge, 1982, p.15. Furthermore, Young is sure to point out that claiming that democracy is 
decentred does not mean that it is the same as being decentralized for the latter is still likely to be 
centred. On this, see Young, Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 46-47. An example of this may be the 
British Government’s idea, since abandoned, of breaking up the NHS into Health Regions in order to 
gain from competitive processes without harming the universalist ethos that underlies the Service as a 
whole. The problem here, of course, is that breaking up one large monopoly into approximately ten 
smaller ones does not fundamentally address the problems attendant to “centred” decision-making at all 
but merely multiplies them ten-fold.
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democracy, now reconfigured as ‘associative democracy’ to capture precisely the informal 
civic social aspect of society.445 Indeed, she devotes an entire chapter to precisely this 
question in Inclusion and Democracy ,446
Now, what Young says here is of great significance for she sees that putting forward 
the idea of civil society as a means to combating domination immediately raises the question 
of what counts as the Public Sphere. On the one hand deliberative democrats - and in this 
comnection Young specifically mentions Gutmann and Thomson447 - generally conceive of the 
discourse as occurring within the auspices of state institutions whilst theorists such as 
Fraser448 widen the locus of political discourse to include the more informal institutions if 
civil society precisely the public sphere when considered as a single entity is all too often 
dominated by powerful groups with the result that public debate is reinterpreted as ‘mediated 
among people dispersed in place and time.’449 The benefits of this ‘disaggregated’ conception 
of the public is that it is not founded upon a face-to-face model of social interaction and, 
consequently, allows for a diversity of modes of expression upon common problems.450 As 
she claims in Inclusion and Democracy, the associational activity to be found in the informal 
institutions of civil society:
... promotes communicative interaction both in small groups and across large publics. It 
fosters democratic inclusion by enabling excluded or marginalized groups to find each other, 
develop counter-publics, and express their opinions and perspectives to a wider public. The 
public sphere arising from civic organization and communication both serves a crucial 
oppositional function and develops knowledge and ideas for political action. Civic organizing 
and public discussion enable individuals collectively to authorize modes and sites in which 
aspects of their lives are represented in political discussion. At the same time, such organizing 
and discussion provides one of the most effective ways of holding representatives accountable, 
civil society limits the ability of both state and economy colonize the lifeworld, and fosters 
individual and collective self-determination.451
444 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p.45.
445 ibid., pp. 188-195, 238, 245-246.
446 ibid., chapter 5. See also for an earlier statement Young, ‘State, Civil Society and Social Justice’, 
Democracy’s Value, Shapiro, I., and Calderon-Hacker, C. (Eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1999.
447 Gutmann, A., and Thompson, D., Democracy and Disagreement, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1996.
448 Fraser, N., ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy’ The Phantom Public Sphere, Robbins, B., (Ed.), Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993.
449 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 167; also pp. 168-173.
450 ibid., pp. 167-168.
451 ibid., pp. 188 -  89.
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Most interestingly, Young discusses as among the virtues of civil society the idea of ‘intra­
society change outside state institutions,’452 or what I shall explain in the next chapter, as 
‘auto-liberation’ in which change in society is effected from within the auspices of civil 
society as opposed to from without, that is from within the auspices of the managing state. 
Citing change effected by discussion of gender and environmental issues Young claims that 
‘ [pjublic organizing and engagement ... can be thought of as processes by which society 
communicates to itself about its needs, problems, and create ideas for how to solve them.’453 
Furthermore, only in this way, claims Young can the idea of the public sphere can be helpful; 
‘in describing how a diverse, complex, mass society can address social problems through 
public action.’454 Young’s flirtation with civil society, it would seem, is set to be a serious 
and prolonged one.
Similarly to Young, Benhabib is sensitive to the problem that the scale of 
contemporary societies presents the rationality of decision made under the auspices of 
deliberative democracy.455 Indeed, like Young she hopes to address this problem by 
privileging ‘a plurality o f  modes o f association in which all affected can have the right to 
articulate their point of view.’456 Benhabib also explicitly invokes here Dryzek’s earlier work 
on ‘the rules of discursive design.’457 Such discursive designs facilitate the provision of 
public goods in a noncoercive and decentralized manner, ‘thus reversing the argument of the 
incompatibility of social complexity and deliberative democracy.’458 Dryzek too notes that 
many deliberative democratic theorists have, following Habermas, emphasized deliberation as 
occurring outside of the state and within a diverse number of public spheres although may of 
these (he does not say which ones) narrowly conceive of it as being inhabited only by
452 ibid., p. 179.
453 ibid., emphasis added.
454 ibid., p. 171.
455 Benhabib, ‘Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, pp. 73 - 74.
456 ibid., pp. 73 - 87.
457 ibid., pp. 86-7; Dryzek, J. Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, Chapters 1-3.
458 Benhabib, ‘ibid., p. 87; Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science, Chapter 3, 
esp. pp. 57, 61 - 63. See also Kukathas’s discussion of Held’s claims concerning the complex problem­
solving ability of Cosmopolitan Democracy in ‘Friederich Hayek: Elitism and Democracy’, Carter, A. 
& Stokes, G. (eds.), Liberal Democracy and Its Critics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, pp. 31 - 37.
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progressive movements.459 In turn, following Dryzek these public spheres can be associated 
with the idea of civil society, as Young does in Inclusion and Democracy. 460
Like Fraser and the later Young, Dryzek’s view is that from the perspective of the 
social movements that represent the diversity of voices and perspectives in society, it is more 
in their interests to maintain an “oppositional” stance towards the state despite conceding that 
this may not always be the case 461 At the outset of his argument and citing the example of 
the suffragette’s Dryzek notes that more often than not the pressure for a more robust 
democracy emanates in the first instance from the public sphere/civil society rather than the 
state.462 Moreover, in contrast to the state, the public sphere/civil society is ‘relatively 
unconstrained’ in the sense that the goals and interests that it reflects ‘need not be 
compromised or subordinated to the pursuit of office or access,’ nor, Dryzek adds, is there 
reason ‘to repress the contributions to debate of embarrassing troublemakers.’463
5.v The Limits o f  Civil Society
Yet, despite all of this, Young at least wishes to claim that, due to their necessarily plural and 
diffuse nature, the institutions of civil society are unable to grapple with oppression. Young’s 
principal reason for claiming this is intimately related to her dual definition of injustice. In 
the first instance, justice is defined as the absence of self-determination - domination - in 
which ‘institutional conditions ‘inhibit or prevent people from participation in decisions and 
processes that determine their actions and the conditions of their actions.’464 Secondly, it is 
defined as the absence of self-development - oppression - where ‘systematic institutional 
processes ‘prevent some people from learning and using satisfying or expansive skills in 
socially recognized settings, or which inhibit people’s ability to play and communicate with
459 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, pp. 23, 100. This 
appears to be in contrast to Dryzek’s earlier view in Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy 
and Political Science, p. 49. The Habermasian theorists Dryzek has in mind are Bohman, J., Public 
Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1996; Dryzek, J., 
Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1990; Fraser, N., ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy’ The Phantom Public Sphere, Robbins, B., (Ed.), Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993.
460 Of course, Dryzek is sure to point out that a precise definition of either the state or the public 
sphere/civil society is not a simple matter as what each o f these notions represents is itself a subject of 
contestation. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, p. 82.
461 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, pp. 85 - 88, 82-83.  
He does, of course, offer two criteria by which social movements could enter into the state to achieve 
their aims. These are whether the movement’s goals are more likely to be achieved by action within 
the state rather than the public sphere/civil society and whether the democratic gain had by the state 
outweigh the democratic loss suffered by the now ‘less vital and authentically democratic’ public 
sphere/civil society. On this see Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations,
p. 82.
462 ibid., pp. 87 - 88, 104.
463 ibid., p. 103.
464 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 156.
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others of express their feelings and perspective on social life in contexts where others can 
listten.’465 Furthermore, Young emphasises the institutional plurality inherent in civil 
society466 and claims that it is able to deal with domination because this plurality is a virtue,467 
civil society cannot come to terms with oppression. In this way, Young’s rejection of civil 
society has some resemblance to Pettit’s rejection of the efficacy of the decentralized pursuit 
of non-domination discussed earlier. For the overcoming of oppression, we need the state 
which, unlike the ‘plurality and relative lack of co-ordination’ of civil society, is able to 
promote self-development or, conversely, is able to limit oppression.468 For Young, related to 
this claim is the fact that the mechanics of oppression takes place within the economy. Indeed 
Young is quite explicit in her desire to decouple civil society from economic processes 
because unlike the latter the former are not motivated by profit.469 ‘Because many of the 
structural injustices that produce oppression have their source in economic processes,’ she 
writes, ‘state institutions are necessary to undermine such oppression and promote self- 
development.’470 Moreover, ‘because profit- and market-oriented economic activities inhibit 
the self-development of many people, citizens must rely on state institutions to take positive 
action to undermine oppression and promote justice,’471 and only the state is able to do this 
because it can provide:
... socially directed investment decisions to meet needs, provide education and training, and 
create and maintain quality infrastructure, parks, pleasant and well-lighted streets, and other 
such public places; and, on the other hand, the organization of the necessary, useful, and 
creative work of the society so that everyone able to make social contributions has the
i 472opportunity to do so.
Thus is in contrast to the informal institutions of civil society which, despite being able to 
respond to these failures it ‘cannot do the major work of directing investment towards 
meeting needs and developing skills and usefully employing its members.’473 For Young this 
is, paradoxically perhaps, precisely because of the plural and fragmented nature of civic social
465 ibid.,
466 ibid.
467 ibid., pp 165-166.
468 ibid., p. 156.
469 ibid., pp. 157-158.
470 ibid., p. 156.
471 ibid., p. 180. See also p. 185.
472 ibid., p. 185. Young agrees with the ‘ “post-Marxist” critique of state socialism for its totalizing 
tendencies’ and, in relation to this, is careful to acknowledge what Pettit calls the problem of imperium 
when she claims that ‘state power must always be subject to vigilant scrutiny by citizens alert to 
dangers of corruption and domination’ but fails to say how. On this see Young, Inclusion and 
Democracy, pp. 184, 180-181; Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory o f  Freedom and Government, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
473 Young, ibid., p. 186.
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institutions. ‘Precisely the virtues of civil society however- voluntary association, 
decentralization, freedom to start new and unusual things,’ she writes, ‘mitigate against such 
co-ordination.’474 ‘Indeed,’ she adds, ‘the activities of civil society may exacerbate problems 
of inequality, marginalization, and inhibition of the development of capabilities.’475 Thus, it 
is to state institutions that we must turn to overcome oppression. However, the important 
question is, of course can any institutions mobilise the resources necessary? Clearly, Young 
thinks not only that they can, but that state institutions would do a better job of it.476
Now, Young does acknowledge the ‘libertarian’ objection to all of this, ‘that the use 
of the state to promote particular social outcomes wrongly interferes with the liberty of 
individuals, organizations and firms,’477 but she does not acknowledge the Hayekian strand to 
this objection that does not assume rights as foundational. This, of course, is all the more 
curious because the Hayekian objection trades precisely on the epistemic problems that flow 
from the dispersal and tacit nature of knowledge in societies comprised of culturally 
embedded individuals who for the most part are mutually ignorant that theorists such as 
Young wish seriously to take into account.
6. Cultural Difference and the Cultural Problem
Yet, extending our investigation of Hayek’s interpretative critique of the concept of 
economic equilibrium in Chapter 1, perhaps the most fundamental problem with the 
difference democrats’ account of justice is that it makes an unwarranted, but as we shall soon 
see, necessary, epistemological assumption concerning what the optimal outcome of the 
cultural process should be. Moreover, this assumption is made despite their so clearly 
emphasising the importance of our embedded identities, the epistemological burdens of which 
are central to this thesis.
We may model this assumption as one of a ‘cultural’ equilibrium point where it is 
deemed possible to rise above the process of cultural interaction in order to see what the 
optimal outcome of that interaction would be. The unwarranted nature of this assumption, of 
course, relates to our reformulation of the cultural and economic problem that is emergent 
from an account of the self that is both culturally embedded and ignorant of the existence of 
those other selves with whom it is said to share membership of society. What that 
reformulation made clear is that, as mutually ignorant, embedded participants in the cultural 
process and not external observers o f  it, it seems far-fetched in the extreme to pretend that we 
may have some extra-cultural insight into the optimal outcome of that process.
475 ibid., emphasis added.
476 ibid.,
477 ibid., p. 187.
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In the case of difference democracy the knowable cultural optimum that needs to be 
assumed is one of the equal status of different groups. Yet it is here where serious theoretical 
problems set in, for the ultimate consequence of this is that difference democracy not only 
assumes away the very problems of the reconciliation of cultural difference and inequality 
that it sets out to address, but also the epistemological burdens that an emphasis upon culture 
and identity unavoidably draws to our attention.
The reason why cultural equality needs to be assumed relates to the difference 
democrats’ primary concern with the unequal status of some groups in society. Because they 
find cultural inequality troubling the seek to justify institutions of justice that will remedy it. 
Yet, this is problematic because precisely for cultural reasons, the equalisation of the status of 
diverse groups is an aim that the very groups whose status is supposed to be equalised - let 
alone those who are perceived to be dominant - would themselves find hard to endorse. The 
very fact of the plurality of cultures and identities, that is, means that there is bound to be 
deep, culturally rooted disagreement about whose identity should gain equal status. For many 
if not all cultures the fact that members of other cultures - or, indeed, members of one’s own 
culture that are traditionally-perceived as deviant or inferior - have a relatively low status is 
entirely consistent with the fundamental norms that shape them. Thus, any assertion that it is 
identities that need to be equalised will not only be perceived as culturally alien but also as 
invasive and in contravention of deeply and often unconsciously-held beliefs.
To get around the problem that cultural difference poses to what is in effect an 
egalitarian politics of difference many theorists simply assume group equality into the 
specification of the institutions that they defend - a point that both Phillips and Williams have 
recognised.478 As Benhabib explains, on the one hand ‘discourses, even to get started, 
presuppose the recognition of one another’s moral rights among discourse participants,’ yet, 
on the other, ‘such rights are said to be specified as a result of this discursive situation.’479 
Yet, despite being necessary, this in itself is problematic. Indeed, and despite her clear 
recognition of the difficulty here, Benhabib ultimately assumes away the very problems of 
cultural inequality and misrecognition that her theory is supposed to address when claiming 
that the discourse ethic upon which deliberative accounts of politics are based presupposes 
‘the reciprocal moral recognition of one another’s claims to be participants in the moral- 
political dialogue,’480 and that the procedural nature of deliberative democracy ‘is a rational 
answer to persisting value conflicts at the substantive level.’481 This, of course, is highly
478 Philips, The Politics o f  Presence, p. 154; ‘Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas, or a Politics 
of Presence?’, p. 144; Williams, ‘The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative 
Democracy’, pp. 141-144.
479 Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, pp. 67 - 94, esp. p. 78.
480 ibid., p. 79.
481 ibid., p. 73.
118
contentious, not only because the characterisation of the participant in that procedure 
smuggles in a recognition across difference that contradicts the idea of the persistence of 
value conflict, but because it presupposes that mutual recognition and equality across 
difference is the proper outcome of the cultural process. This, however, is something that 
only someone who was privy to the unfolding of the cultural process as a whole - that is, a 
deracinated omniscient individual who had a privileged view of the way in which society’s 
stock of culturally-differentiated tacitly-held beliefs shape the discrete interactions of its 
members - could authoritatively claim. Of course, the reason that no such claim could be 
made is precisely because, as culturally embedded mutually ignorant participants in the 
process, none of us ever finds him or herself in this position.
Surprisingly, given her recognition of this issue and of its logical similarity to 
problems in economic theory, even Phillips falls afoul of the assumption of a knowable 
cultural equilibrium point or optimal end state of the cultural process.482 This is perhaps most 
clear in her failure to engage with the clearly cultural question of why marginalized groups 
should be rehabilitated. As has been claimed by Adam Tebble, the same problem plagues 
Young’s account,483 as it does Monique Deveaux’s theory whose conception of ‘deliberative 
liberalism’ assumes - but does not defend - the culturally-laden claim that the integrity of 
diverse groups in society ought to be respected as a means of justly managing relations 
between them.484
The consequence of assuming an optimal state of cultural equilibrium is perhaps most 
explicitly manifested in the utopian character of difference democracy where, in order to be 
just, public decisions must not only be characterised by a formal equality between the 
participants, but must also presuppose an already existent, broadly equal, socio-economic 
rehtionship between them. This is so that any decisions made do not reflect pre-existing 
pover inequalities which do not transform but, rather, perpetuate those socio-economic 
inequalities the forum is supposed to address. A particularly clear statement of the kind of 
reorganisation that would be needed here is to be found in Young where she claims that in the 
heterogeneous public the presence of the marginalized would be secured via
... institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting three activities: (1) self­
organization of group members so that they gain a sense o f collective empowerment and a 
reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of society; 
(2) voicing a group’s analysis of how social policy proposals affect them, and generating
482 Philips, The Politics o f  Presence, p. 154
483 On this see, Tebble, A. J., ‘What is the Politics of Difference?’, Political Theory, Volume 30, 
Nunber 2, April 2002, pp. 259-281.
484 Deveaux, M., Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas o f Justice, Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press, 
2000, pp. 6-12, Chapters 6 and 7.
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policy proposals themselves, in insitutionalized contexts where decision makers are obliged to 
show that they have taken these perspectives into consideration; (3) having veto power 
regarding specific policies that affect a group directly.. ,485
In ‘The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy’, moreover, 
Melissa Williams makes this clear when discussing the intimate relationship between group- 
differentiated political representation and deliberative democracy. On the one hand, theorists 
such as herself, Young, Phillips and Guinier have sought to link the need for democratic 
justice towards disadvantaged groups with their specific representation.486 The argument 
behind this link is that in the absence of systematic over-representation of such groups in the 
democratic process that would afford them the opportunity to escape their perennially out­
voted status, what minority groups need is a democratic process that is based not only upon 
majority voting but upon the giving of reasons. ‘Thus,’ concludes Williams, ‘the defence of 
group representation depends importantly upon encouraging the deliberative features of 
democratic decision-making.’487 By the same token, she writes that ‘deliberative democrats 
have argued that a full account of just and legitimate deliberative processes must give some 
attention to the place of marginalized-group needs and identities in discursive exchange.’488 
Defenders of group representation and theorists of deliberative democracy, then, are ‘natural 
allies.” 489
Yet, Williams does not make this claim without reservation, for whilst the 
rehabilitation of the hitherto marginalized voices may serve to improve the soundness of 
public decisions, that of itself does not necessarily mean that it serves the end of the justness 
of those decisions.490 There are two dimensions to this quandary. In the first instance, and 
similarly to Young, Williams casts doubts upon deliberative democracy’s self-characterisation 
as a public decision-making process for which the notion o f impartiality is central. The 
problem here is that the notion of impartiality may itself be oppressive o f group difference.491 
Secondly, and more importantly for present purposes, Williams draws our attention to the fact 
that all too often theorists of deliberative democracy fail to acknowledge that in order to be an
485 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship’, pp. 261 - 262
486 Williams, M. S., ‘The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy’, 
Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Oxford, oxford University 
Press, 2000, pp. 124-152, p. 124; Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference', Philips, The Politics o f  
Presence', Guinier, L., The Tyranny o f  the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative 
Democracy, New York, Free Press, 1994.
487 Williams, ibid., p. 125.
488 ibid.. Williams counts among the deliberative democrats who make this point Jurgen Habermas in 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory o f  Law and Democracy, Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press, 1996 and Sunstein, C., ‘Beyond the Republican Revival’, Yale Law Review, 97: 
1539-90, 1988.
489 Williams, ibid., p. 125.
490 Williams, ibid., pp. 132-134.
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effective procedure that alleviates the oppression, domination and marginalisation often felt 
by some groups, the deliberative process must itself be prefigured by some condition of socio­
economic equality. This is needed lest difference democracy’s own decisions do not 
transform but, rather, actually reproduce the very inequalities and unequal power relations it 
sets out to ameliorate.492 Yet, she notes, one radical solution to this problem - that of 
reorganizing the terms on which members of the polity conduct deliberative decision-making 
before the actually start engaging in it so that it is a ‘transformative’ politics - seems to be 
‘naively utopian’ as it presupposes the achievement of what much deliberative democratic 
theory takes as its aim rather than as its precondition.493
Williams attempts to resolve this difficulty by offering two reasons why privileged 
groups would be prepared to relinquish the power relationship they enjoy over the 
marginalized. Firstly, she claims invoking Scanlon’s paper ‘Contractualism and 
Utilitarianism’, they may seek to do so because of their wish to perceive themselves and be 
perceived as just and fair 494 Secondly, they may be moved to do so out self-interest in the 
face of the costs of social instability. The result of this, for Williams, is that we best conceive 
of politics as both a mixture of deliberation and interest rather than one or the other, and in 
this way she places herself in a similar position to Phillips.
However, leaving aside Williams’s claims concerning the relationship between ideal 
and non-ideal theory,495 this solution to the problem of utopianism seems inadequate for it 
presupposes a naive understanding of powerful groups. More specifically, it seems that the 
kinds of groups she has in mind are not only powerful groups, but also bourgeois powerful 
grcups for whom self-image and, perhaps, the fear of the destabilizing consequences of overt 
conflict loom large. This is not to say, of course that groups with such concerns do not exist. 
It is to say, however that these are by no means the only dominant groups to be found in 
society, nor that, when pressed, previously bourgeois groups would not revert to more 
primeval reactions. In brief, the bourgeois, conflict-avoiding nature of powerful groups is 
only a contingent aspect of their character and, as such, no principled way to a deliberative 
politics whose precondition, rather than aim, is broad social and economic equality between 
grcups. The problems of naive utopianism and the underlying assumption of a knowable state 
of cultural equilibrium of which it is symptomatic are left, then, unresolved in Williams’s 
account. The claims that group-differentiated representation relieves the burdens of
491 Williams, ibid., pp. 133-141.
492 bid., pp. 134, 141-144.
493 bid., pp. 142-143.
494 ibid., p. 143; Scanlon, T., ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, Sen, A. and Williams, B. (eds.), 
Utiitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 103-128.
495 Williams, ibid., p. 144. Briefly, Williams seems to be referring here to the relationship between a 
theory of society or politics that is logically derived from a limited number o f foundational premises 
and one that is worked up from the observation of empirical imperfections in the world.
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marginalisation and contributes to the wisdom of the wider polity may, of course be factually 
true, although we have also offered arguments that show that they are not. However, 
regardless of whether such claims are true or not, that does not mean that in the world of 
political practice those in dominant positions would be any more predisposed to relieve those 
burdens or that the consequent epistemological losses from not institutionalising group- 
differentiated representation may be prices worth paying if it means they get to hold onto their 
dominant position. The problem of utopianism and the deeper problem of the assumption 
rather than the discovery of a cultural equilibrium that arises from our embededness and 
mutual ignorance of which that utopianism is symptomatic is left unresolved.
Instead of difference democracy, then, it is clear that justice requires principles that 
facilitate the discovery of the proper position of groups within society and of their internal 
hierarchies rather than second guess what answers to these fundamental questions will be. 
That is, rather than attempt to justify our traditions and practices to one another in politics, it 
is only by allowing us to act on the basis of those traditions and practices - warts and all - that 
society as a whole actually comes to see which of those traditions and the norms they endorse 
are socially optimal. The institutions needed to accomplish this, o f course, cannot be those of 
the democratic forum because of its narrowly representative nature and over-reliance upon 
conscious reason as a condition for deciding what norms should and should not be endorsed.
7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have argued that, in the light of the Hayekian reformulation of the cultural 
problem, difference democracy is an inadequate response to the challenge of cultural diversity 
in at least two ways. Firstly, and because of the specific voice it grants social groups rather 
than individuals, it begs the questions of group-specific hierarchy and membership, the wider 
relative cultural status of groups, as well as undermines the claim to practical wisdom. That 
is, rather than work from the Hayekian assumption that answers to such questions are 
precisely what need to be discovered by society, the difference democrats already assume that 
answers have been given. In this fundamentally Hayekian sense, then, we may claim that 
difference democracy makes an unfounded assumption concerning cultural optimality. This 
second problem is made particularly acute by the difference democrats’ defence of not only a 
group-differentiated political discourse but also one that is of a specifically democratic form. 
Mere specifically, due to the representative nature of democratic decision-making, difference 
democracy makes little use of the culturally-differentiated knowledge available to society. 
Moreover, even when the commitment to democracy is weakened via the invocation of civil 
society and sub-altem counter publics this only marginally answers the epistemological 
problems such decision-making faces and, indeed, merely raises them elsewhere when
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difference democrats also defend, as Young at least does, a robust economic co-ordinating 
role for the state as a means of combating oppression.
Of course, it is not only the difference democrats who defend an important role for the 
state in economic affairs. Liberal egalitarians, too, defend precisely this role in their diverse 
interpretations of the importance of the provision of welfare to individuals by the state. 
However, with respect to difference and cultural diversity it is not clear whether today liberal 
egalitarians speak with a unified voice. It is to their response to diversity, then, that we shall 
now turn and, in doing so, complete our examination of the question of whether the Hayekian 
perspective may be invoked as a critical tool for the appraisal of political theories that attempt 
to offer an account of justice under conditions of cultural diversity.
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4 Liberalism and the Culture of Welfare
1, Introduction
As; we have seen, the account of group-differentiated discursive democracy defended by the 
difference democrats is to be rejected on at least three grounds. Firstly, because its 
prioritisation of the political subjectivity of groups conflicts with their anti-essentialist social 
ontology and secondly because at the level of institutions it fails to overcome the challenge to 
discourse posed by the diffuse and tacit nature of social knowledge, a knowledge which the 
discursive democratic fora  difference democrats endorse cannot replicate or make adequate 
use of. Thirdly and most importantly, difference democracy fundamentally misconceives the 
problematic of justice under conditions of cultural diversity by factoring out those 
epistemological concerns at the heart of our Hayekian reformulation of the cultural problem. 
In doing so, moreover, it undermines any claim to the rationality or sincerity of the 
multicultural politics it endorses. The rationality of the discourse is undermined because it 
does not make adequate use of socially available knowledge in public decision-making, whilst 
its sincerity is undermined because its commitment to democratic decision-making is in 
numerous senses necessarily selective of the kind of diversity it seeks to protect.
In this chapter, I wish to examine another response to diversity: that of the liberal 
egalitarians. What makes this a particularly challenging enterprise is the fact that in many 
significant respects, it is open to question whether some of these responses normally 
considered as liberal are any such thing at all.496 This question, of course, has given rise to a 
fissure within contemporary liberal egalitarian political theory with respect to the question of 
diversity for it is with respect to our proper reaction to the fact of pluralism that one of the 
principal theorists to be considered in this chapter, Brian Barry, calls into question the liberal 
credentials of one of its other important contemporary defenders, Will Kymlicka. For Barry, 
Kymlicka’s defence of group-differentiated rights is, like much political theory that attempts 
to accommodate difference, a distraction from more important distributive inequalities within 
society and at best silent on the issue of group-specific inequality.
To a certain extent, of course, we may empathise with Barry’s concerns here for the 
emphasis upon groups to be found in Raz’s and Kymlicka’s culturalism is, for similar reasons 
to the difference democrats, incoherent. Yet, notwithstanding this important debate, my 
primary concern here will not be with the apparent ruptures within the body of liberal 
egalitarian theory but with what has and continues to unite it, regardless of whether or not the 
focus of its attentions are cultural or economic. For whilst agreeing with his general claims, I
496 Kymlicka thinks they are, whilst Barry thinks they are not. On this, see Kymlicka, Liberalism, 
Community and Culture, Chapters 9 and 10 and Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 133-41.
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will argue that Barry misdiagnoses the problematic underlying those distributive concerns he 
seeks to emphasise after rejecting liberal multiculturalism. Furthermore, I will claim that 
ironically, Barry’s misdiagnosis is logically identical in any case to that Kymlicka and Raz 
make with respect to culture, thus undermining the importance of the divisions that are said to 
be evident between them. In both cases, there will be seen to lay a defective logic behind the 
foundational distinction to which all these theorists appeal, regardless of whether the focus of 
their concerns is distributive or cultural. This is the distinction between choice and 
circumstance and the assumption of cultural or distributive optima in virtue of which they 
claim circumstances need to be ameliorated by the state. Moreover, and similarly to the 
difference democrats, such theorists also misconstrue the task of justice by defending political 
interventions in the very social process that enables us to arrive at any reasonable idea of 
which cultural or economic decisions should be made, given the constitutional limitations of 
our knowledge. The fact that theorists such as Raz and Kymlicka have addressed their 
concerns on the basis of these distinctions and assumptions to issues of culture whilst Barry 
addresses distributive inequalities will then be seen to be ultimately beside the point. Justice, 
we will argue, is not predicated upon the protection of particular groups whether these groups 
are defined in cultural or economic terms but, rather, is a means by which we can discover 
which groups merit special treatment beyond the formal rights accorded to their individual 
members equally.
I will begin by outlining Kymlicka’s theory and its fundamentally liberal egalitarian 
philosophical presuppositions. In the first instance, I will outline the foundational distinction 
Kymlicka makes between choice and circumstance, his critique of the regime of ‘benign 
neglect’ and his defence of group-differentiated rights as a liberal response to that critique. In 
both cases, it will become clear that implicit in Kymlicka’s thought here is an undefended 
assumption concerning the knowability of cultural optima in virtue of which unchosen 
circumstances are said to be corrected in satisfaction of the requirement to cultivate cultural 
contexts conducive to autonomous individual choice.
Moreover, our discussion of Kymlicka here relates in a most fundamental way to the 
question of the proper limits of liberal egalitarian politics. This is made clear when we 
consider Kymlicka’s critique of benign neglect in more detail and ask just what kind of 
regime he has in mind. Doing so is important because it will become clear in the course of 
my discussion that despite the institutionally minimalist reading of the phrase ‘benign neglect’ 
that one could make, Kymlicka’s critique only has force when that regime is construed as a 
set of specifically liberal egalitarian public institutions. That is, in the section that follows I 
will claim that Kymlicka’s critique of benign neglect is parasitic upon a wider set of 
distinctively liberal egalitarian claims about social well-being and as such holds, i f  it holds at 
all, only if one assumes a commitment to the public delivery of goods and services that these
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claiims endorse. If one does not assume this commitment, then in the first instance the critique 
of benign neglect can be seen to be telling only against a version of liberalism and not 
liberalism per se, regardless of whether it is a coherent critique or not. That is, Kymlicka only 
thinks his liberal egalitarian cultural thesis holds because he believes that the wider liberal 
egalitarian thesis within which it resides also holds. At no stage, however, does he question 
whether this latter thesis does hold or, indeed, is exhaustive of all that liberalism could say 
about such matters. Moreover, and given this, we may also claim that the ‘neglect’ inherent 
in benign neglect amounts to no such thing, once the fundamentally cultural presuppositions 
concerning individual well-being that lay behind liberal egalitarian interventionism are made 
explicit. I will then proceed to make similar arguments against Raz’s ‘liberal 
multiculturalism’ as tending to beg in advance the political question of the proper status of the 
diverse social groups in society and to falsely assume that cultural integrity is a collective 
good.497
Of course, in sharp contrast to Kymlicka, Brian Barry does not appeal to a critique of 
benign neglect with regard to cultural difference to ground his politics, nor consequently does 
he defend group-differentiated public institutions as a means of correcting unchosen and 
unequal cultural circumstances. Rather, he seeks to defend a more distributivist liberal 
egalitarianism. In section 4 ,1 will discuss Barry’s rejection of Kymlicka’s culturalist position 
and then proceed to set out his own theory. In the penultimate section, I will critically 
evaluate Barry’s response to cultural diversity and claim that whilst not making the same error 
as Kymlicka and Raz - who do so explicitly with respect to the cultural and implicitly with the 
respect to the economic realm - he does do so with respect to the economic realm by 
defending an economic interventionism that is intended to address the inequalities suffered by 
the culturally marginalized. Moreover, and by way of our Hayekian emphasis upon the 
importance of the utilisation of tacit knowledge that is, au fond , cultural knowledge, it will 
ultimately be seen that, despite his rejection of culturalism, Barry’s defence of 
interventionism in the economic process amounts to a species of cultural interventionism that 
is fraught with difficulty. First, it contradicts his stated concern with the distributive and 
shows him in the final analysis to make the same mistaken assumption of cultural optimality 
as Kymlicka and Raz. Secondly, his defence of cultural intervention violates his own claim to 
cultural neutrality and ultimately reveals a fundamental misconception of the task of justice. I 
will conclude by summarising our discussion of the ‘mirage’ of cultural justice as a prelude to
497 Raz, J., ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, Dissent, Winter 1994, pp. 67-79. Raz also 
exhibits certain inconsistencies with respect to the status of immigrants. At one point he suggests, 
similarly to Kymlicka - that they do not properly belong within a multicultural politics (p. 69) and yet 
later cites the example of immigrants to the UK as showing how that country has become multicultural 
(p. 73).
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offering a defence of the institutions of classical liberal justice under conditions of cultural 
diversity.
2. Liberal Multiculturalism: Kymlicka
2.i Choice, Circumstance and the Foundations o f  Liberal Egalitarianism
The philosophical basis upon which Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism is founded is 
identical to the foundation of his liberal egalitarianism more generally, as evidenced by his 
appeal - in a manner akin to both Rawls and Dworkin - to the distinction between choice and 
circumstance.498 Inequalities that arise as a result of our choices are for liberal egalitarians, as 
they are for liberals more generally, morally acceptable. Yet, Kymlicka adds, ‘differences 
which arise from people’s circumstances - their social environment or natural endowments - 
are clearly not their own responsibility.’499 ‘No one chooses,’ he continues in Liberalism, 
Community and Culture, ‘which class or race they are bom into, or which natural talents they 
are bom with, and no one deserves to be disadvantaged by these facts. They are, as Rawls 
famously put it, arbitrary from the moral point of view.’500 Thus, in politics, Kymlicka 
contends, following Dworkin, liberal egalitarian theories of justice hope to capture the moral 
distinction between choice and circumstance by seeking “ to be endowment-insensitive’ and 
‘ambition-sensitive.’’501 That is, they seek to guarantee that individuals are not disadvantaged 
by natural or social traits over which they have no control but that at the same time their 
personal destinies do vary according to their own personal choices.
It is at this point where Kymlicka applies this standard liberal egalitarian argument to 
the particular case of national minorities because, if  the choice-circumstance argument is true, 
‘then it must be recognised that members of minority cultures can face inequalities which are 
the product of their circumstances or endowment, not their choices or ambitions.’502 Central 
to Kymlicka’s theory is that cultures are indispensable ‘contexts of choice’ for autonomous 
individuals that should be considered as primary goods in the Rawlsian sense.503 Given this, 
Kymlicka defends group-differentiated rights as the institutional response to the moral 
requirement that those more vulnerable minority cultures be afforded external protections. To
498 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, Chapter 9 passim.. In Multicultural Citizenship: A 
Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights, Kymlicka refers to this liberal egalitarian argument as the ‘equality 
argument.’ Set Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights, 108-115. Rawls, A 
Theory o f Justice', Dworkin, R., ‘What is Equality? Part I’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 10, 
Number 3, 1981, pp. 185 - 246; ‘What is Equality? Part II’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 10, 
Number 4, 1981, pp. 283 - 345. See also Guest, S., Ronald Dworkin (2nd ed.), Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 1997, Chapters 9 -1 1 .
499 Kymlicka, ibid., p. 186.
500 ibid.,
501 ibid., p. 190, following Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part II’, p. 311.
502 Kymlicka, ibid., p. 190.
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be sure, Kymlicka concedes that ‘[p]eople should have to pay for their choices, but special 
political rights are needed to remove inequalities in the context of choice which arise before 
people even make their choices.’504 For Kymlicka, then, not only are such rights able to 
figure in any theory of justice that is recognisably liberal505, they ought to be a necessary 
condition for the plausibility of such theories.506
Moreover, Kymlicka is carefully discriminating with regard to the lands of groups 
that may be the proper bearers of political rights. The most obvious instance of this is in the 
distinction he draws between national minorities and immigrant ethnic communities.507 For 
Kymlicka it is the former and not the latter who are the proper bearers of such rights because 
the latter have voluntarily decided to enter the society in question508 and because for them ‘the 
context of choice ... primarily involves equal access to the mainstream culture(s).’509 Thus, 
whilst members of national minorities may enjoy ‘national’ rights, those enjoyed by 
immigrant communities are ‘polyethnic’ rights which ‘take the form of adapting the 
institutions and practices of the mainstream society so as to accommodate ethnic differences, 
not of setting up a separate societal culture based on the immigrants’ mother tongue.510 Such 
adaptations include, for example, ‘the right of Jews and Muslims to exemptions from Sunday 
closing legislation, or the right of Sikhs to exemptions from motorcycle helmet laws.’511
How plausible is Kymlicka’s account? First of all, it is important to note from the 
outset that Kymlicka’s is a liberal account of justice, rather than a multicultural theory with 
liberal characteristics. Despite it being a group-differentiated theory of justice, it still remains 
au fond  a liberal theory of justice in which group rights are bestowed upon the basis of their 
being instrumental to autonomous individual choice. Having acknowledged this, it seems that 
an important part of answering the question of the plausibility of his theory will turn on the 
plausibility of the choice-circumstance distinction that lies at the heart of it.
It seems that this distinction is actually inadequate to the task Kymlicka sets it. One 
may claim, for instance, that our circumstances just are an unintended, aggregate consequence
503 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), Chapter 5. On cultural context as a primary good see Kymlicka, Liberalism, 
Community and Culture, Chapter 8, esp. pp. 163 - 167 and pp. 177 - 8.
504 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p. 190. The kinds of rights Kymlicka has in mind 
are territorial autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims, and 
language rights. These are all external rather than internal protections. On this, see Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights, 107. See also ‘Citizenship in 
Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts’ in Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W., (eds.), 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1 - 41, esp. pp 25 - 30.
505 Kymlicka, ibid., p. 190.
506 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights, p. 109.
507 ibid., p. 10 - 16. This is a distinction that is drawn inconsistently by Raz. On this, see Raz, 
‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, esp. pp. 69, 73.
508 Kymlicka, ibid., pp. 63, 95-6, Chapter 5 passim..
509 ibid., p. 114, Chapter 5.
510 ibid., pp. 6 - 7, 96 -  7.
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of individual choices and, as such, are in an important sense indistinguishable from them 
because they are actually constituted by them. That is, without choices, there are no 
circumstances. Thus, the objection continues, to claim that we should be compensated for our 
unchosen circumstances but not for our choices is actually and therefore incorrectly to claim 
that we must be compensated for choices because it is our choices that constitute our 
circumstances. However, great care must be taken here with our definition of ‘our.’ The 
whole point and indeed normative force of the distinction is that any individual selected at 
random should not be held responsible or be made to shoulder the burden of circumstances 
that are not of his choosing with the consequence that any over-catholic definition of ‘our’ 
will defeat just this purpose. ‘Our’, then, is not to be construed as ‘each and every one of us’ 
but, rather, as ‘everyone, except any randomly-chosen individual.’ We are being 
compensated, liberal egalitarians may respond, for the effect other people’s choices have 
upon us, not those of our own choices. The whole point of the distinction, then, is that it 
draws our attention to the importantly unchosen nature of the personal circumstances into 
which we are bom. Of course, those circumstances may have been chosen indirectly by those 
before us including, most obviously, our parents, but that is all by and by. The important 
point here is that we, as randomly-selected individuals, do not chose them because we are 
powerless to do so.
It seems, then, that this point should be conceded. However, it still remains to 
investigate the claims upon others that are said to flow from it. Even if  the distinction were 
tenable - that is, even if  we accept that it may be the case that some do not deserve the 
disadvantage brought about by circumstances they have not chosen - this does not of itself 
show that others should pick up the tab. They of course, may do so if they so please but 
Kymlicka’s choice-circumstance defence of group-differentiated rights and exemptions 
ignores the question of why they should be (or need to be) made to. An analogy can be made 
here with Hayek’s critique of the ‘mirage’ of social justice.512 Indeed, the two mutually 
exclusive positions are actually two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, liberal 
egalitarians such as Kymlicka claim that individuals should not be penalised for the unchosen 
circumstances they find themselves in, precisely because they did not personally choose them, 
whilst in The Mirage o f Social Justice Hayek claims that individuals should not be penalized 
for circumstances that were not chosen by anybody in particular. Let the cards lay where they 
land, without rearrangement, because nobody willed that they fall in that manner, claims the 
Hayekian classical liberal, whilst the liberal egalitarian makes the converse claim that 
rearrangement is necessary just because the individuals who end up at a disadvantage did not 
choose to do so. Despite both camps rejecting desert as a fundamental basis of justice, it
511 ibid., p. 97.
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seems difficult to resolve the sharp difference between the conclusions drawn from the 
rejection. One way of reconciling these positions is to provide institutions of justice that 
allow both interpretations so that we may find out which of them is more attractive, given the 
diffuse and tacit nature of our knowledge and this is an issue to which we will return in the 
next chapter.
Moreover, even if  the choice-circumstance distinction were normatively significant 
and carried the force of a clinching argument, it is still not clear why, at the level of 
institutions, the state should perform the task of compensating for unchosen inequalities, as 
Kymlicka suggests. That is, even if the pursuit of the protection from the consequences of 
unchosen circumstances such as those under which cultural minorities exist were universally 
assented to - and this seems to be a rather tall order under those conditions of cultural 
diversity that Kymlicka’s theory attempts to deal with - the Hayekian classical liberal could 
always argue that a regime of individual rights would do this better because of the unique 
epistemological advantages it confers with respect to the maximal use of social knowledge.
2Ji Incoherence
Of course, notwithstanding these objections, Kymlicka would reject such a regime of 
individual rights. His desire that multicultural justice be endowment insensitive and, as such, 
reflective of the normative force of the choice-circumstance distinction, ties in profoundly 
with his critique of the regime of liberal non-interference with the cultural market place as the 
traditional liberal response to ‘the fact of pluralism,’513 what Kymlicka calls the regime of 
‘benign neglect’. Kymlicka’s criticism of benign neglect is twofold. Firstly, along similar 
lines to Taylor and Young, he claims that the idea itself, when cashed out in institutional 
terms, is incoherent and secondly, that it places intolerable burdens upon the members of 
minority cultures, precisely because its endowment-sensitivity means that one’s (minority) 
cultural inheritance is ignored in the design of public political institutions.514
Similarly to theorists such as Taylor and Young for whom ‘[liberalism is not a 
possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of 
cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges,’515 for Kymlicka ‘[government decisions
512 Hayek, The Mirage o f  Social Justice, Chapter 9, esp., pp. 67 -  73.
513 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1995, Chapter 6, esp. pp. 107-115. For an overview of Kymlicka’s arguments against 
benign neglect see Kukathas, C., ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural
Citizenship’, The Journal o f Political Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 4, 1997, pp. 411-12 and 422-4.
514 Kymlicka, ibid., pp. 110-115. Varieties of the first critique is also to be found in Taylor, C., ‘The 
Politics of Recognition’, pp. 25-73 and in Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, pp. 96-121; 
‘Impartiality and the Civic Public: some implications of feminist critiques of moral and political 
theory’, in Benhabib, S and Cornell, D. (eds.) Feminism as Critique, Oxford/Minneapolis, 
Polity/University of Minnesota Press, 1987, passim.
515 Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, p. 62.
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on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols avoidably involve 
recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and 
national groups.’516 Consequently, the claim that benign neglect actually involves neglect in 
the substantive sense is mistaken. What we have is not benign neglect but selective - and 
unequal - cultural endorsement. The state, by necessity, must reflect the understandings of a 
particular, usually dominant, culture so that it may function with or without the additional 
burden of pursuing any collective goals. It is for this reason that group-differentiated rights 
and exemptions are needed to supplement formal individual rights because without them the 
state will be treating its individuals unequally.
Clearly, the important issue here is the degree to which the liberal state by necessity 
must act in the way that Kymlicka and others who make similar arguments charge. If we 
examine Kymlicka’s list of examples of selective endorsement by the liberal state it becomes 
clear that the regime of benign neglect need not necessarily encourage any of these practices. 
This, of course, relates importantly to the range of liberal theories Kymlicka believes are 
incoherent in this way. To return to our earlier discussion of Kymlicka’s liberal egalitarian 
presuppositions, the reason why he thinks it applies to liberalism in general is because he over 
determines the role played by the liberal state. In doing so, he implicitly argues only against 
the benign neglect of the liberal egalitarian rather than of the minimal or classical liberal state, 
the latter of which is far less, if  at all, vulnerable to his objections and which, moreover, is 
closer to a regime of cultural and economic benign neglect than the position he actually 
rejects. More importantly, it means that at least the equality argument for group- 
differentiated rights and exemptions does not succeed.
The case of state symbols, such as flags, coats-of-arms and mottoes is particularly 
clear here for it can be claimed that Kymlicka’s argument is as much an argument for their 
removal as much as it is for reconfiguring them along group-differentiated lines. Of course, 
what we may characterise as a ‘full-blooded’ classical liberal regime of benign neglect would 
not hesitate to remove them and, indeed, would probably as a matter of principal seek their 
removal. The case of internal boundaries bears the same kind of scrutiny. Would a full- 
blooded benign neglect regime even need internal boundaries, given that these are more often 
than not only the results of the administrative requirements of the state? Similarly, one may 
question the need for public holidays, rather than days off work that a critical mass of 
individuals simultaneously decide to take upon the basis of their personal cultural 
significance. Indeed, the whole notion of a public holiday is, like that of a national symbol, 
anathema to the full-blooded benign neglect regime. What of languages? This perhaps is the 
trickiest of Kymlicka’s objections. After all, it is certainly true that no matter how impartial
516 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights, p. 108.
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law may be in its content, it is always expressed in a language that, by its very nature, will be 
partial. Yet, even here, Kymlicka’s objection is found wanting. Laws have to be framed in 
some language that unavoidably will most likely be the language of the majority.517 However, 
no polity can avoid this without, of course, doing away with law altogether, by which measure 
it would cease to be a polity. Moreover, as Kukathas claims in response to the same 
objection, ‘[a] 11 political institutions must have some character.’518 ‘Just as the framework of 
a building must have some colour (since nothing is colourless), he continues, so must all 
political institutions have some particular features that have more to do with the accidents of 
history and circumstance than with the point that the institutions serve.’519 However, ‘[n]one 
of these things,’ he continues, ‘alters the character of the state as neutral, since in none of 
these matters is the state pursuing or promoting any particular ends.’520 A ‘benign neglect’ 
view such as that presupposed by the strictly neutral and minimal politics of indifference, he 
writes, ‘is characterised not by a failure to realise that neglect will have consequences, but 
rather by a willingness to accept the consequences of neglect.’521 The list o f instances of 
partiality that Kymlicka presents, then, have no serious impact upon full-blooded benign 
neglect even if  they do against the half-hearted, liberal egalitarian variety Kymlicka implicitly 
critiques.
Moreover, it is here where discussion of the implications of the incoherence objection 
is of relevance. For even if one were to accept the objection - and one should not - it does 
nothing to endorse the group-differentiated rights and exemptions Kymlicka seeks. Indeed, 
Kymlicka gives the game away when he associates the failed neutrality thesis of the 
incoherence argument with the provision of specifically public services. ‘ [Ojne of the most 
important determinants of whether a culture survives,’ he writes,
... is whether its language is the language of government i.e. the language of public schooling, 
courts, legislatures, welfare agencies, health services, etc. When the government decides the 
language of public schooling, it is providing what is probably the most important form of 
support needed by societal cultures, since it guarantees the passing on of the language and its 
associated traditions and conventions to the next generation. Refusing to provide public 
schooling in a minority language, by contrast, is almost inevitably condemning that language 
to ever-increasing marginalization.’522
517 Kukathas makes much the same point in Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s 
Multicultural Citizenship’, p. 423.
518 Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, p. 697.
519 ibid.,
520 Kukathas, ibid., p. 697; ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, 
pp. 422-424.
21 Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, p. 423.
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None of this, however, gives us reason to reconfigure public institutions along group- 
differentiated lines for an equally viable option would be to privatise those institutions. In 
fact, privatising them may be a preferred option for by taking them out of the public realm 
one would avoid the problem of partiality altogether. Kymlicka, of course, is blind to this and 
to the claim that liberalism is not incoherent because of his liberal egalitarian reference point 
that is, in turn, informed by the normative significance of the distinction between choice and 
circumstance.
Elsewhere, Kymlicka argues that in the case of immigrant ethnic minorities the same 
kind of argument against benign neglect holds.523 Insofar as public holidays and uniforms for 
public sector jobs are concerned he claims that state decisions cannot but help to reflect, in the 
case of New World societies such as Canada, the United States and Australia, a bias towards a 
particular ethnic group or identity. The demands of immigrant communities, or at least their 
representatives, for redress on these issues, he claims, ‘is simply a demand that their identity 
be given the same recognition as the original Anglo-Saxon settlers.’524 One could of course 
argue that there is an exception to be made here on behalf of Kymlicka’s Anglo-Saxons to 
which his use of the word ‘original’ is the clue. All subsequent migrants have arrived in these 
countries upon the basis of there already being a pre-established social, political and legal 
code, as represented by its symbols, language of public life, dress codes and administrative 
boundaries. Thus, in the first instance, this would seem to indicate that it is incumbent upon 
the immigrants to recognise those symbols as, among other things, at least partially 
representative of the presumably preferable conditions the expected enjoyment of which they 
decided to immigrate in the first place and to pass on the rectitude of such recognition to their 
descendants. Furthermore, one could hardly doubt that, historically, it was a part of the public 
discussion that these symbols would not be changed for such reasons. ‘Let us immigrate and 
we will organise ourselves politically to seek group-differentiated exemptions and to change 
or multiply your national symbols’ is hardly an attractive proposition to the already 
resident.525 Indeed, the idea that immigrants would seek to alter or multiply national symbols, 
or seek exemptions from public sector dress codes and public holidays would not only raise 
the question of the rationality of their original decision to migrate, or of the sincerity of their 
commitment to understand the culture and customs of the country in which they intend to 
spend the rest of their lives. It would seem also to call into question the rectitude of 
immigration itself in the eyes of the already resident. In any case changing national symbols
522 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights, p. 111.
523 ibid., pp. 114-115.
524 ibid., p. 115.
525 Unfortunately, just this argument -  one bad argument amongst many good ones -  was put forward 
by republicans during the 1999 referendum campaign in Australia about replacement of the Monarchy
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for the sake of immigrants does nothing to address the question of the continued foreignness 
to national minorities of the new, apparently inclusive, symbols where the two co-exist 
alongside the mainstream culture as they do for instance in Australia.526 The argument for 
group-differentiated rights and exemptions or the alteration of national symbols to appease the 
feelings of immigrants, then, is just as much an argument to radically change public policy 
and halt immigration altogether, or at least to impose the relevant equivalent of an ‘Anglo- 
conformity’ model of assimilation, as it is to alter the symbols.527
Yet, such an argument merely trades on the same mistaken notion of publicity that 
Kymlicka’s argument does for the anti-immigration argument only goes through if one 
assumes that such matters should be a matter of public political concern and decision-making. 
That is, all of this presumes that there should be such things as national symbols, public sector 
jobs, public holidays or the political management of immigration in the first place. 
Kymlicka’s argument concerning the failed-neutrality thesis of the state under conditions of 
benign neglect can be just as easily taken as an argument for the privatisation of public 
services and policy formation as they can for the reconfiguration of those services along 
multicultural, group-differentiated lines, regardless of whether they are founded upon 
multicultural or liberal egalitarian lines. Kymlicka, then, implicitly argues against the welfare 
rather than the minimal state version of liberalism and, indeed, actually needs to do so in 
order for his argument to go through because the liberal egalitarian state, unlike the minimal 
state, is by necessity committed to the provision of public services. In fact, under a more full- 
blooded minimalist regime of benign neglect - one that Kymlicka does not allow conceptual 
space for in his critique - none of these instances of failed neutrality need occur at all. Only if 
one assumes an interventionist liberal state does the charge of incoherence, or the consequent 
claim for group-differentiated rights and exemptions, have any resonance. If one does not - as 
the classical or minimal State does not - then the criticism misses its target. Thus, contra 
Kymlicka, we do not need to reconfigure public services along group-differentiated lines 
because of the incoherence of not doing so but, rather, privatise them in order to confer equal 
individual interpretative rights where decisions on language, dress and symbols are taken on 
the basis of private conscience. Notwithstanding this, it would seem that in any case 
Kymlicka has scored something of an own goal here for his own group-differentiated 
liberalism would fail the incoherence test in any case because the groups the multicultural 
state recognises will always fall short of the actual diversity of groups in society as this 
always changes.
with a President appointed by a two-thirds majority of parliament and dismissible by the Prime 
Minister.
526 Kukathas discusses the tensions between national minorities and immigrant communities in 
Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, pp. 416-417.
527 On ‘Anglo-conformity’ see Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 14-15, 20, 30, 61, 78.
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2.iii Intolerable Burdens
The other reason why Kymlicka would reject the strategy of privatisation that the regime of 
benign neglect demands is because implicit in his liberal egalitarian frame of reference is the 
idea that without public provision of so-called essential services, such services would be 
either under-provided or not provided at all and, as such, be woefully endowment sensitive. 
Thus, not only would cultural minorities be unfairly penalized under a benign neglect regime 
because they would not enjoy special cultural rights and exemptions, in fact all of us - save 
the affluent - would suffer because none of us would enjoy special economic rights or 
exemptions such as those conferred by the welfare state. This concern goes to the heart of 
Kymlicka’s second argument against benign neglect; that it would significantly fail to provide 
members of vulnerable cultural minorities with the requisite conditions to ensure their 
flourishing or survival and as such would place intolerable burdens upon them528 Without 
such protective rights and exemptions, Kymlicka maintains, ‘the members of many minority 
cultures face the loss of their culture.’529 That is, in some significant sense, the formal rights 
conferred by the regime of benign neglect are not enough because the regime leaves in those 
obligated by its laws the feeling that the state should be supplying something - usually 
resources but also opportunities and life-chances - that it is capable of supplying but which it 
unjustly and unfairly does not.530 This vulnerability may arise in at least two ways: as a result 
of systematic oppressions or simply as a result of a group's failure to achieve critical mass 
within the wider society with the consequence that many of its preferences are unsatisfiable in 
a market in a way that those of large groups. In both instances, the remedy is the same: the 
conferring of special rights and exemptions by the state. Yet, as with the incoherence 
argument Kymlicka’s intolerable burdens argument is similarly misplaced against the 
classical rather than the egalitarian variety of benign neglect.
The first counter-objection that could be made here is that the critique assumes that if 
the state does not do anything nothing will be done at all. Yet, there is good reason to 
question this assumption and Kymlicka’s own distinction between state perfectionism and 
perfectionism in civil society drawn in a discussion of the debate between liberals and 
communitarians about the role of politics is of singular importance here. As he notes in 
Contemporary Political Philosophy both liberals and communitarians
... aim to secure the range of options from which individuals make their autonomous choices.
What they disagree on is where perfectionist ideals should be invoked. Are good ways of life
more likely to establish their greater worth when they are evaluated in the cultural marketplace
of civil society, or when the preferability of different ways of life is made a matter o f political
528 See also Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, p. 697.
529 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 109.
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advocacy and state action? Hence, the dispute should perhaps be seen as a choice, not 
between perfectionism and neutrality, but between social perfectionism and state 
perfectionism -  for the flip side of state neutrality is support for the role of perfectionist ideals 
in civil society.531
To illustrate this, take the flourishing and survival of homosexuals as an example. The 
survival and flourishing of homosexuals can be conceived of either as a matter of debate and 
action within civil society or as a matter of political advocacy and state action. Another way 
of characterising this is to say that their survival and flourishing is a matter of either 
endogenous or exogenous discourse and action. The possibility of exogenous discourse and 
action is made by those who advocate political discourse and state action. Those who deny 
the benefits of political debate, by contrast, assume the possibility of endogenous debate and 
action. Within both categories debate and action can be seen to take two directions: in 
exogenous action, the state can decide to act in the interests of a vulnerable minority group or 
assume a policy of active discrimination against it. Whatever it decides to do, however, it 
cannot do both simultaneously. At least, it cannot do both intentionally, as it only ever agrees 
upon and then enforces one policy at a time. Unlike exogenous action, by contrast, 
endogenous action can be simultaneously beneficent and hostile because the state’s attitude is 
one of neutral permissiveness. What would the situation be like if  the state did nothing?
In the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States and Canada at least, the picture 
does not look at all bad. During the last decade there has been a veritable explosion of for- 
profit and not-for-profit organisations seeking to offer all manner of products to the gay 
customer - from Travel Agencies, cafes and specialist stores to letting agencies, sexual health 
services and refuges. The right of exit here, of course, would be of paramount importance. 
Yet, in contrast to Kukathas in particular, the substantive bite of this right does not reside 
uniquely in an individual’s formal ability to leave a community and upon the contingent fact 
of a wider liberal society in which to enter.532 Central here would be the idea that those who 
have left their communities or even interested non-members concerned with the security of 
the recently rejected or escaped would have opportunities to go out and locate them. Again, 
this is precisely what happens today, here and now in our society, to many gay people. 
Hundreds, if  not thousands, migrate each year from inhospitable families and communities to 
the anonymity of the big city and, increasingly, to smaller towns - thus reducing the need to 
move at all - where they find a support network of the already-resident gay community.
530 Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, p. 697.
531 Kymlicka, W., Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 219, 
emphasis added.
532 Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, p. 134.
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What for present purposes is noteworthy here is that all of this has taken place in the 
absence of group-differentiated rights and exemptions bestowed by the state (and, in the case 
of the UK at least, despite government legislation).533 The flourishing of gays and lesbians, 
then, is representative not of the politicisation of the private but, rather, of the privatisation of 
the public. By relegating our views about others to the private sphere or, in Fraser’s terms, by 
making ‘subaltern counter-politics’ almost the only politics - we not only afford to all the 
opportunity to express and actualise their interpretations (rather than voice them and wait for 
them to be outvoted in the majoritarian process of public policy formation) we avoid the risk 
of hitherto marginalized group-members being oppressed by majorities without suppressing 
the views the majorities hold. The idea that government inaction signals the death-knell for 
outcomes favourable to minority groups, therefore, is misplaced.
Thus, just as the charge of incoherence does not really apply to the regime of classical 
liberal benign neglect, one may question whether the charge of intolerable burdens is 
applicable either. The classical liberal state does not neglect but rather provide a framework 
by which the pursuit o f the interests of minority cultures is devolved into civil society. Under 
such a framework neglect may, but also may not occur. All this model says is that the 
decision to do so should be taken by individuals. This discussion brings us to a point that is 
crucially important to understand: the minimal state does not involve any principled rejection 
of emancipatory policies if enacted from within the realm of civil society - or in Kymlicka’s 
own terms, on not whether but rather where emancipatory action is to take place. On the 
contrary, state inaction means only inaction by the state, not inaction more generally. Yet, 
Kymlicka needs the latter rather than the former to be true for his criticism of benign neglect 
and his positive argument for group-differentiated rights and exemptions to be telling.
O f course, Kymlicka could always claim that this counter-objection is actually of no 
import at all. What he claims is that whatever occurs under the regime of benign neglect, it is 
not enough. Kymlicka thus need not deny that action on the basis of exclusively individual 
rights may be taken but rather asserts that even if it is, it will prove insufficient for the 
survival, let alone the flourishing of minority cultures. How coherent is this claim? It would 
all seem to depend upon the criterion of evaluation that is implicit in it. What is the nature of 
the standard by which Kymlicka judges benign neglect? The problem here is that it is not 
clear from where the criterion of well-being upon which any claim concerning sufficiency or 
insufficiency is made is supposed to come from. Criteria of well-being, that is, do not 
manifest themselves ex nihilo. Yet, without an account of this Kymlicka’s claim looks 
arbitrary. To defend special rights and exemptions as a ‘remedy’ merely begs the 
epistemological question of the appropriate level of well-being.
533 Section 28 of the Thatcher administration’s Local Government Act (1988) comes to mind here.
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This, of course, all relates to our rereading of Hayekian liberalism in cultural terms in 
Chapter 2. We saw there that there were good reasons for claiming that Hayek’s thesis 
concerning the constitutional limits upon human knowledge and the implications these have 
for political institutions are applicable to all social processes, regardless of whether they are 
economic or cultural. Indeed, we saw that for Hayek our economic freedom is in any case 
important because it allows both individuals and society to make use of otherwise unusable 
tacit, locally dispersed and, importantly, cwfrwra//y-differentiated knowledges. Moreover, we 
saw that in the economic sphere, such critiques were premised upon the knowledge of a 
relevant level of economic well-being in virtue of which such outcomes are considered to be 
sub-optimal. The problem with this, of course is that it presupposes the knowledge of such 
optima when these are never given but rather must be discovered. It seems that this argument 
can without complication be made telling with respect to Kymlicka’s intolerable burdens 
argument.
The critique of thinkers such as Kymlicka that endogenous debate and action is 
insufficient for the purposes of the flourishing or the survival of minority cultures, then, is 
founded like its sister notion of economic equilibrium upon an incoherent idea of a meta- 
cultural, Archimedean vantage point - a point of cultural equilibrium, if  you will - from which 
the workings of society can be evaluated and corrected. Without an argument showing how 
such a vantage point is possible, the philosophical foundations of Kymlicka’s critique appear 
to rest on shaky premises. Of course, Kymlicka could respond here that these Hayekian 
points may be to a certain degree telling against economic interventionism, but they are not 
telling against what he proposes, not least because he is not advocating the redistribution of 
physical resources, but rather, legal protections and exemptions for vulnerable cultures. No 
goods are being redistributed, nor is any money changing hands rather, all that is happening is 
that some people are having certain special protections conferred upon them due to their 
membership of vulnerable cultural communities. This, of course, is true enough but the 
important point about such protections and exemptions is that they are interventions in a 
cultural process, not that they are legal rather than physical restrictions. The conferring of 
group-differentiated rights and exemptions, as well as prohibitions upon the sale of 
indigenous land or the exclusion of non-members from community-level public decision­
making processes are legal, but they are nonetheless interventions.
Given this, what is needed is a way in which such knowledge can be made use of so 
that a more rational criterion of cultural optimality may be invoked in our ethical evaluations 
of different kinds of political regime. Without an account of this any claim concerning the 
sufficiency or otherwise of a particular form of politics will appear to be based upon an 
irrational and arbitrary stipulation concerning what is culturally optimal. The only way we 
actually get any idea of the criterion is from within an institutional regime that enables us to
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make use of both dispersed and tacit knowledge. Thus, we may object to Kymlicka that 
despite his claim to be privileging culture as a vital context of choice within liberal 
institutions he actually undermines this commitment by placing restrictions upon what one 
may legitimately do, most obviously but not exclusively with one’s property. Doing this is 
undesirable, of course, because much of our tacit knowledge, as embodied in culturally 
differentiated traditions and practices, is only made use of when we are free to act and dispose 
of our property in accordance with them. As a result, we may make the further claim that 
Kymlicka’s commitment to diversity, like the difference democrats, is largely a cosmetic one.
Moreover, and similarly to the difference democrats, Kymlicka assumes a static 
conception of culture at the level of ontology. For Kymlicka, cultures are the kinds of things 
that one can only ever lose. Yet, there is good reason to reject such an understanding of the 
cultural. Apposite here is Schumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction’ for we may make 
similar claims about the cultural process under a regime of benign neglect.534 In his 
discussion of ‘additive’ identity, Barry points out that under such a regime entire traditions do 
not appear or disappear en masse but, rather, undergo what is perhaps best described as a 
process of cultural osmosis in which norms are being continuously adopted and shed.535 It is 
via this migratory or self-transformational process - of voluntary adoption rather than forced 
conversion - that traditions emerge, transform themselves and disappear. We are not here 
characterising the sudden extinction of entire traditions - that is, cultural catastrophes - but 
rather a gradual, almost imperceptible process of adjustment. Thus, to discuss these issues in 
terms of the Toss’ of a culture that leads to a culturally sub-optimal outcome or cultural 
disequilibrium and the attendant need to protect or guarantee them is a fallacy. It is, rather, 
that traditions and their constitutive norms are perpetually reborn. Kymlicka’s error here, like 
the difference democrats’ with regard to the groups to which special rights are supposed to 
attach themselves, is one of the reification of tradition. Of course, without such reification 
and stasis, Kymlicka would be unable to posit an entity - culture - upon which the occupier of 
the Archimedean vantage point could gaze.
Trading upon Hayek’s arguments about competition as a discovery procedure we 
have claimed contra Kymlicka that if it is the prosperity or preservation of minority cultures 
that is desired then it is for the better that we allow these things to be pursued on the basis of 
individual rights, that is under the regime of classical liberal benign neglect so that society’s 
stock of knowledge may be made adequate use of in determining which norms endure and 
which disappear. Moreover, if we are to factor in the fact of pluralism, then surely we also 
need some mechanism by which we can find out whether we should be pursuing such goals 
and, if so, to what degree? For instance, in Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka claims that
534 Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London, Allan and Unwin, 1976.
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whilst accepting that there is no strong basis for equating the cases of national minorities and 
immigrant groups, it is nonetheless important to accept that ‘if we reject the option of 
enabling immigrants to re-create their societal culture, then we must address the issue of how 
to ensure that the mainstream culture is hospitable to immigrants, and to the expression of 
their ethnic differences.’536 Following Parekh, he claims that immigration is ‘a two-way 
process’ which requires both that immigrants adapt themselves to mainstream society and vice 
versa, although he does not say why this should be so.537 At this level, we also need 
individual rights and nothing more to do just that. To sum up, then, Kymlicka charges that 
the regime of benign neglect is incoherent and impose intolerable burdens upon cultural 
minorities. In both instances we have seen that regardless of whether the charges resonate 
with liberal egalitarian theories of justice, they do not impact upon the classical liberal regime 
of benign neglect in any significant way and that Kymlicka’s solution to the problem is as 
unnecessary as it is inadequate.
3. Liberal Multiculturalism: Raz
Many of the above objections also apply to Joseph Raz who defends a similar position from 
similar premises to that of Kymlicka. Central to Raz’s position is the notion of the ‘social 
form’, which we may for present purposes liken both to Kymlicka’s notion of societal culture 
as an indispensable context of choice and to Hayek’s account of the importance of tradition to 
personal identity and choice.538 Similarly to the case of Hayek, we may concur with Mulhall 
and Swift’s assessment that ‘Raz can hardly be accused of grounding his liberalism in an 
asocial individualism of the kind to which communitarians object.’539 Again, similarly to 
Hayek, Raz is also keen to emphasize that the cultural rules and practices that are constitutive 
of individual choice are more often than not inarticulable. This, however, should not be taken 
as an unwelcome impediment, for it is precisely the tacit nature of much of our knowledge 
that enables us to negotiate the complex web of activities that are open to us. ‘It is 
impossible,’ Raz claims ‘to conduct one’s life on the basis of explicit and articulate rules’ 
and, as such, ‘a lot has to be done ... automatically.’540 Yet, perhaps curiously in the light of 
our discussion thus far, despite this Raz asserts like Kymlicka the necessity of specifically 
public institutions out of the need to ensure the viability of the social forms that facilitate
535 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 81-90.
536 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights, p. 96
537 ibid.\ Parekh, B., ‘The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy’, Political 
Studies, vol. 38, (1990), pp. 695 - 709. See also Kymlicka, ‘Citizenship in Culturally Diverse 
Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts’, pp. 25, 29 -30.
538 Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, pp. 308-313.
539 Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. 329.
540 Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, 70-1.
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individual autonomous choice.541 The reasoning behind Raz’s claim as with Kymlicka’s, is 
that a social form is a collective, or in the Rawlsian terms adopted by Kymlicka, ‘primary’ 
good.542
How, then, does the idea of a social form lead to liberal multiculturalism? Perhaps 
counter-intuitively, for Raz perfectionism is consistent with moral pluralism because ‘there 
are many morally valuable forms of life which are incompatible with each other’543 Prima 
facie  at least, this would seem to be a rather odd claim, especially given Raz’s non-scepticism 
concerning value. Yet, this anti-sceptical claim, he contends, does not commit one to the 
view that there is only one form of life worth pursuing. Indeed, Raz is committed to the claim 
that autonomy is not only consistent with but actually requires moral pluralism, for one only 
chooses autonomously if  one is able to choose from numerous morally acceptable and 
valuable options, not just numerous options, some of which may not be valuable.544 Thus, at 
the foundation of his multicultural perfectionism Raz defends the importance of what he calls 
two ‘evaluative judgements’ to political action. The first o f these has a decidedly Kymlickian 
tone to it, for the liberal multicultural society rests on the belief ‘that individual freedom and 
prosperity depend on full and unimpeded membership in a respected and flourishing cultural 
group.’545 The claim that a cultural group should be respected hints, moreover, at Raz’s 
second evaluative judgment: ‘the belief in value pluralism, and in particular in the validity of 
the diverse values embodied in the practices of different societies,’ leads us ‘to recognize the 
equal standing of all the stable and viable cultural communities existing in that society’546 and 
hence the need for the state to supply the conditions necessary for their survival.547
This latter requirement, moreover, is clear in Raz’s discussion of three liberal 
responses to diversity.548 The first, the response of toleration - which we may equate broadly 
to benign neglect, or what Raz calls ‘supermarket liberalism’549 - was founded according to 
Raz upon the limits of coercion and for the securing of social peace.550 This conception, 
however, was to be supplemented by the second liberal response that wished to secure the
541 Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 132-3, 162, 205.
542 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, 70 - 2; ‘National Self-Determination’, in Joseph 
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality o f  Law and Politics, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994, p. 130. On Kymlicka and cultural context as a primary good see Kymlicka, Liberalism, 
Community and Culture, p. 169. See also Monique Deveaux’s slightly different discussion of Raz in 
Deveaux, Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas o f Justice, where she claims that his theory cannot provide 
a coherent answer to the question of which groups deserve State protection. She is, however, silent on 
whether the state should be offering this kind of protective service. On this see Deveaux, Cultural 
Pluralism and Dilemmas o f  Justice, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, 118 -  127.
543 Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, p. 161.
544 ibid., p. 399.
545 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, pp. 69, 71 -  2.
546 Raz, ibid., p. 69.
547 Raz, ibid., pp. 78 -  9.
548 Raz, ibid., pp. 68 -  69.
549 Raz, ibid., p. 70.
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individual’s rights against discrimination.551 Of course, even this regime extended certain 
latitude to individuals to discriminate in their ‘private dealings’, although Raz does not say 
more than this. More significantly, moreover, and again similarly to Kymlicka, Raz equates 
the legislative domain where classical liberal civil and political rights are supplemented with 
liberal egalitarian rights to ‘a country’s public services, its educational system, and its 
economic and political arenas’ that ‘are no longer the preserve of the majority, but common to 
all its members as individuals.’552 In addition, Raz describes his ‘liberal multicultural’ 
approach as is founded upon the public affirmation of multiculturalism, yet qualifies this 
statement by limiting its defence to societies ‘where there are several stable cultural 
communities both wishing and able to perpetuate themselves’ and where the communities are 
not marked by geographical separation.553
One possible criticism of Raz here would be to focus upon the tensions between his 
perfectionist and multicultural commitments. Surely, his allowance of perfectionist ideals 
into politics means allowing the beliefs of some to override those of others? To neutralist 
liberals, of course, this is unacceptable because of the importance of the idea that we respect 
people’s beliefs equally in politics. For neutralists, the only way to achieve this, moreover, is 
to keep such beliefs - all such beliefs - out of the domain of politics. Yet, for Raz, this 
objection in an important sense misses the point. Central to his perfectionism is a value- 
cognitivism implicit in the idea that we can be mistaken about what is of value and 
worthwhile. As he claims in The Morality o f Freedom ‘satisfaction of goals based on false 
reasons does not contribute to one’s well-being.’554 That is, for Raz perfectionist ideals do not 
come into the domain of politics because they are believed but, rather, because they are valid 
insofar as they are reflective of a valuable form of life. Yet, even if  we concede this - which 
should not be overly problematic for, as Mulhall and Swift point out in their discussion of 
Raz, even a/zri-perfectionist liberals such as Rawls and Dworkin do not need to commit 
themselves to a sceptical stance with respect to the value of conceptions of the good - there 
still remains the important question of whether we should entrust to the state the duty of 
satisfying the demands that the valuable form of life in question places upon us.555 This, of 
course, is not a point to which Raz is insensitive.556
A second criticism would be to take issue with the emphasis upon the role of the state 
in Raz’s theory. Problematic for Raz here is the claim that that perfectionism invokes either 
a) coercion in the imposition of the lifestyles of some upon others and b) that these others are
550 ibid., p. 68.
551 ibid., 68-9.
552 ibid., 69.
553 ibid.,
554 Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, p. 301.
555 Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. 315.
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coerced. Raz, of course rejects this charge because the state can achieve many of its 
perfectionist aims without having to physically compel people to perform or not perform 
certain acts. It can use taxation to this effect, for example as it does for the public provision 
of goods and services.557 Yet, the distinction between physical compulsion and taxation is a 
tenuous one and behind taxation is the threat to coerce. The same, moreover, applies to 
subsidy as it distorts the choices that would otherwise be made and is, in any case, raised 
through taxation.
Yet, it is here that Raz runs into similar problems as those encountered by Kymlicka. 
It does not automatically follow that just because we may accept that social forms are 
necessary preconditions for autonomous choice that, at the level of politics and public 
institutions, the social group should enjoy a prioritised status. Moreover, and again similar to 
Kymlicka and, for that matter, the difference democrats, the necessary definition of the groups 
to enjoy these rights would seem to preclude further development of a group’s composition 
and identity as well as lock out other emergent groups from the political process. Indeed, by 
instituting political rights for groups in this manner, it would perhaps not be unreasonable to 
assume that those groups who already have rights would actively seek to preclude newly- 
emergent groups from enjoying them so as to reduce competition for public benefits.
Thirdly, the emphasis upon the indispensability of social forms provides no grounds 
for according epistemological authority to the leaders of such groups or their representatives 
on what is to count as the content of the form that the group is supposed to confer upon its 
individual members. This, of course is all the more surprising given what Raz, unlike 
Kymlicka, says of the epistemological burdens of being guided by tacitly-held social 
practices. That is, whilst wishing to emphasise the fact that having a cultural context in the 
form of unstated conventions and implicit social rules actually enables us to solve very 
complex social co-ordination problems - as well as to bestow upon us rich and comprehensive 
personal relations and our very identities558 - he says nothing of the corollary that, qua social, 
no single individual has privileged access to what the social form means for its members in all 
particular cases. Yet, by seeking to seal a stamp of approval upon one given interpretation of 
the social form at the level of public institutions by conferring group rights, Raz actually 
presupposes that there is a single interpretation that is authoritative. Rather, then than attempt 
as Raz and Kymlicka do a reconciliation of individual freedom and the group as privileged 
political subject, liberals should outline and defend a regime o f individual rights so that 
answers to questions concerning the membership and nature of groups as well as the content 
of the cultural context they provide may be discovered. Now, to be sure, Raz is not espousing
556 Raz, The Morality o f Freedom, p. 427.
557 M , p .  161.
558 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, p. 71.
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some form of group-level subjectivism and conventionalism. His argument does not claim 
that ‘whatever is practised with social approval is for that reason valuable.559 Nor, moreover, 
does it mean that an individual may not transcend the bonds of their social forms.560 Yet, 
even if this is so, Raz does not distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable social forms, 
nor does he offer an account of the latitude of experimentation afforded to embedded 
individuals by the statist institutions that he endorses.
Finally, his argument from individual choice does not point us towards any specific 
culture that needs protection, let alone that the protection should be public. We may concede 
that in order to choose meaningfully we need social forms or cultural contexts of choice but 
this provides no answer as to which particular context that should be, or whether, indeed, 
there should or could only be one such context.561 Indeed, as Raz is sure to point out, cultures 
are continually changing both in their own terms and as a consequence of their encountering 
other cultures.562 Yet, in defending a special public status for cultural groups and the benefits 
and burdens they confer, he implies that one may safely answer which cultures and aspects of 
them merit protection. Of course, Raz is quick to qualify this by outlining a ‘viability test’ in 
which only those cultures whose members wish them to be preserved actually receive the 
helping hand of the state in achieving this and concedes that such protection will of course 
makes some cultures more viable than others. Secondly, beyond the public goods claim, Raz 
offers no argument for the institutions that are to serve the purposes of cultural protectionism 
being specifically public ones. It would seem that an answer to this is to be found in his 
considerations of cultural viability. Yet it is here where he runs into problems for he is keen 
to stress that his version of liberal multiculturalism is concerned neither with the preservation 
of cultures for their own sake nor with the ever-changing nature of cultures.563 Yet, if this is 
so, then why must the institutions that are to protect those cultures deemed viable - that is, 
cultures whose members seek their protection - be public ones? In claiming this he is 
assuming that there is some threshold beyond which cultures may be deemed viable or not. If 
not, then why the reliance upon public institutions whose purpose is to guarantee certain 
protection or outcomes? It seems that if  the cultures concerned are to be made viable by 
public institutions then they will become viable and their members, including their younger 
members - will seek their continued preservation. Raz too, then, is somewhat insincere in his 
commitment to diversity because of his liberal egalitarian sympathies. Defending such 
institutions, qua institutions of the state whose policies are enforceable, means that in many 
significant areas of life we are not free to do as we please with what we possess and, as such,
559 Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom, p. 310.
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are unable to make use of the knowledges embodied in our inherited traditions and practices. 
This, of course is not only undesirable at the individual level but also at the level of the social 
because it means that society, too, is unable to make use of such knowledge. Thus, in a 
fundamentally significant sense, both Kymlicka and Raz presuppose a preferred outcome of 
the cultural process in their accounts of Liberal Multiculturalism rather than offer an account 
of justice that facilitates the process of discovery of what that outcome should be. Ironically, 
moreover, and contrary to their foundational emphasis upon the embedded nature of man, 
both theorists conclude by defending institutions that take some groups out of the cultural 
process altogether by insulating them against the costs they would otherwise incur by 
participating in social discourse on an equal basis with others who do not enjoy such rights 
and, in that process, reforming some aspects of their inherited traditions. For all their talk of 
our embedded nature, then, Kymlicka and Raz are, like the difference democrats, institutional 
atomists.
4. Culture versus Equality
In Culture and Equality Brian Barry claims that the emergence of multiculturalism can be 
traced historically to the demise of communism in the late 1980’s and the political vacuum 
created by its departing.564 In the countries where central planning failed, Barry claims, there 
has arisen the often-violent politics of ethnic nationalism. By contrast, the West has 
witnessed a less extreme form of this same trend in the emergence of multicultural politics, or 
the politics of recognition, that in many cases has taken inspiration from the New Social 
Movements of the Left that arose in the 1970s in defence of the claims of, among others, 
women, gays and ethnic and national minorities. Li marked contrast to our discussion so far, 
however, Barry squarely locates Kymlicka - although he is silent with respect to Raz - within 
the multicultural camp. For despite Kymlicka’s claim concerning the importance of societal 
cultures as vital contexts of autonomous individual choice, central to Barry’s critique is the 
argument that Kymlicka’s defence of group-differentiated rights and exemptions to secure 
that choice ultimately issues in a cultural subjectivism that undermines any commitment he 
has to the value of individual autonomy. It is worth noting here that Barry’s critique of 
subjectivism is mirrored in his discussion of Kukathas’s critique of Kymlicka’s cultural 
rights. That is, just as Kymlicka and other multicultural theorists are said to leave individuals 
at the mercy of unequal power relationships by delegating rights to culturally defined groups, 
so Barry claims that, despite the fact that so much of his theory is premised precisely upon the
564 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 3-4. For similar discussions, see also Fraser, N., ‘Introduction’, in 
Fraser, N., Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist” Condition (London: 
Routledge, 1997, pp. 1 - 8 and Benhabib, S., ‘The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference’ 
in Benhabib, S., (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 3 -1 8 .
145
rejection of positions such as Kymlicka’s, Kukathas actually achieves the same result by 
denying the validity all such group-differentiated rights.565 For, even if  it is right that the 
liberal state cannot accommodate deep cultural diversity if  that means bestowing rights to 
cultural groups that ‘give the force of law to religious rules that contravene liberal principles 
of equal treatment,’ this does not mean ‘that there is an alternative understanding of liberalism 
that would accommodate ‘deep cultural diversity’ by withdrawing standard liberal protections 
for individuals or putting the force of the state behind practices that violate basic liberal tenets 
of freedom and equality.’566 This, of course, would be to conflate libertarianism as anti- 
paternalism with liberty that is wholly silent on the use and abuse of the most crude forms of 
cultural power. Unfortunately, the latter is precisely what Barry claims Kukathas ends up 
doing, with the consequence that there is no ‘significant difference between what he accepts 
and what he rejects.’567
However, Barry’s core argument against multiculturalism is that it actually 
misdiagnoses the problems minorities face.568 Far from them being rooted in cultural 
inequality, such problems ultimately arise from economic inequality. Moreover, the antidote 
to them - multiculturalism - actually undermines the politics of redistribution that would be 
central to their rectification because it ‘diverts political effort away from universalistic goals’ 
and ‘may very well destroy the conditions for putting together a coalition in favour of across- 
the-board equalization of opportunities and resources.’ This, o f course lies at the heart of 
Barry’s concern that multiculturalism ‘struggles to change the colour o f inequality’569 without 
doing anything ‘to change the structure of unequal opportunities and outcomes.’570 Indeed, 
Barry goes further when he claims that multiculturalism ‘actually entrenches [the structure of 
inequality] by embroiling those in the lower reaches of distribution in internecine warfare.’571 
Such a politics would amount to a ‘free-for-all’ in the allocation of social burdens and 
benefits that would harm both the unoppressed and those weaker members of the oppressed, 
and would, on the same basis, allow for anti-social behaviour to go uncurbed.572
Yet, despite his rejection of multiculturalism in both its Difference and liberal 
egalitarian varieties, Barry views his own liberal egalitarian politics as having a common
565 On this see Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, 
The Journal o f  Political Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 4, 1997.
566 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 128.
567 ibid., p. 141.
568 ibid., pp. 305 - 6. He suggests that Kymlicka and Young are particularly guilty of the first charge. 
On this, see Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 308 - 17 and 306 - 8 respectively.
569 Barry, ibid., p. 325. The phrase is Todd Gitlin’s, quoted in Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 326, 
emphasis added.
570 Barry, ibid., p. 326. A similar point is made by Kymlicka with respect to affirmative action as 
ultimately reflective of an assimilationist ideal towards prevalent socio-economic structures. On this, 
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source with it - a concern with the plight of the disadvantaged. His concern, however, is with 
the largely distributive nature of such disadvantage and this extends to cultural membership 
only to the extent that such membership may be construed as involuntary. We must be 
careful, of course, not to read voluntariness here in the sense of a formal right to exit, a la 
Kukathas. For Barry, we actually need the dispositional wherewithal to make that formal 
right an effective one and he cites at least three ways in which we can make good on the 
requirement for cultural membership to be voluntary, all of which have clear distributive 
implications. In the first instance we need minimum economic protections and standards so 
that, upon deciding to leave a given group, we are not left destitute, the fear of which would 
clearly be an impediment to making any decision to leave. Secondly, we need the exit rights 
to be strengthened by the groups we actually leave behind so that they may not impose unfair 
penalties upon us for leaving and thirdly we need universal, guaranteed provision of education 
and culture. What is of particular interest for present purposes - and this relates clearly to his 
concerns about the structure rather than the colour of inequality - is the relationship these 
prescriptions have to Barry’s other concerns about the politics of multiculturalism being but 
an unwelcome distraction from more important, distributive concerns for it is clear that each 
of them has a clear economic dimension. It is clear, then, that for Barry the project of 
securing the voluntariness of membership is as much an economic enterprise as it is a cultural 
one; that is that we must not attend to the colour of inequality but, rather to the structure of 
unequal opportunities and outcomes. In this way, he claims, we attend to both the inequalities 
that members of groups suffer relative to members of others and help to curb power 
inequalities within them.
The second aspect of his project in particular, moreover, goes to the heart of Barry’s 
rejection of what he considers to be the tenuous distinction between the ‘Reformation’, 
‘tolerance’ or ‘diversity’ variety of liberalism represented by Kymlicka and Galston (he does 
not mention Raz in this respect) and ‘Enlightenment’ or ‘autonomy’ liberalism.573 The 
problem here is that the distinction represents a false choice. If one is to defend liberal 
institutions on the basis of the promotion of diversity or tolerance, one will quickly find 
oneself in the sorts of conceptual difficulties that Barry claims plague Kymlicka’s and 
Kukathas’s theories where, despite their superficial differences, the freedom and equality of 
members within groups is rendered subservient to that between them.574 On the other hand, if 
one seeks to defend liberal institutions on the basis of the value and promotion of individual 
autonomy, it is difficult to see how this would be possible without flying in the face of the 
very problem of diversity concerning conceptions of the good that the theory is supposed to
573 ibid., pp. 118 - 123, 146 -  47. See also, Galston, W. A., ‘Two Concepts of Liberalism’, Ethics 105 
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address. Of course, Barry thinks that this worry is to a large extent unfounded ‘because 
autonomous people can have any substantive beliefs they like.’575 Therefore, in defending 
their autonomy, the state is not only desisting from the promotion of a particular conception 
of the good, it is desisting from the promotion of any particular conception of the good. 
‘What we mean by saying that people are autonomous,’ he claims, ‘is simply that whatever 
beliefs they do have will have been subject to reflection: their beliefs will not merely be those 
that were drummed into them by their parents, community and schools.’576 Let us take each 
of these in turn.
In order to ensure that no one is left destitute by their decision to leave a community 
the formal classical liberal citizenship rights of contract need to be supplemented with social 
and economic rights. ‘The defects of the primitive capitalist labour market,’ Barry writes,
... are better met by adding other rights to the right of contract: health and safety measures, 
maximum hours, protections against dismissal, trade union rights, rights to an income outside the 
labour market, and so on. Similarly, a system of legal mles that gives everyone formally equal 
rights needs to supplemented by the provision of legal aid.577
In many ways, o f course, Barry’s claims here can be seen to be reflective of a logically 
identical argument to Raz and Kymlicka although targeted only at the institutions of 
economic rather than both economic and cultural benign neglect. That is, for Barry, we need 
economic positive rights to supplement our formal rights to property in order to make the 
freedoms those formal rights endorse effective.578 Without such rights, that is, without the 
state actively conferring positive economic rights upon its citizens, the well-being of the 
members of the polity may fall below what would reasonably be considered to be adequate.
The other sense in which Barry hopes to foster autonomy is via what we may call the 
fortification of exit rights. This, sharply distinguishes his position from that of Kukathas who 
appears to rely too heavily upon the value of formal exit rights and no more. In standard 
liberal fashion, Barry seeks to ensure the voluntariness of group-membership by fortifying the 
individual’s rights of exit and does so by ensuring that individuals are not only able to leave 
associations on terms that do not leave then destitute, but that associations are also legally 
bound to ensure that they exclude members on terms that do not leave them destitute, such as 
financial compensation in the case of individuals who are ejected and subsequently 
economically boycotted by the groups of which they were once members.579 In both cases,
575 ibid., p. 123.
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the principle task of the state here is ‘to eliminate gratuitous barriers to exit from groups.’580 
In addition, of course, as Barry quite rightly points out, the availability of the right of exit 
does not mean that the internal affairs of various groups should not be the subjects of public, 
political interest in any case. ‘Even if there are hostels for battered wives that provide a 
refuge from abusive marriages, and a system of income support that removes the threat of 
destitution’, he writes, ‘that is no reason for not making physical injury and marital rape 
criminal offences.’581
Of course, it would be false to claim that Barry does not believe in cultural rights or, 
at least, in a right to culture. His argument for this is that without the public provision of high 
art, it will not be supplied. ‘The only possible rationale for subsidization,’ he claims, ‘is that 
there are some artistic endeavours that are of very high quality and need public support either 
to continue at all or to be accessible to more than a privileged elite.’582 Of course, similarly to 
the question of why a political coalition should be assembled to combat inequality, one may 
object here that this does nothing to show why it should be supplied. Barry’s answer here is 
that culture is central to ensuring that membership is voluntary.583 Ordinarily, or course, we 
can leave the provision of many services to the market for ‘ markets have the advantage of 
leaving people to decide for themselves how they want their fair share of their society’s 
resources to be spent.’584 However, the problem with the market for egalitarian liberals such 
as Barry is that it only satisfies ‘effective demand’; that is, demand that is backed up with 
money. ‘The market,’ he writes, ‘will satisfy the frivolous desires of somebody with a 
hundred thousand pounds a year before it will satisfy even the urgent necessities of somebody 
on the minimum state benefit.’585 It is for this reason, he concludes, that egalitarian liberals 
hold that ‘the way in which goods and services are allocated by markets is fair only if the 
distribution of income and wealth is fair.’586 This, then, would lead us in the first instance to 
simply redistribute resources so that we all have the effective demand to pay for the culture of 
our choice. Yet, as Barry explains, a simple redistribution of resources along egalitarian lines 
in order to ensure a fair starting point is not the end of our difficulties so far as culture and the 
arts are concerned. The root of the problem here is that the subsidization is carried out so as 
to satisfy demand, now rendered effective. However, if we do this, he reminds us, then there
580 ibid., p. 148.
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is no reason why the money would not be spent on non-cultural items, such as groceries.587 
Ultimately, and because of the difficulty of avoiding the scenario where distributed cultural 
funds are spent, for instance on Kellogg’s Cornflakes, Barry contends that public provision of 
culture should be on the basis of the excellence of the works thus supported. ‘The only 
possible rationale for subsidization,’ he writes, ‘is that there are some artistic endeavours that 
are of very high quality and need public support either to continue at all or to be accessible to 
more than a privileged elite.’588 This, of course, also explains why he is against the specific 
subsidization of minority cultural activities:
... If it is merely a matter of opinion that Beethoven is better than banjo-playing, then it is a 
mere matter of opinion that either is better than the monetary equivalent in groceries. And in 
that case there is no case for earmarking funds at all: let people spend the money on 
Beethoven, banjo-playing or groceries as they choose. On the same lines, if we say that the 
object of arts funding should be to spread the money among cultural groups in accordance 
with some implicit or explicit quota system, this undermines the rationale of having special 
arts funding at all. If we once withdraw from the position that the only criterion for funding 
should be excellence, why not really spread the money around by spreading it around the 
entire target population in the form of cash?’589
Implicit here, then, is a perfectionist account of value in the arts that shares much with Raz’s 
account of valuable social forms and that assumes that ‘it makes sense to talk about ‘real 
excellence’ as something that is more than a matter of opinion.’590
Barry’s arguments about the public stake in education are of a similar kind and take 
two forms. Firstly, he claims that the state needs to be involved in the provision of education 
so as to improve standards in education.591 The other kind of argument for state 
interventionism has more to do with debates about the proper locus of decision-making and 
with issues concerning schooling ages and the content of education.592 Barry, of course, 
wishes to sharply distinguish his position from the ‘perversion’ of the libertarian position - he 
has Kukathas in mind here - ‘according to which parents should be able to deny their children 
education or medical care, inflict grievous physical injuries on them, force them into 
marriages against their will, and so on.’593 This, of course, does not mean that the state should 
take control of all areas of the relationship between parents and children: ‘[j]ust as democracy
587 Of course, in response to this we could perhaps defend ‘cultural vouchers’ which only allow us the 
opportunity to spend the thus distributed funds on officially recognised cultural activities.
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is the worst form of government except for all the others, so parents (whether natural or 
adoptive) are, for all their faults, better than any yet-discovered alternative for raising 
children.’594 Indeed, Barry rightly points out that in many instances the record of state-run 
institutions is ‘generally depressing’ in this respect.595 Nevertheless, it does mean that in 
some cases the state ought to intervene.
One important case that Barry cites in defence of state intervention - and one which 
he thinks Kukathas would come down on the side of the parents with regard to - is that of the 
refusal by parents of blood-transfusions for their sick children.596 Such a position, Barry 
writes, is justified because ‘it assigns rights and responsibilities in a way that provides liberty 
where that is appropriate while at the same time attempting to limit the abuse of power.’597 I 
think that Barry’s argument here is to be preferred to Kukathas’s, although importantly this 
does not mean that one need drop the libertarian approach. For we could arrive at the same 
kind o f prohibition to Barry's on the basis of the epistemological discourse rights defended 
here. That is, one could claim that until they attain the age of majority, the child’s potential as 
a contributor to the wider social discourse must be protected, regardless of whether the 
protection is from harmful actions or harmful omissions. Thus because children are 
considered incapable of articulating their views on the rights and wrongs of blood 
transfusions, they are likewise incapable of giving their consent to the refusal of the 
transfusion and, as such, should not be refused it. In short, the inability to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 
should be considered as a ‘no,’ a precept which we have noted has recently motivated the 
drafting of new sexual offences legislation in the United Kingdom with regard to child 
prostitution and, with regard to the debilitating effects of drunkenness, to date rape.598
5. Liberty and the Culture o f  Welfare
5.i Minimum Economic Protections and Standards
Of course, even if  we could claim uncontroversially that in some important sense each 
member of society ought to be dedicated to the task of helping the disadvantaged, there is still 
some way to show that we should invoke the state to do it. ‘My concern’ Barry explains at 
the beginning of his book, ‘is with views that support the politicisation of group identities, 
where the basis of the common identity is claimed to be cultural’599 and he contrasts this with 
the situation where the group identity is derived from non-cultural criteria, such as
594 ibid., p. 202.
595 ibid.,
596 ibid.,
597 ibid., p. 203.
598 UK Government, Sexual Offences Bill (2002).
599 Barry, ibid., p. 5.
151
relationship to the labour market. Unlike cultural identity, these group identities are of course 
important because they pertain to distributive inequalities.
Yet, it seems unclear why Barry’s own criticisms of cultural group rights bestowed by 
the state should not be extended to this domain as well. There are good reasons, liberal 
reasons that Barry ought to endorse, for extending the strategy of privatisation to the 
economic. A brief but lucid discussion of these issues - although perhaps from an unexpected 
source - is to be found in an essay by Alan Greenspan, associate o f Ayn Rand and long-time 
chairman of the United States Federal Reserve. He insightfully points out in his discussion of 
consumer rather than labour market protection that activity by the state drives out the 
protection both get through companies cultivating and defending their reputations. This is 
because it places all companies and employers on the same footing regardless of whether they 
do indeed have good reputations or whether they are recent entrants into the marketplace 
whose reputation is yet to emerge. In Greenspan’s own words, the state enforcement of 
uniform protections ‘declares in effect that all are equally suspect and that years of evidence 
to the contrary do not free a man from that suspicion.’600 Moreover, such standards also 
undercut the consumer or labourer’s ability to exercise his judgement because the minimum 
effectively says that there is need to discriminate between differing products or working 
conditions. In this way, the wider cultural process of judgement is cut short by a regulatory 
intervention. ‘The government’s “guarantee”’, he claims, ‘undermines this necessity; it 
declares to the consumers, in effect, that no choice or judgement is required - and that a 
company’s record, its years of achievement, is irrelevant.’601
Of course, it may be surprising that a Hayekian approach would disapprove of such 
regulation. Surely, such interventions actually minimise the epistemological costs 
encountered when we act in the market place? By imposing uniform standards and relieving 
us of the need to exercise discrimination between goods and labour conditions, the state 
actually fosters co-ordination. Yet, this ignores the fact that the appropriate level is never 
given objectively but is only emergent from the process of competition between differing 
notions of what it should be. Greenspan is particularly erudite on this point and it is worth 
quoting him at length, in the context of his discussion of building standards:
... The minimum standards, which are the basis of regulation, gradually tend to become the 
maximums as well. If the building codes set minimum standards o f construction, a builder 
does not get very much competitive advantage by exceeding those standards and, accordingly, 
he tends to meet only the minimums. If minimum specifications are set for vitamins, there is 
little profit in producing something of above-average quality. Gradually, even the attempt to
600 Greenspan, ‘The Assault on Integrity’, p. 119.
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maintain minimum standards becomes impossible, since the draining of incentives to improve 
quality ultimately undermines even the minimums.602
Worse still, the effect of such regulations is to subvert the very intent because ‘by being 
forced to adhere to standards of construction long after they have been surpassed by new 
technological discoveries, builders divert their efforts to maintaining the old rather than 
adopting new and safer techniques of construction.’603 The consequence of this, then, is that, 
the consumer and the labourer are afforded less protection relative to the standard that could 
be achieved via the non-political socio-economic process.
Similarly, one may argue that the state should not insulate individuals from the 
consequences of the extemalisation of their own beliefs - not least in culturally diverse 
societies - via the institutionalisation of social minima. The reason for this is that doing so 
short-circuits the wider, cultural, process of adjudication between norms. Such adjudication 
cannot, for epistemological reasons relating to the fugacity and tacit nature of social 
knowledge, take place within politics because it is incapable of making as great a use of the 
wider stock of social knowledge relevant to any decision that liberal institutions can. Rather, 
it needs to take place socially, in which our diverse knowledges are allowed to play their part. 
The universal guarantee implicit in the state acting to achieve such a minimum, moreover, 
would seem to destroy the possibility of what we may call the negative cultural feedback by 
which we learn which actions to avoid and which is necessary to the rationality of the 
adjudication arrived at.604
The idea of negative cultural feedback, of course, relates in an important way to 
Barry’s concern with multiculturalism’s tendency to give too much latitude to anti-social 
behaviour for the same argument could be made with respect to the minimum standards and 
protections he defends.605 This, of course is no ‘New-Right’ critique of the welfare state but a 
critique of its tendency to produce people whose behaviour is not anti-social for culturally 
specific reasons but because they are insulated from the consequences of bad behaviour by the 
universal and unconditional guarantees to income and well-being such a state provides.606 We 
may add here that the guaranteed provision of such services to all regardless of their particular 
beliefs and practices - places unacceptable burdens upon the allegiance to the polity o f others. 
It would be intolerable for a gay taxpayer, for instance, to be expected to acquiesce to money 
being paid out to a religious minority who as yet does not have an organised ‘reform’
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movement and who believe the most abhorrent things about gays. Not only would it be 
intolerable, it would smack of the same incoherence that Barry asserts plagues Young’s 
Politics of Difference. Thus, just as the difference democrats and multicultural liberals 
misconceive the task of justice with respect to the cultural, so Barry misconceives it with 
respect to the economic. Given our embedded natures and mutual ignorance, social and 
economic minima are there to be discovered rather than assumed.
5.ii Culture and Education
Barry’s third means of securing the voluntariness of membership - the state provision of 
culture and education - is equally susceptible to the arguments above. By contrast, it is 
precisely because at the most general level we are insulated from the consequences of our 
decisions because of the existence of such guarantees that makes Barry’s argument for strong 
limitations on parental and communal authority so compelling. However, they are only 
compelling because the wider welfare state framework makes the substandard education of 
children or taking them out of school altogether relatively costless. However, if one factors 
out such guarantees - or at least the public, political commitment to them, then the importance 
of such decisions is made clear. In the absence of guaranteed incomes etc., it would indeed be 
cripplingly costly to ‘know less that is true and more that is false than an average well- 
educated and well-read northern European from the early eighteenth century.’607 One would, 
furthermore have to assume an unreasonable degree of cultural brainwashing to accept the 
claim that even those brought up under very strict conditions have absolutely no inkling 
whatsoever of their situation - that is, were singularly incapable of recognising their own 
predicament - in order to do something about it. Indeed, the example of gays goes to show 
that despite all the education and social pressure to the contrary, we do have some inner 
motivation for changing our lot, often for reasons that we are not even cognisant of.
Similarly, it is difficult to ascertain just what would constitute an adequate defence 
against destitution upon exiting a community to which one formerly belonged. The baseline 
of adequacy, that is, just is what we must discover. Yet, by giving this task to the state it 
seems that we may just as well over determine or, indeed, M«<ferdetermine it than get it right. 
This is because most of the knowledge which one would need to make use of in order to 
arrive at an adequate determination would be lost, given that the task o f determination would 
be largely in the hands of politicians, or, perhaps, independent government bodies or 
bureaucratic public consultation processes (which in any case are often non-binding upon the 
state). The problem here, of course, is that all of these seek to divine what the public interest 
is but are only ever representative of but a fraction of the population as a whole. Thus, the 
reason why Barry’s liberal egalitarian institutions fail to do justice to the ambitions they seek
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to serve is intimately related to our Hayekian concern with dispersed and tacit knowledge. In 
defending the institutions of the welfare state Barry fails in the first instance to acknowledge 
the role that culturally differentiated knowledge can play in achieving the kinds of outcomes it 
is publicly committed to achieving. By taking decisions with respect to education, the labour 
market and welfare away from individuals, the use of potentially valuable knowledge is 
denied.
5.iii Reformation, Enlightenment and the Foundations o f Liberal Egalitarianism 
However, more fundamental than the question of whether we should leave to the state the role 
of ensuring the voluntariness of membership is the question of whether we should assemble a 
coalition to help the disadvantaged. For despite his theory not being vulnerable to the charge 
of ignoring the cultural because he is not formally committed to it in the way the difference 
democrats and the Multicultural Liberals are, this invocation unmasks Barry too as, in two 
important respects, a species of ‘culturalist.’ This is particularly clear in the first instance 
insofar as the traditions and practices in virtue of which we are capable of making economic 
decisions are in the last resort cultural phenomena and insofar as the adoption of the minimum 
standards, protections and guarantees that he defends are ultimately derived from particular, 
cultural, interpretations of what is socially optimal. Ultimately, then, behind the appeal to 
distributive considerations is an appeal to the cultural that, of course, must always only ever 
be but a partial and controversial one.
The question of culturalism and neutrality, of course goes to the heart of Barry’s 
programmatic desire to reject the distinction between ‘Reformation’ and ‘Enlightenment’ 
liberalism discussed earlier. Importantly, Barry does not address the question of the 
desirability of assembling such a coalition because this would inevitably lead him back to the 
comprehensive and ethically controversial account of the autonomous individual that he seeks 
to distance his theory from. That is, addressing it would undermine his claim
... that liberals are free to object to the notion that the job of the state is to promote autonomy 
without thereby being committed to endorsing the promotion of diversity. Vice versa, we do 
not have to concede that the only possible reason for objecting to policies for the promotion of 
diversity is that they are incompatible with the promotion of autonomy.608
When it comes to answering why we should be concerned to justify autonomy-enhancing 
institutions he invokes notions of ‘[a] rudimentary sense of humanity’ or ‘outrage’ or
607 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 249.
608 ibid., p. 146.
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‘perversion’ or a ‘gratuitous’ barrier to exit to do so.609 To be sure, Barry concedes at the 
outset that his liberal egalitarianism is assumed in Culture and Equality - the assumption is, 
after all, central to the claim the a politics of difference undermines a politics of 
redistribution610 - and he talks in various places about consistency with ‘standard liberal 
principles.’611 However, is this sufficient? Perhaps we should refer to Justice as Impartiality 
to understand what underpins the commitment to economic emancipation in Culture and 
Equality?612 Nonetheless it is incumbent upon Barry to offer at least some reasons why 
pursuit by the state of the kinds of measures he considers desirable from a liberal point of 
view do not fall afoul of the controversy that apparently plagues the ‘Enlightenment’ or 
‘autonomy’ liberalism he seeks to distance himself from but ultimately remain compatible 
with. The same considerations, of course, would also apply to the philosophical foundation of 
his defence of minimum standards in education and adequate levels of compensation upon 
exit. Thus, despite his claim to the contrary, Barry does defend a species of cultural 
interventionism, once we assume that any infringement on one’s use of goods carries with it 
an infringement of the utilisation of his and also society’s tradition-bound and culturally- 
differentiated, tacitly-held knowledge
This failure, moreover, points us to an important argument about the supposed 
neutrality of Barry’s liberal egalitarian theory and ultimately about what he takes the 
fundamental task of justice to be. For, whilst not presupposing a commitment to autonomy, 
the assumption of omniscience implicit in Barry’s account does presuppose that it is possible 
to comprehensively know what The Good for man is, regardless of which particular good this 
may be. That is, implicit in the comprehensive ethical idea that the Good is, for example, an 
autonomous life is the corollary assumption concerning omniscience. In this case, of course, 
it is not an omniscience of the particular distributive preferences of the diverse individuals in 
society but rather omniscience concerning the telos of the wider cultural process within which 
our institutions of justice are embedded. All of this has grave consequences for the coherence 
of these theories, not least because they are supposed to satisfy the need for justice of the 
citizenry of culturally diverse societies. For, in the last resort, the assumption of omniscience 
makes clear the failure of neutrality. That is, without the assumption of omniscience 
regarding the cultural process, it would not be possible to postulate any ethical value of set of 
ethical values in virtue of which public institutions should be articulated, designed and 
justified. The assumption of cultural omniscience concerning the Good of the diverse and 
mutually ignorant members of society, therefore, is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the postulation of any ethical value as the ultimate foundation of our principles of justice.
609 • jibid., passim.
610 ibid., p. 8; Chapter 8, passim.
611 ibid., pp. 128, 148, 203.
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That is, the only way that one can postulate any such value as the foundation of the 
institutions that justly govern the unfolding of the social process is to assume in a 
fundamentally problematic way what the optimal outcome of that process should be. With 
the assumption of omniscience, then, comes a necessary violation of neutrality between 
competing conceptions of the good. Thus, rather than offering an account of justice that 
enables us to discover to what extent we should alleviate suffering and also to determine how 
best we may, Barry rather presupposes that answers to these fundamentally ethical and, hence, 
cultural questions have already been given.
6. Conclusion
We have seen that liberal egalitarians appear to be divided over the most appropriate response 
to the challenge of diversity. Liberal Multiculturalists such as Kymlicka and Raz argue for 
group-differentiated politics from liberal - more specifically liberal perfectionist - premises 
whilst theorists such as Barry share with them a desire to foster individual autonomy but 
claim that a multicultural politics - whether or not it is one that holds itself up to be liberal - is 
both misguided and ultimately subversive of its own aims. Yet, despite our concurrence with 
Barry’s claim here, we have also argued that, similarly to Kymlicka and Raz, he provides no 
sound reason for accepting that what we need instead of cultural interventions are economic 
ones by the state. We do not need either cultural or economic interventions. Firstly, because 
in both cases the critique of non-intervention which both presuppose has been found to be 
wanting. We have also seen that even if the critique of either cultural or economic benign 
neglect was not to be found wanting, then we still need on epistemological grounds, to bestow 
individual and only individual rights so as to discover precisely what best to do in the face of 
the results of benign neglect, regardless of whether it is construed as an economic or cultural 
regime. Without such rights, any interventions will issue in socially irrational economic and 
cultural outcomes in which social knowledge has not been made adequate use of. In the case 
of immigrants and contrary to what the difference democrats, Liberal Multiculturalists and 
liberal egalitarians such as Barry claim or implicitly assume, we also need principles of 
justice to allow us to discover what kind and quantity of immigration is in the best interests of 
the members of the polity, given their local and tacit culturally-differentiated knowledges. By 
contrast, the liberal egalitarians, like the difference democrats, fail both the sincerity and 
rationality tests of the adequacy of a theory of justice. Similarly, in Culture and Equality 
Barry states that we may assume that diversity - within which we may include the diversity 
brought about by immigration - is ‘here to stay’ if  we rule out, as he does, mass expulsions or
612 Barry, B., Justice as Impartiality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
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the enforcement of cultural norms, or genocide as a means of reversing it.613 Raz, too, makes 
similar comments with respect to the acceptance by indigenous populations of the changes 
that must necessarily come with concentrated if not large-scale immigration.614 The problem 
with this however is that the idea of severe restrictions on immigration - or even of mass 
expulsion as a solution to it - is no longer but a glint in the eye of a few but a rather attractive 
option to significant numbers of people who are also politically organized. What this should 
prompt us to do, then, is to offer an argument in favour of immigration.
What, then, are the principal conclusions to be drawn from our Hayekian discussion 
of the ‘mirage’ of cultural justice. At the most fundamental level both the difference 
democratic and liberal egalitarian theorists that have been considered here misconceive the 
problematic of justice under conditions of cultural diversity. In the case of the difference 
democrats this is most clear in their desire to rectify the differential positioning of specific 
social groupings without addressing the issue of the cultural particularity and hence 
controversy of their desire to do so. Similarly, and despite, apparent disagreements between 
them, liberal egalitarian theorists attempt to rectify differential cultural and economic 
positioning without realising that such positioning is just what public institutions of justice are 
designed to help us discover, given our irremediable ignorance of all the facts needed in order 
to achieve just this.
The important question that our interpretative variant of Hayekian political theory 
places at the centre of contemporary debate about justice, then, is not whether the concern of 
justice should be cultural or economic but, rather, what we should be seeking to achieve when 
we attempt to theorise justice for culturally diverse societies. We do not need principles of 
justice to secure pregiven and supposedly optimal cultural or economic outcomes but, rather, 
to secure the conditions within which we may discover what outcomes we should be seeking 
to achieve -  and, indeed, what coalitions we should be assembling - given the limited 
knowledge implied by our embedded natures and mutual ignorance. We need, that is, a set of 
public principles of justice that allow individuals to interpret on their own terms and given 
their own knowledge, what social meanings demand of them. Let us turn now examine the 
character of such institutions.
613 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 21.
614 Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal perspective’, p.79.
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Part III: Discovering Cultural Justice
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5 The Privatisation of the Political and The Discursive Minimal
State
1. Introduction
In the two previous chapters, I have discussed the inadequacies of both the difference 
democratic and liberal egalitarian responses to cultural pluralism. To recap, the difference 
democrats incoherently privilege cultural diversity as a regulative ideal in politics but 
ultimately thwart it at the level of institutions by advocating a group-differentiated discursive 
democracy. Liberal egalitarians such as Kymlicka and Raz, similarly, thwart any stated 
commitment to diversity that they have by advocating an economic interventionism which, in 
the final analysis, amounts to a species of cultural interventionism. Barry, by contrast, does 
not privilege ethical diversity, nor does he defend a group-differentiated politics, thickly 
democratic or otherwise. However, despite claims to the contrary he does espouse a form of 
culturalism at the level of institutions by defending positive welfare rights as the appropriate 
means both to protect us from and correct what are morally defective economic outcomes. 
Finally, we have seen that both traditions betray a fundamental misconception of the task of 
justice that has important consequences for the internal coherence of the theories they 
endorse. Rather than seeing the task of justice as providing a framework in virtue of which 
social answers to important distributive and cultural questions may be discovered, both 
difference democrats and liberal egalitarians assume that answers have already been given 
and that politics simply has to be reflective of those answers.
In this chapter I will give an account of the Discursive Minimal State that is the 
institutional conclusion of my application of Hayek’s thought to the problematic of justice 
under conditions of cultural diversity. In the first section, I will focus upon two important 
characteristics of this account of justice. The first of these is that similarly to the difference 
democrats, Hayekian liberalism endorses a discursive form of public decision-making. In 
contrast to them, however, and because of the limits imposed by Hayekian social 
epistemology, the public discourse of the Discursive Minimal State is of a largely 
individualistic and, crucially, disaggregated form that issues in what we will call the 
privatisation of the political, rather than the politicisation of the private. A full and proper 
account of this discourse, moreover, leads to the second characteristic of neo-Hayekian 
cultural justice that sharply distinguishes it from the difference theorists’ commitment to a 
deliberative form of democracy. This is that the bestowing upon individuals of socio­
economic discourse rights - including the right to one’s body and its faculties - issues in an 
individualistic politics of a minimally democratic, Discursive Minimal State. In introducing
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the Discursive Minimal State in this manner, I will discuss various issues in Section 2 to 
illustrate just what the disaggregated discourse that follows from the privatisation of the 
political implies for various minority groups for whom only a politics of difference or a 
liberal egalitarian politics is said to be the best antidote to cultural and economic inequality 
and exclusion.
In doing so, it will become apparent that discourse and institutional minimalism are 
linked in the sense that just because the politics is discursive in nature, the state must have a 
decidedly minimal - although no less important - role to play. However, why must it have 
such a minimal role? Section 3 will be concerned to answer this by exploring more 
thoroughly the minimalist nature of the Discursive Minimal State and will defend the view 
that, unlike its difference democratic and liberal egalitarian rivals, it endorses a public 
discourse that is sincere with respect to cultural diversity. That is, it allows us to raise at least 
two important questions the answers to which need to be discovered rather than assumed: to 
what extent, if at all, we should celebrate or affirm or acknowledge difference and to what 
extent, if at all, we should attend to distributive inequality.
In the fourth section I will extend this argument to claim that not only is the discourse 
sanctioned by the Discursive Minimal State sincere with respect to diversity, it is also a 
rational discourse, in the sense that it enables us to discover rather than announce what the 
answers to pressing social issues are. That is, given the inherently diffuse, tacit and 
culturally-differentiated nature of knowledge, the degree of flourishing of any given group in 
the Discursive Minimal State is itself a more rational ‘answer’ to a question concerning its 
proper status in society than an ‘answer’ that arises from and is ultimately enforced by an 
epistemologically emaciated political discourse that occurs in a public space. Given that we 
cannot know in advance the outcome of such a debate -  unless, o f course we rig it by inviting 
only those who agree with a particular viewpoint to participate -  the voluntary nature of the 
discourse will give us the most accurate, non question-begging answer precisely because it 
allows us to make use of our knowledge. I will conclude by summing up the argument before 
proceeding, in the following chapter, to defend it from some important objections.
2. Disaggregated Public Discourse and the Privatisation o f  the Political
2.i Extension o f  the Scope o f  the Counter-Public & Expansion o f  the Domain o f  Discourse 
What would the character of justice be once interpretative rights had been accorded to 
individuals? As with the accounts of difference democracy discussed in Chapter 4, the 
politics of the Discursive Minimal State is a discursive form of public decision-making. 
Indeed, not only is it discursive but the discourse it sanctions, similarly to the later version of 
Young’s Politics of Difference and Nancy Fraser’s discussion of subaltern counter-politics, is
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‘decentred.’615 Under this conception, discourse not only occurs under the institutions of the 
public political forum but also in civil society, between diverse individuals and groups that 
are representative of a wide range of social identifications, interests and perspectives. 
Similarly to Fraser and Young’s conceptions, moreover, the Discursive Minimal State can be 
said to be at least in part an emancipatory conception of politics insofar as it offers members 
of these often marginalized groups the opportunity to address important social questions on 
their own terms by making use of their own knowledges and tacit understandings. For Fraser 
the counterpublics have a dual emancipatory function ‘as spaces of withdrawal and 
regroupment’ and ‘as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward 
wider publics.’ ‘It is precisely in the dialectic between these two functions,’ Fraser reminds 
us, ‘that their emanicpatory potential resides.’616
Yet, in a number of important respects the discourse of the Discursive Minimal State 
is radically different to and indeed ultimately incompatible with these difference democratic 
accounts. This is because it acknowledges that once the epistemological demands attendant to 
socio-economic mediation and the embedded nature of the self are taken seriously, it is 
necessary to extend the scope of the counter-public to the level of the individual. Doing this, 
moreover, leaves behind any political commitment to groups or democracy. However, this 
does not mean that groups have no voice in the discourse. Rather, they do so on the prior 
basis of individuals actively alienating their individual interpretative rights to a representative 
who enters debate on their behalf; for instance as part of a trade federation, an ethnic 
community organisation, or a gay rights or pro-life advocacy organisation. Moreover, we will 
see that groups do still participate on an emergent, self-selective basis in dialogue via the 
contributions the individuals who identify themselves as belonging to them make to the wider 
dialogue. The results of these individual contributions, then, dovetail to indicate what the 
group’s perspective on a given public question is. The upshot of this extension, moreover, is 
that the discourse is able to take on a disaggregated form in which contributions to public 
dialogue take place ‘between’ participants who for the most part do not come into face-to-face 
contact. In brief, with respect to the vast majority of issues and controversies the Discursive 
Minimal State follows Barry’s strategy of privatisation although, importantly, it does so on 
the basis of Hayekian social epistemology.617
The strategy of privatisation, of course, explains why unlike the difference democrats, 
Barry’s liberal egalitarian politics is not premised upon a commitment to group level
6,5 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, Chapter 5, passim.-, Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A 
Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’, p. 14.
616 Fraser, N., ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy’, p. 15. Fraser then asks how we should understand the discursive interactions among 
competing publics but she does not actually say how it will happen.
617 Barry, Culture and Equality, Chapter 2.
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difference or diversity per se but, rather, is concerned with the alleviation of economic 
inequality between individuals. Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, an important part 
o f the argument of Culture and Equality is that the politicisation of group difference actually 
obstructs the alleviation of material inequality and may even exacerbate it. Yet, despite 
concurring with the thrust of Barry’s claim, it is at this point where significant intramural 
differences between classical liberals and liberal egalitarians as well as extramural ones 
between liberals and difference democrats emerge. For emerging from our critique in 
Chapters 4 and 5 is the claim that Barry’s own anti-multicultural argument for the strategy of 
privatisation of the cultural sphere is equally appropriate to and thus should be expanded to 
include the economic domain that he takes as primary. Again, and unlike Barry’s own ethical 
argument for privatisation, the reasons for this are the same as those relating to Hayekian 
social epistemology discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 which have been appealed to above in 
order to extend the scope of the counter-public. Given that in the economic domain no 
individual can know all that is needed to be known in order to effect socially equitable 
outcomes or corrections of inequitable ones, we are best off privatising and therefore 
disaggregating economic decision-making in order that differentiated local and tacit 
knowledges may be made socially available to discover what should be done in response to 
the sometimes deleterious outcomes of social co-operation. Instead of Barry’s liberal 
egalitarian welfare rights, then, the Discursive Minimal State enables the social management 
and correction of economic outcomes to take place in terms of individual decisions in which, 
importantly, the rectitude of the conferral of the benefits that positive welfare rights would 
otherwise achieve is itself a subject of the wider, disaggregated public discourse.
2.ii The Privatisation o f  the Political
Most significantly, once we extend both Fraser’s notion of ‘subaltern counter-publics’ to the 
level of the individual and expand Barry’s strategy of privatisation from the cultural to the 
economic we radically reconfigure the normative significance of the public-private split in 
politics. Rather than make the private political or, in other words, politicise the private in the 
interests of the economic emancipation or cultural recognition of members of marginalized 
groups, the epistemologically-motivated extension of the counter-public and expansion of the 
domain of its ‘discursive space’618 means that ultimately we privatise the political.619
Two important clarifications need to be made here. Firstly, and acknowledging any 
concerns one may have about the disappearance of groups from public discourse, the
618 Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy’, p. 16.
619 This is what Jonathan Wolff calls ‘the enfeeblement of the political.’ On this see Wolff, J., ‘John 
Rawls: Liberal Democracy Restated’, Liberal Democracy and Its Critics, Carter, A. and Stokes, G. 
(eds.) Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, p. 123.
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privatisation of the political does not mean that we take important issues off the public agenda 
and leave those to whom such concerns are of importance to fend for themselves in a invisible 
private domain that admits of all manner of insidious and unadmitted oppressive relations 
between interpreters.620 That, clearly, would be a rather sorry state of affairs. Rather, the 
claim that all aspects of social cooperation are the fitting subjects of public discussion is one 
with which we concur. Furthermore, and in contrast both to Fraser’s characterisation of 
subaltern counter-politics, that is, as precisely a counter-politics that is viewed as an 
alternative or corrective to more formal political decision making institutions and to Young’s 
rediscovery of civil society in Inclusion and Democracy, the disaggregated discourse of the 
Discursive Minimal State is the norm throughout the polity and not the exception.621 As such, 
it is not a discourse that addresses only certain kinds of issue that otherwise would be 
excluded from the public agenda - as if they were mere political afterthoughts - but, rather, is 
ultimately constitutive of public discussion itself.622 In this sense the disaggregated discourse 
is not one in which the marginalized are permitted to play a complimentary but nonetheless 
second fiddle to others more centrally situated in society’s discursive orchestra but, rather, 
one in which all play first violin. The extension of the counter-public and the expansion of 
the domain of the discourse that together are constitutive of the privatisation of the political, 
then, are institutional responses to Hayek’s epistemic problematic that do not alter the content 
of public discourse but, rather, its form. Precisely because the place of the individual in 
society is taken seriously, the discourse is both all-encompassing and largely of a 
disaggregated character and as such is, on epistemological grounds, most appropriately 
institutionalised along individualist lines. In the discourse of the Discursive Minimal State, 
then, everything is up for discussion and everything is discussed on equal terms.
Moreover, and on the basis of the argument for individual interpretation of Chapter 2, 
the questioning of the rectitude of conferring public discourse rights to all on an equal basis 
could not be raised. That is, to deny that women, for example, should enjoy these political 
rights would be to beg the question of their very conferral. At the political level all need to 
enjoy these rights so as to find out the answer to such questions. A similar line of argument 
could be made, of course, with respect to slavery. We cannot buy or sell for good ourselves 
or other people in the Discursive Minimal State because this would be to deny the very 
interpretative rights that all are supposed to enjoy without recourse to reconsidering one’s 
decision. Of course, one may, as is already the case in societies that permit prostitution, be
620 A concern which figures in Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s interesting and comprehensive critique of 
Hayekian political theory. See Galeotti, A. E., ‘Individualism, Social Rules, Tradition: The Case of 
Friederich A. Hayek’, Political Theory, vol. 15, no. 2, (1987), pp. 163 - 181, esp. pp. 173 - 179.
621 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, Chapter 5.
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able to sell oneself on a temporary basis. Furthermore, it is clear that the abuse of children 
would be ruled out for, as not being possessed of these public political rights until attainment 
o f the age of majority, they would not be in a position to consent to the inflicting of harm 
upon them.
Before discussing the merits of such an arrangement, let us now take a self­
consciously eclectic, although by no means exhaustive, list of issues in order to illustrate the 
character of public discourse when individuals rather than groups are accorded interpretative 
rights about all the results of social co-operation. The issues that will be discussed are: 
abortion and homosexual parenthood, employment practice and affirmative action, cultural 
rights and exemptions, immigration and the allocation of housing. In the first instance we 
will see that the privatisation of the political demands the libertarian option rather than 
prohibition or the rule-and-exemption approach whilst in the second, the privatisation of the 
political demands the regime of private property rights.623
Abortion and Homosexual Parenthood Abortion is perhaps the most useful issue 
upon which to begin explaining the character of the Discursive Minimal State as it is an often 
discussed topic in work on interpretative approaches to justice and is in many respects a 
paradigmatic example of the kind of cultural, as opposed to material or distributive, concern 
of the New Social Movements of the Left and Right.624 Discussion of abortion is usually 
conducted in terms of two broad and mutually exclusive choices. Pro-choice advocates often 
ground their defence of abortion in the woman’s right to control her body whilst pro-life 
advocates, by contrast, claim that the sanctity of life is paramount. To see what stance the 
Discursive Minimal State would take, let us take the example of an inhabitant of Anytown 
who wishes to have an abortion because she believes that it is irresponsible to bring new life 
into an already overcrowded and underfed world. Initially at least the approach taken towards 
the issue of abortion by the Discursive Minimal State may appear similar to what Ronald 
Dworkin has described as a ‘checkerboard solution’ in which competing, if  not mutually 
exclusive interpretations are accommodated in legislation.625 The strategy Dworkin discusses 
is one where abortions are legal - in order to placate pro-choice advocates - but are legal only 
for women bom on odd years - to placate pro-life advocates. This strategy, Georgia Wamke 
tells us in Justice and Interpretation, means that pro-choice advocates are satisfied because ‘at
622 Given that the state will oversee the passing of at least some laws with regard to law enforcement, 
national defence, voting and most importantly, who is to qualify as a protected individual interpreter 
this claim will need to be weakened in a later section.
623 On this, see Barry, Culture and Equality, Chapter 2, passim.
624 See Wamke, Justice and Interpretation, passim.-, Cohen, J. L., ‘Democracy, Difference and the 
Right of Privacy’, Benhabib, S. (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the 
Political, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 187-217.
625 Dworkin, R., Law ’s Empire, Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 178 - 184.
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least some women were allowed the choice they thought just and pro-life advocates could 
similarly know that at least half the cases of injustice against foetuses had been stopped.’626
The conferral of individual interpretative rights with regard to abortion, similarly, can 
prima facie  be seen to be a checkerboard solution in that it allows both pro-choice and pro-life 
interpretations to be externalised. Of course, the way in which it does so is different because 
it involves the removal of the issue of abortion from the law altogether and, as such, has far 
more in common with Barry’s notion of a ‘libertarian option.’627 Not only would one have 
the right to choose to have an abortion, others - including, of course, doctors - would have the 
right to choose whether or not to perform one or to work for hospitals or abortion clinics that 
do. The hospitals of Anytown, moreover, would be permitted to decide as a matter of in- 
house policy whether or not to perform abortions and, if  they do, under what conditions. 
Moreover, Anytown’s construction companies and suppliers of medical goods, as well as 
those based in other places, would be permitted to decide for themselves whether or not to 
accept contracts to build abortion clinics or supply them with essential goods. The extent to 
which our single mother may have an abortion, then, would not be set in advance by 
legislation but, rather, by the extent to which others, often unseen others, would be prepared 
to perform the wide range of tasks that facilitate it. Abortion, then, whilst being legal and 
permissible, would not be a matter of positive right.
Let us take as another very different example the debate concerning whether gay 
couples should be allowed to hire the services of a surrogate mother or a donor father, or 
make use of an adoption agency to have child. One such couple in Anytown, have decided to 
seek an adoption agency that will allow them to provide the love, commitment and care 
involved in bringing up a child. They have to date being relatively unsuccessful in their 
search as in Anytown one of the two adoption agencies has as a part of its charter the 
commitment to respect the wishes of donor parents who do not wish to see their soon-to-be 
adopted children brought up in same-sex households. This means that, at the moment, there 
are no children available for adoption. There is one other adoption agency in Anytown, 
although it is one that the couple have decided not to seek help from as it has no commitment 
to take on board the desires of donor parents at all, whether they are in favour o f or against the 
idea of same-sex adoption. Despite not agreeing with those who are against same-sex 
adoption, the couple have decided that it is more important that donor parents are at least 
consulted on the issue.
In the case of homosexual parenthood, then, the response of the Discursive Minimal 
State is formally identical to that governing abortion in that the issue is not subject to 
legislation and, as such, is not a subject of the politics of recognition simply because it is not a
626 Wamke, Justice and Interpretation, p. 71.
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subject of politics. The fact that a couple may merely want a child for what some would 
consider to be the wrong reasons - such as wanting to make a legal or political point or for the 
even more crass reason of wanting a child in the way one wants a new car - would, under the 
reading offered here, not have been reason enough to impose a ban. Rather, such factors 
would enter into the moral deliberations of those whose consent is needed in order for the 
couples concerned to have or adopt the child: the surrogate mother or donor father, the 
hospital, the adoption agency, the parents of children who will give them up for adoption to 
name just a few, all of whom participate in Anytown’s disaggregated discourse about 
homosexual parenthood. Of course, the inhabitants of Anytown participate in discourses that 
are wider than this. The availability of abortion services would be derived in part upon the 
moral deliberations of other, unseen women, their husbands or partners who, together with the 
inhabitants of Anytown, transform and are transformed by the wider economic and cultural 
nexus. Unseen doctors, too, would contribute to this wider context of choice when deciding 
which hospitals to work for as would suppliers of medical goods when deciding to which 
institutions they should supply upon the basis of their own knowledges and often tacit 
understandings. In the case of homosexual parenthood, the choices available to couples will 
also be determined by hospitals and adoption agencies drawing up their own in-house policies 
on whether they provide surrogacy and adoption services to homosexual couples, the moral 
choices of the parents of soon-to-be adopted or surrogate children deciding whether they want 
to give them up to adoption agencies that allow for adoption or, indeed are premised as a 
niche service-provider upon adoption by gay couples. This wider, mediated discourse, then, 
sets the context within which women choose to have abortions and gay couples choose to 
adopt children and within which others, including other women and other gays, offer their 
services to help them do so. All the issues that are discussed within the political forum, then, 
are here relocated within the context of civic social relations.
Employment Practice and Affirmative Action The libertarian option or the strategy 
of privatisation would also be adopted with regard to the issue of employment practice. The 
question here concerns the rectitude of employing and sacking workers upon the basis of the 
acceptability to the employer (and, indirectly, the employer’s customers) of traits that are 
cultural, ethnic, racial or gender-based. Barry, of course, claims that to allow employers to 
cater to their own tastes or to the tastes of their customers in this way would be to allow them 
to ‘drive a coach and horses through anti-discrimination legislation.’628 The reason why Barry 
finds this objectionable, of course, is that more often than not the reasons cited for the refusal 
to hire or for sacking someone are irrelevant to the good performance of the job. 
Significantly, however, he does accept that deciding what inhibits the efficient discharge of
627 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 4 1 -2 .
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the job ‘leaves a lot of room for interpretation,’ that is, that this notion is subject to 
interpretative dispute.629 Yet, admitting this much without going on to say why this is so is 
not only problematic for his unhappiness with the idea of repealing of anti-discrimination 
legislation, but also for his positive argument for minimum standards. For money-making 
enterprises at least, efficient discharge of the tasks demanded by the job would be parasitic 
upon profitability. Indeed, this just is the way that the markets Barry, with obvious 
qualifications, endorses reconcile the diverse and often conflicting preferences that we have. 
The degree of profitability of a company just is the degree to which what it produces and how 
it produces it is acceptable to the people it hopes will buy the good in question, given their 
diverse traits and interests. If clients or customers do not find certain traits appealing, they 
will simply take their custom elsewhere for reasons which only they know. Indeed, the recent 
rise of fair trade coffee is an interesting case in point where the change in preference was not 
for a particular type of coffee per se but, rather, for the alternative production process that fair 
trade represents. What of not-for-profit ventures such as charities? Again, it seems that the 
problem here is that efficient discharge will be determined by factors many of which will be 
unknown to the employer or the beneficiaries of the organisation's services. Ultimately, then, 
we need freedom here - that is, the repeal of anti-discrimination legislation which rules out 
race, gender, sexuality and religion as ever significant factors for the performance of any job - 
to enable society to find out just what ‘efficient discharge of the job’ means.
Discussion of employment practice is often part of wider debates concerning 
affirmative action and the Discursive Minimal State would also allow an employer to decide 
whether or not he should employ on the basis of prior concerns about the social upliftment of 
particular groups. In the case of the Anytown Construction company, there is in place a 
policy of affirmative action that actively seeks to employ people from the Outcast minority 
group of Anytown, who along with Devout Believers have typically experienced higher levels 
of unemployment than other groups. The Outcasts, are differentiated from the majority 
community in terms of their race, as opposed to the Devout Believers who are differentiated 
from the majority in terms of their distinctive beliefs, practices and traditions.
Similarly, and as we have seen with regard to employment practice, the decision to 
selectively admit or, indeed, set up colleges, schools and universities that only admit 
particular groups because of their disadvantaged position in society, is protected. Beyond 
this, members of the wider community would be free to externalise their beliefs about 
admission policies by sending or not sending their children to such establishments or 
supplying or not supplying goods and services. What the libertarian option makes clear, then, 
is that the issue of affirmative action is itself a subject of contestation and, as such, is left as a
628 ibid., p. 60.
168
matter of individual conscience. In the Discursive Minimal State, then, all would enjoy the 
freedom to employ, sack and admit whomsoever they - and their consciences - chose and 
others would be free to externalise their beliefs about those choices.
Cultural Rights and Exemptions The issue of affirmative action leads naturally to a 
consideration of the status of cultural rights in the Hayekian polity.630 Similar to the position 
defended by Chandran Kukathas, it is clear that in the Discursive Minimal State neither the 
Outcasts nor the Devout Believers would enjoy, along with any other cultural grouping, 
cultural rights.631 Yet, the prohibition of cultural rights by the Discursive Minimal State does 
not mean that the concentrated benefits derived from their enjoyment are lost. Rather, the 
rectitude of the conferral of the benefits that would be enjoyed by the possession of cultural 
rights would itself be one of the subjects of the disaggregated discourse. The members of the 
Anytown Housing Co-operative, for instance, are free to choose to divert some of their 
collectively owned resources to members belonging to the Outcast and Devout Believer 
minority communities. Thus, the Discursive Minimal State would offer principled constraints 
upon how such benefits are to be accorded. What is important here, then, is that the 
derivation of the group-differentiated benefit in question takes place upon the basis of the 
prior possession of individual rights. In this case, membership of the Co-op is voluntary and 
the procedures it has in place for the determination of in-house policy are left subject to a free, 
fair, although non-secret, vote. Thus, in the Discursive Minimal State group differentiated 
benefits are the kinds of thing that only individuals would accord by devoting the exploitation 
of their individual rights to those they deem in need of special treatment. Those who saw 
group-differentiated benefits as a good thing, for instance, would be free to persuade others of 
this and to back up their beliefs by devoting the exploitation of their individual rights to this 
end. Moreover, and contrary to the argument of Chapter 4, this may, of course, reflect the 
belief that the voice of a marginalized group - to gain expression via an elected representative 
or traditional authority figure - is an identifiable entity. Alternatively but not exclusively of 
this possibility, the institutionalisation of a group voice may simply reflect a desire for 
efficient decision making on the part of the individuals concerned. None of this, however, 
mitigates the argument being offered here, as the conferral of individual interpretative rights
629 ibid.,
630 I am following Barry’s use of ‘positive’ and ‘negative multiculturalism to be coextensive with 
cultural or group rights and legal exemptions respectively. Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 17.
631 Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, Political Theory, Volume 20, Number 1, February, 
1992; ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, Political Theory, vol. 26 no. 5, 
October 1998; The Liberal Archipelago, forthcoming. We will examine Kukathas’s Politics of 
Indifference more closely in the next chapter. See also Kukathas, C., ‘Cultural Toleration’ in 
Kymlicka, W. and Shapiro, I. (eds.), NOMOS 39: Ethnicity and Group Rights, New York, New York 
University Press, 1997, pp. 69 - 104.
169
proceeds as much as a basis for answering questions concerning the truth of such beliefs as it 
does to discussing the rectitude of group-differentiated benefits themselves.
Similarly to group rights, neither the Outcasts, the Devout Believers nor any other 
group would enjoy group-differentiated legal exemptions in the Discursive Minimal State for 
the simple reason that there would be no item of legislation to which there would be an 
exemption. Of course, just because there are no legal exemptions does not mean that there 
will be no exemptions per se. Rather, it is to say that there is no special, group-differentiated 
case for a legal exemption as conferred by the state. Anytown Construction, for example, has 
recently accepted a contract to build a new abortion clinic. It has also needed to devise its 
own response to the presence of the large number of Devout Believer inhabitants who, as is 
well known locally, are highly experienced and skilled workers in this industry but whose 
religion forbids the removal of traditional headgear. Anytown Construction, however, runs a 
strict worker-safety employment policy and must decide whether employees who for religious 
reasons cannot wear construction helmets, should be employed by it under a special 
exemption. After lengthy deliberation they have decided not to offer this exemption as a part 
of the contracts they enter into with workers. Thus, only those Devout Believers who are 
secular and do not wear the headgear have the opportunity to work for Anytown Construction. 
Similarly, a rival construction company in Anytown that is actually owned and run by a well- 
established Devout Believer family must also decide whether or not to impose a helmet 
requirement on all of its employees except those of Devout Believer origin. Expecting that 
this may cause some resentment between employees of different communities, they have 
decided to pursue a libertarian option within the company and allow their workers to decide 
for themselves, provided of course that if they choose not to wear protective headgear they 
sign a document to the effect that the responsibility for any injuries that a helmet would have 
provided adequate protection against is theirs and theirs alone. Furthermore, and in keeping 
with the idea that these decisions are part of a wider set of decisions being simultaneously 
made in Anytown and beyond, the degree to which both companies’ policies were acceptable 
would in turn be reflected in the choices of others, to work for them or hire their services. 
This is shown by the fact that two other companies that recently adopted a similar libertarian 
option policy had to reinstate compulsory headgear because of the drop in orders they 
experienced.
Immigration In the case of immigration the Discursive Minimal State would take a 
permissive stance and sanction free migration. Of course, under such a regime the point of 
control of immigration levels and the composition of immigrants is not removed altogether, 
but is rather relocated to a different, civic social level. Thus, it would be individual 
interpreters who would decide whether or not to offer immigrants jobs, housing, or any other 
of the myriad goods and services available. Newly arrived migrants to Anytown would,
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conversely, be free to link up with already-established networks of immigrant communities, 
with those already-resident people and organisations whose business it is to help them, or to 
forgo this option and seek direct entry into the wider host community. Prospective 
immigrants who have not yet left their countries of origin, moreover, would themselves 
contribute to the process of the determination of immigrant numbers and composition by 
selecting countries on the basis of the reputation for hospitality they enjoy.
Housing Similarly to the issues considered above which all fall within the politics of 
recognition, the issue of housing may be a subject of interpretative diversity, despite it being 
at first glance located within the realm of the politics of distribution. However, unlike the 
cases above, interpretative diversity is not dealt with via the libertarian option of removing the 
issue from the province of law altogether. To do so, of course, would be to remove it from 
the province of contract and tort. Rather, the encounter between diverse interpretations 
concerning socially optimal levels and quality of housing is arbitrated via several property 
rights. The Anytown housing co-operative, for instance, is constituted by collective rather 
than individual decision-making. Under this collectivist interpretation decision-making 
proceeds under the auspices of democratic majority rule. Another interpretation may be of a 
co-operative nature but without such an emphasis upon democracy. This is the institution of 
the Anytown Housing Association where the property is jointly owned but decisions are made 
by a representative committee, either elected or employed by the householders. Thirdly, there 
is the individualist interpretation where housing is placed within a market along profit- 
oriented lines and individual buyers negotiate with individual sellers or by estate agents. 
Finally, a housing concern may be premised upon all of these ostensibly irreconcilable 
interpretations via a system of internal cross-subsidy in which, for instance, a proportion of 
properties owned were subject to collective decision-making and these, as an important 
experiment for the company as a whole, were subsidised through profits gained through a 
more strictly individualist approach. Many inhabitants of Anytown have opted for this 
because their jobs do not allow them the time to actively participate in altruistic endeavours, 
despite their moderately higher than average desire to do so. Finally, there is a housing 
company that designs and builds accommodation according to the principals of Feng Shui and 
what this makes immediately clear is that even apparently ‘distributive’ issues such as 
housing are ultimately as much cultural issues as they are economic. Under the auspices of 
the Discursive Minimal State, all five interpretations of good housing practice - and probably 
many others not considered here - compete for the allegiance of the members of the polity, 
given their interests, traits and other priorities.
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3. Institutional Minimalism and the Sincerity o f  Public Discourse
What, then, makes this account of justice more attractive than those we have considered thus 
far? Over and above any other claims one may wish to make in its favour, there are at least 
two things in particular that are true of this liberal conception of politics - but not of the other 
conceptions I have investigated - that stem principally from its second fundamental 
characteristic. The first of these is that, unlike the difference democrats and the multicultural 
liberals, the minimalist account of justice that is the institutional conclusion of the Hayekian 
conception permits the extemalisation of the diversity of interpretations, including those that 
are premised upon the disvaluation of diversity. That is,
I. To the extent that it is committed to diversity, the Discursive Minimal State is sincere in 
its commitment
The Discursive Minimal State satisfies the criterion of sincerity because the disaggregated 
discourse it endorses means that more than one interpretation can be acted upon at any given 
time as a part of a wider social process that determines, under conditions of resource and 
knowledge scarcity, the most beneficial response to the wide range of social questions it 
encounters -  both concerning the distribution of resources without foreclosing debate via the 
passing of legislation.632
To make this clear, it is necessary to distinguish, after Michael Polanyi, between the 
monocentric character of the politics endorsed by the liberal egalitarian and difference 
democrat states and the polycentric character of the disaggregated discourse sanctioned by the 
Discursive Minimal State.633 A monocentric order is characterised by the fact that there is one 
and only one centre of ultimate authoritative public decision-making from which one and only 
one policy is pursued at any given time because final decisions are made in a representative 
assembly or, as we have discussed in Chapter 3, in a discursive forum. By contrast, in a 
polycentric order final decision-making authority rests in at least one (and usually more than 
one) place and this has the consequence that at least one policy (and usually more than one) 
may be pursued at any given time. The fact that under the auspices of the monocentric 
political order only one policy may be pursued at a time, regardless of the popularity of the 
alternatives that happen to lose out in a vote, of course, does not mean that we may not 
change our minds at a later stage. Policies do become unfashionable. What it does mean,
632 Quoted in Benhabib, Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political, p. 7
633 Polanyi, M., The Logic o f  Liberty, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, (1951) 1998. Hayek also claims that 
Michael Oakeshott’s distinction in between a teleocratic and a nomocratic order is the same as 
Poknyi’s. On this see, Hayek, ‘The Confusion of Language in Political Thought’ (1967), New Studies 
in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History o f  Ideas, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, 
p. 89; The Mirage o f  Social Justice, in Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume Two: London, Routledge, 
(1976) 1982, pp. 14-15.
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however, is that even if  we do change our minds this will only happen via a process in which 
the choice to change rules out the choice to keep the status quo and, as such, result in the 
previously endorsed policy being ruled out in spite of any residual popularity it may have 
amongst at least some members of the polity. Politics, then, no matter what it ends up 
deciding, is monocentric in terms of which courses of action are to be decided upon (and, 
subsequent to this, permissible) and, as such, its decisions will always be experienced as 
onerous by at least some members of the polity who end up being the political losers. Let us 
now cash out the distinction between monocentric legislation and polycentric permissiveness 
in terms of the policy areas discussed earlier. What will become clear in doing this will be 
that the Discursive Minimal State endorses what Barry calls the strategy of privatisation with 
respect to most of the issues raised634
Abortion and Homosexual Parenthood In the case of abortion adherents to both the 
pro-life and pro-choice positions would be allowed to externalise their interpretation and, 
indeed, to work towards that interpretation being pervasive in society at large. It is here, 
moreover, where the difference between the Hayekian conception and Dworkin’s 
checkerboard solution becomes clear.
Of course, it is important to note that Dworkin himself does not endorse these 
solutions on the grounds that they violate the idea that we cannot treat people differently 
‘where no principle can justify the distinction.’635 This, for Dworkin would be a violation of 
one of the three political virtues, that of integrity. (The other two virtue being justice and 
fairness, neither of which could rule out checkerboard solutions as both parties to the abortion 
debate could view such a compromise as both just and fair.)636 ‘The state lacks integrity,’ he 
writes, ‘because it must endorse principles to justify part of what it has done that it must reject 
to justify the rest.’637 Yet, beyond this, there are other good reasons for rejecting 
checkerboard solutions.
Whilst attempting to satisfy incompatible interpretative aspirations, the checkerboard 
solution still retains the idea that the issue it is intended to deal with remains within the 
province of legislation. In contrast, the strategy of privatisation sanctioned by the Discursive 
Minimal State means that abortion is removed from the province of law altogether. 
Stemming from this difference, moreover, is the ultimate incompatibility of the Hayekian and 
Dworkinian responses. In leaving abortion as a subject of legislation, the checkerboard 
solution leaves unanswered the interpretative authority of the legislature, more precisely of 
those who happen at any given moment to occupy its positions of authoritative public 
decision-making. Li order to accept a checkerboard solution we would need an account of
634 On libertarian options, see Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 41 - 4; 142 - 46.
635 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, quoted injustice and Interpretation, p. 71
636 On this, see Wamke, Justice and Interpretation, p. 71.
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why legislators gain the authority to foreclose debate. Of course, as we have seen, it is not the 
case that such an account is not forthcoming. Discursive forms of difference democracy 
answer this by way of appeal to the cultural groups the legislators represent. Yet, this still 
leaves unanswered the question of the epistemological authority of the singular, group- 
specific interpretations the legislators annunciate in the public political discourse. Moreover, 
and this problem notwithstanding, given that the checkerboard solution itself is but one 
possible answer to the issue of abortion, we would need to know on what grounds it should 
enjoy interpretative privilege in the law as an item of enforceable legislation over other 
possible answers. This issue becomes all the more important when one realises the contested 
nature of the checkerboard solution itself. The acceptability of making abortion legal in order 
to satisfy pro-choice advocates but only for women bom in odd years in order to satisfy pro­
life attitudes notwithstanding, it is not at all clear how women bom in the wrong year would 
find this attractive or acceptable. This is so not least because the decision arrived at, despite 
pretensions toward the accommodation of interpretative diversity, is legally binding. The 
problem here, then, is that the solution is devised to placate organised political interests rather 
than individual members of the polity.
Of course, one important objection to the strategy of privatisation with regard to 
abortion is that it will satisfy nobody at all. Leaving it as a matter of choice for pro-life 
advocates is tantamount to leaving murder as a matter of choice in the Discursive Minimal 
State. Could the Discursive Minimal State, they may rightfully ask, really leave murder as a 
matter of individual choice so that society can make use of its stock of tacitly-held cultural 
knowledge to ‘discover’ if it is acceptable? If this were so, it is not at all clear how, in its own 
epistemological terms, this would not be contradictory to the consent requirement and the 
associated protection of the bodily sphere. The issue here, of course, centres on the idea of 
what is to count as a person. For pro-choice advocates the foetus is not a person whilst for 
pro-life advocates it is. Indeed, it is because the foetus is a person that its interpretative rights 
- which, we have argued, include in a fundamental way its bodily integrity - must be 
respected. Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the fact that this person is a minor means 
that it is incapable of giving consent and therefore should always be taken to be saying ‘no’ 
with respect to abortion. The Discursive Minimal State, then, in order to be consistent, let 
alone just and humane, must ban abortion as it would ban any non-medical, bodily-affecting 
practice to which a child cannot give its consent.
However, pro-choice advocates would then with equal consistency claim that the 
bodily integrity of expectant mothers is being violated as they are being forbidden to use them 
as they see fit. To ban abortion, therefore, constitutes the withholding from expectant
637 Dworkin, Law ’s Empire, p. 182, quoted in Wamke, Justice and Interpretation, p. 71
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mothers the right to exploit their body and, crucially, externalise their interpretation of what 
morality requires with respect to abortion. In addition, we may argue again consistently with 
the epistemological premises of the Discursive Minimal State that given that it is our 
knowledge that ultimately both freedom of expression and freedom of action allows us and 
therefore society to make use of, it is of no consequence that the foetus is aborted as it does 
not have any knowledge. Once the foetus is bom, of course it does begin to acquire 
knowledge as it begins to acquire a culture, a fact which we have seen rules out murder and 
child abuse.
Clearly, then, the issue of abortion is of particularly acute difficulty for the regime of 
individual interpretative rights defended here. Much of this difficulty, of course, is because 
the ultimate debate turns on what we should consider to be a human being. If this is the 
primary issue, however, that means that perhaps abortion would have to be one of those more 
fundamental issues - along with who is to count as an adult and who is entitled to vote - that 
we have already conceded the state and politics, not civil society, must decide. At the very 
least, then, the perspective being developed here would need to engage with these issues in 
more depth, something that we cannot do for now.
Nevertheless, a similar approach, it seems, could be taken towards homosexual 
parenthood. As in the case of abortion, the Discursive Minimal State would allow those both 
for and against homosexual parenthood to externalise their views on this matter and, as such, 
would not seek to impose a ban or make same sex adoption a matter of right. Of course, it is 
important to ground the permissive stance of the state on the correct footing. The reason that 
the state takes this stance is not because it endorses the preference for same sex parenthood 
per se but rather, because it endorses the view that such matters are best decided, on the 
grounds of interpretative sincerity, within civil society.
Employment Practice & Affirmative Action Again, the strategy of privatisation may 
be chosen in the case of employment practice. With the exception of the employment of 
minors, by not making the conditions upon which employers hire and fire employees a subject 
of the law one allows the diverse interpretations of best employment practice to manifest 
themselves in civil society because the Discursive Minimal State affords the opportunity for 
differing practices to compete for social adherence without favouring any of them or short- 
circuiting debate about which among them is socially optimal. The repeal of anti- 
discrimination legislation, then, would not mean that the state endorses discrimination per se 
but rather, that it upholds the idea that civil society is the proper locus for debate and 
decision-making about discrimination.
An interesting case in point here is that of a Chinese take-away in the north of 
England that sacked an English employee on the grounds that she did not adequately perform 
her meal delivery duties. A local court found the business guilty of race discrimination on the
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basis that the employee’s race was irrelevant to the adequate performance of her job and 
consequently awarded her compensation. Clearly, given the law as it stood at the time, the 
court was absolutely right in reaching this verdict. Our argument, then, cannot be against the 
particular decision. However, it still seems debatable whether the case should have come 
before the court in the first place.
Of course if  by ‘efficient discharge’ we mean the ability to safely drive a moped 
laden with hot food, to deliver the food to customers and to safely receive payment, then race 
would indeed appear to be an irrelevant factor. However, what if we consider efficient 
discharge of these tasks to include the ability to speak fluent Mandarin or Cantonese, to relate 
culturally to non-English-speaking customers of Chinese origin, or the requirement to be of 
Chinese appearance so as to make the culinary experience more authentic? O f course, if  these 
were legitimate requirements then we may wish to fine the proprietors of the take-away on the 
grounds of foolishness for, in the first instance, failing to note at the interview stage that the 
English candidate did not posses the requisite skills and, in the second, for thinking that an 
ethnically homogenous Chinese take-away is a lively, let alone inoffensive, possibility in 
areas where the Chinese labour-market is bound to be small. The again, maybe there was a 
shortage of Chinese candidates at the time? The important point is that the criterion of 
efficient discharge is itself a matter of interpretative dispute and is resolvable only in terms of 
the largely tacit understandings that we all have. As such, it needs to be discovered by 
allowing individuals to discriminate rather than be foreclosed by the perhaps parochial and 
question-begging definition of efficient discharge that the anti-discrimination legislation 
Barry defends makes.
In fact, however, the Discursive Minimal State would permit more than 
discrimination, a point which Barry seems to miss in his admittedly brief discussion in 
Culture and Equality of freedom of association, employment practice and the reasonable 
rejectability of discrimination in a Scanlonian Original Position.638 In contrast to the owners 
of the Chinese take-away, the owners of Anytown Construction do not have any objections to 
hiring applicants from a diverse number of backgrounds. However, they are not inclined to 
hire those who manifest what they perceive to be homophobic attitudes regardless of whether 
it is rooted in a set of wider, although culturally particular, understandings. They thus make a 
rejection of homophobic, racist and sexist attitudes and behaviours a contractual pre-requisite 
for hiring and the expression of any such attitudes at work grounds for instant dismissal.
Similarly, the Discursive Minimal State would protect the freedom of employers and 
educational establishments to adopt affirmative action programmes. That is, members of the 
polity would be free to discriminate in favour of individuals and groups as they would be to
638 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 211 -  212.
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do so against them. Claims for affirmative action can be grounded in at least two ways. 
Firstly, they may be grounded in the claim that members of particular groups have suffered or 
still do suffer systematic oppression and injustice and have been or are over-represented in the 
lowest income percentiles of society. Of course, both of these claims are contestable. Some, 
for instance, may not deny that affirmative action is a decent and moral response to historical 
or contemporary systematic oppression but reject it because they deny that such oppression 
took place or, if it did, because it was too long ago to be morally significant today. Equally, 
affirmative action may be denied because its pursuit would be to assume that newly-arrived 
migrants are culpable in the past actions of a dominant community of which they are not 
members. This would seem to be particularly important with regard to recent immigrants to 
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.639 Of course, others may well defend 
the view that such groups deserved and still deserve the treatment they get and make moral 
arguments in favour of this view grounded, for instance, in cultural practices they disapprove 
of. Others may hold the position that systematic oppression did indeed and still does take 
place and that this needs to be rectified in some appropriate manner but still deny on 
efficiency grounds, that affirmative action is the best way of doing so.
What this final objection makes clear is that the case of affirmative action differs 
from those discussed so far in its implicit invocation of an optimal end-state - in the form of 
an ideal number of representatives of a pre-selected group - that is supposed to be achieved. 
An important question here for those who support affirmative action, then, becomes who is to 
decide which groups need or merit special representation and how many of them do, either in 
absolute terms or relative to the wider population. Thus, just as was the case with respect to 
the pursuit of affirmative action itself, even if there were unanimity about this question, what 
such pursuit would actually require of us would itself be contestable. Yet, as with the case of 
abortion, homosexual parenthood and employment practice, it is not at all clear whence the 
legislature actually derives the epistemological authority to favour one view over the others. 
In contrast, by choosing a libertarian option with respect to the proper pursuit of affirmative 
action not only would those groups currently being aided be helped but, rather, others who do 
not currently enjoy the favour of those in political power will avoid falling through the 
affirmative action safety net due to the current configuration of political forces and the 
indifference, hostility or simple lack of knowledge of their existence it reflects. Thus, for 
those who do indeed think that there is a case for affirmative action, the Discursive Minimal 
State allows them the latitude to experiment with other, more effective, ways of dealing with 
such injustices which only those working ‘on the ground’ could conceive of because of some
639 Equally problematically, it may also be contrasted with the view that affirmative action programmes 
are ultimately reflective of an ideal of assimilation toward prevalent socio-economic structures. On 
this, see Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights, pp. 67-68 .
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local fact about their organisation or circumstances. The benefits of the strategy of 
privatisation, then, are in this instance epistemological. Those who need hiring or admission 
into an educational establishment will be identified more readily than via a legislated 
affirmative action programme because the decision-making process is more readily able to 
take into consideration the particular circumstances of time and place as well as the tacitly- 
held knowledge of individuals. An objection to the libertarian option here would be to claim 
that the fact of interpretative diversity does nothing to shift the locus of decision-making away 
from the state because an employer or educational institution could always make 
representations to the state for an exemption to or introduction of an alternative item of 
legislation. Yet, and similarly to the enforcement of a checkerboard solution to abortion, 
doing this begs the question of the final interpretative authority of those who occupy positions 
of power in the legislature.
The view being propounded here is to be contrasted with that of Michael Walzer in 
Spheres o f Justice who rejects affirmative action, for instance, as a temporary measure to 
remedy the historically systematic discrimination suffered by Black Americans.640 For 
Walzer, affirmative action is problematic in two respects. Firstly, it violates current 
understandings of job allocation which are subsumed under a norm of jobs open to talents.641 
Secondly, the sphere of office under whose province policies such as affirmative action would 
fall is itself a dominant good along with the distribution of which comes honour, status, 
power, prerogative, wealth and comfort.642 The problem here, then, is that any distribution of 
jobs is experienced not only as violating the norm of jobs open to talents but also as invasive 
of other spheres. It is for these reasons that Walzer contends that rather than defending 
affirmative action, complex equality would rather demand careers open to talents but with 
‘limits on the prerogatives of the talented.’643 Yet, as we saw with regard to the difference 
democrats in Chapter 3, Walzer’s problem here is that the norm of careers open to talents is 
left unquestioned and merely posited as the proper basis upon which to determine the 
allocation of jobs. When one questions this norm - and indeed, upon the basis of such 
questioning, comes to reject it as less important in certain circumstances than the recognition 
of historical injustice that is operative behind many claims for affirmative action - it is not at 
all clear why ‘jobs open to talents’ alone should determine the distribution of jobs across 
society as a whole. Doubtless, some, perhaps most, members of society do regard the norm of
640 Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A Defense o f  Pluralism and Equality, Chapter 5, passim.
641 ibid., p. 152.
642 ibid., p. 155.
643 ibid., p. 164.
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jobs open to talents as of prior importance, but this does not mean that all do.644 The job of 
public institutions, then, is not to favour one norm over the other but, rather, to afford the 
means of arbitrating between them in a manner that does not foreclose the arbitration 
procedure itself. Of course, the way in which this is made possible is by withdrawing the 
issue of who gets which job from public political deliberation.
A similar problem becomes evident for the defence of affirmative action either as a 
permanent feature of social institutions or as a temporary measure to redress historical 
inequalities that would be rescinded in favour of the restoration of the norm of equal 
consideration as soon as Blacks, for instance, ‘escape from the trap that their blackness has 
become in a society with a long history of racism.’645 The problem here is that the social 
resonance of the norm upon which affirmative action policies are justified is not questioned. 
In the case of Dworkin such a defence is grounded in a ‘right to equal consideration when 
policies about office holding are worked out’ rather than upon the right ‘to equal 
consideration when offices are distributed.’646 Affirmative action defended on these grounds 
would involve, as Walzer rightly points out, the violation of the right to equal consideration of 
other candidates who are not members of the target group.647 However, why should we 
accept as any less controversial Dworkin’s alternative grounding? That is, why is the 
rectitude of affirmative action itself not subject to debate regardless of the grounds upon 
which it is defended? Moreover, those who advocate affirmative action even as a temporary 
measure do not question that, for some, affirmative action may be conceived, on the grounds 
of cultural survival, as a permanent measure. In the Discursive Minimal State, of course, the 
duration of such policies would never be foreclosed in advance by a change in legislation 
because they would never be subject to political decision. Individual proprietors would be 
free to pursue a policy of affirmative action as long as they thought necessary as would others 
be free never to pursue it. The problem with both sides of the debate, then, is that because 
they assume the reasonableness of authoritative, political closure, they assume that a single 
policy must be decided upon, to the exclusion of all others.
Cultural Rights and Exemptions As we have seen, the Discursive Minimal State 
would not confer cultural rights or grant cultural exemptions because to do so would be to 
render ineffectual the interpretation that the benefits derived from their exercise should not be 
enjoyed. Rather than doing this, the Discursive Minimal State recognises on a permanent
644 Equally problematically, it may also be contrasted with the view that affirmative action programmes 
are ultimately reflective of an ideal of assimilation toward prevalent socio-economic structures. On 
this, see Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights, pp. 67-68.
645 Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A Defense o f  Pluralism and Equality, p. 152. Also Kymlicka, 
Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp. 141-144; Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  
Minority Rights, pp. 4, 141-142; Moon, J. D., Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic 
Conflicts, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 186.
646 Walzer, ibid., p. 152.
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basis that the issue of cultural rights and exemptions may be subject to contestation and, as 
such, devolves debate concerning the rectitude of their conferral to civil society.648 The 
problem, then, is that if such matters are made subjects of the law then, whatever is decided, 
doing so unavoidably determines in advance that the chosen policy should be enforced 
regardless of the reasons some may have for not doing so. This is not to say, of course that 
cultural rights and exemptions would be ruled out for that would be to commit the same error 
of (political) foreclosure. Rather, the Discursive Minimal State, recognises that such 
questions cannot, on epistemological grounds, be decided within the narrow confines of 
politics.
An interesting case in point here is that of the parents of a Sikh schoolboy who sought 
an exemption to his school’s uniform rule in the United Kingdom on the grounds that the 
requirement to wear a school cap and to have hair sufficiently short so as not to touch the 
collar was discriminatory.649 The problem here is that the exemption may be viewed as 
onerous, in the first instance, by other pupils at the school who to their own minds - and 
perhaps to those of their parents - have their own good reasons for seeking an exemption (say 
some want for cultural reasons to dye their hair pink whilst others wish to dispense with 
trousers and wear kilts) yet which do not merit such consideration by the school’s board of 
governors on the grounds that they are, somehow, not sufficiently ‘cultural’ to merit an 
exemption. In response to this, the state may pass a law that extends the exemption to all the 
pupils by banning school uniforms. Yet, it is here where the problem that has been implicit 
all along - that of an overly narrow definition of culture - becomes clear for whether one 
respects the claim of the Sikh boy’s family or grants an exemption to all pupils, what is being 
violated now is not the culture of any of the pupils and their families but, rather of the school 
which presumably has a uniform code as at least partially constitutive of its ethos.
We are thus lead into what appears to be an irresolvable problem. One way to resolve 
it, however, would be to claim that it is the school's claim that should be respected. The 
objection that this leaves the Sikhs (and punk rockers and Highland Scots) in no better 
position than before would be a non-starter because in the Discursive Minimal State such
648 Now, as Barry reminds us in Culture and Equality, many rights that ostensibly look like group-level 
cultural rights are in actual fact no such things. Rights that select individuals because of their group 
membership but which only aid them, as individuals are not group or cultural rights as such. (Barry, 
Culture and Equality, pp. 112-113; also Kymlicka, W., Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp. 138- 
140.) Yet, even if we grant this, it does not mean that the enjoyment of such rights by some is 
experienced as any less onerous by others upon whom the cost of such enjoyment is spread via the 
public diversion of resources and opportunities yet for whom their enjoyment would never be a lively 
possibility.
649 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 61-62; Poulter, S., ‘Ethnic Minority Customs, English Law and 
Human Rights’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 36 (1987), pp. 589-615.
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groups would enjoy the freedom to set up their own schools and determine dress codes 
accordingly.
Another case here is that of the famous English department store Harrods which until 
recently refused entry to people wearing jeans on the grounds that it was not in conformity 
with the ethos of the store. The reason for the change was simply that of changing fashion as 
more and more wealthy people dress like the less wealthy. The important point here and for 
the Discursive Minimal State in general, of course was that the change occurred upon the 
prior possession of individual rights
Immigration Again, in the interests of interpretative sincerity, the issue of 
immigration is devolved down to civil society via the strategy of privatisation. Given this, 
there is no presumption by the state of what Kymlicka calls an ‘Anglo-conformity’ model of 
assimilation under which migrants are expected to adopt the norms of the host society or, to 
determine whether they should enter the sitting of language and points tests.650 Conversely, 
there is no presumption in favour of political multiculturalism. In the Discursive Minimal 
State, then, it would be impossible, to advance a ‘White Australia’ or ‘England for the 
English’ policy or, for that matter, to mandate permissive immigration policies, simply 
because immigration is not a subject of legislation. Of course, this does not mean that there 
will be no micro level White Australias or their multicultural opposites.651 Rather, both 
responses to immigration, as well as the response of indifference, are permitted to be 
externalised simultaneously.
Housing As was discussed earlier, issues with distributive implications such as 
housing cannot be removed from the province of law altogether via a pursuit of the strategy 
of privatisation without removing them from then province of property rights. Rather, the 
issue is dealt with via the facilitation under the rule of law of the extemalisation of the diverse 
interpretations concerning socially optimal housing arrangements discussed in the previous 
section. The problem here, then, is not that pursuit of the collectivist interpretation of justice 
in housing rules out the others. The problem, rather is that any of the policies would rule out 
pursuit of the others i f  they were enforced, including pursuit of profit-oriented decision 
making in housing. Instead of this, if  a particular group understands the requirements that 
ethics places upon the nature and distribution of housing in a way that is not widely shared, 
this understanding can be externalised without having to exclude or, indeed, be excluded by 
the expression/enactment of other interpretations. Of course, one may respond that we may 
legislate for and thus enforce a mixed market in housing in which subsidised accommodation 
is set alongside private and other methods of provision. Yet, this, merely begs the question of 
the sincerity of the commitment to diversity.
650 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 1 4 -1 5 .
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5.1 The Publicity Requirement and the Epistemological Role o f  the State
The account of the sincere, disaggregated discourse should not be taken to mean that there 
would be absolutely no room at all for the state in the Discursive Minimal State. We may 
assume that the state would be responsible for the defence of the external borders of the polity 
and, within it, for the passing and, perhaps, the enforcement of its laws. Moreover, it seems 
that there would still be many important debates, for example, over who is to enjoy individual 
discourse rights, that would occur within the auspices of the state and its legislature.
Beyond this, and in keeping with its neo-Hayekian emphasis upon the coordinative 
and informational role that voluntary interaction plays, the Discursive Minimal State would 
also impose a Publicity Requirement upon the diverse associations to be found in society. 
This would serve to lower the cost of obtaining information about the communities the 
members of the polity may be considering living in or trading with or with whom they 
currently live and trade. The Publicity Requirement would legally bind the diverse 
communities of the polity - including commercial communities - to disclose on an annual 
basis what practices and policies they tolerate or endorse in a manner similar to how present- 
day firms have to disclose their constitutions to a public authority that makes the information 
publicly accessible. Indeed, such disclosure would, in the context of a culturally diverse 
society, take a robust form. The questions that would have to be answered on an annual basis 
would relate, for instance, to each of the issues we have so far discussed and many others 
about which we have been silent. If a company or cultural organisation hires or refuses to 
hire people of a particular ethnicity or sexual orientation or who endorse a particular practice, 
this would be precisely the kind of information that would be made publicly available via the 
Publicity Requirement. To back the Publicity Requirement up, the state would also have the 
power to ensure compliance and, if a community does comply, to verify any response 
made.652
Importantly, the Publicity Requirement would not be operative for the purposes of 
that explicit, propositional justification that is constitutive of the deliberative process of a 
public forum in virtue of which some policy options are endorsed and enforced whilst others 
are rejected. Rather, it is intended to contribute, in a more Hayekian vein, to the provision of 
that information that facilitates informed individual choice and the judgement that goes with 
it. The aggregate outcome of this, we will see in the following section, is constitutive of the 
wider social process of public justification that, like the discussion itself, takes place at the 
disaggregated level. With such information at hand, the citizens of Anytown would decide 
whether or not a practice is acceptable and take appropriate action to externalise that belief. 
Of course, there is no strong reason to suppose that in the Discursive Minimal State the
651 On White Australia, see Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice, pp. 46-8.
652 On this see also Barry, Culture and Equality, 41-2.
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majority of people would be members of such communities. It is, perhaps, more likely that 
individuals will operate solely as individuals and members of families. Here the discursive 
justification of behaviour will take place in much the same was as it always has; via informal 
and local social pressures. It would be a rather dark State that forced its members to fill out a 
personal statement of belief every year.
Of course, the information gathered by the state under the terms of the Publicity 
Requirement is certainly not exhaustive of all that needs to be or can be known about the 
diverse communities and firms of the polity. In addition to the Publicity Requirement, there 
would in any case be an incentive in civil society for the evaluation of communities and, as a 
consequence, for some to step in and seek this and other information on behalf of the 
members of the polity for whom search costs would be too high. Investigation here, for 
instance, would be about the way communities are organised and about the values upon which 
that organisation is based and, crucially, the degree to which the communities are true to 
them. It should be emphasised, however, that such investigative action in civil society is not 
the same as that embarked upon by the state in satisfaction of the legal requirements of the 
Publicity Requirement. What the state does here is ensure that the members of the public 
have some baseline of information upon which to base their judgements but, crucially, it is 
not a participant in but a rather a facilitator of the judgement process itself. Thus, in the 
absence at the aggregate social level of a judging, choosing subject, the task of government is 
to provide the framework that allows that judging and choosing that is constitutive of the 
disaggregated social discourse about the nature of the good to occur. This, then, is a 
discourse ‘that is not articulated in philosophical terms’ but rather, as, Kukathas tells us, one 
that ‘takes place not only in verbal discourse, but also in practice as individuals adopt or reject 
ways of living according to their own experiments and their observations of the successes and 
failures of others.’653
4. Institutional Minimalism and the Rationality o f  Public Discourse
The second, more profound, benefit of the Discursive Minimal State is represented by the 
second claim of this chapter that relates to our concern with the ultimate task of justice. Not 
only does the disaggregated discourse sanctioned by the Discursive Minimal State permit the 
extemalisation of the diversity of interpretations, doing so means that it maximally affords the 
opportunity to see under conditions of resource and knowledge scarcity which interpretations 
ought indeed to be externalised in society as a whole rather than second-guessing what these 
will be. That is,
653 Kukathas, Hayek and Modem Liberalism, p. 117.
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II. The Discursive Minimal State is rational in its arbitration between
interpretations.
The truth of this second claim, moreover, is dependent upon the truth of Claim I.. That is, 
only if we have an institutional framework that allows the diversity of interpretations to be 
externalised will we discover which among them prove to be most socially beneficial, given 
the dispersed and tacit nature of social knowledge. The rationality of public discourse, then, 
is intimately related to institutional shape.
There are two ways in which we may defend this claim. Firstly, we may assert that 
the cultural liberty endorsed by the Discursive Minimal State is necessary to allow people to 
act upon the basis of their own traditions and practices as part of a wider process of economic 
and cultural co-ordination in which dispersed and tacit knowledge is made use of and answers 
to important social questions are discussed. This argument clearly invokes Hayek’s ideas 
about traditions - and the tacit knowledge they embody - as being not only instrumental to 
but, more strongly, constitutive o f  the economic co-ordination process.654 Without cultural 
liberty, economic co-ordination would be minimal and its results socially disastrous not 
because we would not be able to adequately collect the available economic knowledge 
necessary for co-ordination but, rather, because we would have no means of discovering what 
that knowledge is.
Thus traditions are not to be valued for themselves but, rather, for the coordinative 
role they play in enabling us to find our way in a world that is only ever partially known.655 
It is for this reason, moreover, that John Gray claims that Hayek’s defence of tradition rests 
on similar grounds to the epistemological arguments in favour of the market process as the 
most useful means of transmitting knowledge, much of which is tacit and refractory to 
articulation.656
The problem with this first argument for cultural liberty as subservient to economic 
co-ordination, however, is that it makes the cultural instrumental to the economic by claiming 
that practices are beneficial only insofar as they enable the co-ordination necessary for 
rational resource allocation.657 We must therefore defend the discovery process sanctioned by
654 For Hayek on tradition see Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, Chapter 4; ‘Notes on the Evolution 
of Systems of Rules of Conduct’, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London, Routledge, 
(1967); ‘Rules and Order’, Law, Legislation & Liberty, Volume One, London, Routledge, 1982, 
chapter 1; ‘Our Moral Heritage’, Knowledge Evolution and Society, London, Adam Smith Institute, 
1983, pp.45-57.
655 See also, Hayek, F. A., ‘Why I am not a Conservative’, postscript to The Constitution o f  Liberty, pp. 
397-410.
656 Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 41.
657 Furthermore, there would seem to be a clear argument here on the part of difference democrats and 
liberal egalitarians that, this problem notwithstanding, in order to make maximal use of the diverse
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the Discursive Minimal State as a cultural and not merely economic process. This relates to 
the second of our arguments in favour of cultural liberty which, as Gray notes, is the third 
aspect of Hayek’s theory of spontaneous order: the natural selection of competing cultural 
traditions. For Hayek, Gray writes, ‘the evolution of culture may itself be fruitfully 
investigated in terms of the competition between different traditions or practices, with a 
natural selection among them occurring which is at least partly to be explained by their 
relative efficiency as bearers or embodiments of knowledge.’658 Thus, in order to avoid the 
problem of reducing the cultural to the economic we may claim that we need cultural liberty 
rather than the politics of culture or a political culture of welfare in order to see which of 
those practices that facilitate co-ordination are indeed socially optimal.659
One of the most important, specifically normative, implications of the Hayekian 
approach to justice under conditions of diversity comes precisely from Hayek’s later work 
from which is emergent an explication of the Discursive Minimal State as the arbitrating 
framework of the cultural marketplace. What is normatively significant about Hayek’s ideas 
here for present purposes, furthermore, is the relevance they have to culturally diverse 
societies. No longer are his arguments about cultural selection to be understood to relate to a 
competitive process between discrete traditions each with its own broadly identifiable 
territorial boundaries but, rather, to the process of competition for adherents that occurs 
between traditions, or more specifically between the norms they endorse, within one society. 
It is not just our identities that exhibit ‘undecidable boundaries’ in modem, mediated 
societies. In such societies, so do the overarching traditions that bestow content upon those 
identities. What is politically important, then, is that Hayek’s arguments concerning cultural 
selection also provide us with a further argument against the political arbitration of cultural 
justice and an argument for the non-political yet still social management of culture. Thus, 
given the dispersed and tacit nature of social knowledge - knowledge that is not given in its 
entirety to any individual or agency - Hayekian cultural liberty not only facilitates the 
economic discovery process, it also facilitates the cultural process of the discovery of which 
norms best serve economic co-ordination and, beyond this, of which norms are most 
desirable. An objection here would be to question the criterion of optimality invoked in by 
the preference for Hayekian liberty over and above politics. Yet, as we have seen, the
cultural knowledge available in society, the state needs to step in to ensure a minimum baseline for 
certain more marginal cultural groupings to actually act out the requirements of their specific norms.
658 Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 41. For Gray, the selection of competing cultural traditions constitutes 
the third element of Hayek’s wider notion of spontaneous order. On this, see Gray, Hayek on Liberty, 
Chapter 2. The issue of the appropriate critical stance towards them will be taken up in the following 
chapter.
659 Because the process of the selection of norms is one largely of migration, macro outcomes cannot be 
selected but must be waited for and allowed to unfold. Clearly, each instance of migration is a 
conscious choice yet, in the first instance, its motivation is due at least in part to unconsciously held 
beliefs.
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Hayekian need not invoke any specific criterion of optimality to get this rationality claim 
through. All he need claim is that, whatever the relevant optimum actually turns out to be, it 
is to liberty rather than politics - to law, rather than legislation - that we must turn in order to 
discover it. Under conditions of the division of knowledge, moreover, the discovery process 
does not merely concern itself with arbitrating between different viewpoints or socially 
pressing issues, as if these were readily apparent to the arbitrating agent, but facilitate the 
discovery of what these viewpoints actually are.
Thus, the reason we make Abortion legal although not a subject of right is that its 
degree of social acceptability is precisely what we want to discover. On this view the reason 
why abortion should be legal is not because it is desirable to kill newly conceived human 
beings or because a woman’s right to choose is paramount. Rather, given our particular traits, 
attachments and local and tacit knowledges, it is only by taking a permissive stance that we 
are uniquely positioned to see to what extent abortion is a morally attractive or dubious 
enterprise and, to the extent that it is attractive, how and on what terms it is performed. Only 
by allowing people to externalise their moral interpretations on this issue can we have any 
reasonable, non-question-begging idea about the moral rectitude of abortion as we watch 
discrete choices dovetail into an aggregate pattern for the society as a whole. Similarly, the 
result of disaggregated decision-making at the aggregate level just is the acceptability of the 
idea of Homosexual Parenthood to society. It is as a result of all these decisions that we 
would have a better idea on whether the otherwise short-circuiting political judgement to ban 
gay parenthood would be made clear. What we do not want, on the other hand, is for the 
debate to be short-circuited by way of an advance judgement in politics, that unavoidably, 
must make a choice of some kind and in doing so exclude alternative avenues of action. In 
the case of Employment Practice, the Discursive Minimal State adopts a similarly sincere 
attitude towards the diversity of interpretations for in doing so, it allows for local and tacit 
knowledges to be utilised. Given this, we are able to get a reasonable idea of the rectitude of 
hiring and firing on the basis of culturally derived characteristics that does not beg the 
question of the outcome of the debate itself. Similarly, by adopting a permissive attitude and 
removing the issue from the province of law altogether, the Discursive Minimal State also 
allows the rectitude of Affirmative Action to be discussed and subjected to social scrutiny in a 
way that makes use of local circumstances, knowledges and traditions in a way that its rivals 
cannot. Indeed, with the institutionalisation of freedom with regard to both of them, it is just 
as possible that in some instances society would discover the need for an oven*epresentative 
number of members of particular groups in certain professions and industries than would have 
been brought about by strict adherence to a population proportionality criterion by the statute. 
Similarly for Cultural Rights and Legal Exemptions. The degree to which the benefits 
cultural rights and legal exemptions confer should be enjoyed is a matter that only civil
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society can resolve in a rational way, given that the reasons we may have for bestowing or 
withholding the benefits in question are only partially visible to the gaze of conscious reason. 
Immigration Again, as in the case of homosexual parenthood, the aggregate result of such 
discrete decision-making would be the degree of acceptability of immigration for the society 
and its constituent communities as a whole not because it defends permissiveness for 
permissiveness’ sake but, rather, because doing so affords a more reasonable means of 
actually finding out how many, or few, immigrants each society can bear. Also, the 
framework allows for hitherto untried approaches to Housing emerge without having to be 
sanctioned by the asocial, individual reason of the state. Thus, whether the question concerns 
the pros and cons of affirmative action, cultural rights, housing, subsidised entry to national 
monuments, immigration or the rights and wrongs of homosexual parenthood or abortion, 
individual discourse rights help us elicit answers that can be genuinely informative because 
the socio-economic process by which they come to be given take on board the fugacity and 
tacit nature of much of our knowledge without requiring us to leave behind the essential 
attributes of our identities and understandings.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have offered a Hayekian account of the Discursive Minimal State. This 
discourse builds upon the work of theorists such as Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser but 
is unique in two ways. Firstly, it extends the scope of the counter-public from the level of the 
group to the level of the individual so that adequate use is made of social knowledge. 
Secondly, it expands the domain of the discourse to a point where it is no longer an alternative 
to but, rather, largely constitutive of public discourse. The discourse of the Discursive 
Minimal State, then, is a public, albeit non-political, discourse that endorses the strategy of 
interpretative privatisation as the most sincere and rational form of public discourse for 
culturally diverse societies. The discourse sanctioned by the Discursive Minimal State is 
sincere because it allows the diversity of interpretations to be voiced in a fully expanded 
discursive space. Moreover, not only does it allow these interpretations to be voiced, by 
taking them out of the forum - that is, by privatising the political - it also allows the full 
diversity of society’s interpretations to be acted upon. No longer is discourse just talk, it is 
constituted by both talk and action, that is, by action as tacit speech. Unlike liberal 
egalitarianism, moreover, the Discursive Minimal State allows for a sincere discourse to occur 
with regard to the economic realm as well where the ideal of welfarism is publicly 
acknowledged as one but not the only account of how society’s benefits and burdens are 
distributed.
As a consequence of its interpretative sincerity, the discourse of the Discursive 
Minimal State actually affords the most rational means for us to see how economic and
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cultural issues are resolved and, indeed, how the diverse views concerning them actually 
arise. This is because by our public institutions allowing us to be free to act, society is able to 
make us of the full range of dispersed, differentiated and crucially, tacit knowledge that is 
potentially at its disposal. Finally, I have sought to link these two virtues of the Discursive 
Minimal State with the fact that it endorses a specifically Minimal account of the role of the 
state. Because the state’s role is a minimal one, any opportunities it may present members of 
the polity to publicly impose their interpretations over those of others, are minimised. Again, 
unlike difference democracy that postulates the ethical priority of diversity itself upon the 
polity or liberal egalitarianism that imposes a particular, culturally specific view of the 
requirements of economic justice upon a society for whom there is no given understanding of 
it, the Discursive Minimal State does not beg the question of the outcome of the conclusions 
of any of these debates concerning cultural diversity or economic justice because it does not 
involve itself in any of them. Let us now turn to some important objections to the account of 
the Discursive Minimal State.
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6 Permissiveness, Plurality and Disaggregated Discourse: A 
Defence of The Discursive Minimal State
1. Introduction
Having given an account of the character of the Discursive Minimal State in the previous 
chapter, it is time now to defend it against some important objections. In doing so, I will 
contrast the Discursive Minimal State with other recent work that endorses classical liberal 
institutions. The work of two theorists is of particular significance here. In the first instance, 
I will critically compare the Discursive Minimal State to Jeremy Shearmur’s ‘Liberal 
Metautopia’ as discussed in Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research 
programme.660 What makes this comparison important is that, like the Discursive Minimal 
State, Shearmur’s framework for politics is discursive in form and, as the title of his book 
suggests, is drawn explicitly from the work of Hayek. Differentiating the two approaches, 
then, will be important as part of a wider positive argument in favour of the Discursive 
Minimal State. Of course, judging them based on their success in coming to terms with 
cultural diversity would be a somewhat unfair enterprise especially since the Liberal 
Metautopia is not explicitly intended as a theoretical answer to the challenge cultural diversity 
poses to the theory of justice. Success here, rather, is measured in terms of the Discursive 
Minimal State and the Liberal Metautopia’s Hayekian pedigree. Nonetheless, critical 
leverage will be gained in terms of the relative success of the Liberal Metautopia’s answers to 
objections to classical liberal theories of justice.
By contrast, much of Chandran Kukathas’s work is aimed precisely at answering the 
challenge of cultural diversity. Yet, in contrast to Shearmur or the neo-Hayekian account of 
the Discursive Minimal State, he does not do so with recourse to an explicit invocation of 
Hayek’s corpus.661 Furthermore, unlike the Discursive Minimal State and the Liberal 
Metautopia, Kukathas’s strictly neutralist Politics of Indifference is not discursive in form. In 
contrast, then, to our examination of the Discursive Minimal State and the Liberal 
Metautopia, examination of the Politics of Indifference will not focus upon the Hayekian 
pedigree of its supporting arguments but will largely be in terms of a second criterion of 
evaluation. That is, it will focus upon the comparative ability of both the Discursive Minimal
660 Shearmur, J., Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research programme, London, Routledge, 
1996, chapters 6 and 7.
661 Kukathas, C., ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, Political Theory, vol. 20, no. 1, (1992), pp. 105 - 
139; ‘Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Political Community’, Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 13 
no. 1, (1996), pp. 80 - 104; ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’,
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State and the Politics of indifference to supply answers to common criticisms of classical 
liberal or so-called ‘benign neglect’ approaches to justice for culturally diverse societies. 
Taken together, then, the work of Shearmur and Kukathas is resonant with our concerns in 
two fundamental respects that serve both to further clarify just what the Discursive Minimal 
State is as well as to show how attractive a normative political theory it is. In the first 
instance, it will be resonant with regard to the advancement of an explicitly post- or neo- 
Hayekian agenda in contemporary political theory and, in the second, with regard to offering 
an adequate, distinctively classical liberal, response to cultural diversity. In both cases, I will 
claim that the Liberal Metautopia and the Politics of Indifference are inadequate. Of course, 
given that the principal aim of this thesis is to offer a specifically Hayekian approach to 
cultural diversity that is more attractive than either the difference democratic or liberal 
egalitarian responses, this chapter will be a two-fold affair insofar as intimate to the rejection 
of the Liberal Metautopia and the Politics of Indifference will be the defence of the 
Discursive Minimal State and the politics of it endorses as the best set of institutions to come 
to terms with the challenge presented by diversity.
In the following section, I will outline Shearmur’s Hayekian Liberal Metautopia and 
Kukathas’s Politics of Indifference. In the sections that follow, I will return to and defend 
these and the theory of the Discursive Minimal State from objections to what is called the 
political theory of Benign neglect and will defend the Discursive Minimal State from the 
objection that it endorses an ethical subjectivism and relativism that culminates in an 
unsavoury segregation between communities and a decidedly uncritical stance towards the 
diverse norms they endorse. Emergent from this defence will be the claim that of the three it 
is the Discursive Minimal State that is to be preferred in terms of its Hayekian pedigree, its 
internal coherence and insofar as it offers a compelling response to the challenge that cultural 
diversity poses to the adequate theorisation of justice.
2. Family Resemblances: Shearmur’s Liberal Metautopia
Central to Shearmur’s concerns in Chapters 6 and 7 of Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism 
as a research programme is the problem of trying to derive a political theory that prioritises 
individual liberty out of a concern for general welfare or, in Shearmur’s own terms, the 
difficulty faced when we try to accord rights - what he calls ‘dialogue rights’ - that allow 
individuals a ‘cognitive contribution’ to the overall well-being of society.662 Trying to do so
The Journal o f Political Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 4, (1997), pp. 406 - 427; ‘Liberalism and 
Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, Political Theory, vol. 26 no. 5, (1998), pp. 686 -699.
662 Chapter 6 of Shearmur’s book Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research programme can 
be read, its author notes, as in part a response to the philosophical problematic explored in Kukathas’s 
Hayek and Modem Liberalism. Briefly, the problematic of the earlier book centred upon the tension 
that exists between Hayek’s Kantian and Humean inheritances. More specifically, upon the dilemma
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upon the basis of utility, he writes, is problematic at least insofar as it is ‘competing with 
other contributions that the individual might make - most radically as an object to be 
consumed by others.’663
Shearmur’s response to this problem is to postulate an epistemological rather than 
utilitarian basis of these rights. More specifically he contends that individuals ought to be 
accorded discourse rights - ultimately convertible into inviolable private property rights - ‘qua 
participants in factual and, finally, normative dialogue’ in which each and every participant 
has a unique contribution to make and that includes on its agenda the attractiveness of 
utilitarianism itself as opposed to some other value system.664 Yet, an immediate objection to 
this strategy concerns precisely the uniqueness and consequent value of our own contributions 
and thereafter, of others. For, whilst
... [everything that the first person had to contribute was, it might seem, a result of his 
occupying the role that he did; it is not clear that a second person would have anything to add, 
even on issues concerning which he had an intimate knowledge. Accordingly, if we have, 
here, a theory of rights generated from epistemological considerations, it would seem to be 
very limited in its scope.665
Ultimately, for Shearmur, what saves the second person and others like him is precisely his 
participation in -  and contribution towards - that culture from which the first person’s 
interesting and potentially valuable perspective is drawn.
The step from these epistemologically grounded dialogue rights to property rights is 
slightly different.666 The problem here is related to the kind of society, more specifically its 
size, in which the discourse rights are supposed to be operative. That is, Shearmur accepts, 
one could claim that ‘in political terms, it must generate a variant of the polis-sized 
democratic ideal,’ in which decisions are arrived at democratically rather than via markets.667 
Furthermore, it seems quite reasonable to assume that democracy just is what the rights would 
lead to for, as Shearmur explains, ‘actual dialogue has its limitations as a model for 
politics.’668 Is this the end of the story for a non-democratic discursive form of politics that is 
emergent from Hayekian considerations? For Shearmur it is not for in response to this he
encountered when Hayek seeks to offer an enduring and principled philosophical account of the liberal 
rules of justice that clearly delineate individual domains on an equal basis whilst at the same time 
subscribing to a Humean epistemology that emphasises the strict limits of the capabilities of reason for 
the successful pursuit of such an enterprise.
663 Shearmur, Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research programme, p. 196.
664 ibid., p. 193.
665 ibid., p. 192.
666 ibid., pp. 193 -  195.
667 ibid., p. 193. This, he notes further, would be somewhat ironic given that the kind o f society Hayek 
favours -  and, for that matter, Adam Smith before him - is the ‘Great,’ or abstract, Society.
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advocates a ‘simulated’ dialogue in which individuals are accorded rights ‘on epistemological 
grounds.’669 The model Shearmur uses for this is that of Nozick’s utopia in Part Three of 
Anarchy, State and Utopia,670 Interestingly, and unlike their foundational role in the first two 
sections of Nozick’s book, Shearmur notes (as indeed does Nozick) that rights here ‘are being 
accorded as a means to an end: the pursuit of the good (as in our dialogue about ethics), utility 
(where there is consensus about this) and truth.’671 This, Shearmur notes, is a ‘utilitarianism 
of rights.’672 Thus, ‘[i]n our liberal metautopia,’ he writes,
... experimentation and learning take place via the activities of individuals. Individuals back their 
own judgement with their own resources in the membership of some society, organization, club or, 
more radically, experimental community. Learning takes place via these individuals deciding they 
had made a mistake and pulling out; or staying and making whatever changes are allowed by the 
particular constitution of the small-scale organization which they have joined; or by their being 
joined by, or imitated by others.673
Moreover, it is here where the state has an important role to play for it ‘preserves individuals 
(and voluntary communities and associations) from aggression and overspill effects, and ... 
also prevents individuals from being held prisoner by some community or association that 
they have joined.’674 Indeed, Shearmur goes further in this regard by claiming that the state 
ought to take particular care that second-generation members are able to choose between 
alternative communities.675 Moreover, in a fashion related to but not exhausted by this 
concern, the Liberal Metautopia will perhaps diverge from the traditional picture of socio­
political interaction painted by classical liberal economics insofar as it may impose a ban -  on 
epistemological grounds -  upon the use of private property rights for the construction of 
social formations that ‘protect people’s judgements from critical scrutiny.’ A ban, that is, 
upon what Shearmur calls ‘conventionalist strategies.’676 Moreover, Shearmur argues that 
central to the avoidance of conventionalist strategies would be the existence of a public forum 
that serves ‘both as the place within which the rules of the system are legitimated to its 
inhabitants, and also within which different specific forms of life must give an account of 
themselves.’677 Ultimately, then, discourse in the Liberal Metautopia takes place at two
668 ibid., p. 194.
669 ibid.
670 Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia, London, Basil Blackwell, 1974.
671 Shearmur, Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research programme pp. 195 -  196.
672 ibid., p. 177. The phrase is Nozick’s. On this, see Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 28- 9.
673 Shearmur, ibid., p. 196.
674 ibid.
675 ibid.
676 ibid.
677 ibid.
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levels: at the level of civil society - the disaggregated, surrogate discourse and also at the 
aggregate political level of the public forum.
3. Family Resemblances: Kukathas’s Politics o f  Indifference
In ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’ and elsewhere Chandran 
Kukathas sets out a strict neutralist conception of the liberal polity - more specifically a 
‘liberalism of the limited state’678 - that, in contrast to Shearmur’s Liberal Metautopia, is 
specifically intended to deal with the challenge posed to justice by cultural plurality. The 
Politics of Indifference, moreover, is explicitly offered in opposition to Taylor’s multicultural 
response to the challenge known as The Politics of Recognition.679 Kukathas reminds us that 
under an institutional regime of strictly neutralist liberalism individuals are free to form 
groups or associations, or to continue their association with groups that they have joined or to 
which they may have been bom.680 Yet, by the same token it remains uninterested in the
... interests or attachments - cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, or otherwise - that people 
might have. It takes no interest in the character or identity of individuals; nor is it concerned 
directly to promote human flourishing: it has no collective projects, it expresses no group 
preferences, and it promotes no particular individuals or individual interests. Its only concern 
is with upholding the framework of law within which individuals and groups can function 
peacefully.681
It is for this reason, moreover, that Kukathas does not endorse group-differentiated rights for 
cultural or ethnic minorities as this would amount to political interference in the cultural 
process that involves both the emergence and disappearance of the cultural formations that 
constitute it.682 Similarly, to Shearmur’s Liberal Metautopia, this, of course, does not mean 
that the Politics of Indifference would preclude the members of such groups ensuring on their 
own terms that their particular cultural affiliation endures and flourishes. What the neutral 
state will not do, though, is either help them or hinder them in their attempts to do so because 
‘cultural survival cannot be guaranteed and cannot be claimed as a right.’683 This liberalism -
678 Kukathas, Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference, p. 696.
679 For Taylor’s view see Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, Multiculturalism: Examining the 
Politics o f  Recognition, Gutmann, A. (Ed.), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995.
680 Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, p. 691.
681 ibid.\ ‘Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Political Community’, pp. 103 -  4.
682 Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, passim..
683 Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, p. 694.
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the ‘Politics of Indifference,’684 then, can be summed up by ‘a refusal to be guided by such 
goals as fairness of outcome in social policy or institutional design.’685
Kukathas, of course, also rejects intervention by the state, in the first instance 
negatively, by denying that it is capable of achieving the aims that intervention is supposed to 
achieve and that, in any case, its pursuit has often not been benign.686 Thus, not only does 
state action in the cultural realm often issue in a tendency to standardise a diverse population 
but also because the criterion of fairness in terms of which the outcome should be judged is 
itself a ‘subject of contestation and dispute’ in a culturally diverse society. 687 Consequently, 
Kukathas continues, ‘the appeal to fairness to settle disputes will be, at best, unlikely to 
succeed, and possibly aggravating.’688 It is for this reason that Kukathas suggests that it is 
better to allow cultural outcomes to be the results of the accidents of history or geography 
than the results of the political pursuit of particular ends.
In making this claim, Kukathas also locates a significant positive basis of the Politics 
of Indifference in the need for order. ‘To tell a group, which has fared less well than it would 
like out of a distributive settlement, that the outcome is fair or just,’ he argues, ‘may not 
mollify it but add insult to injury.’689 He is keen to argue, then, that in trying to recognise the 
claims of minority cultures - or, for that matter, to bolster the majority culture - politics will 
always fail. In doing so, moreover, it will inevitably sow the seeds of discord between groups 
and thus within society at large.690 Thus, if the state does choose to involve itself in the 
‘cultural constitution of the nation’, it is highly likely - and, indeed, reasonable - that 
minorities would demand a say in the process. Far from leading to order this, Kukathas 
claims, ‘will only cause dissension.’691 Thus, for Kukathas, the state must in the interests of 
harmony withdraw from its role of arbitrator between cultures and, instead, be strictly neutral 
in its dealings with them, thus countenancing the idea that some cultures will flourish whilst 
others will die out.
Kukathas does admit, of course, that in denying the appropriateness of cultural rights 
and exemptions to minority groups as a means of combating inequality between groups the 
Politics of Indifference is simultaneously vulnerable to the claim, made in the first instance by 
Kymlicka and, most recently by Barry, that this would equally allow them to tyrannise their 
own members and lead to the tolerance of what liberals at least would consider to be unjust 
behaviour: restrictions upon freedom of worship and expression, ritual scarring, as well as the
684 ibid., p. 691.
685 Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, The Journal o f  
Political Philosophy, Volume 5, Number 4, 1997, pp. 406 - A ll, p. 423.
686 ibid., p. 423; Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, p. 697.
687 Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, ibid.
688 ibid.
689 ibid., p. 424.
690 Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, p. 693.
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curtailment o f opportunities for sub-group members such as women,692 not to mention the 
active, if subtle, persecution of gays. The problem here, o f course, is that in removing culture 
and almost everything else from public political debate the Politics of Indifference appears to 
give carte blanche to all manner of insidious practices, the public acceptance of which can 
lead to so many private hells.693 It is at this point, where Kukathas offers two responses, one 
largely empirical, and the other principled to allay any fears the liberal may have. In the first 
instance, he reminds us, it is necessary to always bear in mind that the kind of society within 
which the several communities are nested is itself a liberal society. The pressure to broadly 
conform to the precepts that underlie its organisation, then, would be quite great.694 Secondly, 
and similarly to Shearmur, the right of association -  which comprehends both entry and exit -  
would be upheld as a kind of safety valve for those who no longer experienced the demands 
of their respective communities as anything but onerous.695 Thus, the Politics of Indifference 
would afford one the opportunity to flee into a wider, liberal, society.696
4. Objections: relations between communities
4.i The critique o f benign neglect
The question as to whether the regimes similar to the Discursive Minimal State are adequate 
as responses to the demands of justice under conditions of cultural pluralism lies at the heart 
of Will Kymlicka’s critique of State non-interference with the cultural market-place or 
‘Benign neglect’ in Multicultural Citizenship.691 To be sure, Kymlicka’s criticisms are, not 
entirely new or unique nor are they explicitly targeted at classical liberal theories of justice 
per se. Yet, given that classical liberal theories are liberal theories, Kymlicka’s criticisms are 
the kind of objection that institutional regimes such as the Discursive Minimal State, the 
Liberal Metautopia and the Politics of Indifference should seek answers to. For this purpose 
our attention will not be focused upon his first objection that the regime of Benign neglect is
691 ibid., p. 697.
692 Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, pp. 132 - 3. For the criticisms see Kymlicka, ‘The 
Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas’, pp. 142 - 143; Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 143 -  
146.
693 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 141-146.
694 Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, p. 133.
695 ibid. pp. 133 -  134.
696 Significantly, at the very end of ‘Are there and Cultural Rights?’ Kukathas acknowledges that 
making the right o f exit substantive would depend upon the wider society’s conforming to the norms of 
liberal political culture; that is, it would need to be one that invokes, amongst other values, liberal 
autonomy. We shall return to this issue at a later stage of this chapter.
697 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Chapter 6, esp. pp. 107 - 115. For an overview of Kymlicka’s 
arguments against benign neglect see Kukathas, C., ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s 
Multicultural Citizenship’, The Journal o f  Political Philosophy, pp. 411 - 412 and pp. 422 - 424.
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incoherent but, rather on the second objection pertaining to the intolerable burdens it is said to 
impose upon members of vulnerable minority cultures.698
A variant o f the intolerable burdens argument is acknowledged by Shearmur in his 
discussion of what he calls ‘Plant’s Trap’ after Raymond Plant.699 Briefly, Plant’s argument 
is that even if  an individual is accorded rights upon the epistemological basis of his 
contribution to a surrogate public dialogue, then why not accord him positive welfare rights 
so as to ‘enable him to play a full role as an active civic participant’?700 Without such rights, 
it is claimed, vulnerable individuals - which includes individuals who are members of 
vulnerable cultural groups - will all too readily be left behind, their perspectives remaining 
forever off the political agenda. Moreover, it seems that a similar argument can be made 
against the Politics of Indifference. If the state is to be indifferent between different cultural 
communities how are the weaker ones supposed to flourish or even survive and thus continue 
to play the indispensable role of providing a context of meaningful choice for their members? 
‘At the very least,’ Kukathas writes, originators of this objection claim that the liberal state 
‘ought to pursue the task of creating a harmonious and cohesive society -  one that makes for a 
stable social unity that will endure over a substantial period of time.’701
Shearmur’s answer to this objection is to reassert the Hayekian instrumental argument 
that serves as the foundation for the Liberal Metautopia. That is, because the rights in 
question are accorded upon the basis of epistemological considerations in which resource 
allocation will be publicly decided by the options which represent their ‘best’ or most 
efficient use, ‘we are not committed,’ he writes, ‘to saying that resources must be used come 
what may to give someone a voice in the dialogue if the opportunity cost of so doing would 
be high.’702 Of course, this does not mean that in the Liberal Metautopia we would be 
precluded from doing so. Clearly, to at least some it would be very important to utilise 
resources to do just this.703 The Liberal Metautopia, then, involves as much a commitment to 
institutions such as charity to enable culturally vulnerable groups a voice in the surrogate 
dialogue as it does to those that are run for profit. Indeed, some institutions which are 
predicated upon combating the contingencies of life -  such as insurance -  are themselves
698 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 110 - 115. The first critique is also to be found in Taylor,, 
C., ‘The Politics of Recognition’, pp. 25- 73 and in Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, pp. 
96 -121; ‘Impartiality and the Civic Public’, passim.
699 Unfortunately, Shearmur does not identify the source of this argument in Raymond Plant’s writings 
but he may have in mind papers such as Plant, R., ‘Autonomy, Social Rights and Distributive Justice, 
The Moral Foundation o f  Market Institutions, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1992, pp. 119- 
141; ‘Hayek on Social Justice: A Critique’, Bimer, J. and van Zijp, R. (Eds.), Hayek, Co-Ordination 
and Evolution: His legacy in philosophy, politics, economics and the history o f  ideas, London, 
Routledge, 1994, pp. 164-177 and ‘Why Social Justice?’, Social Justice from Hume to Walzer, 
Boucher, D. and Kelly, P. J. (eds.), London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 267-281.
700 Shearmur, Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research programme, p. 189.
701 Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, p. 697.
702 Shearmur, Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research programme, p. 196.
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based on profit and there is no reason why entire communities could not take out policies of 
this sort thus protecting their voice from the silencing forces of economic marginalisation. 
Similarly, Kukathas’s emphasis upon freedom of association weakens the intolerable burdens 
objection for an intimate part of that freedom for group members -  and, indeed, sympathetic 
won-members - to concern themselves with the well-being of cultural minorities. The charge 
of intolerable burdens, then, is misplaced.
However, it is at this point where decisive arguments against the Liberal Metautopia 
and the Politics of Indifference become clear. Particularly in view of Shearmur’s earlier 
programmatic claim that a telling argument is not represented by ‘the construction of 
philosophical foundations, so much as considerations that other people, coming from 
wherever they do, will find telling,’704 it seems somewhat odd to claim that if  the opportunity 
cost of giving vulnerable and marginalized group members a voice in the surrogate dialogue 
is too high then we should not be compelled to do so. How the handicapped, for instance, let 
alone their able friends and political allies (unless all were already starkly libertarian) would 
not be positively troubled by such an explanation rather than merely not find it telling is 
unanswered. It seems that the only way of convincing everyone is to give an argument that 
actually does resonate in a positive way with everyone, including most importantly the 
disadvantaged. Similarly, the Politics of Indifference’s strong emphasis upon rights of 
association - including exit rights - and the empirical assumption that the kind of society into 
which recently parted members of closed communities enter into is, thankfully, a liberal one 
may rebut the charge of intolerable burdens but it does not give us any reason to actively 
prefer the Politics of Indifference to other candidate theories such as multiculturalism or 
liberal egalitarianism. What both the Politics of Indifference and the Liberal Metautopia 
would need in order for this to be so is a supplementary argument that claims that if it is 
aiding vulnerable and marginalized members of society that you want to do then you are best 
served by according them, and everybody else, private property rights as the most sincere and 
rational means of giving them succour. This more robust counter-objection to the intolerable 
burdens argument, then, is not only that it is not necessary to involve the state in cultural 
justice but that to do so is indeed to underdetermine the scope for aid to minority cultures as it 
does not make as full use of local knowledges - both propositional and tacit - and 
circumstances to this end.
Furthermore, the example of endogenous gay survival and flourishing fits in precisely 
with Hayek’s writings on the abstract society. Subjecting the discourse about the status of 
homosexuals to the strictures of aggregative, individual reason in the public sphere could just 
as easily mean that gays would not have been afforded the means to flourish, especially if the
703 ibid. p. 195.
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majority view were a hostile one. By contrast, because it takes no particular stance with 
regard to this, the Discursive Minimal State allows for marginal communities to flourish 
without being subject to the power of a hostile government. Again, Milton Friedman has 
made just this point very succinctly with regard to minority groups of all kinds in Capitalism 
and Freedom. ‘No one who buys bread,’ he writes,
... knows whether the wheat from which it is made was grown by a Communist or a 
republican, by a constitutionalist or a Fascist, or, for that matter, by a Negro or a white. This 
illustrates how an impersonal market separates economic activities from political views and 
protects men from being discriminated against in their economic activities for reasons that are 
irrelevant to their productivity -  whether these reasons are associated with their views or with 
their color.705
Thus, the benefit of the abstract society to gays and other minority groups is twofold. In the 
first instance - and we may invoke Fraser’s subaltern counter-publics here706 - gays are 
afforded the opportunity to organise in ways that they regard as maximally conducive to their 
well-being, precisely because social decision making is privatised. Under this arrangement, 
gays and their allies are able to take advantage of their own local, particular knowledges and 
circumstances to further their own ends as sincerely and rationally as possible. Moreover, 
they will do so without being subject to the enmity of those hostile to them for the simple 
reason that they have little or no face-to-face contact whilst all the while participating in the 
wider socio-economic context.707 Secondly, the degree of flourishing of a homosexual 
lifestyle on these disaggregate terms in the Discursive Minimal State is itself a more accurate 
indication of its degree of acceptance than that to be had out of a debate in a public political 
space. Given that we cannot know in advance the outcome of such a debate -  unless, of 
course we rig it by selecting only those who agree with a particular viewpoint to participate in 
the political discourse -  the voluntary nature of the discourse, a discourse where conclusions 
are reached, as it were, by voluntary steps rather than by politics will give us the most 
accurate, non question-begging answer. Moreover, precisely because it is arrived at via
704 ibid. p. 178.
705 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p, 21.
706 Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy’, Robbins, B. (Ed.), The Phantom Public Sphere, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993, pp. 1-32.
707 Even more interesting than this, is that the abstract society permits even those who find 
homosexuals a decidedly disagreeable group to help them in this quest. Tracing the flow of goods and 
services through the economy is often far too costly as to make it practically impossible to see whom 
you have indirectly helped. In the great Society of the Discursive Minimal State, then, one person’s 
negative unintended consequences may be another’s unintended benefit. On this see, O’Neill, J, 
‘Liberty, Polity, Neutrality’, p. 417; Hayek, The Mirage o f  Social Justice, in Law Legislation and 
Liberty, Volume Two, London, Routledge, 1982, pp. 109-110.
198
voluntary steps it will be seen to be both just and fair. As such, the answer yielded by the 
disaggregated discourse of the Discursive Minimal State is the most sincere, rational and fair 
answer to the question of to what extent should gays flourish in society.
We are now in a position to assess the Discursive Minimal State by comparing it to 
the Liberal Metautopia and the Politics of Indifference’s response to the charge that they all 
impose intolerable burdens upon the members of cultural minorities. Like Shearmur, the 
basis of the argument for the Discursive Minimal State is derived from Hayekian 
considerations but it goes one step further to offer reasons that even the marginalized would 
find compelling. What the Discursive Minimal State assumes is that, whatever your 
objective, its achievement is most sincerely and rationally satisfied via individual rights on the 
grounds of interpretative sincerity and rationality. The upshot o f this claim, then, is that if we 
do want all the voices of the polity included in the dialogue, the best way of doing this under 
conditions of social disagreement and resource and knowledge scarcity is to institute a set of 
individual discourse rights as the most interpretatively sincere and rational means of attaining 
it. Unlike Shearmur, then, we invoke Hayek not only to rule out the political pursuit of public 
objectives but also to positively recommend the Discursive Minimal State on the grounds of 
sincerity and rationality. Similarly, the positive argument for the Discursive Minimal State 
does more work than an emphasis upon the rights of association in the Politics of 
Indifference. Rights of association, of course, are indispensable to secure protection from 
cultural tyranny. However, unlike their defence in the Liberal Metautopia, we may add 
further that they also enable us to respond better to it than would be the case otherwise. This, 
however, is something that Kukathas who is more concerned to rebut the charge of intolerable 
burdens does not make clear. Thus, following Hayek’s arguments about competition as a 
discovery procedure, we have claimed that, contra Kymlicka and Taylor, if it is the prosperity 
or preservation of minority cultures that is desired, then it is for the better that we allow these 
things to be pursued on the basis of the individual rights protected by the Discursive Minimal 
State. To sum up, what separates the Discursive Minimal State from the Liberal Metautopia 
and the Politics of Indifference is not just its rebuttal of Kymlicka’s argument, but also its 
ability to offer a positive argument in favour of this kind of institutional regime.
4.ii Segregation and the Geography o f  Interpretation
Another aspect of the charge that theories of justice such as the Discursive Minimal State 
impose intolerable burdens upon cultural minorities relates to the second species of objection 
that is loosely collected around the idea of ethical subjectivism and relativism. The two 
particular criticisms that shall be dealt with here are those of segregation and the possibility of 
social criticism. Given that under the Discursive Minimal State interpretative sovereignty is 
centred upon the private rather than the public sphere, the first critique is that this would lead
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to the segregation of different of groups and as a consequence only serve to promote those 
misunderstandings that all too often lead to distrust, enmity and, ultimately, conflict out of 
which, one may add, the minorities always fare less well. Given the account of cultural 
outcomes by voluntary steps that the Discursive Minimal State sanctions, there is nothing to 
stop entire segments of the population choosing to relocate away form other segments they 
find unappealing or even repulsive. At worst because there is no public political sphere in 
which members of the polity have to justify their views to one another this may lead to a 
Civic Social apartheid - an apartheid by stealth, as opposed to by the state - as an emergent 
characteristic of social institutions. Interpretative liberty has decidedly unpleasant foreseeable 
consequences.
However, do we have good reason to assume that apartheid by stealth will be 
emergent in this way? The objection, of course, depends upon the assumption that people’s 
interpretations on matters such as religion, ethnicity, race, gender and sexuality figure so 
highly upon their list o f priorities that they would be the first things they would think of when 
choosing a place to live, a company to work for or an employee to work for them. For some -  
a small minority -  such things would figure very highly upon their list o f priorities but for the 
vast majority of people they would probably figure somewhat lower down upon the scale. 
The resulting aggregate picture of all of this -  the geography of interpretation, if you will -  
would indeed be characterized by a certain degree of segregation: racists would live only 
among themselves, religious fundamentalists would have no social intercourse with gays or 
women interested in careers, gays would have no social intercourse with fundamentalists. 
Yet, for the vast majority of places the geography of interpretation would be mixed. Indeed, 
one of the largest, if not the largest, of the so-called ghettos allowed for by the Discursive 
Minimal State would be one where only those who actively want, do not mind or are too busy 
to care about living among others very different form themselves is emergent. Let us assume, 
then, that there would be some but not total segregation. We have, then, to consider the force 
of the segregation by stealth objection in terms of the cost to all concerned.
It seems that one counter-objection is that it is unclear why such segregation would be 
worse than a situation where mutually antagonistic groups for whom the cost of contact is far 
too high, find themselves in direct, face-to-face and hostile contact with one another. What 
perhaps blinds us to this is that all too often we conceive of the problem of segregation as one 
in which some are metaphorically ‘left behind’ by others and that they do not want to be left 
behind. It is upon the basis of this sentiment, moreover, that we then proceed to question the 
indifference of the state to such processes. Is it right, we ask, that the state does nothing to 
stop such abhorrent social tendencies? hi truth, however, often the minority in question is 
quite pleased that such segregation takes place and its members do not perceive themselves to 
have been left behind but, rather, is at last able to get on with life on their own terms. This
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author at least does not know of any gays who would find particularly attractive the idea of 
living side by side with Islamic fundamentalists or of any blacks that would positively enjoy 
the company of Ku Klux Klan members. Indeed, it is because the neo-Hayekian framework 
of the Discursive Minimal State and, for that matter, the theories of Kukathas and Shearmur 
would lead precisely to this kind of segregation that it is to be welcomed. This, of course, is 
in stark contrast to the multicultural perspective. Here the problem of hostility in the forum 
and as a consequence political discourse is made too demanding. Moreover, and related to 
this, it merely begs the question of the rectitude - let alone the partiality - of the politics of 
integration that presumably would be the remedy of segregation. Similarly, liberal 
egalitarianism makes too many demands because of its intimate relationship to democratic 
decision-making. Under such a procedure, there will always be winners and losers, a feature 
of the process that will inevitably leave a bitter taste in the mouth of the latter.
Yet, the counter-objection may be taken further than this by way of the distinction 
between the face-to-face and the mediated. Clearly, the segregation by stealth objection is 
operative at the face-to-face level and we have found it wanting. Yet it is also clear that 
despite this there would be social co-operation in any case as all members of the polity would 
still occupy the abstract, mediated economic and cultural space regardless of their 
background, interests and affiliations. As a consequence of this, individual communities 
would still make indirect contributions to the surrogate, disaggregated discourse for the 
simple fact that they trade with those they do not see and do not know. Thus, there still would 
be discourse and co-operation although it would be at the indirect, abstract level. What the 
segregation by stealth objection conflates, then, is the idea of integration and that of the face- 
to-face. The former is not parasitic upon the latter for one may have integration at the abstract 
level even if it not always is in evidence at the face-to-face level.
5, Objections: relations within communities
5.i Subjectivism, Conventionalism and the Authenticity o f Minimalist Discourse 
Hitherto, our objections have been centred upon the inequalities between communities rather 
than within them that, prima facie at least, theories of justice such as the Discursive Minimal 
State are vulnerable to. Yet, inequalities within communities are of equally pressing 
importance and are brought into stark relief when many of the claims made by or on behalf of 
cultural minorities are expressed in the vocabulary of equality and marginalisation. Related, 
then, at a more profound philosophical level to the problem of segregation is the threat of 
ethical subjectivism to the Discursive Minimal State and the uncritical stance towards the 
content of the particular traditions sanctioned by it. How, after all, is the Discursive Minimal 
State, the Liberal Metautopia or the Politics of Indifference to rule out some practices rather 
than others without fatally floundering upon the rocks of ethical controversy which they are
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programmatically committed to avoiding? This, of course, is especially important given the 
importance the neo-Hayekian perspective attaches to tradition as conducive to co-ordination.
The problem here, however, is that if we accept such an emphasis upon tradition and 
local practices, even if that acceptance is on an instrumental basis, it is difficult to see how we 
can subject them to critical appraisal. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti touches upon this in 
‘Individual, Social Rules, Tradition: The Case of Friederich A. Hayek.’708 In the first 
instance, Galeotti claims - correctly - that for Hayek ‘the political order is thoroughly parasitic 
vis-a-vis the social order’ in the sense that the political order relies upon the traditions that 
constitute the social order to ensure social cohesiveness.709 It is for this reason, crucially, that 
Hayek’s State can be a minimal one whose unique task is the enforcement of the law.710 
Thus, all politics should, indeed can do, is enforce the law because ‘the social order, which 
the state is meant to protect is a very complex, self-regulating mechanism that has already 
solved in its own way, the fundamental issues of living together.’711 However, Galeotti 
continues, ‘the fixing of political boundaries that exclude tradition results in the exclusion of a 
crucial part of collective life from public discussion and political consideration.’712 Tradition 
and spontaneity, then, ‘not being matters of politics are simply facts that can be explained but 
not questioned.’713 But once it is accepted that many aspects of our traditions (Galeotti 
discusses them in the context of their functionality to the formation of the identities of the 
sexes) perhaps need to be subjected precisely to such critical scrutiny, it is hard to see where 
the theoretical momentum for this can come from. ‘We know only too well from historical 
records,’ she adds, ‘that traditions have typically embodied privileges and partialities.’714 
Similarly, as Gray notes, in a political theory such as Hayek’s the instrumental benefit of 
traditions should not be considered in terms of their being ‘means to antecedently chosen 
ends,’ but, rather, ‘their functional usefulness depends on their being observed as it were 
uncritically.’715 To a significant extent, it is not only that traditions ought not be observed 
critically but, rather, that they cannot be so observed precisely from the fact that they are the 
carriers of tacit knowledge that is ‘inaccessible to critical statement’716 and that there exists 
‘ [n]o Archimedean point of critical leverage ... for the assessment of entire moral codes.’717
708 Galeotti, ‘Individual, Social Rules, Tradition: The Case of Friederich A. Hayek’, pp. 163 -  181.
709 ibid. p. 173.
710 Included in which, presumably, is the protection of the framework of law from extra-judicial, 
typically international, threat.
711 Galeotti, ibid.
112 ibid..
7.3 ibid.
7.4 ibid. p. 174.
715 Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 42; Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, p. 114.
716 Gray, ibid. p. 42.
7,7 ibid.
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Two points are worth making here. Firstly, it seems difficult to use this concern as 
the basis for the political settlement of such issues once the doctrine of the Privileged Position 
is taken into consideration. This, in essence, is the same problem that we encountered with 
regard to the identification and correction of defective economic outcomes. We saw there 
that the problem was that the apparent defect is ultimately based upon the ascription of one 
interpretation of the value of economic interaction that is itself only ever partial. Thus, the 
only way to fairly arbitrate between rival interpretations of what would constitute a beneficial 
economic outcome is to allow the interpreters to go about correcting, or not correcting, on 
their own terms. Similarly, Galeotti's attitude towards tradition is but one interpretation of its 
ethical status. Traditionalists, obviously, would wish to disagree that the privileges inherent 
in tradition of ethically troubling. Yet, whether or not these are useful responses they do not 
give us an argument fo r  the minimal state. Answering this will, again, enable us to see how 
each of these three classical liberal conceptions rises to this challenge and to ultimately make 
the claim that the Discursive Minimal State is the preferred option.
Shearmur proposes a public discussion forum in which representatives of diverse 
communities will come together to justify their traditions and practices to one another.718 In 
this way, it is claimed, only those practices that are morally legitimate in the eyes of the wider 
society - and not just within one of its constituent communities - are said to be justifiable. 
However, this seems to open up a whole range of new difficulties. How, after all, are such 
justifications to take place and, more importantly, by what justifiable criteria? Two problems 
arise here. Firstly, is the problem of pedigree for Shearmur’s proposal ultimately leaves too 
much room for precisely the kind of aggregative discursive formation that his Hayekian 
emphasis upon disaggregated discourse would appear to rule out because it would make 
precisely the kind of epistemological demands that his defence of the surrogate, disaggregated 
discourse would deny. Secondly, appealing to an ethical postulate as a tie-breaker between 
conflicting values would, in any case, violate the sanctity of the experimental and educational 
aspects of the Liberal Metautopia that are at its heart.
The same argument, it seems, arises, in Shearmur’s discussion of the danger to the Liberal 
Metautopia of ‘conventionalist strategies’.719 Conventionalist strategies are the construction 
upon the basis of the private property rights enjoyed under the auspices of the Liberal 
Metautopia of ‘certain kinds of social formation which protect people’s judgements from 
critical scrutiny.’720 Presumably what Shearmur has in mind here would be communities that 
are closed to the outside world -  such as religious cults. Because of the possibility of such 
protection, Shearmur argues that it may be necessary to have certain restrictions upon
718 Shearmur, Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research programme, pp. 217 -2 1 8 .
719 ibid. p. 196.
720 ibid.
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property rights that would not normally be countenanced by the free market economist. 
Unfortunately, he does not say what the restrictions might be and actually adds to the 
confusion by saying that practices are placed within a public forum that ‘serves both as the 
place within which the rules of the system are legitimated to its inhabitants, and also within 
which different specific forms of life must give an account of themselves.’721 Yet, again, it is 
unclear what kind of forum this is supposed to be. Given his concerns about the difficulties of 
the face-to-face forum, it seems likely that what Shearmur does not have in mind is the forum 
of deliberative democratic theory discussed and rejected in Chapter 4.722 Yet, at the same 
time, the fact that diverse forms of life of the Liberal Metautopia must give an account of 
themselves here it seems, after all, that this aggregative, political discourse is precisely what 
the Liberal Metautopia would demand. Of course, Shearmur is careful to note that his line of 
argument is merely suggested by Hayek’s work. His task, then, ‘is not to show that there is 
an argument in Hayek’s work ... but to offer an argument which it would be possible for him 
to accept.’723 Yet, even if  we grant this, an argument in favour of a public forum is not one of 
those arguments. Of course Shearmur does argue for the need for the right of exit and this, as 
we have seen, can be understood as going hand in hand with the wider learning and 
experimentation process that can be understood as constitutive of the process of 
justification.724 By voting with their feet, which includes deciding to stay as much as it does 
deciding to leave, individual interpreters give rise to a wider, disaggregated, social, 
justificatory process. ‘In our liberal metautopia,’ he writes,
... experimentation and learning take place via the activities of individuals. Individuals back their 
own judgement with their own resources in the membership of some society, organization, club or, 
more radically, experimental community. Learning takes place via these individuals deciding they 
had made a mistake and pulling out; or staying and making whatever changes are allowed by the 
particular constitution of the small-scale organization which they have joined; or by their being 
joined by, or imitated by others.725
Moreover, it is here where the state has an important role to play for it ‘preserves individuals 
(and voluntary communities and associations) from aggression and overspill effects, and 
which also prevents individuals from being held prisoner by some community or association 
that they have joined.’726 Indeed, Shearmur goes further in this regard by claiming that the 
state ought to take particular care that such second-generation members ‘have the opportunity
721 ibid., pp. 196, 218.
722 ibid., p. 194.
723 ibid., p. 179.
724 ibid., p. 196.
725 ibid,
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to exercise choice between alternatives.’727 The problem here, of course, is that this sounds 
perilously close to the positive welfare rights he rejected in our discussion of the intolerable 
burdens critique. O f course, the solution to this is merely the authorisation on the part of the 
state of the police to investigate the communities concerned for evidence of malpractice such 
as enslavement or forced membership both of which would violate the sanctity of the private 
property rights the state is supposed to protect. Moreover, there would also be an incentive in 
civil society for individuals to investigate communities of which they are not members and, as 
a consequence, for others to step in and seek that information on their behalf. Investigation 
here would be about the way communities are organised and about the values upon which that 
organisation is based. Again, the extent to which this takes place is the extent to which such 
information is deemed important in people’s lives other things considered. Given, in addition, 
that the choice of the form of life is of incredibly high importance to the vast majority of 
people it would seem that such a market for social criticism would only ever be a robust one. 
Who would doubt that taking pride of place amongst less serious publications such as Which 
Computer? and Which Car? would be Which Community? For those who doubt this it needs 
to be pointed out that magazines and other privately provided sources of information already 
do feature in our daily lives with regard to the most important things: insurance, life
assurance, banking, household security and many other products and services. There is, then, 
contra Shearmur the possibility of turning to civil society rather than the state for this kind of 
judgement.
What of the Politics of Indifference? In section IV of ‘Liberalism and 
Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’ Kukathas gives us an indication of the 
underlying philosophical assumption of his own strictly neutralist liberal perspective. It is a 
perspective, he writes, that
... does not lie in any view of human dignity - as is suggested, for example, by Taylor’s 
analysis of liberal thinking. Nor does it lie in any kind of emphasis on the importance of 
individual autonomy. Under the institutions of liberal society, in this view, ways of life that 
disvalue autonomy or individuality may still flourish. The foundation of this liberalism lies, 
rather, in a particular view of freedom: the freedom of individuals to associate or dissociate 
from others in pursuit of their diverse although often shared ends.728
Clearly, then, in the Politics of Indifference it is the right of association that is critical. Given 
that many of the groups of which we are members - particularly cultural groups - we are not 
members of voluntarily (because, for instance, we are bom into them) Kukathas claims that
727 ibid. Inexplicably, however, he only extends this right to children or older second-generation 
members and not to those first generation members who may change their minds.
205
what is paramount is ‘that members recognize as legitimate the terms of association and the 
authority that upholds them.’729 Moreover, ‘all that is necessary as evidence of such 
recognition,’ he writes, ‘ is the fact that the members choose not to leave.’730 Thus, the right 
to exit has, for Kukathas to be fundamental and we must respect a minority’s wish to live 
according to their own practices ‘not because the culture has the right to be preserved but 
because individuals should be free to associate: to form communities and to live by the terms 
of those associations.’731 Moreover, when this right is respected and individuals come and go 
as their interests and conscience’s dictate, we have the judgement process at work. This right 
of association, then, would seem to supply the Politics of Indifference with the critical clout it 
needs to avoid the problem of unreflective conventionalism. Unlike the Liberal Metautopia, 
the Politics of Indifference has no forum. Yet, another question arises here. At the level of 
justification, how is even this right of exit, thin as it may be, not reflective of a deeper liberal 
commitment to autonomy that is itself controversial and hence programmatically contrary to 
Kukathas’s aims? One may readily accept that a particular conception of liberty is doing the 
foundational work here but still question the perhaps comprehensive basis of this, clearly 
ethical, conception.
This, clearly, is an important question, not the least because of the multicultural 
problematic the Politics of Indifference is intended to solve. Why should those for whom 
autonomy is not culturally operative accept its incorporation into the political institutions that 
regulate their behaviour? What do we say to those who claim that, epistemological 
considerations apart, I hold my way of life to be true and do not wish to see it relegated to 
some private interpretative sphere -  not least one where, under this politics, there is only a 
private sphere. In any case, whether the grounding of this politic is ethical or scientific is 
beside the point for it is its comprehensiveness that is the problem. After all, it is my doctrine 
that is comprehensive, true for all, and not this one. Thus, despite the fact that Kukathas’s 
approach does indeed give ‘a great deal of authority to cultural communities,’732 (which, he 
says, Will Kymlicka’s group-differentiated perspective is ambiguous about in 
‘Multiculturalism as Fairness’) his approach does nonetheless presuppose a commitment to 
individual autonomy that many of the groups governed by the Politics of Indifference would 
find onerous.733 Later on Kukathas seeks to show that the right of exit is not merely a formal
728 Kukathas, ‘Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference’, pp. 696 -  697.
729 Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, p. 116.
730 ibid.
731 ibid.
732 ibid., p. 117.
733 There is, furthermore, the question of whether such a conception of liberty - liberty o f entry and exit 
- is viable or meaningful in a society whose political institutions, Kukathas himself is ready to admit, 
would allow for the disvaluation of individual autonomy and hence the very freedom to exit amongst at 
least some groups.
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right but one with ‘substantive bite’,734 one of the most important guarantees of which is the 
existence of a wider society - as there is in most if not all liberal societies - willing to accept 
defectors or at least allow them to reassociate on new terms.735 Of course, Kymlicka objects 
at this point in his reply to Kukathas in ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures’,736 on the grounds 
that a woman who has been denied an education as well as association with the outside world 
‘does not have the substantial freedom to leave because she lacks the preconditions for 
making a meaningful choice.’737 Thus, he concludes ‘any system of minority rights which 
gives cultural communities that much power over their individual members is seriously 
deficient from a liberal point of view.’738 The problem, however, with Kymlicka’s response 
and to a certain extent with Kukathas’s argument is this. Surely under Kukathas’s schema 
such a state o f affairs - the denial of education and the freedom to associate at all with the 
wider world - would be precisely that ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’739 that is ruled 
out? This may be an adequate response to Kymlicka but the further problem with it is that it is 
not a response that I think Kukathas can adequately make without recourse to the theoretical 
resources of liberal autonomy that he has made unavailable to himself. How, then, does the 
Discursive Minimal State grapple with the problem of conventionalism?
Given the difficulties with which the liberal Metautopia and the Politics of 
Indifference, the task facing the Discursive Minimal State is to provide a means of avoiding 
the charge of conventionalism that its emphasis upon tradition makes it vulnerable to. At the 
same time, however, it must do so without invoking an aggregative discursive forum that 
would run against other aspects of its Hayekian inheritance nor to a controversial ethical 
postulate that would fall afoul of its profession to neutrality and its fundamentally different 
conceptualisation of the task of justice. It is to this task that we now turn.
As we have seen, like the Liberal Metautopia, the Discursive Minimal State would 
impose a Publicity Requirement. However, unlike Shearmur’s theory, the requirement is not 
operative for the purposes of explicit, propositional justification in a public forum but, rather, 
for the purposes - surely more Hayekian - of conveying information for individual choice. In 
this way, public justification, like the discussion itself, takes place at the disaggregated level. 
With such information at hand one would decide whether or not a particular practice is
734 Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’, p. 129. Another argument you may wish to deploy 
against the proponents of group rights who wish to deny the right o f exit is to claim that this is only the 
same right which they themselves wish to enjoy as members of a wider society extended to their own 
members. If  they think that it would be reprehensible to be forced to stay within certain boundaries or 
held in bondage why would the same not be true of their members?
735 'ibid., p. 135.
736 Kymlicka, ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas’, Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
February 1992, pp. 140-146.
737 ibid., p. 143.
™ibid.
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acceptable and take appropriate action to externalise that belief. Over the medium to long 
term the practices which survive are those which ought to have survived because they have 
proved acceptable to the mind of a sufficient number of people, all things considered. 
Perhaps the moral rectitude of voluntary female circumcision will be an enduring value 
around which we all will congregate in the future pluralist communities of Sydney, London or 
Los Angeles (although, here and now, it seems somewhat doubtful)? Yet, the only way of 
finding out if it will endure is to test it against other norms and to see to what extent those that 
endorse it flourish.740 Given, furthermore, that the actualisation of interpretations and not just 
their voicing is central to interpretative liberalism, the state would have a crucial role to play 
insofar as it would legitimately intervene in cases of forced membership. This, then, is the 
justificatory process at work in the Discursive Minimal State but, unlike the aggregated 
process of justification of the Liberal Metautopia where practices must be acceptable to the 
occupiers of a public political space, it works at the Civic Social, disaggregated level.
The selection of competing cultural traditions, then, is an aggregate term for the 
micro-level process of the migration between norms in civil society. Yet, this appears to 
imply that in a neo-Hayekian disaggregated discursive forum no criticism takes place at all. 
For, as we have seen earlier this emphasis upon the co-ordinatory role of traditions also 
implies a ‘paradigm shift’ from ‘the criticism and evaluation of social institutions by 
reference to preferred principles of morality to an assessment of them in terms of their 
capacity to generate, transmit and use knowledge including tacit knowledge.’741 Yet, the fact 
that we are both unable and consequently ill advised to readily subject the diverse traditions 
of the pluralist polity to critical assessment should not trouble us and, moreover, the metaphor 
with Hayek’s other economic arguments concerning the epistemological role of markets can 
be extended to make this clear. It is not that the traditions are not critically assessed but, 
rather, how and perhaps most importantly, where they are so assessed. The Discursive 
Minimal State does not mean that no criticism takes place at all. Rather, following Gray’s 
analysis of the relationship of social criticism to tradition in Hayek, we can say that such 
criticism ‘consists in the detection and removal of incoherences’ and takes place imminently 
‘as a result o f innumerable small variations upon and deviations from established rules and 
practices, undertaken by countless anonymous individuals in unconnected but similar
739 Quoted in Poulter, S, ‘Ethnic Minority Customs, English Law and Human Rights’, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 36 (1987), pp. 589-615, at pp. 600-1.
740 Importantly, if those who endorse female circumcision do not flourish then this should not be taken 
to mean that some form of ethnic cleansing has taken place. Rather, it should be taken to mean that 
they either have done away with the norm or have migrated elsewhere.
741 Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 41. See also Hayek, Hayek and Modem Liberalism, pp. 175 - 177 where 
Kukathas makes a similar point in a discussion of Hayek and Rawls with regard to the former’s opinion 
of reason’s capacity to ‘set out a justification of right action independent o f the tradition(s) he shares’ 
(p. 177).
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circumstances.’742 The natural selection process - as evidenced in the myriad migration 
between norms discussed earlier - just is the critical process in operation. Like the correction 
of morally dubious market outcomes, ensuring the well-being of minority groups or the 
rescuing of the recently rejected or escaped, cultural critique takes place at the disaggregated, 
Civic Social, level in which discrete decisions by citizens to migrate from one norm to 
another dovetail to give an overall picture that, despite always being inaccessible to individual 
reason, represents at any given time the comparative preferability of norms. Indeed, in 
pluralist societies one is uniquely placed to critique quite effectively. Unlike a relatively 
homogenous state where the overwhelming majority may be said to be internal to the 
traditions of their communities, in pluralistic societies there are many norms - say those 
endorsed by members of a religion different to our own - that we are external to. It is here, in 
the interaction between communities themselves, where such critical leverage may be gained.
Yet, again, just how neutral is this? Why is not the problem Kukathas faced relevant 
here? One possible response to those who subscribe to comprehensive doctrines is that they 
actually have nothing to worry about. Even if  their conception of the good is true then all the 
framework of the Discursive Minimal State does is allow the rest of us, who are clearly in 
error because we are not believers or, more appropriately, recognisers, to discover it. The 
good here is discovered by voluntary steps, not revealed by involuntary ones, and the 
foundation of the public institutions that allow us to take these steps and prevent us from 
being frog-marched to a proper understanding of the Good does not rest upon the denial of the 
truth of any particular conception simply because it is agnostic about the veracity of all of 
them. In the eyes of the faithful what the Discursive Minimal State allows, then, is a sincere 
and rational path out of the darkness of infidelity for the unbeliever as much as it allows 
individuals to find their own way.
Again, what is important here is the ultimate foundation of the process. It is from this 
epistemological foundation - rather than from an assertion concerning the true good for man - 
that the Hayekian position is derived. It is because not every individual can know the good 
for man that the good requires an institutional framework that allows it to be discovered 
socially and that does not issue in favouritism between the competitors on the grounds of 
interpretative sincerity and rationality. Moreover, those espousing comprehensive doctrines 
would have an interest in the establishment of such a politics because they would know that 
hitherto lost souls would have been redeemed sincerely and rationally. Moreover, they would 
also be able to take comfort from the fact that this politics presupposes no covert 
comprehensive ethical doctrine because it is not ethical at all. Of course, whilst not indeed 
being founded upon a comprehensive moral doctrine - such as autonomy, or freedom, or
742 Gray, Hayek on Liberty, p. 42.
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equality - it does presuppose a comprehensive epistemological doctrine. Yet this should not 
concern us for the key issue here is not that the foundation be moral (as that would get us into 
all sorts of difficulties when theorising justice for plural societies) but, rather that it merely be 
comprehensive and, as such, applicable to all transculturally and transhistorically. Kymlicka 
makes a very similar point although his claim, problematically, is that one’s life goes no 
better if it is lead ‘from then outside’. The claim here, of course, is that it is not sincere or 
rational for one’s life to be lead from the outside.743 In this way, then, we may secure 
universal rights without violating the neutrality of the state. Unlike Kukathas’s account, then, 
the Discursive Minimal State does not ground those rights in an ethically controversial 
account of individual autonomy, which would diminish any prospect it had of resolving the 
problematic of justice for culturally plural societies.
6. Foundational Values and Diversity, Neutrality and Institutions
Of course, in opposition to the claim that the Discursive Minimal State is neutral between 
values and sincere about interpretative diversity one could claim that, similarly to the liberal 
egalitarian or difference democratic State, the Discursive Minimal State already assumes a 
single value around which its public institutions are justified and subsequently oriented. 
Thus, just as the liberal egalitarian State may assume autonomy, the Discursive Minimal 
State, like the difference democratic state, wantonly celebrates the value of diversity precisely 
because it endorses a disaggregated individualistic public decision-making process. What 
about those who, either because of indifference or hostility, do not value diversity? Why 
should they, (a working class English community from South or East London, for example), 
accept that their public institutions be modelled on the celebration of diversity and how could 
such a model be experienced as anything but onerous and invasive by them? Alternatively, 
but with a value monism no less subversive of the claim to interpretative sincerity, one may 
characterise the Discursive Minimal State as being premised upon the value of self-interest in 
which public institutions are geared towards the satisfaction of private, perhaps selfish, wants 
and desires. Rather than being representative of a fundamentally different mode of public 
decision-making, then, the Discursive Minimal State, like the liberal egalitarian or difference 
democrat State can be thought to enforce the requirements of a single ethical value at the 
levels of justification and institutional shape.
Yet, the foundation of the Discursive Minimal State and the individual interpretative 
rights it protects is not to be found within the province of ethical enquiry at all but, rather, is 
located within the Hayekian social epistemology and the amoral conception of the self that 
informs it. As such, the Discursive Minimal State can claim to be neutral between differing
743 On this see Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p. 12.
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conceptions of the good that are the subjects of our explicit and tacit deliberations in the 
public political discourse it sanctions for the simple reason that it is not justified in terms of 
any of them, nor do its constituent institutions reflect any subsequent public commitment to 
them. In this way, and unlike the difference democrat State, the Discursive Minimal State 
also affords those of us who do not value diversity, autonomy or narrow self-interest the 
opportunity to live lives that are meaningful on an equal public footing with those that do, in 
the knowledge that the public institutions that regulate our social interaction are not skewed in 
favour of one value rather than another. This, moreover, explains why the criterion of 
evaluation of the Discursive Minimal State is couched in terms of sincerity rather than 
diversity. In opposition to diversity, sincerity leaves open the possibility that more often than 
not, the unanimity of opinion that renders a public commitment to the celebration of diversity 
is rare. Within the context of the problematic of this thesis, then, the Discursive Minimal 
State is to be recommended because it answers a more profound question than the somewhat 
platitudinous and unreflective one of how public institutions best reflect the fact of diversity? 
Rather, it asks how our institutions may accommodate those who do and do not value 
diversity in a society that is nonetheless diverse.
Of course, we have already recognised that Barry’s liberal egalitarian response to the 
multicultural problematic is not vulnerable to this charge because it does not pretend to 
celebrate or institutionalise diversity or difference. As such, it cannot be said to fall short of a 
professed commitment to diversity. Yet, the serious issue of the controversy of autonomy as 
a foundational value for the public institutions of a diverse society notwithstanding, it seems 
that he makes the same error with regard to autonomy as the difference democrats do with 
respect to the value of diversity at the level o f institutions. For, even if  there were the 
requisite unanimity of opinion concerning, for example, the value of individual autonomy or 
diversity to adequately ground and justify a public commitment to a particular view of ethical 
life - and there is no reason why this assumption should be waved through in any case - that 
would still be no reason to invoke politics per se to answer the question of how either of these 
values is best satisfied in the daily lives of the members of the polity whose institutions these 
values govern. Thus, whilst being subject to the demands of a State that prioritises autonomy, 
the subjects of the liberal egalitarian State will not be afforded much institutional autonomy in 
determining what this requires of them in their daily lives. Similarly, whilst being subject to 
the demands of a State whose public institutions pretend to satisfy the requirements of 
diversity, the subjects of the difference democratic State will not enjoy diversity in 
determining what the ethical value of diversity actually requires of them in their daily lives.
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7. Conclusion
In this chapter we have offered a convincing response to common criticisms of the political 
theory of benign neglect. In doing so, we have seen that whilst the criticisms that benign 
neglect is incoherent and that it imposes intolerable burdens upon members of minority 
cultures may be reasonable complaints against liberal egalitarian varieties of liberalism, they 
are not with regard to classical liberal ones. However, we have claimed further that, of the 
classical liberal theories examined and defended here, it is the Discursive Minimal State that 
is able to proceed from a mere rebuttal of the critique to offer compelling arguments in favour 
of the politics that it endorses, arguments that, crucially, are couched in terms of the interests 
of the most marginal.
Moreover, we have responded in a broadly similar way to the related problems of 
subjectivism, segregation and the possibility of effective social criticism arguing that in both 
cases the criticisms concerned miss their intended target. Significantly, and again similarly to 
the charge of benign neglect, out of our defence has arisen an important difference between 
the Discursive Minimal State and the other minimalist liberalisms of the Politics of 
Indifference and the Liberal Metautopia. With regard to Shearmur’s Liberal Metautopia it 
seems that the Hayekian inspiration is unnecessarily weak and, at times, even violated. The 
postulation of a public forum where individuals and groups come together to explain and 
justify their practices to one another would seem in the first instance to fall short of the 
Hayekian, disaggregated discourse - Shearmur’s ‘surrogate dialogue’ - that is placed quite 
rightly at the heart of the Liberal Metautopia. However, more problematically, the defence of 
a public forum to serve this purpose would seem to be entirely contrary to the sprit of the 
Hayekian insights that lay at the foundation of Shearmur’s theory. In the case of Kukathas’s 
Politics of Indifference, it appears the main problem -  again lying behind the problem of 
relativism and the possibility of effective social criticism that we have discussed -  is the 
comprehensive ethical basis that the Politics of Indifference needs. Given that Kukathas’s is 
ultimately an ethical project of politics, without an appeal to the value of individual autonomy 
it would seem that the Politics of Indifference cannot offer an effective answer to these 
problems. Yet, this is precisely what Kukathas is precluded from doing because of his 
programmatic rejection of an appeal to controversial values upon which to found any politics 
designed to respond to the challenge of cultural diversity. In response to this, we have seen 
that the Discursive Minimal State needs no such basis as its foundation is an epistemological 
one.
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Conclusion
We started out by asking whether or not Hayek’s perspective is capable today of supplying an 
answer to the challenge that cultural diversity poses to the theory of justice. It is safe to say, 
conclusively, that it does. By commencing with an interpretative reading of Hayek’s social- 
theoretic, economic and political doctrines and by making explicit the conception of the self 
that informs them, we have seen that it is possible to offer a coherent account of cultural 
justice from Hayekian premises. We have achieved this by uncovering the interpretative 
assumptions behind the embedded conception of the Hayekian self which in turn enables the 
Hayekian perspective to straddle and indeed render largely irrelevant the apparent divide 
between the distributive and the cultural that has come to mark so much post=socialist 
discourse in the theory of justice. More specifically, we have clarified with reference to and 
further development of Hayek’s thought the unique epistemological burdens a recognition of 
our embedded, tradition-bound nature imposes upon us and what implications this recognition 
has for the nature of public institutions.
The broad argument of this thesis, then, can now be summed up. Despite the 
postsocialist cultural turn and the virtual disappearance o f the kind of centralised economic 
institutions that Hayek was always keen to reject, it remains possible to reconnect his thought 
to contemporary political theory and to both critically and normatively contribute to the 
debates about multicultural justice that are so central to it. What is most interesting about 
Hayek today are not the reasons why he defended liberalism but rather the conceptual tools 
that he deployed in defending liberalism. It is these conceptual tools that can be shown to 
have a relevance to contemporary concerns with cultural diversity that is methodologically, 
critically and normatively both clear and compelling.
In Part One we saw that, despite his apparently marginal status to debates about 
justice and difference, a specifically interpretative reading of Hayek’s social theory and of the 
conception of the self that underlies it, not only unlock the underlying assumptions inherent in 
the well-known economic arguments he did make, but also enables us to appeal to his thought 
anew with respect to the culture. Moreover, we also claimed that central to this reading of 
Hayek’s radical reformulation of the economic problem which we in turn transposed upon the 
basis of the universal nature of his Limited Knowledge Thesis is a reformulation of the 
cultural problem that is faced by society. In Chapter Two we built upon these arguments to 
address Hayek’s normative argument for individual economic liberty and ultimately to extend 
it to the realm of culture, via our modelling of a Hayekian argument for individual 
interpretative liberty as a response to the economic and cultural problems.
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In Part Two, I was concerned to examine, from this Hayekian perspective, the 
responses to diversity of a range of theorists. In Chapter Four, I will examine the response of 
the difference democrats who endorse a group-differentiated account of deliberative 
democratic decision-making and, in Chapter Five, of liberal egalitarian political theorists who 
both attempt and in a significant sense reject the reconciliation of cultural difference with the 
institutions of the contemporary welfare state. In both cases, we found these theories to be 
inadequate. In the case of the difference democrats this was due to the incoherent privileging 
of cultural diversity itself as a regulative ideal in politics when an important aspect of that 
diversity is the fact that many if not all groups in society do not wish to celebrate the 
difference of at least one of the other groups. At the level of institutions, moreover, we 
claimed that the difference democrat’s defence of a group-differentiated democratic discourse 
ultimately thwarts the aspiration to diversity they seek to uphold because it cannot make 
adequate use of the tacitly-held and culturally-differentiated knowledge at society’s disposal.
In the case of liberal egalitarianism we saw that despite their apparent differences 
both multicultural liberals such as Kymlicka and Raz as well as more traditional egalitarians 
such as Barry all ultimately subscribe to a cultural thesis concerning the good for man which, 
in the case of the former, undermines the commitment to diversity and, in the latter, the claim 
to neutrality. Lastly, both schools of thought ultimately conceive the task of justice as one of 
reflecting pregiven answers to society’s economic and cultural problems rather than 
defending institutions that enable society to discover what these answers may be by making 
adequate use of the knowledge of the embedded individuals who comprise it.
In response to this, in Part Three an account of cultural justice emergent from our 
prior engagements with and modifications of both Hayekian and contemporary political 
theory was offered and defended as on epistemological grounds the most sincere and rational 
response to the challenge cultural diversity poses the theory of justice. We did also note that 
this account does have some shortcomings and, as such, potential for development as a future 
research project. More specifically, this is the case with regard to the issue of abortion.
Nevertheless, what has been particularly original about this approach is the new 
interpretative reading of Hayek that it presupposes. No longer is Hayek to be read as a 
utilitarian or a purely instrumental or, if not this, a Kantian or Humean defender of liberal 
institutions - nor, indeed, as some hybrid amalgam of the latter two. Rather, he is to be 
viewed as an interpretative political theorist who, despite removing the task of the 
justification of public institutions from the realm of the ethical altogether, nonetheless derives 
distinctively liberal normative conclusions. Moreover, the very fact that decidedly liberal 
conclusions have been reached from an understanding of the self that is embedded in the most 
thoroughly communitarian sense should also serve as a unique achievement in its own right.
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It is an achievement that I hope reinforces the point that so much of the discussion between 
so-called ‘wholists’ and ‘atomists’ has been, at best, misplaced.
Thirdly, special mention should be made of the new disaggregated account of public 
discourse that our Hayekian variant of cultural justice has set out. What is of special interest 
here, of course, is that it continues in its own way the work of theorists such as Young and 
Fraser, despite the clear normative differences in the conclusions these and Hayek’s 
perspectives respectively endorse.
Of course, to leave off with the claim that there is a Hayekian account of justice under 
conditions of cultural diversity would be hardly adequate. What is of greater importance is 
the degree to which such an account is an adequate one. Ascertaining this depends upon its 
strengths relative to other candidate theories. I have claimed that in virtue of at least two 
criteria - rationality and sincerity - the Discursive Minimal State is preferable to difference 
democratic and liberal egalitarian accounts of multicultural justice, not least because it takes 
seriously the claims of those whose projects do not include the celebration of difference itself. 
Insofar as other classical liberal or libertarian theories are concerned, we have also seen that 
the Hayekian perspective defended here has distinct advantages, more specifically in terms of 
its Hayekian pedigree in comparison to Shearmur’s Liberal Metautopia and in terms of its 
internal consistency with respect to Kukathas’s Politics of Indifference.
In many ways however, and despite any advantages it may have, it is clear that in two 
important respects this thesis represents but a first step. As such, one of the achievements of 
this thesis has been to outline two ways in which Hayekian political theory may be carried 
forward as a research programme. In the first instance, it is plain that our Hayekian account 
of justice for culturally diverse societies has not dealt in any systematic or detailed way with 
another perspective upon the challenge of cultural diversity: that of the political, conservative 
Right. This is, I believe, a very important issue for the post-socialist era has witnessed in 
Western societies at least a rise in the popularity and political organisation of what we may 
call New Right Social Movements. Perhaps in response to the emergence of the New Social 
Movements of the Left, there have arisen, and continue to arise, all over the Western world 
political movements that address many of the same issues through the very appeals to identity 
(usually national or ethnic identity), the ‘ravages’ of globalisation and the destruction of 
cultural values that have in recent times been considered to be the preserve of the Old Left. 
Significantly, these Hard and Far Right groupings are often more effectively organised at both 
the Civic Social and party political levels then their counterparts on the Left to which, perhaps 
complacently, the majority of attention has been given in academia. From the Christian 
Coalition, the Buchananite ‘Cultural Warriors’ and the multiracial supporters of California’s 
Proposition 187 denying all but essential public services to illegal immigrants in the United 
States, to the emergence of Hard and Far Right movements and political parties in Continental
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Europe, North America and Australasia, the New Social Movements of the Right may in fact 
prove to present a far more serious challenge to the political establishment than those of the 
Left whose concern seems to have been one more of reform than replacement.744 Indeed, 
whilst in countries such as France, Switzerland, Australia and Denmark, such parties have had 
a significant impact in the electorate or in policy formation. In others such as Austria, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Italy they have actually achieved government. Most interestingly, 
perhaps, the multicultural problematic is opening up all sorts of totally unexpected fissures in 
political engagement. The meteoric rise of the openly gay but multiculturally-sceptical Pirn 
Fortuyn in the Netherlands was perhaps just the first of many such figures that will emerge to 
destabilise in a most fundamental way received notions of identity and toleration. Moreover, 
what the atrocities of September the 11th 2001 and the Federal Election in Australia that took 
place two months later suggest is that it would only take one minor or major event to tip the 
balance of popular rather than fringe opinion still further in the Cultural Right’s favour. This 
thesis, then, is as much a beginning as it is a definitive answer to the question of justice and 
cultural diversity and should be considered as but a first step until these concerns are 
addressed in a systematic way.
Ultimately, however, there must remain an important question concerning the 
epistemological, amoral nature of the defence of the Discursive Minimal State. Granted that 
such a defence appears prima facie to hold out the prospect of persuading a diversity of 
interests as to its benefits precisely because of its amoral and, therefore, unavoidably 
neutralist foundation, it would seem at least on these terms to be quite an attractive theory. It 
would, indeed, be hard to fault the Discursive Minimal State in terms of a failure of neutrality 
in the management of public discourse between competing conceptions of the good for the 
simple reason that the ethical reasoning upon which such discourse is founded is not a part of 
its justificatory procedure. Yet, in an important respect this is a two-edged sword for it may 
well just as easily be the case that the arguments here persuade nobody at all, precisely 
because they are devoid of any moral and hence motivational content at the level of public 
justification. The Hayekian State, as much as the state Hayek conceived of, ultimately 
appeals to our reason and not to our attachments, to the fact o f our embeddedness and not to 
what our embeddedness demands of us and demands we demand of others. Whether this will 
be seen as persuasive to those caught up in the midst of their deep and indeed often tacitly- 
held beliefs is another matter. It promises also to be a further extension of the Hayekian 
research project.
Despite the postsocialist cultural turn and the virtual disappearance of the kind of 
centralised economic institutions that Hayek was always keen to reject, there is, after all, a
744 On this see Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond', Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 277
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way to reconnect his thought to contemporary political theory and to both critically and 
normatively contribute to the debates about multicultural justice that are so central to it. For 
what is most interesting about Hayek today are not the reasons why he defended liberalism - 
the debates from which they sprung are, for the most part, irrelevant today both to political 
theory and to political practice - but rather the conceptual tools that he deployed in defending 
liberalism. It is these conceptual tools that can be shown to have a relevance to contemporary 
concerns with cultural diversity that is methodologically, critically and normatively both clear 
and compelling.
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